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ABSTRACT
An attempt is made to identify a principle underlying the increasing 
complexity of the early and middle dialogues of Plato without postulating a 
secret doctrine or straining the text. Socratic argument is argument from 
a position, and this reserved position isuoften the key to the vicissitudes 
of the argument.V et he is prevented from expressing this position because there 
is no generally recognized contemporary framework of philosophical discussion 
by means of which he can make his argument independent of the reaction of 
his interlocutors. Thus the whole dialect /.cal situation is part and parcel 
of the proof. The whole dialect: ical situation was analysed by Plato in the 
effort to generalise the application of the proof, to produce a doctrine 
of character - of the man on whom dialect: ic work^^ a doctrine of hypothesis 
in which dialectiic is interpreted to professor^of other disciplines in a 
competition for attention traditional between the disciplines/ a doctrine 
of memory and recollection, based on analysis of the role played by memory 
in guaranteeing the truth content of a conversation; and a doctrine of mind 
and perception which is dialect; ic.. internalized and transposed to a mental 
sphere. The fundamental character of Platonic proof is reported dialectic, 
and in the dialectic reported, at least at the beginning, natural forces work 
to produce the desired result. The evidence for a formalized dialect ic 
dependent on, or independent of or even pre-dating Plato is not sufficient to 
produce conviction. The ghost of Socrates must always be supplied to the 
dialectical machine.
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tINTRODUCTION
Platonic scholarship seems to divide along two axes. The poles of 
one axis are Development and Unity; the poles of the second axis are 
Drama and Philosophy. Most scholars with a historical bias have chosen 
Development and Drama; whereas philosophers would prefer to opt for 
Unity and Philosophy. But in the case of a philosopher who lived as long 
as Plato, and who had so much groundwork to lay before it became possible 
for him to philosophise at all, developmental studies may have their own 
use. Such studies might emphasise how each stage of Plato’s thought 
developed out of the previous stage. The later stage no doubt would not 
have developed without some external stimulus; but as each stage seems to 
become some sort of system for solving problems on many fronts, a study 
which is more than merely chronological or merely descriptive can be made 
of the relation between each stage.
The historians’ temptation is to assume a line of ^ OkKLkagprogress, 
starting in Plato’s case either from near nothing, or from something of 
which near nothing is known. He takes the dialogues as his main evidence, 
and announces that the early groups are dramas, since they look like dramas, 
and Plato could not have known at that date he was writing philosophy 
(Wilamowitz). But the only reason alleged for writing such dramas is the 
relief from mental conflicts; unless of course it was to perpetuate the 
memory of Socrates (Burnet and Taylor). But this does not explain why the 
’Socrates’ perpetuated varies from work to work; nor, if the point is simply 
to perpetuate Socrates’ "message", why this message is presented in such 
a tantalising way that all we get is really some sort of method - dialectic.
Perhaps the most usual solution is to assume that the dramatii^ motive 
is dominant in Plato’s youth, and the philosophical is dominant in the later 
dialogues, though neither pole is absent at any stage. This solution makes
the question of development overtime crucial. So we have the Plato who
betrayed his master (Popper), the Plato who re-turned his attention to the 
physical world (Stenzel), the Plato who became another Eleatic (Grote)...
Some suggest that this development is due to developments contemporary with 
Plato (Chroust); but this loses our problem, which is about forms of 
argument presented in the dialogues. It is possible Plato got these forms 
of argument from outside sources - Megara (Burnet) mathematic|C%|V$ (recently 
Brown), but there is not much evidence for radical discontinuity. Many later 
doctrines are transparently developments of earlier beliefs and commonplaces, 
and one is left with the impression that Plato read himself with more 
attention than he read anyone else, except for a few short passages of 
Heraclitus, Protagoras, Zeno and a longer passage of Parmenides.
But at this point opinion again dividesJAre Plato’s philosophical 
interests best regarded as method (e.g. Goldschmidt) or as metaphysical 
(e.g. Kramer)? Each school is obliged to find the philosophy behind the 
dialogues, either by revealing a "structure of the dialogue as a written 
work", or by revealing the existence of unwritten doctrines, to be wrested 
from the indirect tradition (Gadamer, Gaiser, Kramer). The principles of 
the two schools can be combined by working out the lelations between the 
doctrine (in so far as there was any doctrine) and the method (in so far 
as there was any method). Most conspicuously this happens in the area of 
the theory of Forms. The theory is not argued for in the dialogues, but 
nevertheless seems to arise naturally out of dialectic. The earliest forms 
are the objects par excellence of Socratic discussions sealed (Crombie,
Ryle); and their special ontological status - their separation from particulars 
- may be a consequence of affirmations made in dialectic about the sort of 
entity Socrates is talking of, that good is good and bad is bad (Allen,
Detel, Owen ct.Vlastos 1972). The object of the present study is to transfer 
this sort of analysis to ether doctrines.
But though it is clear that method and metaphysics are connected, it
is not always clear what the method is. Some use logical analysis on the 
dialogues and find them adequate (Detel, Sprague) or inadequate (Robinson, 
Bochenski). Some claim Plato elaborates a conscious logic (Stahl) or at 
least has a grasp of fallacy (Sprague, Peck). Others assume that Plato 
can think; but find historically suitable methods for him in Zeno (Lee, ) 
or in widespread eristical practices of a specialised kind (Ryle, Moreau).
The question of Plato’s "logical status" depends in part on his aims in the 
dialogue. Interpret _ers can undervalue the extent to which dialectic was 
a conversation^in which a deliberately informal vocabulary was used. This 
is the element Socrates claimed distinguished him from his contemporaries, 
and it is this element we shall analyse. What Socrates’ own techniques were 
we cannot be certain of; but for the purposes of this investigation, it will 
be assumed with some supporting evidence that Plato analyses and refines on 
#be analysis of Socratic techniques. From the investigation of anamnesis and 
hypothesis it is hoped that information will be forthcoming about what the 
method was, though this does not imply that it was originally an elaborated 
method.
Plato’s questions about Socratic techniques break into two:
1) why was Socrates successful at all?
2) why was he not more successful?
Nowhere does he ask in our texts at any rate the different, more properly
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epistemological questions!
3) was Socrates ever successful? was he right? why was he right?
Questions 1) and 2) are factual, answered by analysing in detail the
idealised Socratic conversations. Now Socrates did not talk blind; and 
it is on some sot of conscious method that Plato concentrates. Prof.Ryle 
has described this method as "concatenations of question and answer", 
blocks that could be memorised, and moves in games, but does
not admit to what extent such chains were an attempt to express rules of 
inference. And chains are only what the method looks like from the outside.
aThe method went with strong beliefs about the nature of the world, with 
pedagogic intentions and with polemic, which were as much pact of the 
method as the technique of question an«| answer and eristic.
But Prof.Ryle’s characterisation introduces the notion of an order 
in the successive questions which itself plays a role in the proof, and 
which can be taken into account in the analysis of successive admissions. 
Second, he helps towards an answer for question 2). For this method had 
no general application. It can be seen almost complete in the cross- 
examination of Meletus in the Apology 24c - 28. The elements present 
are the insistence on a certain sort of direct answer,^  procedure by 
questions where the argument depend s in fact on more complex warrants 
(like assumptions about the nature of techne^), dilemmas^ and aporias^, 
the deduction of consequences of varying quality from the opponents 
position^ and from one’s own^, fixed beliefs felt to have fixed implications^
g
(what we later call hypotheses), and exactly the sort of character analysis
* ,
and polemic described in Chapter I for the Gorgias, Protagoras and 
"Thrasymachus". The weakness of the method is obvious: it applies only to
9Meletus and is not even successful in perslyndîng the audience because what
most people would consider some essentials of a generalised proof have been
left out. The method, in fact, seems to be a method of some sort of '
inference rather than of demonstration. Why should a man reply to such and
such a question? and in what way are his replies determined or law like? In
the Apology the answer is easy - the law bids it.^^ But the problem is
11 .still there; for Aristotle and underlies most of the dialogues.
This brings Plato face to face with the problem of what a valid conse­
quence is; and how to distinguish a valid consequence from ^’4L *
It is in this area that the reason for the introduction of the notion of
1. 24 e; 27 b 4. 2. 25 b. 3. 26.
4. 25 d; 27 b. 5. 27 a 6 ff. 6. 25 d 8 ff.
7. 26 a. 8. 26 e 6 ff. 9. 26 b
10. 25 d 2,3. 11.
■s
hypothesis must be looked for. For absurd consequences arerjjirst and 
easiest consequences to think of. They have their uses in developing 
a science of argument; but they must be neutralised before acceptable 
inferences, or before an acceptable meaning^can be given to a statement 
of opinion. Hence Socrates’ preoccupation with w{\JÙLt a man means ; which 
brings his attention to the mind - the private place from which the 
statements come.
When Socrates gives something like a cosmic argument in the Phaedo,
12 .most of the argument happens privately in his mind. The only way we 
can learn about it is biographically. The biography itself is given 
in the shape of a thinly disguised elenchus. We are equally removed from 
a historical and a philosophical analysis. Anaxagoras’ Mind-principle 
for example is probably very much a Tf in Anaxagoras’ system
13and the analysis Socrates brings to it depends on his beliefs about himself. 
The main argument for Socrates’ programme is Socrates himself and this 
state of affairs is not due to Plato’s piety, but to the non-existence of 
any suitable method of demonstration. Accordingly Socrates does not argue 
for the theory of ideas - he does the next best thing and tells you how to 
defend or elaborate it correctly in conversation, that is, how to make your 
correct meaning clear. The implication seems to be that one’s meaning is 
generally right, though one’s words may not be. So too certain beliefs 
make genuine argument possible, because they are beliefs not only about 
conduct and the world, but also about the conduct of argument which is the 
world in miniature.
It follows, then, that in answer to question 2) Plato is led to 
consider the problems of generalising the argument. But this involves 
generalisation both at the level of state-policy and at the level of more 
rigorous demonstration. For the fulfilment of the purpose of argument
12. Phaedo 100a.
13. 98 e.
idepends on the existence of good menCL»^
Plato started with the relatively narrow resources of the conver­
sationalist and the controversialist. In the following chapters an 
attempt is made to trace the effect of this origin on some early doctrines 
and arguments, which owe their existence, it is suggested,to repeated 
analyses of idealised Socratic conversations, with the conversation element 
a strong second to the method element. In his strict handling of the method 
element (question and answer) Plato serves to illustrate the rule that 
the instincts of a philosopher fix on the most tendentious outrageous 
elements of a system and refine them. The analysis of dialectic and mind 
shows the effect of the further incursion of dialectical methods into a 
specialised area, where the methods impose their own structure. In the 
Theaetetus the claim of the individual mind to be a source of knowledge 
is examined and apparently rejected in what is in effect the generalisation 
of aporia. Dialectical techniques continue to under 1(42 the argument in the 
Theaetetus (and though the dialogues are not examined, the Sophist and 
Philebus); and they stand in for Plato*s"logic".
Now valid thinking can hardly have a history: but expressed methods 
of thinking can have such a history if their quirks and asymmetries are 
taken seriously. Robinson has pointed out how far short Plato falls of 
developing an adequate logic, but he does not analyse Plato’s method, 
however inadequate, for its own sake. In the following chapters it will be 
argued that Plato tries to generalise his method by making it more automatic 
and more doctrinal.
Doctrine has the advantage over dialectic that it can be taught; and 
the new methods are geared to producing results of some kind. In the 
Parmenides it is the systemati(^ exploration of concepts; and the arguments 
involving the theory of Forms start at a greater level of generality than 
anywhere else in the dialogues. Diaeresis produces stateable results, 
and effects a classification that will always provide slots by which one 
can tell one real thing from another, or the genuine from the bogus.
[0
Anamnesis and hypothesis produced no immediate results (except pious hopes) 
because they were essentially directed towards analysis of what was already 
happening in ’dialectic*.
An attempt is also made to fix doctrines in the context of contemporary 
Greek theories. When Socrates says he does not know,^t is suggested that^
his statement is significant ^ o rth e time only if it means that Socrates
y
13 . .cannot teach. Starting from this level, we reach a different sort of
appreciation of the dialogues than if we haj assumed Socrates is saying
something directly about modern epistemological questions (though his
difficulties may be none the worse for being pre-Cartesian). Contemporary
trends emphasised the teachability of anything, or the wissenschaftlich status
of all practical arts. But Socrates claims læ can only cooperate with, and
not control, forces that will lead eventually to a good end for a good man;
and one cannot be a good man unless one cooperates with them. At a pinch
one might say that Protagoras and the others were magician-teachers; but
Socrates had the "scientific" hope merely of cooperating with a universe
he hardly understood. The counterpart of his "ignorance" is the aporia
of his followers. When this aporia is generalised in the ’Theaetetus’, the
way is open for the generalised discussion of what the world is really like
by means of statements, words and concepts. It is not claimed, however, that
this is a chronological development.
CHAPTER I. DIALECTIC AND CHARACTER
Socrates' irony is notorious, but our evidence for it rests on Plato's
testimony alone. The fragments of Aeschines S^raticus are too short to
provide a satisfactory confirmation to the statement of Demetrius that both
Polycrates and Aeschines Socraticus are * w . We are
usually told too that Xenophon is not ironical. For these reasons some
scholars have tried to transfer the glory, or approbrium, of being ironical
2
from Socrates to Plato . Against this Professor Guthrie has pointed out
that Charicles^Hippias, two Xenophontic characters, accuse Socrates of asking
3questions to which he knows the answers . But neither episode looks purely 
Xenophontic. Burnet, too, noticed that irony was probably one of the charges 
laid against the historical Socrates by his enemies^. We shall argue that 
the term is opprobrious, %hough its full meaning cannot be fixed before 
Plato, where its meaning is ascertainable, the term justly applies to the 
Platonic and probably the historical Socrates. Plato retorts the insult on 
the Sophists. In his final usage, the word is used for the diagnosis of a 
"hopeless case", but enough of the earlier meaning is left to produce an 
observable tension in Aristotle's usage, which in any case diverges from the 
popular usage of his day shown in passages of Demosthenes. The "good irony" 
far from disappearing in the later Plato, is ramified into the doctrine of 
or play.
1. Because of the technicality of the use: 120, 291.
2. Gulley 1952, Ethical Analysis in Plato's Earlier Dialogues. CQ 1952 
74-82; Burge E.L.Antichthon 1969, pp. 5-17 Bfprge's list of ironical 
passages in Xenophon (p.7 n.8) fails.
3. Guthrie III ii 126; Mem. 1.2.36; 4.4.9.
4. Phaedo 1911 p.lvf.n.5. But Burnet's interpretation of irony is 
'failure to commit oneself to a doctrine'(see ad 63c) which is not 
our interpretation.
Attempts to fix the meaning of 'eiron' from etymology and Aristophanes
have failed. Little recommends Schwyzer's derivation eiron ist einer,
der immer sagt ' f k  (X 137)^.
Three Aristophanes’ loci have been interpreted in as many ways. Ribbeck^
takes the root-meaning in those passages to be Nichtwissen and at Birds
,'6 . 7
1210-11 practically takes to mean 'act like Socrates'. Stark objects that 
R. cannot claim both that the word is a "volkstumliche Ausdruck" (because of 
its company (Clouds 449) and that it refers specifically to Nichtwissen. He 
substitutes Schwyzer's derivation and claims the word means Heuchlerei.
(Stark is fortunate in having a word that can mean hypocrisy, active deceit, 
swindllify^ , false pretences, disingenuous relations without further periphrasis) 
Sta^ is right that Nichtwissen cannot fit Clouds 449f without more evidence 
that the statement of a scholiast. Stark accepts Ribbecff's version of 
Birds 1210. Iris ’ A
Here irony does refer to Socrates, for according to Stark, Socrates
has changed his spots since the Clouds! But irony can refer to several
elements ^fraction in the refusal to answer, the alleged innocence 
ei*(xO
sheer cunning reply. Stark quotes with approval a characterisation of Iris 
as "indignabunda et tamen ridens nam egregie absurda ei videntwr quaecumque
g
audivit" . This, he claims, rules out the alternative explanation of irony 
given by Buchner^, viz, that eironeia means Kleintuerei, Faulheit. But the 
pOint of the Birds scene is that Pisthetairos misinterprets Iris' action. 
Whatever Iris' speeches may suggest, Pisthetairos seems to think he is faced 
with a coy maiden (1217 0"< ; 122 Roger's note; 1261). One cannot argue
from the scene that 'irony' can cover openly aggressive behaviour against the 
unanimous later evidence. It seems best to discuss the Wasps passage as if 
it had no connection with Socrates and take our cue from that: Philocleon
5. I p.487 n.9
6. Rheinische Museum 1876 p.381 ff.
7. Rh.Mus. 1953 pp.77-89 Sokratilhes inder Vogeln des Aristophc&f^ Ç^ ,
8. ^.^0 k.
9. Hemes 1941 p. 339-58.
Bis trying to escape his son's guard and attend the courts again. He 
claims that he wants to go outdoors to sell the ass because he will get 
a better price for it than his son will.
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Here the word can refer either to his ability to make false allegations
(prophasis is a technical term) according to the rules of rhetoric, or
to his manner of delivery or both. It is unwise to separate them. This
instance of irony has an important element in common with the Birds
passage - in both, the speaker gives the impression of innocence and,
anticipating our inquiry a little, we may add that^he speaks humbly and
gently to escape detection. For Buchner's Kleintuerei is right to the
extent that the eiron avoids open self assertion. The most we can say
is that the eiron uses what look like defensive stratagems. However,
the pre-Platonic evidence is insufficient to establish any meaning, and
our purpose so far has been to show that no pre-Platonic evidence is
11contrary to our later interpretations .
Irony in the dialogues is closely connected with the concept of
paizein. In fact, paizein helps to make eironeia objectionable. The
sort of reaction that levity can arouse in an earnest Greek breast is
12shown in Herodotus' story of Darius and the Scythians . The Scythians 
started and pursued a hare, when they had been drawn up in military 
formation. Darius thinks this behaviour is a token of disrespect. 
Cobryas agrees - he knew it by report and now he has come he has seen 
the instability for himself. Paraphrasing Darius he says:
They agree that the Scythians are unreliable allies. This passage 
gives some inkling of^paizein had tiijn to insult. Herodotus also
10. Hall and Geldart, O.T. their comma is not strictly necessary.
11. This is also the procedure of L.Bergson, Eiron and Eironeia Hermes
1971 pp.409-22.
12. IV 134, 19;24.
It
uses paizein in a context very close to Socrates. He meets the treasurer 
of the temple of Athena in Sais, who tells Herodotus that he knows the 
source of the Nile. No one else boasted or claimed ) bo
know. Herodotus says: ^   ^ ^
àbcoÇ 5 -^efMW é- <^ U é^Ve>^
' * •
Examples abound in the Platonic dialogues^^ and comes to
replace "irony" at the end. But paidia is not sufficient r r 
in itself as a meaning for eironeia^^.
The surest thing about irony is that it is a charge made against 
Socrates by his enemies. It is unlikely that Plato had nothing in history 
to explain away when he talked about irony, which is a quality he attributes 
directly to Socrates and the Socratic life. It is not surprising that our 
instances of the word used by Socrates or by a friend of Socrates come from 
two defence speeches - the Apology, in which Socrates faces his judges, and 
in "Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium, in which Socrates is cleared of 
certain imputations. As has been seen^^, the meaning of the word eironeia 
alters, but we suggest it alters under pressure of Plato's propaganda.
The only explicit reference to irony in the Apology is at 38. I 
cannot promise not to pursue my calling, says Socrates, because such a 
promise would be disobedience to the God. But you will not believe me, 
because you think I am being ironical. This word can refer either to the 
excuse just offered for what seems to be aggressive behaviour, or to the 
whole manner of Socrates' life. Outside this context the word does not 
seem to apply to the allegation of pious excuses - the God is not as 
relevant to Socrates meaning as the suspicion in the minds of the audience 
that Socrates' excuse is not a sufficient motive for his conduct. He 
claims that he acts peaceably and humbly: but he reaps the consequences 
of overwhelming pride and aggression - exile. The motive for his humility
13. II 28.
14. Euthyd. 277c9; GorgiQs 499c etc.
15. Ct.Bergson op.cit. p.418.
16. Stark op.cit. p.82.
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must be disreputable or aggressive. But you believe me neither when I 
tell you this, says Socrates, nor when I tell you that my "clever" talk 
is the greatest blessing I could aim at. The implication is that Socrates 
has to produce a self-interested motive for his actions, because they are 
not really the actions of a quiet man. Admitting the charges of your 
enemies, or at least forestalling their reactions, and offering them an alter­
native to that predictable reaction is very much an orator's trick Socrates 
protests like Elizabeth that they "would have him answer answerless"; and 
the weapon they use to deprive him of his answer is the charge of irony.
It follows from this earliest Ratonic passage, that irony has nothing to 
do with Nichtwissen. For one does not tell an Athenian court: you think 
I am pretending not to know my own motives, but I protest I am in a quandary ... 
about them. The court is not interested in one's ignorance but in one's 
motives and one's strategies.
It seems likely from 38 that the charge was a standing charge against 
Socrates; and there is an unsignalised example of irony in the speech 20 
of 4-6:  ^ ^  ^
Again he is combatting the charge: if you are so innocent, how do you 
come to have this reputation. The point is that Socrates' notorious 
knowledge, or cleverness, rests on his knowledge of his own ignorance.
But people attribute to him knowledge of the subject of his cross- 
examination (23a 3-5). He is concealing something in order to make a 
sport of his interlocutors. If, as I suggest, this passage is a reference 
to irony, then irony is a matter of manner and motives and the concealment 
of motives and Plato's claim is that Socrates' ironical behaviour is not 
really ironical because it is truthful.
llo
The only two openly favourable uses of the word in Plato are at 
Symposium 216E; 218D. Plato is again at grips with his master's 
reputation - his relations with Alcibiades. On the outside, says 
Alcibiades, Socrates looks like Silenus. Nor does he seem to care 
about not having the things that make life worth living for those of 
us who do not look like Silenus. He affects to treasure physical 
beauty, but really despises it. But in those matters about which he 
is really serious, you can see his own true beauty. Socrates' behaviour
to beautiful boys is sheer irony: ^
CCV ^ lO v  21^ /16-f
Now irony here means two things (a) Socrates dissembles in his praise: 
his irony covers contempt. (b) Socrates really despises what people 
are praised for. The two points are independent and only the first 
seems to have any connexion with the cunning innocence we have learned 
to expect from the eiron. Socrates' brand of "irony", then, included 
the praise of beautiful boys - but in such a way as to deflate the
beautiful boys. Plato claims that Socrates really did despise the cheap
sorts of beauty and his damning them with faint praise was a truthful 
reflection of his own beliefs rather than the scheming of the 
or his pleasure in the discomfiture of others. Irony has overflowed 
into lifestyle - dress, for example. It connects Socrates with 
Antisthenes. The correct text for explanation is the otherwise difficult 
passage in which Aristotle says that the adoption of Spartan dress can 
be beastful (alazoneia) - the opposite of the eiron^^. The implication 
of the context is that wearing spartan dress is a mark of (Socratic) 
eironeia. Yet it is eironeia only in the rather extended sense that in 
which we meet with it here, and which^ as will be clearer later, Plato 
developed in surprising directions in his defence of Socrates. We shall 
deal later with Aristotle's notion of irony; it is sufficient here to 
note that in respect of the Spartan cloak he elaborates on a concept of
17. Arist. Nic Eth. 1127b22.
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irony that seems to owe its existence to the struggle to apologise for 
Socrates.
The next use of eironeia is more traditional. At 218d Alcibiades 
uses fijf\e words and moral pretexts to seduce his master. Socrates 
listens ironically and remains master of himself and speaks in an 
unaltered tone, in his usual manner :
K A  % AvToo T3-
The listening, not the speaking is ironical, but it was all part of the 
same act, because Socrates replies with a mixture of pride and humility 
which might be taken for an illustration of the Aristotelian text
^  6r?Ç)o>V&i-^
He replies: "Maybe you are serious I); but you see an
impossible beauty in me beyond what I see in you. Any exchange of beauty 
then will be to my disadvantage. But look closer lest I should not be 
worth it." In his effort to be ironical he almost contradicts himself.
The later prejudice in favour of irony is explicable only from the 
Symposium, since the other references in Plato are hostile and much more 
restricted in scope. We cannot say definitively that the Symposium 
niceties were added to the concept of irony by Socrates or Plato, but 
the remaining uses of term in Plato make it likely that it was.
We begin with the contexts where the word is used of the enemies 
of Socrates.
At Euthydemus 302B, Dionysiodorus, asophist, is about to introduce 
the homologia which will destroy all earlier homologiai. The new premise 
is of incredibly indirect relevance: Do you have an ancestral Zet|s? But
it is prefaced by ironical behaviour ( Cl^\/’o
H^ érV'O^  ^ ) Socrates notices that irony is a 
danger signal. He refuses out of mere suspicion to give his assent to it, 
even though he is not sure he understands it. Jowett translated "after 
an artistic pause".
18. Arist. Rhet. 1379b.31.
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At Amatores 133D the word occurs in a scene of rumbustious satire. 
Unfortunately the Amatores is probably later than comparable dialogues 
of Plato's oeuvre, and the use of irony is highly developed and closely 
connected with sophistry. A "sophisticated" debater makes use of an 
ironical stratagem. But the words seem to mean little more than 
"sophisticated" "dishonest". It shows what irony became, not what it 
was. The debater claims to be wiser than he is (132D) and so he is 
fair game for Socrates. But the first thing the fellow does is to 
complicate the progress of dialectic: /^ oU érSy\
This is tantamount to answering "both and neither" which we shall see 
in a later chapter was a well-known 'move' in dialectic. Ironical here 
need mean no more than sophistical; and the sophistical trick is a 
technical one. Because of this the most important function of this 
passage for our purpose is to reveal the completeness of Plato's victory 
in the matter of irony - there is a bad irony but it is the sophist, not 
Socrate^ who practises it. Yet the characteristics of the ironical 
answer in the Amatores do not square with the behaviour that the Sophists 
designate as ironical in Socrates.
19The same goes for a passage in the Cratylus . Cratylus has just 
told Hermogenes that his name is not really Hermogenes - a very oracular 
utterance which is referred to later as manteia. Hermogenes describes 
the incident as follows: !TpO U jué{/aO  6<SZyjL{ VToZe'
- behaviour which reminds me of the behaviour connected by Heracleitus
in the Delphic Oracle: C Xb
s P u T e  KpoCTTé-f . 20^
19: 384Â
20. Dk B.93.
Elsewhere Plato does complain of the difficulty in getting Neo Heracliteans
to answer questions, and presumably he is referring to the same difficulty
21here. Hermogenes (like Alcibiades elsewhere ) has been practising on 
Cratylus a method of dialectic learned from Socrates. As far as Hermogenes 
is concerned, the dialectic has gone through the proper forms. But 
Cratylus breaks the rules by refusing either to admit a valid generalisation, 
or show why it is invalid. By this refusal Cratylus saves himself from the 
elenchus of his statement that Hermogenes name is unnatural. He refuses to 
give any sign of his meaning: silence as so often is an ironical weapon.
There is an assumption of superiority Cj ^ , and
this is mirrored in the reaction of the interlocutor. He thinks that 
Cratylus is keeping back something, claiming to know something but refusing 
to make it public. Socrates helps to heal the wound by interpreting the 
remark as a jest - the beginnings of an instructive
Now there is no reason to suppose that this behaviour is typical of 
Sophists. Refusing to explain themselves is a characteristic not of Sophists 
but of Sophists confronted with Socrates. Nor is it a characteristic of 
charlatan priests for whom the traditional word is alazones. The sort of 
behaviour described as "ironical" is I believe specific to dialectic. One 
cannot assume a meaning for irony close to "Tartufferei" because
this is insufficient to account for the extraordinary weight put on the 
word at the end of Plato's life. He tells us there are two brands of 
atheist. The first sort speaks what he thinks freely, making jokes of 
the ^ ods and encouraging others to make jokes of them if he is not stopped.
The second sort is outwardly pious, but inwardly guileful and treacherous.
The first sort is to be punished with imprisonment, admonition, improving 
discourse, but hanging is too good for the second sort (^^
). I find it incredible that Plato should make 
this distinction on grounds of "sincerity". Ideas of the moral wor|j^  of
21. Xen.Mem,. I(ii),
lô
sincerity are anachronistic. Something more relevant must be at the heart 
of the distinction, and I suggest the notion of incurability. But 
insincerity does not make a condition incurable. I suggest that the 
ironical man is defined by his behaviour in dialectic, and that what makes 
him incurable is that he cannot respond to purgative therapy of dialectic 
- specifically, he cannot admit aporia.
The suspicion that Plato is using irony in a technical sense is deepened 
after consideration of Sophist 268: "There is the simple-minded type of 
Sophist who imagines that what he believes is knowledge, and an opposite 
type who is versed in discussion, so that his attitude )
betrays no little misgiving and suspicion that the knowledge he has the air 
of possessing in the eyes of the world is really ignorance" (Cornford). The 
à and the are contrasted already in the Sophist and
used again in the Laws. No explanation is given about why the additional 
classification into 'frank' and 'ironical' is necessary, but this is in 
keeping with the manner of this part of the 'Sophist'. A glance at the 
Summary 268C 8ff will reveal a string of typically Platonic concepts with 
important philosophical reverberations, none of which has been explained 
in the Sophist but which nevertheless read like the summary of a very 
much ramified theory: "The art of contradiction-making, descended from an 
insincere kind of conceited ( S'o ) mimicry, of the semblance-
making breed { ), derived from image-making i
distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that 
prevents a shadow play of words ( u? )" (Cornford). The
Greek, as the above shows, is untranslatable precisely because of these 
reverberations. Irony, as the 'Sophist' shows is a working element in 
Plato's analyses, though it is no where made quite clear what the root 
model is: we have to reconstruct.
The opposite of irony is bragging, pretension, alazoneia. The 
opposition is explicit in Aristotle, and the two words are found together
2l
at Aristophanes Clouds 449. It is traditionally associated with false
professional pretensions and the vagrant priesthood. By derivation, it
probably means a wanderer, a travelling beggar. In De Morbo Sacro capii
we see them included in a list resembling our list in the Laws, but where
we should expect 'irony' the De Morbo Sacro gives us alazoneia - showing
how unlikely it is that in the Laws Plato is just using irony as a word
traditionally associated with deceitful priestcraft:
5 %  ô t  CTpCdToc XJoXCo V i/crT jfU d C&pcoâ^v'Vé^
Xo l o V T o o i ô i KcîV p /id ^ o ( (V fcA
&i£ro ^6r^ prt ( /^ i  K .^  f *
n
U
The word occurs in a similar context at Charmides 173c.
... «7(1 ci^i^âT/' z â i
/Ca‘ ÛZO ^ pûû~l/{/^ i^ x^  ^ %-Zr?ZouzRy
Xou^ jPirV’ “cHZà
Alazoneia might have been the more natural word to use of Sophists 
and charlatans - but Plato uses irony. Irony is associated with mean 
and ostensibly peaceable behaviour. It deprecates anger. It suits 
Socrates. But if we consider a few dialogues in which the charge is made 
against him by his enemies, we shall see how it is turned back on his 
interlocutors. Socrates behaviour looks ironical but is not ironical.
The enemy's behaviour looks unironical, frankly aggressive, but it is really 
ironical. Once the point is established Plato is free to use 'irony' later 
in the oeuvre in a transvalue^-: sense.
The locus classicus for irony is Republic I 337A. Here the bad 
tempered Thrasymachus accuses the good tempered Socrates of using his 
"customary irony". Thrasymachus has already accused Socrates of sticking
22.
to asking questions because it is easier to ask questions than to answer 
them and because Socrates uses his questions for his own aggrandisement 
( ^ e > ( / • His tone is fierce, his interruption
sudden, S o c r a t e s G a t h e r i n g  his wits together as best he may, 
Socrates says his failure to find wisdom is involuntary, and that mere 
courtesies would not stand in his way for he is a spoudazon. This is 
one strand in the charge - Socrates is not serious. But his way of 
not being serious is to deprecate himself: u
e o r f «  [tô o  t>ïr^ Jyi-wr ^
Irony is something Socrates sinks to in order not to answer. Protesta-
tions of Nichtwissen meet with no credence. Socrates 337a 8)
and hopes to get away with a lesson from Thrasymachus without paying for
it. This Thrasymachus thinks is a very suspicious sort of naivete.
The others pay and Socrates says please very nicely (338). 337d
(Cp ). Thrasymachus enters the discussion, like Protagoras, for reasons
22
of self-glorification : this is the first point in which his accusation
of Socrates turns out to be true of himself. Socrates first attempt at
clarification is taken as malice (338d i j ]  6t ) .
Thrasymachus continues his abuse at 340d, where he calls Socrates a
sycophant. The exact sense of this accusation is not clear. It could
simply mean an eagerness to convict, but there is some sense of doing it
in an underhand way. Socrates is sycophantising in the argument, and in
his willingness to admit that a doctor who makes mistakes is still a doctor
while making the mistake - he is drawing attention to the mistakes. But
whatever sycophancy may refer to, the relations of this charge to the
/
charge of irony are clear: Poé-r ^ 6 ' 2 ^  TpTç
a l f U  o o ^ l v  % OTM
d ’<^tcr
' ' TlJl/SLiO
22. Rp. 338a 317a 7
Of course the argument is reversed and Socrates vindicated. But 
Thrasymachus does not concede his agreement easily. His reluctance 
turns into attack at 343f. Socrates responds with a tightening of 
the rules. Thrasymachus must no longer shift his ground without 
making his shift explicit: this had been allowed earlier.
(345b 8f 340 cf). The result of the ensuing argument is to force 
Thrasymachus into a "more stubborn position" (Cornford: ^ Tér(>ér^T€rpo\f 
348 e5) in which he says loudly that injustice is admirable. This 
he says after a little prodding by Socrates who is trying to get into 
his mind. Then Socrates says:
349ab 60 c i
Fd-p)
But where could the serious and adult Thrasymachus have made a joke?
He strikes us as a man who always says what he thinks. It seems that
Socrates is shifting the charge of irony to him. At 350d Thrasymachus
blushes, and from that point on he is sweetness itself. Socrates calls
this sweetness of his But the sweetness is not genuine.
It is a mockery of what should be the attitude in dialectic^^.
Thrasymachus long ago withdrew his genuine assent from the argument
(350 eff); and his way of showing it is to claim that all his assents
25are made out of courtesy. The result is that the argument finishes short 
of the conversion of Thrasymachus. Now at the very beginning (336C2 
fCd,cdik^l^cfjl^6'«0i ) Thrasymachus protests that Socrates does not really
want to know what justice is. If he did, there would be fewer compliments 
and deferrings. At the end of the argument Thrasymachus is full of 
compliances himself, which are (350 e 6). Now
Socrates nowhere says that Thrasymachus is ironising, but I think the
23. Rp. 353a 12.
24. Infra
25. 351c 6; 351d 7; 35263ff; 354a lOff,
judgement is implicit at 349a 6. He is made to blush - but thereafter 
he withdraws assent without losing his ability to further the argument; 
he marks the split between logic and morality which is fatal to a 
Socratic dialectic couched in moral terms. Something is lacking in the 
effect of dialectic on Thrasymachus and I suggest this is because 
Thrasymachus begins ironising in a bad way, instead of saying what he 
really thinks. If Thrasymachus is not amenable to dialectic, all the 
resources of education will be lost on him, and he is incorrigible.
The case is clearer at Gorgias 489E:
Socrates: ^Ojb\.JiCn6' ju 6 - Tt
y x rn )^ ù ix ^ c r io  crvo
Callicles : ^ ^
X h / 'J i ]  TTpds /kA-'
Socrates:
One notices that the irony consists self depreciation. Socrates
is Callicles* pupil. But there are other concepts belonging to the nexus:
Socrates is accused of (Gorg. 489b7 Rp.336b 9); of not
being serious Gorg.481b 6 f —  Rp.336e 9). His
suggestions are dismissed as naive ( ^  Gorg.491e 2 ^ Rp.337d 6).
But Socrates is much more emphatic that Collides is an ironiser: the 
charges axe at the following points (a) 490e 9f. Socrates always
says the same things about the same things; while Callicles does the 
opposite. It follows that CalliclesVword cannot be relied on. (b) 497a 
Callicles says he doesn't understand Socrates' clevernesses )
Socrates replies that he understands very well but pretends he doesn't,
)• The word used is not common, so we cannot be sure
of its meaning in Plato's time. But in all subsequent times it refers to
coyness, prudishness, false female innocence. It fits the virile and 
shameless Callicles ludicrously. This is surely 'irony' turned as a charge 
on Callicles. (c) From this point on Callicles professes to know nothing
2 <
^98d; 505c; 511a; 513c 4.) He withdraws his assent from the argument, but 
like Thrasymachus can still follow it. He is only pleasing Gorgias and 
helping to finish the argument. (497b 4; 501c 7; 503d 4; 506; 510; 522e 7), 
we compare Thrasymachus’ refusal to admit
(d) The charge of paizein made at 481b 6f; 485a-d is turned against 
Callicles at 499bc, when Callicles tries to escape by alleging that he
is not serious I This contradicts the statement of serious intention that 
Socrates puts such a price on extracting at 495c. Now the sense of paizein 
as explained there is the adoption of propositions without belief.
(e) To make the similarity to Rp.I even closer, we are given the rule 
that answering iKt/' destroys the force of the argument
(495a 5f) Callicles agrees to this rule suspiciously quickly only to claim 
later as we have seen that he was not serious. He gives most of his 
remaining answers merely for the sake of argument. No doubt he would be 
caught blushing like Thrasymachus, if the form of the dialogue were indirect 
narration rather than dramatic. But the important point is that he gives 
answers he does not believe, and never examines his own thoughts - doesn’t, 
as it were, wash his dirty linen in public as Socrates always does.
(f) A dialectician is (489d 7)^^, but this never becomes even
a front for Callicles. Many critics have pointed out the "lifelikeness" of 
Callicles - he has his own character, which does not reduce to Thrasymachus. 
However, he does learn not to obstruct Socrates flow of argument, and 
this is the methodological effect of praotes.
In both dialogues the charge of irony is related to Socrates claim 
not to know - he learns, or tries to learn, from everyone, but he does not 
know why he never succeeds in learning anything. The chargei^irony is 
directed against Socrates’ claim not to understand the methods of his own 
destructive arguments. Of course this does not imply that Socrates 
claimed not to believe any of his beliefs, or even not to know them: it
26. ct.violence: a charge brought against Socrates and turned 482c 4; 
505d 4; 508d.
^(o
simply amounts to a claim that his arguments do not pre-suppose any 
(special?) knowledge of the subject, and in that sense are more certain 
than an ill-defended "knowledge". The charge of irony is turned against 
the interlocutor not on the grounds that he pretends to know what he does 
not - the Greek for that is an alazon, but on the grounds that he "ironises 
and would do anything rather than answer" (cf. Rp. 337a 6) straight questions 
about his beliefs^^^.
The concealment of the aporia is found again%"the Charmides 169c 3ff. 
Critias is a Sophist - but in the dialogues also the friend of Socrates.
Like Protagoras^ Thrasymachus he takes part in a discussion in order to be 
well thought of (169c ). The situation is described as follows:
:>i érin UiTfu^y[fpoo
(cf. Laches 196é)*
This is one respect in which Critias resembles other Sophists, though the 
tone is considerably less acrimonious. Nevertheless he is conscious of 
dialectic as a public fight that someone wins, and this leads him to turn 
a methodological criticism of Socrates into a personal one. When Socrates 
asks what good thing (understood as "what material benefit") does Sophrosyne 
obtain for us, he replies that Socrates is using a "likeness"to other 
"skills" where there is no likeness. Socrates changes his tactic and 
argument, but Critias claims he is making the same mistake:
166c 3f£: fu 't "<â3 '•^1
’i p ü  e3/c r<’ oto ï r ô c 6 ^ ç - lp ^ ^ o l in l( ^ P ^ 's
I7l ^  %crTiv
Socrates answers that personalities are not at stake - as long as he 
answers what appears to him to be the case. But later Socrates makes a 
similar charge, only is justified because Critias has claimed to know 
what sophrosyne is.
26a. For the view that Meno 80d 5f. is an accusation of irony, see Moline, J«* 
Memo's Paradox? p.153-61. Phronesls, 1969.
174b ll:jl 1 7^ -i^ M K ^ ‘i^  KÔ<«^V
2(;R,bù,u?rc/A.»7»( %%4 - i ï ^ é t n a r ^ p ^ c o c  - à S
• I ïT p ^ (fe i\ /
(cf. 161b 8).
Now at 166c 3ff. the charge of 'insincerity’ includes a charge of 
conducting the argument in an ostensibly innocuous manner. At 174b 11, 
this cannot be true. It pleases Socrates to imagine that his interlocutor 
had known the truth all the time - that, no matter how obviously 
unironical his behaviour, he was in fact concealing his knowledge, 
claiming to know less than he does know. 174c is not a protest against 
being dragged round the mulberry bush but a protest against cunning 
concealment. The pathos to which these lines refer is a common one in 
the dialogues. It seems that Socrates has the dialectical skill to turn 
any argument upside down, but the fault lies not in his skill, but in the 
interlocutor who conceals the truth from Socrates, who does not take him 
seriously, who issues playful and enigmatic replies and who refuses the 
challenge of the aporia, escaping into argument for the sake of argument, 
or for the sake of reputation, against the tenor of his own beliefs. The 
refusal of the challenge of the aporia, seems to be the crucial element 
in the Rp. and the Gorgias, and their link with the ironical men of the 
Sophist and the Laws. The development of the word, though it shows the 
signs of a polemical retortio, must not be dismissed as that, because 
Plato follows it up. He blames the mind or character of the J-ophist for 
the fact that irony does not ’take’. The sophistical mind is not open 
to inspection because argument does not mirror it. The many arguments of 
the ^ Dphist might be arguments of as many Sophists for all the coherence 
they have in relation to one another. But the sophist never notices this, 
or at least, the ^hphist is so clever that he can always reconcile his own 
arguments one to another. The rest of us must examine our own opinions 
and only our own opinions (lOle 5 Phdo; 154d 8ff. Theæt. etc.:).
The examination of the contents of the mind matters: the Sophist has already 
got over this stage:
 154^_^. p%rV l/<?\ f(c^\ 2^ 3)^  c?\ ^ 2 f 7 T - W r ^ ,  31. d
é K  îTë-(>iCotrf^ç  ^ h .^ 0 C 'à f(i^ o c ^  6 /l/%
&-CI p j ( ^ l /  'u>i<t.bZ<^\/ -te v s
Plato does not seem to be protesting against myriad-mindedness simply 
because it is myriad-mindedness. It is a dialectical fault he is examini?g 
Now this dialectical fault is not the sort of thing one thinks up after an 
examination of arguments as a set of propositions, but after examination of 
the effect of argument on people. We under^ ^^ .^ vj4fctb.e extent to which Platonic 
arguments are psychological, and when this is spelt out for us by Aristotle 
we leap to the conclusion Aristotle is talking about a dialectic historically 
different from Plato's. In the case of 'bad' irony, a charge made originally 
against Socrates has been affixed to a certain type of dialectical behaviour.
The fact remains however that Socrates does seem to have behaved in an
ironical way. Plato must show the good side of irony. We have seen how
he does ttiis in the Symposium - irony there refers to his contempt for 
irrelevant things, his single-minded search for truth - and a certain 
austerity later taken up by Antisthenes. An example of this sort of 
behaviour - but is it Laconism? - in Socrates comes at the beginning of 
the Charmides. After playing a distinguished part in the retreat from 
Potidaea, Socrates^asked the evening after his arrival in Athens by the 
emotional Chærephon, how comes it he is safe { G~L}^
replies "As you see." When asked "did you see the
fighting?" ( f l p ^ l y o U  ) he replies: Yes
( )• We do not 'doubt' that his ensuing account of
the battle was given in the same style: é lfi-ù i
f (153c 2). At the beginning of the Symposium we find him
2^
washed and beslippered - not his usual way of appearing in the streets.
He tells ^ K c ( ^ ^ i c > > c n c r ^ f O ^ o v  Tu)
(174a 8/9). But the main interest for us lies in Plato's conversion of 
irony into . We have already noticed it at Cratylus 384c 4:
Socrates says Cratylus is not ironising: %p(
e n rJ^ lP te ^ y .
Robinson writes that Plato abandoned irony . "The passage in the
Sophist (229E - 230E1) makes no mention of irony and asserts that elenchus
makes the 'patient' angry only with himself, but gentle towards others.
The Seventh (p.19) letter requires that elenchus shall be conducted in
a friendly manner. ... The elenchus which Plato came to approve was a
contest in which both parties openly admitted that the questioner was
trying to refute and the answerer was trying not to be refuted. It was
the formal and open exercise for which Aristotle wrote rules and limits
in Topics." It will appear in the course of the essay that I think this
paragraph is misdirected. Specifically, "friendliness* and irony are by
no means incompatible. One of the functions of dialectic in the Corgias
and Rp.I is making a man praos. If the charge of irony disappears from
sight in the later dialogues, this is because Socrates nowhere meets the
type of man who is likely to charge him with it, and nowhere even in the
early works does he refer to his own methods as ironical. If we are right
in supposing that Plato's notion of "irony" is a part of his analysis of
Sophists, then we have a readymade reason why it is not found in later
27
works, though he comes near to accusing Zeno of it;
\  ^  y'dr-i %T( o o
^  j CiûT6r- Ox>
28
The same sort of charge is made against Protagoras in TheætAéi^
27l Parm. 128b 3ff.
28. Theaet, 162a 2.
So
Q c  j ' -ù v  K*, ën d (J i^ é^ _ i ( f
^ J n f u 5 - ( ^  O p  tC L < *.^ d p ‘ >'> fi3f^ <5t>c31 ê /b  'Zjôo ^ ^ ^ 6 Z o u
29Here of course Plato is complaining about books as well, and that
includes his own books which are a sort of paidia. This of course is
not to condemn books utterly, because paidia seems to be a principle
of life in the Laws^^. The notion of paidia in Plato is too wide to
be broached here; but we can say that part of its point is pedagogic
- to promote an active attitude of mind to what is read or heard. In
education paidia promotes criticism - and has the added advantage, that
any criticism will also be paidia. The essential difference between
paidia and elenchus is that paidia makes the ironical assumption:
Protagoras is a great man: he must know what he is talking about - while
31I (who have just disproved it) must be mistaken and callow. Of course 
other considerations enter into - youthful agility, youthful
freedom to take a fall. The attitude of a pedagogue towards the game 
must be ironical, simply because otherwise he would win too easily. Yet 
the pedagogue must direct the game. We have the example of at least one 
grateful pupil: Phil.30e.
Protach*s:
S o c r a t e s : d  / P c O T - * P ) (p O v iv lQ  é^ViWe- -f
Whether Plato will call this sort of pedagogy ironical I do not know. 
Socrates might coax and flatter young men into doing philosophy, but the 
scheming malevolence which is part of the full concept of irony is removed 
from it. diminishes in the later works, but even in a
constructive dialogue like the Philebus, Socrates pretends not to know 
where he is going, "l/e ought to have collected that family which shows
29. cf. Ptgs. 329a; Phdr. 277e; Ep.Vn 341b ff.
30. Laws 685a, 764e; Parm. 137b.
31. Theæt. 152c ff; 162d 2f; 164e 2; 168c 6; Ch. 161c 9; 162a 10 ff; 
164e 6. Soph. 241c 4f = off hand etc., Philebus 18b; 
20b; 25d; 28c.
the character of limit; but we didn’t. Still perhaps it will come to
32the same thing in spite of that..." But in the Philebus, we have 
Socrates trapped - he must explain everything he says: and this is the 
death of irony. Protarchus’ final speech is reminiscent of Socrates 
gibes on so many occasions:
f y  / . ^ \ <r / y
(TpoZ(^p(^S C7Z-
/
(67b Ilf).
This odd reversal of role reminds us that irony is the ploy of a superior
towards an inferior, of an old man to a young one. Irony with pedagogic
intent is good; irony with sophistic intent is bad. So many of the
phrases shared by Plato’s Socrates and Theophrastus’ ironical man are
33
perfect pedagogical devices :
d S x o y  ^ à x ^ o v  V é r f o \ / ' lv 'M ‘ 
f J t  r i
In addition to the irony of the educator, Plato practises the irony
of the writer: what is the value as historical evidence of the statement
that Plato had fallen ill before or on the day Socrates died?^^(
^  )• .(= irony according to TheophraXtus 1.4).
He enterg^ or inverts his character’s ignorance to give the impression of
35a realistic narrative . It is common for a character of his to fail to
32. Ph.25d.
33. Theoph. Ch.1.6.
34. Phdo.59b 10.
35. Ptg.314c; 315e 1-3; 361d 7ff;
Sz.
36
remember , or for Plato to conceal the identity of the sources of the
37
theories he discusses , which may very often be his own, and consequently
his concealment may come under the ba^n of irony. But the additional and
even wanton irony we find in the dialogues may not have seemed irony to
38Plato. I am referring to the sort of irony Cornford says: "is not a 
deliberately invented artifice; it arises of itself in the advance from 
the purely symbolic stage of drama. In that earliest stage, the whole 
dialogue might be called ironical in the sense that it is the poet’s message 
to the audience, not the expression of the person’s character..." But 
when he excludes mention of himself from his dialogues, when he leaves 
arguments unresolved, or when he refers in one dialogue to the results of 
another without mentioning a name or giving a hint, when he wilfully 
misrepresents poets and previous philosophers - all this must have struck 
him as irony and not all of it was imitation of Socrates.
We have seen how irony is converted from a calumny of Socrates into 
a Socratic virtue. That virtue is variously imitated: in some, like 
Antisthenes, it becomes boorishness. For the Aristotelian notion that 
a gentleman should adopt an ironical bearing towards his inferiors is a 
product of Plato’s experience, and of his brand of imitation of his master.
is as near as the Ancient World comes to charity; and as such more 
appropriate to the Alcmæonid, the last link of later Greeks with the 
Great Generation than it is to the aggressive Socrates^^. Others^^ emphasise 
the continuity between Socrates and Aristotle: the needs of Socratic pedagogy 
bring about an. anomaly in the description of the Aristotelian Great Souled
36. Phdo. 73a 5; 103a 5; Theæt 201c ff.
37. Theæt. 172b 6; Philebus 44B; Soph.242c 8f; 246a 7ff.
38. ThiU-cydides Myth^istoricus p.148. ’
39. ' Albias shared by Burges 1969 p.16 for different reasons.
40. Bergson 1971 pf^^uoting Deman T. 1942 p.56.
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Man - he is ITpoC (E.N. 1124 h 29).
Aristotle uses the word both for a strategy and a character^^. He 
schematises - aletheia is the mean, alazoneia the excess, and eironeia 
the deficiency which is the case is 'better' than the excess^^. Later 
writers inherit the schematism or simplify the word still further 
e.g. Rhet. ad Alex: 22 ^  77 p A . iTpoâÏÏûioJ^é-tdai
' Zct ç %Yd^YTfoLx
Somehow it becomes specially connected with the Athenian character Timon
of Phlius talks of a é c Z k T n A x
44
Timon is referring to the literary tradition in which as Demetrius reminds
us, such writers as Polycrates and Aeschines Socraticus came close to "irony",
even though we cannot be what he means by it.^^ But Demosthenese the Orator 
claims that the Athenian demos is renowned for its irony. Here the word 
is very close to cowardice, to talking and not doing; and provides our only 
examples of the word used in a context not influenced by the philosophical 
tradition apart from the Aristophanes-loci. Demosthenes charges the 
Athenians with two things - eironeia and bradutes both of which are habitual. 
This is an odd thing to say about a body known for its fickleness, and 
alertness.
(5% T<Sy  (( p c ^ Y l^  oi i v OO ^
41. e.g. EN 1108a 30; 1124b 29f; 1127b 20ff; Rhet. 14201; 1379a 34; 
Physign. 808a 27.
42. EN 1127b 20.
43. Buchner p.345 f. GiV^s the fullest account of the words subsequent 
history cf. Pavlovsic'fj.' 1968 p.22-41.
44. Timon 25.3.
45. W.Rhys Roberts 1902, §120; 292.
46. IV, 7; 37; IV 18.
seems to mean fighting a coward's battle - a defensive war. The remedy
is to hazard one's jjody or pay one's taxes (or give voluntary contributions)
(7). We can well imagine a charge against the Athenians as follows: "You
are cowards: you cheat, you talk high, you buy allies. You fight defensive
wars from within your citadels and never come out into the open. But 
really you are the most envious and ambitious of nations. Never fear, your 
wordy deceit, your democratic processes will be the death of you."
... But this is specu/<^ tion. All we are entitled to is the suspicion that 
philosophical and non-philosophical uses of the word developed in different 
directions; and that in the Platonic dialogues we can watch the word being 
twisted to fit the people who applied it to Socrates. In that twisting 
and redefinition the "parameter", as it were, is dialectic, and a man's 
response to dialectic is the "thing measured". The analysis of personal 
reactions, the choosing of the right type of man is part of dialectic from 
the beginning. But the intention is to find the educable man, not to test 
the morality of the interlocutor. The Sophist is not condemned for 
"insincerity" but for having an undialectical nature. It is not a 
"psychological" statement.
47. Schærer 1938 p.52. La sincéritéjgocfatique est laborieuse, 
méditative, ennemie de toute spontanéité.
Sç
II
Similar developments are found in the concepts of gentleness,
-- o Cf
moderation \ 0 ^  of youth and age viz. the concepts 
are defined with reference to dialectic.
We have seen that anger is the wrong behaviour for a dialecticy&^; 
but a common reaction of the sophistical man - Protagoras^^, Callicles 
and Thrasymachus each lose their temper and refuse to finish the discussion 
validly. Even at this stage, then, it is clear that Plato was conscious 
of the need to avoid rousing the anger of his interlocutor; and he attempts 
the task of gentle reeducation even in the Protagoras. It is instructive 
to notice that one of his difficulties is the proper treatment of seniority.
After an outburst from Protagoras, he begins his elenchus as follows: 
he separates Protagoras' honour from the fate of the argument by putting 
the whole thing into what others would say^^; later he says^^ (Guthrie) "I 
fear that our questioner is ill-mannered, he will laugh and retort:
What ridiculous nonsense ...." Guthrie's "ridiculous nonsense" is rather too 
strong: 'geloiofv ... pragma' is a favourite expression of Socrates. The 
fictitious questioner merely points out a contradiction - but because of 
Protagoras' character this simple act must be performed with great circum­
spection. Protagoras' quid proquo is to humourSocrates
) Socrates' device is paralleled in Hippias Major (303e) ; and the 
connotation of is settled by Meno 76b:
47. Ptgs. 360d 9; 333e.
48. 352 eff.
49. 355c.
50. Ptgs. 360 e4.
%^oken when Meno is pressing for a yet further favour ^  ^
)g Meno's position vis-a-vis Socrates is Socrates' 
position vis-a-vis Protagoras. By the conventions of the times, a young 
man who contradicts ( ) his elders is at fault. It is
unseemly for an old man to argue on equal terms with a younger first 
because the old man is old^^ and second because muscles are no
53
longer supple . Youth and age is one of the motifs of "dialectic" and 
just as the word "conversational" itself covers several "methods" so the 
motifs of youth and age are put to different uses at different times. The 
first use is simply to record the fact that one man knows more than 
another.
Young men occupy themselves with philosophy and natural science; I ~* 
which /^ e^ " terms is ‘ crz  ^^  Vr
but later he develops an ironically more pejorative use - -
boys discuss certainly, but Socrates is mainly interested in young men for 
whom this word is an insult. But though young men discuss with facility,
they are sometimes frozen by worthless arguments simply because they have
not heard them before. The tension between the virtue and the vice of youth 
is everywhere evident in Plato. It is not something foisted on Socrates
by a reactionary Plato, but part of a genuine analysis of the dialectical
. 55situation.
In the Gorgias we find Socrates complaining to the older Gorgias
that Polus attempts elenchus without understanding what he is arguing against;
the situation is described as follows - ^ \
J é r O ^ c -  é z t t i
■ ‘ %
(Gorg. 463e)
f(À
51. 76b 4; 75b.
52. Laws 892d ff.
53. e.g. Theæ. 162a
54. Phdo. 96a 6 ff. Phdr. 270a
55. cf.Popper^, 134; cf. Gould Platonic Ethics p.66, 81. 1955
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Gorgias relieves Socrates of his natural reverence for Gorgias' age
(463a 5) Callicles ' attempt at elenchus leads him into strong and
disputations language ("T^  \/&-A\/t , Callicles himself
accuses Socrates of childishness (485a ff.). The 'matrix' for this
usage seems social - what would happen in any conversation between Greeks
on such subjects.
Preliminary arguments are sometimes described as attempts to
frighten young men with bogies - i o  T f . The
^ "she goblin used ... to frighten naughty c h i l d r e n . I t
is used by Cebes of his residual and irrational doubts about a preceding
argument which is of course a strong argument^^ and the doubt is satisfied
by pnionged argument. In the Theætetus Socrates brings out a string of
prefabricated eristical objections to Protagoras' dictum. True to his
58dialectical ability, Protagoras protests : these are old stories fit to
frighten young men. Socrates, he says, is taking advantage of youth, which
cannot foresee ) the consequences of an answer. The young
should not have refrained from granting that a man can remember and not
remember. Similarly Dionysodorus and Euthydemus strike terror into Socrates
59and the young Kleinias. The 'young' Socrates is perplexed by the wisdom 
of natural scientists in the Phaedo; and makes mistakes in the course of 
his famous conversation with the old Parmenides, who tells him:
We discover more about the roles of youth and age in dialectic by 
rn\^ «ifc.jvh>jthe Theætetus further. The usual relations obtained between a 
younger and an elder, but as something foreign to a dialectic in a 
technical sense, but natural to a conversation. A question like 'what is 
knowledge?" interests a young man. It is not because he knows nothing but
56. Phædo 77e 5, Burnet; Crito 460 Adam.
57. 992d ff.
58* 166abc.
59. Euthyd. 303; 302 b 5; 275d 5.
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because he Is young that he is puzzled by certain philosophical problems. 
The succeeding arguments are mainly destructive and highly abstract until 
at 162d Socrates gives the game away: VéÔ^  ^ d  (^1 U X ?  ' c o Y
What is marked as 'young' is the instability of opinion which'^ the perfect 
analogue for the reversals of dialectic. The easy recourse to the 
opposite opinion. But Socrates has to attempt to salvage Protagoras a 
second time in a dialectical defence beginning at 166 a-c. Theodores 
claims of this defence: ^  ^ A K U  (Xér^VttiAs,
Now Theodores
is dragged into the discussion, to prevent any KoY 27. .
*7tcv/ yWV" from slipping into the argument,and it is only when 
words are readmitted into the discussion as a focus of interest that
Theætetus once again becomes interlocutor^^. In the meantime, Socrates 
has discussed with Theodores matters of fact - "ihe nature of the 
Heraclitean school, the disadvantages of the rhetorical life. These are 
things known by experience, and an old man's experience*to a young man's. 
Theætetus wants Socrates and Theodores to examine the opinions of 
Parmenides, which require older heads than his; but instead the investigation 
turns itself once again to the deliverance of Theætetus.
Essentially, the same points are made in the Sophist: youth is 
peculiarly susceptible to reversals of opinion, to by the opinions
of men: 265 d (Cornford). Theætetus says "Perhaps because I am young, I 
often shift from one belief to the other; but at this moment looking at your 
face and believing you to hold that these things have divine origin, I too 
am convinced... " Some people who come to dialectic too early are
disappointed because they quickly exhausted words and never dealt with 
their physis. This was always Plato's point — short discussions must be
61. 148 e.
62. The. 168 c 6.
63. 169 c 9.
64. 184 c.
about physis. Theætetus agrees "so far as (he) can judge at his age".
(234 d).
But Theætetus is acknowledged to be worth a dozen grey beards.
Mere age does not protect a man from nefarious effects of premature 
dialectical questioning. For it is quite possible to reach old age 
without any practice in them - and then to become a foolish opsimath.
Such old men fall victim to young men's e r r o r s . F a r from being an 
eulogy of old age, the Laws passage about not trusting old men to the 
stream is a reiteration of Plato's insistence on the importance of a 
formal dialectical education. At the same time, the Athenian could not 
undertake an enquiry of such magnitude except in the company of men of 
great experience - who are more the Athenian's equal in this respect than, 
for example, Glaucon is the Republic who is refused the higher path.^^
The Eleatic Stranger instructs Theætetus and for that reason 
Theætetus must not hold up the process with youthful angers and untimely 
expostulations. The Greek for having a smooth informative discussion is 
prP^(d>i> ÿ\(^Gn the Stranger is in doubt how to dispose his 
material Socrates tells him: T okY ox/' XxA V ^  1 / K
The word connotes the correct partner for Socrates - an even-tempered man
who can be corrected. It is so common as to be technical.It is a virtue 
69of Theætetus
Only against this background can certain Platonic doctrines be 
properly understood.
The first such doctrine is easily dealt with - the cathatic role of 
dialectic, destroying false opinions. But it can do this only if a man is 
more ready to be angry with himself than with his interlocutor. Corrigi- 
bility ( ) is a condition of dialecticit^at Sophist 2316 ff.
65. 168 c 4f.
66. Euthyd. 272 b 5 ff; Soph. 251 b 5; Phil 14 de; Rp. 487 b; Laws 892 de.
67. 533 a; 531 d; 534 b 1, 2.
68. e.g. Rp. 354 a; Gorg. 489 d; Phdo 116C; Laws 888 a.
69. Soph.217 d. The. 144 b 5; 151 c; 161 a 6.
to
Plato claims that socialising, civilising is a virtue of dialectic when 
practised by
The second doctrine is the rule at Rp.539, that dialectic should 
not be permitted to men and women under thirty. Popper is trenchant.
Plato s reason for this amazing rule is clear enough. He is afraid of
the power of thought." Similarly Popper says of Parm. 134 ab^^: "It
looks as if we had here (among other things) Plato's answer — 'Even a 
Socrates was once too young for dialectic' - to his pupils who pestered 
him for an invitation ^o dialectic^ which he considered premature".
But surely Plato's rule is mere recognition that dialectic is not enough. 
Dialectic was never the open-minded search for truth according to impersonal 
rules of debate that some people like to imagine. Instead it was an
examination of older or younger men the results of which were stated as
facts about older and younger men, and not simply as "moves" of verbal 
argument. Hearing the truth from an older man is both a Socratic and a 
tribal stance; nor is there anything unlikely in the supposition that 
Socrates himself relied on the respect due to age to avert captious objec­
tions. He associated only with those whom he could benefit - this is an
72assumption of pedagogical superiority. Plato's Socratesis a man who has
looked into most things, and found technical knowledge unsatisfactory i.e.
73he has surpassed but not by passed the specialises . The same path 
must be trodden by the Guardians. There seem to be no grounds for rejecting 
this " sophistication" as a trait of the historical Socrates.
Whether the rule of Thirty was observed or not at the Academy is a 
difficult question to answer^^ if we limit ourselves to evidence-chopping.^^ 
But it is highly unlikely that a set of young men who had been attracted 
into the Plato's circle by proptreptics written, like our dialogues, in 
praise of dialectic could have been kept off dialectical subjects for so 
long. Without going into the dreadful question of the agrapha dog mata.
70. Open Society p.133.
71. p. 134.
72. e.g. Alcibiades I 103a 5 ff.
73. Phdo 96 ff; 60 d ff; Ap.21 b ff; Euthyd 272 cf; Crat.384c; Laches 197 d etc,
74. Cherniss 1945 Cap(IU)esp.69. ■ 75. tevinson^l953 65ô/654^°" ”___
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we can see that Plato is planning an ideal situation, for perfect men.
The quality of the men produces the quality of the ideas. Popper has 
recently constructed a Third World^^ inhabited by written theories 
independent of thoughts and meanings. For Plato, however, propositions 
are what people think and live by: all true argument is with the 
Spoudazon. The 'third world' is pure paidia and paidia is only a part 
of the Socratic conversation. This cleavage between the development of 
Plato and the development of Popper makes clearer the opposition between 
the process of elimination and corroboration of theories by the hypothetico- 
deductive method, and the concrete Platonic dialectic.
Plato also has a doctrine about the best sort of consdtution - 
political, psychological or academic. It is startling like his analysis of 
what is right with Theætetus and wrong with Callicles. The good man or 
the good pupil or the good dialectician combines two opposed qualities. The 
doctrine starts, we claim, when Plato urges his interlocutors to state their 
positions boldly, but to accept correction mildly. The theory lasts his 
lifetime:
Laws 731 a: , ^  ^
^ U jU 6 ^  ) ( p ^  Xrt V<^ ( ^
The famous watchdog of the Republic, which barks at what it does not know,
is not (pace Popper) Plato's reason for adopting this doctrine, though dog-
breeding and horse breeding may have been an Alcmaeonid occupation. The
-watchdog is a dialectician because he combines gentleness )
with j 'Cô , . The
combination reoccurs in the Tima eus Summary of the Rp (17 d 4 //
). The physis that fits a man for guardianship fits Theætetus
76. Objective Knowledge ii; Epistemology without a Knowing Subject p.106 ff
77. Rp. 375 cf. Laws 888 a 6.
for intellectual pursuits especially dialectic.
^  y ^ /0  J (d }\d rirO \/ T \p2bV  <Aa)
tC e^i édh i  ce>u Z o c ^  '^ d Y ^ Q é n ù x /
^  o'ZTr^"^^/ ^ 2 ^ 6 - /^96:?
The: 144 a 3-6 cf. 144 b 5.
Wherever it occurs it is an object of wonder, because it is paradoxical
that such a combination could ever occur. They are the qualities of the
first generations of Atlantis, in whom the divine element predominated, and
where the virtues occur in a form ready to pass into the NicoAachean Ethics -
78men had great souls but were even tempered in little things. The kingly
art of the Politicus has for its junction the interweaving of the aggressive
79and the gentler virtues. Whether Plato's attention was first drawn to 
single out these qualities by his consideration of dialectic, or whether 
(and it is less likely) he first examined society and then noticed the 
importance of the combination in dialectic, it is clear that analysis in 
terms oi. \ ( is, for Plato, part of dialectic, part 
of the argument.
The nature of Plato's analysis of dialectic becomes clearer if we 
trace the development of arguments between one dialogue and the next on 
two topics - the Forms, and the existence of God or the Soul. We deal only 
with his report of his own arguments - his Auseinandersetzung with himself. 
The two arguments are connected, since the admission of Forms is also the 
admission of the Unseen - the world of gods and souls, though of course the 
reverse is not true. Now it is quite clear that Plato never argues for the 
existence of forms — he seems to assume acceptance of them, referring to 
"what we are always saying ... " and whose existence is granted by the 
interlocutor^^, in other places he expresses relief that the report has 
been granted without more a do. If he alleges any reason for granting the 
point, it lies in the physis, the profession or the dialectical experience
78. Critias 119 e 3f.
79. Pol. 306 ah.
80. Phdo 75 d; 100 b; Rp. 507 a 7; Rp.476
of the interlocutor. Socrates thanks Theætetus, Socrates thanks
Theætetus for admitting that 'very', 'like', 'equal' and the like are
investigated by the soul itself. Essentially the same point is made
in the Sophist; the seen and unseen are separate genera, yet 'being' and
82its companions must cover both. Socrates distinguishes between the
convincement of 'friends of Forms' (the question of whose identity we may
•£
ignore) and the corporalists - who drag everything back to the body. Now 
the alleged reason why the friends of the Forms are easier to convince is 
not that they already admit something incorporeal. §^ut that they are
, The word cannot refer to their psychology, so much as to 
their behaviour in dialectic. The "materialists" who seem to be natural 
scientists and polymaths rather than anything we would recognise, as 
materialists, have to be made more law-abiding - because then their 
agreements, concessions ov tii will be more binding { K v p ).
It is only after they are made more law like in imagination (or in
I / gg
dialectic? ) that they will answer questions at all. Obviously
Plato complains about the difficulties of conversion among the lesser breeds 
without dialectic, and the specific flaw is that their agreement is not their 
bond. Here we are close to our Callicles and Thrasymachus now assimilated 
to the type of Sophist. But instead of presenting us with a "realistic" 
picture of their disagreement (which some commentators have mistaken for 
"freedom of discussion") he proceeds to discuss what they should say, if 
their word were their bond and if they would submit to question and answer 
methods.
"But we ignore their personalities, and sæe searching
for the truth." We have the feeling that it is fitness for dialectical 
cooperation that is in point. Only those who share Socrates' ideals and 
goodwill can cooperate in attempts at construction.
8Ï1 185 e 5f. Whether this is really about substantially existing forms is
irrelevant: the conceps are summarised as if the interlocutor had prior 
knowledge.
82. Soph. 247 d.
83. 246 de.
Oç(j^
Callicles, Thrasymachus and the Titans have contempt in common
(246 b 2) and this contempt prevents them from listening. Contemptuous®^
too is the atheist of Laws X who seems to be assimilated to the same type.
It is instructive to compare the final"dialectic against the Sophists".
With the earlier dialectics. The main difference is that in Laws X, Socrates
has more opportunities than he has in the early dialogues — for he educates
the young, and makes Laws against reprobates. But he has a difficulty —
neither of his interlocutors is of the quality required in a dialectical 
85
partner which testifies to the weight Plato's attaches to their moral 
worth, or their sheer experience. The three men are the most impersonal 
in Plato — simply constitutions embodied. Their knowledge comes from 
outside the word-business of dialectic. The Cretan and the Spartan provide 
the consensus sapientium, which is their first argument®®, and in the matter 
of the young and inexperienced, this is not a bad argument. Socrates rejects 
it however because he is more interested in the problem of the misinterpre­
tation of knowledge. Now just as in the problem of the Sophist, he meant 
something different^ from what we mean by materialism, so in the LawSy he 
means by atheism something different from what we mean by atheism. He 
appears to mean a mixture of superstition and positivism. The superstition 
man thinks he knows where the gods are - in all sorts of undesirable places; 
the positivist thinks he knows where the gods are not - not in desirable 
places, like the heavenly bodies. Both of these positions are the outcome 
of pretended knowledge; and this is the claim the Athenian does battle with. 
He expressly excludes the impiety of young cubs - because they would grow
out of it. Quite in the style of a penal-reformer he insists that real
87impiety is a man's crime.
Now the impious deny propositions we are used to seeing in dialectic.- 
Protagoras' followers®® for example are credited with something very like 
889 e: "as for right, there is absolutely no such thing as real and natural 
right, mankind are eternally disputing about rights and altering them and
84. 885 a; 909 b 2. 85. 892 ff; Schærer, R.La Question Platonicienne
1969 p.154; n 1. 86. 886 a 4. 87. 888 b ff; 910 c 6
88, Theæ 172 b 6.
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every change thus made, once made, is from that moment valid ..." (Taylor). 
The work of dialectic is to tame )®^^and it is only to be
used on those for whom it is suitable. It takes the form of a preface to 
a law. The process of conversion has two moments, both of which are 
familiar: the first, the nature of soul and its life, convinces of the 
existence of gods, the second, the nature of goodness, convinces us of 
their providence. Both moments arise from stock situations in dialectic: 
the interlocutor is often asked to reflect on soul and on goodness and
from these reflexions consequences are drawn for the purpose in hand; e.g.
89was Pericles a real statesman . The dialectical propositions like "there 
is no such thing as justice" is made to cover an extensive social category.
The law when codified makes a distinction as we have seen between 
"atheists" requiring correction and "atheists" requiring removal by death. 
"Atheist" includes kings, prophets and generals who have in common with 
charlatans their reaction to dialectic; and their additional qualification 
for inclusion on the dangerious list is the "possession of a vigorous memory 
and a keen intelligence" (908 c) - the very qualities needed for a good 
dialectician* yet because of their basic levity - their refusal to be 
bound by their own agreements and face up to the aporia - dialectic does 
not work in their case. Noone in-the.. PI atonic, corpus says in dialectic 
that there.is no such thing as soul or god, and how rife such beliefs were 
is difficult to assess^^ but it is unlikely that such vigorous assertions 
of atheism as Plato requires would have been common in the group to which 
he attributes them. He is drawing what seem to him to be the conclusions of 
their beliefs about tenuously related matters. A rider to this is the 
restricted scope of Plato's dialectic - it seems to apply to those who will 
admit the good. Even in those passages in which Plato argues against
89. See Detel, W.Arch. i^ir Gesch. der Phil 1973 p.2-29 p. 16 Detel points out 
the logical role of the 'good' ubiquitous in the dialogues.
90. e.g. Guthrie III A p.236 f.
%materialists , the argument is not properly directed against materialism, 
but an attempt is made to "shame" materialists into acceptance of an "unseen" 
thing. Only a few will make the admission and the range of the ensuing 
argument is restricted to these.
The instructors faced with youthful atheism are not to lose their
tempers. They are to treat the àisaase.
The tradition of this sott of behaviour towards the errant pupil goes back
a long way in Plato. In the Republic he asks for a special treatment of
anger in an elenchus. The anger in this instance is justified, because any 
man who is mistaken is at least thinking something. Socrates phrases his 
request as follows Zt
\p€n ^ D~i( 91
Concealment can be put to hostile or as here to pedagogic purposes. Plato
produces a philosophical balm: a man’s mistakes lie in the realm of doxa.
The irony of teacher to pupil remains throughout Plato's work. Much of his
later work is devoted to removing causes of anger against philosophy herself.
It is one of his complaints that eristic produces anger because it is so
92exasperatingly untrue. Some anger is justified, for example, of the man 
faced with obvious untruth. Teachers do not rouse their pupils' ire 
unnecessarily. But the man who charges Socrates with irony, and chafes 
angrily under Socrates tuition is incorrigible. Plato’s analysis of dialectic
The remark applies to Plato's view of dialectic; and what the 
dialectician discovers in his analysis is truth common to dialectic and to 
society. Aristotle's emphasis on the similarity of dialectic to rhetoric 
was not a bolt from the blue.
91. Rp. 476 e.
92. See within:Enthydemus passing
93. Phdrus 271 c 10 ff.
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The modern philosophical habit of taking examples from the lecture—
room, as in the question: is this an inkwell that I see before me? has its
origins (if not its present-day function) in the Platonic conversations,
where it is a cunning extension of Socrates' habit of making matters
personal. Grand theories or propositions are always referred to Socrates
and his interlocutor: their salvation is at stake, and they can only
understand a theory as what it means for them. Hidden in this arrogation
of theories to present circumstances is the appeal to commonsense - to
what one really believes about the situation one finds oneself in. There .
is an element in Socrates of Dr.Johnson banging the table and kicking a
stone to prove its existence.
We take three examples. As a matter of phifsophy our first example^® 
94is described by Taylor as follows: " ... he made the fatal mistake of 
confusing a cause, or causa principalis, with 'that without which the cause 
would not act as a cause', causa# comitantes or accessory conditions".
But the "demonstration" of the distinction rests on the ludicrousness of 
supposing that Socrates is in gaol at Athens because his foot bone had not 
moved his leg bone, and his sinews had given up. The 'demonstration' is a 
tekmerion, drawn from the personalities present and the unexamined common 
assumptions about them. Our second example^® is described by the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy as the first statement of the Correspondence 
Theory of truth?^ But the passage simply says: "Theætetus sits" is a state­
ment about you, Theætetus , who know you are sitting here with me. The 
instant translation of Protagoras' famous first sentence may be of the same
97 «I
sort - " anthropos? that means you, Theætetus, and me, Socrates . Socrates 
is generally embarrassed by the introduction of extraneous knowledge, even
though he is quite well aware that dialectic somehow depends on it. His
93*^ Phædo 99 b. 94. Man and his Work p.200. 95. Soph. 263 a.
96, Vol. 1,1 224 (A.N.Prior). 97. Theæt 152 a 6 ff; cf. 16 b 5, which is 
slightly different.
point must be that what a man believes about himself and his neighbours 
in daily life - if a man begins his thinking from that point, he is
; but if he begins from some 
technical proposition which is. much less part of his life, then he is
The picture of dialectic emerging is not that of the dialectical 
tournament; but that of a non-repeatable experiment or a house party. 
Perhaps they have met to play a game, like dialectic, but the purpose 
and success of the party, or even of the game, depends on temperament, 
amenity, who the people are; and it is a party that can never be repeated, 
though the houseparty can be reconstructed with increasing precision as 
more elements in the dialectical situation are realised to be elements 
that contributed to the the game on that occasion.
CHAPTER II. DIALECTIC AND THE SCIENCES
(i)
The examination of moral character is not enough.
The date of the Gorgias is unlikely to be far removed from the
composition of the Meno, in which Plato begins to study method 
1
disembodied . The dialogue claims rather more conclusiveness for its 
arguments than the early work, though as we shall see this may be an 
illusion. Thus two considerations make it likely that 'Gorgias' will 
yield valid examples of an emerging method that does not simply depend 
on moral confrontation - not of course that Socratic method ever did 
depend simply on moral confrontation: we have treated character-analysis 
first for reasons of convenience, and because the psychology becomes more 
impersonal - more doctrinal - in the later dialogues. The two considera­
tions are:
(1) Plato is beginning to write positively: he adds to his store of
2 . . .  3beliefs ; and claims an unusual degree of certainty for his deductions .
Vlastos claims that this claim is to certainty of deduction only, not 
certainty of premiss^. Dodds doubts this®: Shorey® points out that
(509) is a pun - Plato presumably means no more by "bound 
by iron and adamantine arguments" than "protected by warlike and uncon­
quered arguments". Vlastos, who takes the view that this refers to 
correctness of deduction, explains that Socrates does not claim to know 
the premisses, and claims in consequence that Socrates here grasps the 
essential feature of his argument, namely that it cannot lead to
1. Dodds p.23; ct. Taylor II 103
2. Dodds p.20; Taylor 129 op.cit
3.. Gorgias 509.
4. Vlastos xxxi.
5. Dodds p.16 n.2.
6. Cl.Phil.l886p.
So
demonstrative certainty. This distinction between valid and true argument 
seems to be anachronistic, especially as the premisses are ethical 
propositions Socrates values. Nevertheless, Socrates says that he does not 
know. My own suggestion is, he does not know why it is that the outcome
of the argument is as it is, and himself once again victorious. He disclaims
any understanding of his dialectical power; but does not claim that he is 
not convinced of his ethical propositions. Accordingly he does not claim 
validity for his argument so much as that the argument is the best argument 
under the circumstances, and that these circumstances are peculiarly propitious 
to the discovery of truth. He makes the same sort of claim in Phaedo’.^
(2) The second claim of the Gorgias to our attention is that Plato seems 
here to emphasise the insufficiency of a mere moral or dramatic interpretation 
of dialectic. Callicles asserts that it is shame (false shame) that makes
Rius and Gorgias admit Socrates' victory over them. Now this shame must be
carefully distinguished from the true shame through which dialectic works.
For the first shame is shame felt before otherSonly, and the second shame
9is the shame of words dissonant with action or words dissonant with words .
Callicles appears to be devoid of the latter sort of shame^^ and a victim
of the first sort^^. He claims of course to be free of the enervating shame,
which blushes at immorality and disowns logical consequences that properly
belong to it. Because of this shameful situation Callicles is an excellent
12partner for Socrates. When Socrates says that a victory over Callicles is
almost a proof of Socrates' opinions, he does not attribute this state of
13affairs to Callicles' cleverness but to Callicles' shamelessness, which
he counsels him not to abandon^^. The outcome is the (indirectly stated) 
conclusion that if shame claimed the unfortunate Polus and Gorgias, then 
shame has also claimed a victim in Callicles. As that is impossible ex 
hypothesi, it is truth, not a pathos which has convicted them all.^^
7. Phdo 107 B 6-8.
8. 482 d.
9. e.g. Corg. 482 c 7; Laches 185 a; 188 c 3 ff; 193 e; Phdo 91 a 4 ff;
Ptgs 339 c 8. 10. 488d 4; 489 e 9; 495 a 5-6; 497 a 6; 499 b 7-8.
11. e.g. 505 c; 510. 12. 486 d ff; 489; 500 b 6 f.
13. 487 c; 508 a 5. 14. 489.
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The clue to the situation is to be found in our interpretation of
Phaedo 101 c e: Callicles is the perfect foil because he refuses to
abandon his opposition. It is a virtue symmetrical to Socrates'
dialectical doggedness. By his refusal he forces Socrates to deepen his
proof Callicles is no boy to be put off with blushes, or frightened by
demons. The charge of bogey-waving and oration-mongering made by Socrates
against Eius is turned by Callicles against Socrates himself.What makes
Callicles a good foil is that he cannot be frightened off with preliminary
ready-made arguments^^; and because of his lack of shame any argument that
would convince him would succeed for its properties as an argument, of
course Callicles is not convinced. Yet some sort of wide ranging victory
is claimed; and this must be in virtue of the strength of the method of
argument used. They come to grips at a deeper and at the same time more
formal level than in previous contestants did although the arguments are
18similar and actually join. But the point in which Callicles differs 
from Polus is the degree to which he is prepared to let the apparent 
consistency wilder and wilder Consequences over-rule his — shall
we say his h e a r t . T h e  attempt to embarrass Callicles out of his position 
ends with Callicles' statement of belief that we are the happier for giving
in to our itches. From that point on the argument takes a formal turn.
20
There follow two arguments, the first of which Taylor characterises 
as follows; "(a) Cood and bad are "contraries", you cannot predicate both 
at once of the same subject, nor can you deny both at once ... Pleasure and 
pain are not opposed in this way." Robinson takes a similar line; for him, 
the deduction is made " from the premisses, first that good and evil are
16. 473 d 3; e3; 482 c 4-5; 494 d.
17. cf. Cap.I ii.
18. 500 a 7.
19. 480 e; 495 b 9; 481 b 7; 491 a; e,
20. Taylor II, p. 121.
contradictories, second that contradictories cannot belong to a thing at
• • 21 once, and third, that pain and pleasure can belong to a thing at once,"
Dodds protests but seems to underestimate the possibility of linkage between
our passage and the later passages characterising contraries and contra-
22
dictories in Plato. This sort of problem was occupying Plato's mind
whether or not he had yet worked out the categories. The second argument
(497 d 8 - 479 b 3) takes further Callicles' distinction between the 'good'
man and the 'bad' man, the argument merges into the long argument of
Socrates with himself at 506 c 9f. For Callicles admits that there are
good and bad pleasures. Socrates siezes on this distinction and leads his
opponent to admit that the criterion between good and bad pleasure lies in 
23
the purpose of the action, which in the case of a good pleasure is good.
Here the argument rejoins with discussion with Polus, since Callicles has 
in effect admitted that good may be the object of which requires
an expert^^. In other words the argument has taken a circuitous route to 
the same end as the previous one (Polus'). It is a -
the journey through formal, apparently distant arguments which must be 
undertaken by the accurate dialectician. We see in it the sort of dialectical 
detour that Goldsmith makes a mark of the "constructive" dialogues.What 
has forced Socrates into this longer journey is Callicles' shamelessness. 
Reversing the situation, we may picture Socrates forcing his thought deeper 
and deeper by accepting the strange consequences of his deepest beliefs, 
refusing to abandon them when they are disproved, and working out the sort 
of contradiction that would be an acceptable defeat for him, - but impossible, 
he hoped, for his beliefs.
No one can hold to a contradiction. But the sort of purely verbal 
contradiction that Socrates calls a bogey must not be confused with a genuine
21; Robinson p.40.
22. Dodds 310; Phdo 94 d; 100 af; Rp.583 c 3; 436 ff.
23. 500 a 2.
24. 500 a 6.
25. 465 e; 519 d; Rp. 484 a; 504 B; 435 D.
26. Goldsmith I. p,156-7 ff, codding Symp. 210 a 1-4; Phil 23 b 5-7; Soph 242 b 6
contradiction. It is as much in the interest of his defence as of his 
attack to work out such a theory. Inadvertent blindness to outlandish 
consequences must not be allowed to  ^ MiCjk Socrates into accepting or 
abandoning a position: he surrenders only to a genuine elenchus. The 
frist argument against %Lus contains the germs of this examination.^^
What does it mean to say that pleasure is the same as good and that virtue 
is different from knowledge. Well, good is the 'opposite* of bad, but 
pleasure is not really the 'opposite' of pain because the two are found 
together. The point is formed again at 60 a Phaedo when Socrates comments 
that pleasure and pain are "fastened to a single head". Goodn&ss and
t
badness of course differ to to caelo; and never occur together (&V ^ ^6/
^  c ^ ) . The sort of mistakes Callicles makes about goodness 
can be shown to be wrong by the "logic of the concept" (i.e. because 
the one pair are contradictions and the other pair is not). Another 
favourite trick of Plato's is to point out the relevance of the good to 
all actions: all actions are undertaken for some one's good somewhere, 
real or fancied; and it is a mark of a that ifjgood is objective.
The significance of the "longer road" is that matters are dealt with 
more adequately. A position is defended over a range that is impossible 
given the usual short verbal dialectic. It brings out into the open the 
real grounds of assertion. This does not mean that argument is deductive 
and axiqnatised; but that Plato is beginning to appreciate the importance 
of formal, categorical characteristics which provide arguments powerful 
enough to affect whole classes of propositions - I refer to statements of 
identity and difference, statements of contrariness and contradiction. They 
are the -K concepts with which to begin an elenchus; yet the correct
interpretation of these questions requires doctrine about the various possible 
meanings appropriate in various circumstances. Plato is sensitive to the 
eristic possibilities of the areas and devoted a great deal of attention to 
neutralising them.
27. 496 c 1-4.
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To Callicles* annoyance, Socrates goes on drawing conclusions, but 
28
does so on his own. The intention is to finish the argument. Callicles
has withdrawn his support, and Socrates is obliged to go on with the
argument alone. But he will only do so subject to surveillance by the
other two, who may be provoked by a Socratic lapse into disproving Socrates'
case. He accepts that he must go through the argument speaking his mind 
C 9/ <T
( ). But Socrates makes it clear that he is
subject to the same rules in answering himself, as those to which he
subjects others, for he can be convicted of contradiction at any point.
His excuse for this departure from the normal is that the logos must be
finished ( ) . Quite what is meant by this is not
clear. For Socrates' next step is^to draw a conclusion, but to reconnect
the argument from the beginning. Socrates does not finish the argument
alone in order to save the possibly historical fact that Callicles was never
29converted; for Callicles' gives the assent necessary later. The parallels
do not help because they give us a Socrates who proceeds to draw conclusions 
30 .only. But in The Corgias, the emphasis surely falls on the recapitulation,
31which is shown to be an essential part of the dialectical process. The 
necessary admissions have been made: ademonstration of how the admissions 
interrelate does not require the attendance of an interlocutor. In this 
passage we are treated to Socrates leading out his own thoughts. He is 
restricted to some extent by the admissions made earlier in the argument, 
but the order of the admissions is new, as if he were putting his argument 
into a sort of standard form. Nowhere else before the Corgias does it seem 
likely that Socrates reveals his own side of the battle. Here he takes 
the positive side of a discussion with an imaginary interlocutor: in the
28. 506.
29. 510.
30. Ptgs. 360 d 9; Rp. 350 e 6
31. Phil. 60a; 4 % ; Meno 85 c; Phdo 105 b.
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Other examples of this technique Socrates introduces only an imaginary 
32
eristic. As we shall see, one of the apparent innovations of the Phaedo 
is precisely this: it recommends "considering with oneself" before taking 
the answerer's part — in an effort to avoid premature elenchus, by making 
quite sure what one means by one's answer. In the Gorgias we are given 
something of the same sort, and it is interesting to see that Socrates' 
arguments with himself are not ad hoc, but show considerable similarities 
between one 'positive' argument and another. In his recapitulation, he 
entangles as much as possible of the preceding discussion in an 
uninterrupted chain with which he pulls the discussion tight. At end of 
it he claims that his position is defended by iron and adamantine logoi.
Part of his confidence must come from having defeated the eminently 
suitable Callicles. Part must come from the safety of his own miniscule 
ironwork. But he does not give us a paradigm of deductive inference. Each 
of his steps can be paralleled in the work, rather than summarised from it. 
The first steps are recognisable as agreements reached earlier within the 
confines of a fairly regular continuous argument. The later steps seem to 
be related to the entire Corgias. But it is difficult to say how the steps 
are related to each other. Each step has peculiarities which can be 
explained only by reference to peculiarities of meaning. Thus when it is 
declared that a sophron does what he ought, "what he ought" is itemised into 
good behaviour towards Cod and man and this behaviour includes bravery.
Bravery is a matter of ami bearing the appropriate dangers - abides
own punishment. But the step depends on a doctrine about sophrosynej 
that a sophron does the appropriate thing - whether this doctrine is Socratic, 
Platonic or simply conventional. There is no clear principle necessitating 
the next step. Similarly in (iv) and (v) below he moves from a statement 
about virtue to a statement about the good soul. The most "logical" 
principle in this chain is the inference of the opposite - to say it as
32, Ptgs. 354 Hipp.Maj. 286 c 9.
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Utntechnically as possible. If a good soul is white, then a bad soul is 
black. We show the chain, rather vaguely, below:
/
506 c 6. (i)t^  CO T^O taV
506 c 9. (ii) ^VérKd\
506 c 9 ( H i ) a n d  
-d 2 _ '
ct . and /j
(499 b
(Polus cf. 474 c 5.
500 a 2/3. 
makes for goodness (497 e.
virtue
506 d 7/8 (iv)%^^'ft>j implies order and an art
/  (by ii, i / )
(Polus cf. 476 cf.
(500 e - 1 c; 506 e 
Polus 464 b f
(individualising) 
507 a 1/2 (v) CrJô  ^ (/(^  ^ 3((^
ty ,)\J /
4 w, Cï^ vv4i/r/-î‘v')
(iii, ii, i) 506 e 12 
491 d
507 a 8. (vi)'O â~d)^bjV 'à.
(505 b 9.
(cf. Polus 479 f.
y
37 A:
itemised according to traditional spheres.
507 c 3
. * ^ he stays his punishment 
C , ' • ^
491 d 
L.S.J.l.
491 c 6; 497 e 3-5. 
505 c 3-5
(vii) Q *?© commonplace
e.g. 479 e; 505 b.
(viii) 507 c 9 - 508 a 9
declaration of moral belief; exhortation.
(ix) limits of my proof (a) positive implications:
the discussion I had with Polus and Gorgias remains 
valid esp. in training in orator punishing a fried 
(b) negative implications: there is so much about
the argument I do not know.
nFor my position has always been that I am ignorant of how these things
are, but that I have never met anyone who could say otherwise, no more than
3 3you can, and not appear ridiculous". Dodds (ad hoc) says: "It is as if
Plato had belatedly remembered to make his hero speak in character." For
having claimed much for the validity of the conclusion, he takes it back
again; and repeats his stand at the trial.Jowitt and Hamilton translate
as though odtc ^ refers to Socratic ignorance of
propositions like "It is better to suffer an injury than to injure". But
rather more seems to be involved; for Socrates must always say the sdm^hing
both that he does not know how such things are, and that no one who says
otherwise does not become a laughing stock. Now this boost could be
independent of the propositions — Socrates can prove or disprove anything.
In that case his victory has proved nothing. But his victory has proved
something, if he is only victorious so long as he says the same thing -
namely that it is better to suffer punishment than inflict injury injustly.
On my version, Socrates claims not to know why he is victorious - simply
that these propositions always are: "I don't know why the argument keeps
on turning out the same every time "is a related and frequent complaint in 
35the dialogues. The correct comparison is with Socrates' incredulity at 
the outcome of arguments and lamentations that he has such a gift for making 
things turn out wrong. He claims that no other opinion will cohere, so he 
is dïliged to the truth of the side he takes. All Socrates' beliefs
seem to cohere, and cohere so much that he cannot get away from them. Why 
he cannot he does not know - and here we suspect an ironic concealment. 
Socrates' arguments are the outcome of dialectical skill - the tCSsr
- and a system of ethical beliefs. In so far as we have any 
guide to his secret this "recapitulation" of the Gorgias must be it.
The Gorgias seems to have little connection with the "hypothetico- 
deductive" method; and a great deal to do with the technique of "thinking
33. 509 a 4 Jowitt.
35. e.g. Euthyp. 15 b; 11 b c; Ptgs. 361 a; f; Ch. 175 b.
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to oneself" which begins after an elenchus.Socrates is not sure of 
his deductions, but open to conversion at each point. If any one can 
show him how to get away from one of his beliefs, then he would be free 
to change his mind. Yet the difference between the Phaedo and Gorgias 
seems to lie mainly in the use of the word "hypothesis". The hypothesis, 
as we shall see, is that in virtue of which a subsequent theorem is 
believed, so that some propositions are more important than others. As 
we all know the strength of the chain lies in the adequacy os . : /
of the premisses and in our case especially (i) - (iii). These are the 
'elements' of the chain Plato spends a lifetime exploring. Somehow this 
sort of chain must withstand the pattern preliminary shock - genuine 
elucidation - elenchus. It is worth observing that to get a proper 
answer, you cannot ask for an opinion haphazardly. For behind the answer 
will lie the reasons why the answerer holds it. So a gap is emerging 
between the opinion, or ostensible answer, and the framework of the discus­
sion, which holds the answer in its place and gives it sense. This is
37brought out dramatically at 463 e , where Polus is reprimanded for not 
seeking out the framework behind the answer - which is by and large, our 
steps (ii) and (iii). But^Socrates (or even Callicles) holds extensive 
and fairly coherent views in the wings which are very difficult to roll on 
the narrow dialectical stage, where there seems to be room only for a few 
key destructive words, 1’ i it is necessary to tie one logos to the next 
until one produces the "scene" of the real disagreements. The Gorgias 
chain reminds us that behind the reversals of dialectic in the Cratylus 
or the Laches or the Euthyphro there must be a guiding moral presence, 
which is Socrates. It is Socrates behind the arguments how holds them all 
together. He imposes on each argument the additional requirement of 
philosophy - which for him means a massive harmony of words, deeds and
36. --Infra;- and Ap. -22 e 1.
37. See Cap. IV.
attitudes, and it is philosophy which purifies the argument of eristicism.
The definitions of justice, courage and the rest successively eliminated
in a dialogue are connected with each other by more than chance. But attempts
to trace the line of this connection will be subjective. All such attempts
however have in common that they assume movement towards greater precision,
greater scientific validity. These requirements are not formal only, but
38follow the bases of the "ordinary" conception. Dieterle using apparatus
39provided by Goldsmith so analyses the movement of definition in the Laches.
The definition starts at the level of the interlocutor. Thus the first 
definition of bravery fits hoplite bravery: bravery is to stay and fight, 
cowardice is to flee and not fight. Socrates points out that the Spartans would 
not stay their ground at Plataea, but were still brave ( t u K
). Dieterle claims that Socrates wants to 
point the role of the will in bravery^^; and therefore to correspond to his 
elenchus he elicits by carefully chosen examples the definition: bravery is 
. f ^ _ y , /) ; and from this definition he leads on to
^ • Thus the elenchus in each case is
progressive and constructive. Another version of the "unity of the Laches" 
finds "there is a harmony between the incomplete definitions they offer and 
their own characters. The unity of the Laches rests in this"^^. Yet another 
approach to an elenchtic dialogue is to solve it, as Taylor^^ solves the 
Euthyphro. The point is that dialogues that ostensibly end in aporia give the 
impression nevertheless of constructive line of thought behind them. It is 
difficult to imagine Socrates argue that it is right to escape punishment - in 
the Gorgias, the subject-matter limits his Protean freedom; and enables us 
to see the thought behind the scenes. Yet of course Plato does not claim that 
the thought behind the scenes is definitive, incorrigible or even exactly what 
he means.
38. Diss.Freiburg 1966. p.56 ff.
39. Les Dialogues de Platon 1947.
40. p.65.
41. Laches 191 a; 191 c; 192 b 9; 192 d 10.
42. O’Brien, M.J.Unity of the Laches, Yale Class.Stud.XVIII 1963 p.147.
43. II p.154.
he means. At this juncture enters the "method of hypothesis". It is from 
the beginning associated with the defence of arguments rather than their 
destruction.
II. Hypothesis in the Meno
We shall claim that hypothesis is a method used by the dialectical
answerer, rather than by the dialectical questioner. It is used to make
dialectic comparable to other sciences, which also have their hypotheses,
but the dialectical hypotheses are peculiar, not so much'*\:heir content,
as in the method one must use on them. This method is essential/^ j
dialectical; and its borrowings from other sciences cannot be properly
determined, though it had quite as much influence on other sciences as
other sciences could have had on it. We shall deal with the relevant
dialogues in the order in which they were written. However the^are of
different types. The discussions of hypothesis in the Meno and Republic
seems to be protreptics the study of dialectic, as opposed to the
. . "ho
Study of other disciplines; while the Phaedo is a protreptic virtue, in 
which dialectic is used to settle philosophical and ethical cosmological 
questions in flagrant independence of other sciences. To help our examina­
tion of the Meno we shall examine first what philology can tell us about 
the method of hypothesis, then what the history of mathematics can tell us, 
and finally what the nature of dialectic itself can tell us. In so doing 
we shall face the arguments of those who treat dialectical methods as though 
they were logical methods.
The order Meno - Phaedo - Republic is fixed by internal references and 
general considerations.^^ It is in these three works that the Platonic 
"method of hypothesis" is most advertised and discussed. In the Meno, 
hypothesis is a method of dealing with unknowns ; in the Republic hypothesis 
is defined by relation to the without which is not anything known
which is known. The word and its cognates are frequent in the dialogues of 
all periods; but the word is by no means always accompanied by the method.
44. Phdo 72 e; Meno 81 a; 97 a; Rp. 506 c; 534 b; Stenzel-Allan pp. 6ff; 15 ff
>1%
Even in the early dialogues the verb marks a statement off from its 
neighbours as a genuine unit of the argument. These statements are 'put 
forward’ and should ’stand’ though they have a disconcerting habit of 
reversing themselves. Robinson gives examples of its use in Rp.I.^^ He 
shows subsequently that such statements can be posited ( ),
abandoned ) changed ( ) or hypothesised
i.e. posited as a preliminary ( ’Hypothesis’ in its
use as "something proposed" has been carried back as far as Homer^^, but
the noun is first used to our knowledge in the Vetus Medicina, which is
generally placed in the 440-20 Festugiere (p.26) goes so far as to
say it is %onic for "se proposer a sojjmeme lAACbase pour la recherche" and says 
that it appears in the V.M. with "toute sa valeur prêgnante." Lloyd says he 
can find no clear instance of the verb meaning "assume" before Plato other
than in the V.M. itself " (p.112 n.l.) Heijboer says that hypothesis in
49mathematics is "an important Athenian novelty of the Pelopornesian War."
We may doubt that it originated in Athens. Festugiêre is in favour of a 
Ionian origin; Lloyd, suggests the originator is Philolaus.^^ He says that 
the V.M. "indicates that already in the period before Plato (in all 
probability) medical theorists were familiar with the concept of a postulate
i.e. ^mething which has itself not been proved, but which is assumed as a 
basis for theories and explanations and had discussed the legitimacy of 
making use of such assumptions in different fields of inquiry. It is 
interesting that V.M. is still using the word ^ in the sense of
natural philosophy. (51, 10). That the hypothesis had mathematical uses is 
usually taken as guaranteed by DK 87B13 and Rp.510c.^^ Its medico-mathematical 
use is further shown by Arist.EN.1151 a 16f. If the originator is Philolaos, 
then this collocation of uses is no mystery. The evidence, then, makes of it
45. Robinson I. p.93.
46. 94-5; Classen p.72-8; Taylor C.C.W. I 1967 p.195; Festugiire n,l; p.26.
47. Festugiêre gives Od.IV 163; II.: JŒI 293.
48. Festugiêre, Longrigg 196g. Lloydr: G.E.R 1963.
49. Mnemosyne 1955 p.106 n.2.
50. Lloyd;:, G.E.R. 1963 p. 120.
51. For value of evidence: Einarson 1936 p.33 and Robinson I 152.
a method that was dominant in the decades when Socrates (according to the 
Clouds) was interested in natural science.
Xenophon (Mem IV vi.B) says that Socrates used to lead every question 
back to the hypothesis ( ). In context, this seems to mean
little more than that Socrates corrected particular misjudgements (that x 
is a good man’ ) by reference to general statements about good and bad men. 
The passage contains genuine Socratic echoes, but grossened to an almost 
Johnsonian degree. It also contains the phrase;
Gulley^^ finds this passage is some confirmation "that Socrates^ use of a
method of hypothesis in Plato’s early dialogues is not simply a piece of
Platonic sophistication;" he adds that the basic pattern of the method can
be seen "in exchanges such as those between Euthydemus and Socrates at
Mem.IV.ii". The passage has many Platonic reminiscences, some of which
53could be mistaken for philosophical method . But even supposing that the 
other passage (IV vi) is an unadulterated Xenophantic mpassage, the argument 
for the genuineness of "hypothesis" for Socrates really depends simply on 
the fact that it was a slogan of the period. But the use ^  Xenophon of 
what was a slogan word as much in his day as in Socrates’ surely proves 
nothing about Socrates’ version of the hypothetical method. It certainly 
does not prove a distinctive hypothetical method - which is what Plato’s 
method can claim to be. Little weight can be put on a "hypothetical" method 
for Socrates. The method comes into prominence as the Socratic element in 
the dialogues begins to diminish.
But even if Socrates like everyone else did use the hypothesis notion, 
the middle dialogue use of it would be discontinuous, if only because Plato 
waited until then to emphasise it.
52. 5.p. 51 n 51; 52. /
53. e.g. ii.2 *—  Lysis 233 y ii 40 .—  phdo 100 d;
ii. 10 ; 16 ; 18 ^
^er(p\xuSvdSTU>Y Gorgias 491 b.
We examine the vocabulary associated with the ’Hypothesis-lehfe* 
in the medical corpus. It falls into four main groups,
V,M,Cap I
(a) Jkiipy c^ixâ’pCOfToiàri
Voucrcô\/ ^\zltra>0 ItXl uScn Ttj*/ 3l/o
I (cf De Flatibus Cap,I; 13; 15.)
Festugiêre (ad ^c) assumes that %  is one of the boasts
of the Hypothesis-lehre in fact "ce principe vraiment scientifique qu’il 
vaut mieux un petit nombre de causes que beaucoup, une seule qu’un petit 
nombre ,,," It could of course be merely a charge of skimping; but in view 
of the de Flatibus parallel we shall suppose Festugiêre right in supposing 
that synoptic brevities already an intellectual virtue in Greece - that is, 
before it becomes a prerequisite of the Socratic method, its insufficiencies 
were being pointed out,
(b) 67 j o ô «  ^ ^ 1
t t  ô ^ o td < y fn  À Z  )
The contrast is between methods of procedure in matters known and matters 
unknown, ' ^ c j covers the future, astronomy, and such subjects. The 
mystery is not that the use of hypothesis is restricted to obscure matters;
for it was a wellknown principle that obscure matters had to be dealt with
. -, 54in a special way.
Now as a host of instances show,^^ the usual thing to say about Ùc
is that one has to get at them through . The
shock in our passage is that are replaced by ;
which are by no means proofs or signs, but plain fundamental explanations.
54, Diller, H , H e r m e s  1932 p,14-42; Gomperz, H,Hermes 1933; 
later history: Schuhl, P-M La Fabulation Platonit
1968 p,126-3,
55, Taking Euripides only f. 574; 811; Rh, 705; A(Z240, De Reg I 11, 12 See 
Schuhlop, cit,
As Taylor^^ says; "A hypothesis is what a pre-Socratic writer is most sure 
of." Nor is there any evidence that Socrates’ interlocutors put forward 
their hypotheses tentatively, for correction. The V.M.’s point is that 
the subject matter of medicine is not , because how we fare
physically is known to every layman^^; and because there is already an art 
of medicine in existence - 'C£>€v'^ )with the art of eating. The V.M, does 
not question that procedure by hypothesis is the correct procedure in 
matters unknown. The objection seems to be that hypothesis is inappropriate 
because medicine is manifest, i.e. a matter of sensations, and must be 
studied directly in the sensation, without the mediation of a theoretical 
statement no matter how true it may be. What is wrong with the hypotheses 
AC polemicises^is not that they are tentative, but that they are wrong:
59where is the hot and cold, for example, that is not something else as well? 
V.M, is not above producing a single ’hypothesis’ of its own (VI fin. cf IX), 
but it is not a hypothesis that envisages the existence of any thing that is
not immediately obvious - or, in jargon,^ostensivej'
V.M, tells us that astronomers do not know if they are telling the truth or 
not because "there is nothing by reference to which one must know the truth," 
(ct.Jon^: "For there is no test, the application of which would give certainty"). 
Medicine is in the anomalous position of being an art readily intelligible or 
confirmable by laymen, because of its subject matter, which immediately tells 
you what is true and what is not true if only you have experienced it yourself 
or watched others experience it. The ’art’ is an inherited memory, a short 
cut, if you like, which saves you from finding out the properties of hellebore 
the hardway. Furthermore this is the only sort of knowledge possible and 
anyone wishing to know the nature of man must approach his goal via medicine
56, Taylor p.438, 57, II 14 Loeb,
58, e,g. III, V, 59, XIII; XX.
kbecause medicine is more given than the other areas of investigation^^.
I think, in fact, the emphasis is on the anomalous position of medicine, 
rather than on the tentativeness of hypothesis.
(d)/W<L.T^
Î  Y i i /p \r T * . i Tf- ïïiv 'T é r i é t r '  r , ^ ‘n
Hypothesis is a theoretical method, employed by intellectual empire - 
builders like Empedocles. It claims to simplify complex questions, it is 
neither traditional nor practical. But the art of medicine already exists, 
and if there are any di^onances between hypothetical and traditional 
medicine, then the fault lies with the former.
Diller was so impressed by the apparent similarities between the 
opening chapters of V.M. and Plato that he thought that the V.M. is a reply 
to Platonic complaints about empe^iria. His suggestion has not met with 
acceptance. Kuhn^^has pointed out that the language of V.M, (e.g. above
) pre-supposes an Eleatic rather than an Academic 
adversary. However the similarities of vocabulary remain. We, may add 
for instance that the use of l^ Vd. above does not seem to be found
in Isocrates or Xenophon, Yet together with it occurs
in Plato in the context of the theory of forms, and in contexts in which 
a standard is required,The language of hypothesis passed to rhetoric 
too. But I have not been able to find an Isocratean or Lysian passage in 
which this vocabulary is methodologically significant. Most of the 
vocabulary seems to be completely absorbed into normal oratorical method, 
Kuhn^^ finds that Isocrates does carry over in his use of hypothesis and
60, Cap,XX,
61, Kühn 1956 Hermes Eiri^ .g|icKriften Heft 11, esp, pp.47 ff; cf Lloyd GER, 
Phronesis 1963 108-21; Longrigg, J, Medicine & Philosophy Harv.Stud, 
Class,Phil, 1963, 147-75 e.g. 157 ff,
62, e.g. Phdo 76 D; Lys 219 c; Gorg, 487 e; Cratylus 425 D,* see later 
chapter on Memory; Lloyd I, p,125; Cohen 1969 130 f; Herod,II 23,
63, p,47.
the relation O  ^ ^ ^  (Antid 76; Areop.28; Nicocl.9 etc.). We can
add the Platonic parallel Laws 631a, where the context is also rhetorical. 
Words like "Ÿ are freely used in developed senses by V,M,^ Plato
and Isocrates, What is from this discussion is that though
hypothesis may have had a distinguished history behind it in natural science, 
with which Socrates may have been acquainted, the associated vocabulary has 
been absorbed into the dialogues at a level lower than the level of the "method 
of dialectic" described in the middle dialogues. That at any rate is billed 
as something special, and my hunch is that Plato reformed the general use of 
hypothesis rather than adopted it,
Plato himself seems to have been impressed by the of the
word - a putting underneath. It is impossible that he took advantage of the 
form of the word to create a triumphantly new sense,
Philology then can tell us little about the method. The important fact 
to be retained is that ’hypothesis’ is likely to have been a well-known term 
of art in "theoretical" branches of investigation; but which branch of 
investigation is not established,
B, Plato tells us that the hypothetical method he used in the Meno is
an importation from mathematics. The Meno was written at a time when the 
influence over Plato of Pythagoreanism and mathematics was increasing,
The ’Meno’ uses other terms of art from mathematics besides ’hypothesis’.
The Slave passage contains (82 d 6) ; /f S 4j
(ct, )84c^^. But Robinson looked for the influence of
mathematics on the "hypothetical" treatment of "virtue is knowledge" and 
had difficulty hiding any such influence: "The method of analysis and the
64. Von Fritz/938/63, p,63 Classen p,77; Thompson ES, Meno p,146; 
Robinson I 98 seems unsympathetic to Plato’s impish use of language 
Phdo lOlD Bluc^ p,93, Heiboer 1955 p,122; Euth.lld'.
65, Gorg, 508 c; Schuhl 1968 29-32, etc.
method in the Meno both include the act of hypothesising. But they have
no further resemblance; they do not use the act in the same way,"^^
Rejecting the method of analysis, he gives us no other mathematical method 
in lieu. He characterises the ’act of hypothesising’ in the Meno as positing 
p to prove q, of which it is the equivalent^^. Bluclf ^ alls the Meno method 
apagoge, and quotes Arist.An. Priora 69 a 20, to show that Aristotle thought 
of the Meno as apagoge. He then argues in a double fashion: that
(87 a) makes it unlikely that hypothesis was fully a mathematica)term^^;
 ^ 72.
and if it was, ^ the term applies to apagoge, Heijboer agrees that the
word is not fully mathematical; but takes the method to refer to giving
diorismof (determination^ which state the limits of possibility within
which the theorem applies (e.g. Eucl, El, VI, 28),
72Cornford supposes that that the Meno does refer to the method of 
analysis, but that analysis might be intuitive: "the prior truth cannot, 
of course, be deduced or proved from the conclusions it must be grasped 
( ^p. 511 b) by an act of analytical penetration, "Robinson^^
points out that in Euclid XIII 1-5 the finding of the requisite true 
proposition by analysis is a deductive process, and that the synthesis is 
simply the analysis in reverse, Gulley^^ proves by examination of Pappus 
on hypothesis (Thomas, Greek Mathematical Works II 596-9 Loeb, Hultsch VII 
634-6) that two sorts of analysis were known in antiquity - analysis proper 
in which steps of the analysis are reciprocal; and intuitive analysis, in 
which the steps of the analysis are not reciprocal, and therefore not
67, p,121 Robinson
68, Robinson I p,117
69, Meno p.80 f,
70, p, 93,
71, 106 n,2; 122 (1955),
72, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, Allen, R,E, p,61-97 p,68 f Mind 1933 p,43,
73, Mind 1936 464-473; Essays in Greek Philosophy 1969, pp.1-16, ’Analysis 
in Greek Geometry,
74, Phronesis 1958 pp.1-15 ÿ.
convertible into a synthesis. He finds evidence in Aristotle for a theory 
of analysis in which analysis-steps are not convertible: at Anal,Post 78 a 11 f 
Aristotle says that mathematical propositions are oftener convertible than 
propositions of dialectic. The inference is that Aristotle allows "the 
practice of a form of mathematical analysis in which the implications are 
reciprocal, and recognise(s) that very many mathematical propositions are 
convertible; (the remarks) imply at the same time that some are not 
convertible: they do not themselves present a formulation of a method of 
geometrical analysis in which the analysis is deductive,Analysis of 
this intuitive type, of course, does not lead to statements of possibility 
or impossibility: failure to find a solution implies nothing. But Gulley’s 
revision of ’Cornford on Analysis’ does not make the difficulties of the 
Meno any easier. There is still no sign of hypothesising the desired 
conclusion: instead the hypothesis appears to be, by consensus, that "Virtue 
is Knowledge", But it seems that "virtue is good" is not inferred from 
"virtue is knowledge"; but somehow j to be in a special relation to
the proposition in a fashion Gulley allows.
However, Aristotle can also be read as an account of the distinction 
between two methods of analysis - the mathematical and the dialectical, which 
have different strengths. Because mathematics abounds in definitions, the 
mathematical method of analysis is reciprocal, whereas the dialectical, because 
of its weakness in definition, cannot often enjoy reciprocal analysis. This 
fits in with the theory that the two methods of hypothesis - mathematical and 
dialectical are distinct,
Bluck takes this loosening a step further: he accepts Aristotle’s version 
of the matter. At Anal,Prior, 69 a 20, Aristotle seems to give an example 
called from the Meno: apagoge is a means of "proving" that justice is teachable, 
if it is clear that knowledge can be taught, but not clear whether or not 
justice is knowledge. Now apagoge according to Aristotle is as follows when
in Syllogistic form:
All knowledge is teachable I
virtue is knowledge II
virtue is teachable III
Now I is a generally accepted proposition 20; 25)
assumed for the purpose of proving I I I . P l a t o  does say that his 
proposition I is TKv/fi (87 c 2) but no weight seems to be put
on this property of the proposition. But for Aristotle’s syllogistic way 
of thinking the assumption of I on the grounds that it is
is very important. He goes on to say that the minor must be more probable,
or equally strong as, the conclusion before we can call a syllogism an
apagoge. In other words, an apagoge is a syllogism that does not carry .
conviction, because the major is , the minor probable and the
conclusion - voluntary. Aristotle says an epagoge can bring us nearer
knowledge, if for example there are few mediations between the minor and
the conclusion. In an apagoge you believe more strongly in the minor than
in the conclusion. Apagoge is part of the logic of dialectic, and Ross
(ad ^c) cites Topics 159 b 8 - 23; 160 a 11-14. These are descriptions
of what an answerer ought to cede in terms of ^ ^
in other words, not Plato’s view of «f^ jjA^ at all. Nor is it clear what
use such an argument would be to Plato. Now Aristotle has his own use
78for the notion of hypothetical syllogism, which is part of the logic of 
demonstration. A hypothetical syllogism requires an additional agreement
i.e. all A is B, all B is C, all A is C: if A is C then C is D. The 
additional agreement is underlined. This sort of arrangement could fit 
the Meno, but it is rejected by Socrates (89 c), who subjects the additional 
agreement to examination,
Shorey noticed that Aristotle seems to have the Meno in mind in the 
Analytics (Ross p,373 AJ.P.X 1889 452), Shorey gives three references: the
77, Using Ross’ •»' •
78, Anal.P^, 50a 16 ff.
^1
locus we have already dealt with, and passages at 67 a 21 f and 71 a 29 f.
In the latter cases the dialogue is named. The first of them is a criticism 
of the Meno Anamnesis doctrine set out in language Plato would never have 
dreamed of using:
/ . > , . r,. /
67 a 21^  /j  ^ ‘  o o f k j ^ u  ^  IT V ^H M ver, ^
%%,/ (CuK lï)< rïï< ^ ^  d v ^ ^ v u /p f jo v T ^ s  ’
-k W  p ôôhç ^r<
S^'Ô
Obviously we are being given Aristotle’s version of the Meno in which his 
purpose is to counteract the tendencies of Plato’s examples. Similarly 
71 a 29 is plain Aristotelian solution: Menons difficulty does not occur 
if we make the proper distinction between simple knowledge and qualified 
knowledge: 71 b 6 f
Bluck has given no reasons for thinking that Aristotle’s handling of 
the hypothetical episode is any more sympathetic. But there are reasons 
for thinking that the episode sets Aristotle a terminological puzzle which 
he would be likely to solve in the way he has. For the choosing of the 
hypothesis in the Meno has a syllogistic flavour (all knowledge is taught, 
virtue is knowledge ,,,), But it is not a hypothetical syllogism since 
it is not ratified at 89 c. So nothing is proven. Yet the "hypothetical" 
method is supposed to be a help, an aid ( ) - this again
suggests something other than a hypothesis. For Aristotle the Meno method 
brings us nearer to knowledge, even though we cannot say what it is. For 
Plato, and for mathematicians, the ’help’ given by a hypothesis should be 
more substantial than that - it should be the jumping off ground for a
/
4^
solution. Apagoge, then, is what Plato should have called his method. The 
sting is, that it proves nothing, but carries some persuasive force; and 
it does not prove anything about the relation between hypothesis and arche.
For Plato’s diagnosis of the error cZ is wrong as usual^  thinks
Aristotle^ he has no understanding of the acceptable limits of the hypothetical 
method i,e, the need for the additional agreement; and his apagoge never 
reaches the status of demonstrative syllogism,
Bluck also insists that what is brought into play when I move backwards 
to find a construction or the starting point of a proof is my noesis. Now noesis 
links to anamnesis - my "faculty", the nature .of my thought, is reason why 
I can do mathematics intuitively, in the absence of techniques, algorithms 
and convertible analyses. It seems appropriate to point out that the distinc­
tion between procedure and intuition follows codification and axi<JHatisation 
rather than precedes it. For instance, if anyone had asked Hippocrates "How
do you come to reduce the circle like that?" I think it unlikely he would 
/reply: meaning "by intuition: by genius," He would have said:
"I proceed so because I can treat a parallelogram so ,,," i,e, he would have 
explained his procedure with reference to and not bothered about
the "upward path" leading to it; and this because, if mathematics was not 
fully axiqnatised and method not fine-honed, he would not be as conscious 
as we are of the difference between "obvious" and "achievable by application 
of method". This sort of work was being done by Leodamas and others during 
Plato’s lifetime^^; and it is often suggested that axiomatisation and 
codification is the main use of the hypothetical method in mathematics. But 
it seems to go too far to imag^that a mathematical method ever included an 
"intuitive jump", Platonic notions of the ’upward way’ and ’noesis’ would 
be siezed on after it had become clear that certain ’intuitive’ methods are 
irreducible. Nor is there any evidence that Platonic was fascinated by the 
’intuitive’ element of a special mathematical method, like hypothesis - apagoge.
79, Lee CQ 1935, 117 f; Gulley 1958 p.5-9; Lasserre, F 1964 p,107. Birth of 
Mathematics in the Age of Plato, Canford op,cit, p.66 (Allen)(= Mind 1932 
p.41 f).
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We cannot identify the mathematical method with any certainty. But
some critics have admitted the arguments of Cornford and Gulley but assumed
that reciprocal analysis is used here simply because it fits so well. Among
80these are Stahl and Sayre. Sayre says: "There is of course no necessity 
that this characteristic of convertibility was part of all geometrical methods 
referrred to as "analysis" ... Gulley allows, nonetheless that ’there is at 
leas^ no doubt that Gréek geometers were aware that a large number of geometri­
cal propositions were convertible.." Apparently this is enough for Sayre who 
proceeds to show that there is no contradiction in assuming that convertibility 
is assumed in the Meno and Phaedo. As the evidence can be made coherent by 
this assumption, it follows that the assumption is rightly made. But no effort
is made to prove that it is better interpretation to assume it, than not to 
81assume it. Stahl bases himself on the claim of the geometrical example to
have conclusive force. He claims that if ’Virtue is knowledge’ is taken as
hypothesis, then deductions are made from it - virtue is teachable, virtue has
teachers; and so the method is traditional analysis! Stahl’s arguments will
be dealt with later, but one objection may be brought here: if analysis runs
Virtue is Knowledge - virtue is taught - virtue has teachers, how does synthesis
run? If it runs : virtue has teachers ^ ^  virtue is knowledge, then the
method is intolerably \/tfi,platonic. For Plato the "higher" reason must come first.
Blass in the early C19 was already acquainted with thirty solutions to
82the mathematical problem which illustrates hypothesis, and they have multiplied
since. Trying to work out the meaning of the passage by working out the
mathematical problem first is obscurum per obscurius. It was some such method
83as this that probably led Farquharson to reach his conclusion that "the 
hypothesis is the assumption that a construction may be provisionally assumed, 
the employment in an exact science of an indirect method of enquiry..." But 
even if the correct mathematic A* were available, the issue of what is meant by
W . p.22 n.l.
81, p.412 f; 417 f.
82, Heijboer p,88 f,
83, CQ 1923 p,26.
’hypothetical method’ would be logically independent of it.
Certain things can be said about the mathematical method however.
First, it is a specific technique, and not a general term for mathematical 
method: mathematicians use this method only some of the time.^ '^  Second it 
involves refusing to answer a question about this circle and this quadri­
lateral. We follow Bluck (ad $oc) against Friedlqnder and Stahl in assuming 
that is used absolutely in both cases (86 e 3; 87 b 3), But
once this is done, then the hypothesising is detachable from the mathematical 
example given. For the example given is a determinatio, setting out the 
limits of possibility. But the method in virtue of which or as part of which 
the determinatio is given is the hypothetical - which may only have an 
#|cidental connection with the fact that the illustration given is an 
illustration of a determinatio. This is even more the suggestion is
accepted that ÔiTû implies that "hypothesising" was not a
term of the mathematical artt^Gaiser (p.26 6ff) shows clearly how the notion 
of hypothesis must have changed between the pre-Platonic days when it meant 
"grundlegende, allgemef^ultige V o r a u s s a n d  its post-Platonic days 
when it is an assumption that may be confirmed or contradicted. He claims 
that this is unlikely to be completely the work of Eleatics and their 
"indirect proofs" or reduction^ absurdum. For Plato emphasises the role 
of a higher, more adequate hypothesis, that seems to have no part in 
Eleaticism. Unfortunately Gaiser’s subsequent argument relies heavily on 
readings of the mathematical problem, which we have eschewed. Also he 
spoils his ideas by going too farj his is one of the few treatments which 
appreciates the double movement in the Meno - upwards to a confirming 
supraordinate hypothesis (bestiy)^/%K^^Determination) and downwards to a 
consequence (teachability)• But he takes the consequence to lead into 
questions of empirical experience or investigation (are there teacher^ and 
the supraordinate hypothesis to lead back to elementary postulates. The
84. 86 e 5.
notion of empirical experience is a red herring, though he uses it. The 
notion of elementary postulates is not in the Meno. The fact that both 
the mathematical and the ethical discussions can in Gaiser*s opinion divide 
into five stages is not a safe proof of the extent or nature of the 
parallelism.
C. As neither philology nor mathematics helps us much it seems best to
examine the Platonic evidence more carefully, and largely independently of 
other areas of evidence. The most obvious course is a survey of any dis­
continuities between the "method of the dialogues as practised before the 
Meno and as practised after it. But no such discontinuity leaps to the eye
- except of course that later works are more ambitious than earlier ones, and
show us more of the supposed "workings of Socrates’ mind". If we look for 
a discontinuity in talk about method, then the answer is that there is more 
talk about hypothesis; but little of it seems to connect with the hypotheses 
of the Meno. True, the phrase ^
is used at Rp.510 b ff to describe both the method of dialectic and the
method of mathematics; and the dialectical method is praised for the handling 
of hypothesis possible within it,((^ tïcthe geometrical method of handling 
hypotheses is dispraised. A knowledge of the hypothetical method is assumed 
almost from the start of the Phaedo (92 d) and the people who most undastand 
it are mathematicians - Simmias and Cebes. But whereas in the Meno the
method of hypothesis is decried, in the Republic it is only half decried, and
in the Phaedo praised as Socrat^ ft,* method. We sbaLl see that to think &0
this is to misinterpret the Phaedo: in the Phaedo, too, the mathematical
method of hypothesis is inferior to the dialectical method. The three dialogues
represent varying degrees of coolness towards the method. But there is a 
further difficulty. In the Rp., dialectic proceeds
(singular); while mathematics proceeds ^ (plural) .^^Now 
the Meno the mathematical method appears to demand a singular ad hoc hypothesis.
85. Rp. 510 b 8; 510 b 5.
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The plural mathematical,hypothesis" seeun^ to refer to elements of mathematics 
that have little connexion with ad hoc arguments. These "hypotheses" are 
axioitb, basic postulates, existence theorems, or what have you^^ — but not 
determinations, mere theorems or reductions. It is quite possible that in 
the Republic Plato is importing a non-mathematical (rhetorical or dialectical) 
use of the word hypothesis into mathematics to describe hypotheses that only 
Plato regarded as hypotheses ... It begins to look as though the connection 
between the Meno method of hypothesis and the Rp. method of hypothesis is 
accidental and temporal onlyI Similarly there is a lack of cohesion between 
the Phaedo and the Republic. The Phaedo method (100 ff) is tentative, the Rp. 
method is decisive; there is also an possible tension within the Phaedo itself 
between the method at 100 ff and the method of hypothesis which is assumed 
elsewhere. The Meno passage looks like an attempt to point out the differences 
of mathematical method in dialectic; it takes a small hypothesis and contrives 
an elenchus for it. The Phaedo and Rp. may be generalisations of this same 
elenchus i.e. the later method of hypothesis bears the same relation to the 
Meno passage as the Phaedo doctrine of Recollection bears to the Meno doctrine 
of Recollection. Both Recollection and Hypothesis have connections with non- 
Platonic origins which are not specifiable.
We must first recognise the existence of a hypothetical method within 
dialectic. Arguments have a "hypothetical" necessity within them i.e. if A 
is granted, no matter whether true or not, then B must be granted. The 
hypothesis is "assumed" to be true and thereby restricts the rest of the 
argument. It does not seem to matter whether the "hypothesis" is an agreement 
about method, or a proposition in the argument. Consider the passage at 
Gorgias 454 c: / h r ^ , / ,
"td- ^  ^  (T T -o tcd
86. 510 c 3; Hare 1965 p.24; Taylor C.C.W. 1967, 195 ff; Robinson I 152 ff.
Dodds (ad loc) rightly says the word may have no technical meaning in
this passage. He translates "foundation" and takes it that the refers to the
87
definition of oratory first given. Classen calls it a Prinzip fiir eine
_Jiskussion and says its parallel is Rp. 341 b 8 —  346 b 2, where the verb
88refers to an initial definition . But there is slightly more to it. An
astonishing amount of the Gorgias is taken up with emphasising the rule of
question and answer, and how one either answers or asks questions. At points
in the dialogue people change roles. Polus and Gorgias promise to answer short 
89 . ,
answers, a promise which cannot be withdrawn though any other statement of
90
the argument may . So it is possible that hypothesis at 454 c refers to
this methodological agreement. The important point to remember is true on
both interpretations, that once put forward, the hypothesis can only be
withdrawn explicitly. The answerer is as much bound by his own answer, as
the questioner is bound by the reply to his question. This restriction on 
the liberty of the answerer is clear in a similar passage from the Hippias 
Major. Socrates has just solved a difficulty in the definition of beauty by 
invoking the following possibility; a sight-and-sound object may be beautiful, 
but the sight-object and the sound-object need not be beautiful.
302 e 11 f. . » ■ -I c
Hippias; y
Socrates of course goes on to show that there is another question to be dealt 
with first. Hippias is a very bad dialectician, but his readiness to accept
a hypothesis as true is typical of the interlocutors. For Hippias the
87. p.73 Classen
88. Op.cit. 97.
89. 448 e; 449.
90. 461 d; 462 a.
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the acceptance of a hypothesis is the end of something.
There is another parallel at Euthyphro 9 d 6 f;
Euthyphro: 'tt ^
Socrates: o u d ^  O V  Tô
^  *35"ro ($’ÎTE56'^ jjUéVb^  ^ é r
Euthyphro is putting faward a definition.
The division of role between answerer and questioner is clear. The
next step^^both Euthyphro and Gorgias is the examination of consequence.
The hypothesising, which for most people is a help towards something else
because it i#\ true corresponds in elenchus to the point at which Socrates
says : hold it; we must go no further, and of course it is in the
effort to go no further that Socrates begins his questions. The "going no
further" is the hypothesising; the consequences must follow not lead. The
sense of hypothesis that comes through most plainly is a feelingfixity.
As far as the interlocutors are concerned there is no sense of tentativeness,
no notion that a hypothesis is put forward as an approximation to be
dispensed with. Their view usually is that it is an adequate approximation.
Now Robinson explains that hypothesis begins life as a proposition,
posited for the proof of some other proposition, a premiss and not a
demonstrand."^^ but, he says, the verb hypothesize" came to "assume" the
sense of ’posit in order to test’. It came to assume this meaning because of
two similarities (a) a hypothesis is the beginning of a train of thought both
in elenchus and elsewhere (b) in both elenchus and elsewhere, the hypothesis
is posited by the answerer. In indirect elenchus the answer is posited at
the beginning of the refutation. In other words, in any report of a Socratic
elenchus, the purpose of eliciting a hypothesis seems to be to destroy that
92hypothesis. But Classen seems to find only five cases of hypothesis adduced 
as assumptions under condition that they might meet with contradiction; they
91. Robinson I p.113.
92. op. cit. 77.
41
are Phaedo 94 B 1; 107 B 5; "%^ ,mae(& 61 D 3(bis); Theaet. 165 P 1. But none 
of these unambiguous» His examples of hypothesis introduced as assumptions 
with the possibility of contradiction expressed come without exception from 
the Parmenides. In other words, in dialogues usually agreed to be early, 
the notion of "hypothesis" must be in the process of being reformed; and the 
interlocutor brings to the conversation a notion of hypothesis foreign to the 
elenchus.
At 454 c, Socrates must draw out Gorgias’ conclusions in the way that
most accurately reflects meaning: Gorgias must state his own opinion.Socrates
had no hand in it. Now at any moment an answer in the spirit of a hypothesis
may cease to reflect the real dialectic. For an answer "in the spirit of"
previous answers may be an insincere answer which the answerer will give for
93the sake of the argument. This is the difficulty of Theaetetus. _
k v   ^ S ^cS liC p ^T e^  I ^  4^JV
The procedure seems to be that Socrates having proved a "hypothesis" is
, not for another hypothesis, but:
(Hipp.Maj.303 d).
The moral of Socrates’ triumph is the same in the Meno - namely, that you 
do not at all know what you are talking about unless you give me the right
answer. Concentrate on the arche ( ), he seems to say:
concentrate on the first answer — you will not get subsequent answers right, 
if that answer was wrong. So what is new in the Meno, that might have led 
to the elaboration of dialectical method with regard to hypothesis?
No answer seems to be forthcoming if we look for a special type of thing 
to be a hypothesis. Robinson has shown that the verb is not restricted to
. . .  94definitions or existential propositions.
93. Theaetetus 154 c 10 f.
94. Robinson I p.99 ff.
A second approach takes '^ hypothests*^  to mean a concept, Supporters of the 
approach
. . point to the mathematicians? hypotheses of Rp. 510 d, which are circles
and triangles not forms of words^^. But C.C.W. Taylor has shown that there 
is no use of hypothesis in which the word must not refer to a proposition.^^ 
Gosling translates 510 c as "hypothesising that there is such a thing as the 
odd and the even" where the ’odd’ and the ’even’ seems to mean little more than 
areas of interest, subjects of investigation.^^ Getting at the meaning of 
hypothesis through its content does not seem to be particularly fruitful.
D We divide Meno 86 d 3 - 87 c 10 into three sections.
(a) 86 d 4 - e; Simply states the circumstances they find themselves in: 
the pair know nothing about what virtue is (or ’the real virtue’) neither 
what it is nor what sort of thing it is. They wish to find out the answers 
to these questions, but Meno wants to know the answer to the logically 
posterior question first.
(b) 86 e - 87 b 1: AA J
is probably a pun.
How can mathematicians help? Now ^  îTBrt
is a way of examining dark matters where direct knowledge is minimal, as
it is for V.M. But Socrates specifies how this is to be done. In the 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the same meaning in each
occurrence. It is unclear whether emphasises the technicality^^
of the expression, or its metaphorical sense. So we are hard put oto it
to find the necessary innovation of technique. I reconcile matters by
claiming that (87 a 2) is used by a mathematician, explaining
his action through a metaphor regardless of the technicality of the expression;
95. Hare, R.M. Stenzel-Allen p.85; 36 ff.
96. Taylor C.C.W. 1967 p.193-203 esp.195 ff.
97. 1973 p.Ill f.
98. E. de Striker op.cit p.146.
99. Bluck:Meno p.92 etc.
and at 87 a 9 and 86 e 4 he states his method emphasis, its technical 
use. Both uses of ^ (87 a 9; 87 b 4) may or may not be 
absolute: their parallelism points to it (Bluck ad foe).
Three elements seem to be involved in "hypothesising". First comes 
the choosing of the hypothesis relevant to the problem. This hypothesis 
is certainly used as a base for further operations; and is something 
independently known. Choosing the hypothesis is concurrent with a denial 
of any knowledge whether this triangle fits into this circle. Second is 
the announcement: "I am willing ( = can) to tell you the answer hypothetically" 
( in this sort of context ="I am able," "I can legitimately ...").
The hypothesising has occurred - and a result follows. The third element
does not occur in our passage, and that is the question, how much knowledge
my hypothesis can give me. A "diorismic" hypothesis states limits of 
possibility, and can therefore tell me whether or not my problem is capable 
of solution. A merely heuristic hypothesis can fail without giving me any 
information at all. The example Plato has actually chosen is an ambiguous 
one. For the example chosen is diorismic; it takes the form of a construc­
tion which may or not be possible; the ’hypothesis’ can be put into the
,. f , , ,
form: if p, then q; or it can be put into the form, p where p yields the
desired result, q. How many of these elements are paralleled in the ethical
discussion is not obvious.
(c) 87 b 1 - 87 c 9
The first sentence corresponds to section (a). YTom i t
corresponds to section (b). It is repeated from (a) that we neither know 
ÏI 'io ffi/' X{ • ill these circumstances, mathematicians
say ^^ 6-/ iootoir. . B  0^ 1 the emphasis is on
knowledge of the quality - there is no suggestion that a mathematician ever 
knows C> 7f • Stahl on the other hand claims that this confusion
is merely the result of Plato’s terminological carelessness,comparing 
Meno 97 b 11. For Stahl, the mathematician and Plato hypothesise the "what
100. Stahl 1960 p.412; n.l; 413; n.l.
%it is", (cf. Phdo 93 c 10 where C> v^ o ô ’érj^^U ’OX refers
to a definition). The question becomes: "being what would it be such?"
But such a question is only appropriate to the ethical example, and only 
occurs in an ethical context. The form of the mathematical procedure is 
"if it is such ..." which by-passes "being what would it be such?"; and 
the form of the ethical example seems to press the point that here we
deal only with a posterior question
^  ô t o y  , It is difficult to see how the question "what it is..."
arises in this mathematical problem. What the mathematician assumes is the
hypothesis that it is so.
That virtue is such - becomes that_'virtue is knowledge . It is very
much the sort of thing one expects Socrates to say - though he is quite
capable of attacking the proposition as in the Laches. The statement A "if
virtue is knowledge, then virtue is teachable" is also typicaH^Socrat^C; as
is "if you say virtue is teachable, then you must produce teacher/pupils of
it."^^^ A couple of typically Socratic ploys are here used in a new way;
neither of the pl^ys is questioned, or thought to be uncertain. At 89 d when
Socrates refuses to withdraw A he uses a word associated with hypothesis
). But A cannot be a foundation (to continue the metaphor,
it is a coping stone). Equally, in the mathematical method of analysis, the
hypothesised proposition is simple - from which a second proposition is
deduced. It is generally agreed that the "hypothesis" in the mathematical
102sense is "virtue is knowledge" - a proposition which is then apparently 
proven. The hypothesis is used to prove "virtue is teachable". Robinson 
describes it as follows: "(The hypothetical method) is a method for deciding 
whether a given proposition, say q, is true or false; and it consists in 
abandoning the attempt to prove or disprove q directly and finding some other
101. cf. Ptgs. 319 C-E; Laches 185 B f; Alcib.Maj. 110 f; Xen.Mem. 3, 5, 21; 
4, 2, 2. Heinimann Rh.Mus.1951 p.126 f; 106 n.7.
102. Bluck:Meno p.86, n.4 and his loci; Gaiser p.282.
3^proposition, say p, which is equivalent to q, so that q must be true if p 
is true and must be false if p is false. "The links between the two parts
of A is thought of as equivalence. But Robinson is obliged to ignore the
H I 103verbal indications of the presence of 1 sewhere in the argument,
and he gives no reason for, nor fruits of, Plato’s sudden interest in the
equivalence relation. Bluck makes more use of the fact that the only
proposition to be called a hypothesis in the Meno is "virtue is good" (87 d 1-3)
"If the premiss from which ’virtue is knowledge’ is deduced is only itself a
... and if the reasoning as a whole is necessarily provisional,
since has not been defined, it can only be true in a very special
sense to say that that ’virtue is knowledge’ is proved’ This special
sense, he suggests, is that it is said conditionally on the truth of a higher
hypothesis. Bluck’s approach seems to me to contain the germs of the correct
answer, but he has assumed too much when he thinks that 6 (î^
simply means conditionally. For what is "hypothetical" in
our sense in the mathematical proof is not the truth of the hypothesis, which,
if true, is true; but the adequacy of the hypothesis ^  to the proof of the
second proposition. The link from the hypothesis to the second proposition
is some form of implication. It is because I know the hypothesis that I can
attempt the question, but I cannot tell whether my knowledge of the hypothesis
will yield me knowledge of the solution to the problem. If my hypothesis is
a determinatio, or if my analysis is a matter of reciprocal implication, then
the failure of the hypothesis will always yield knowledge. Plato proceeds
to prove the hypothesis. But there is no reason to suppose that he is here
following mathematical method. He has given an answer in a mathematical
way, dependent on what would be a theorem of a Socratic theory if Socrates
could prove anything; but the next dialectical thing to do is to prove the
103. Robinson I.p.118 The notions of h^hesis ... are running in Socrates’ 
mind, so he has a tendency to use them on any aitable or even speciously 
suitable occasion.
104. Bluck Meno p.88.
Hhypothesis. This proof takes the place of the construction in the mathematical 
example without being at all the same thing. In fact the broad outlines of 
the last section of the Meno read like the use of dialectical methods on a 
man trained only in mathematics: A correct "mathematical proof by hypothesis" 
is given; but it falls victim just the same to Socrates’ gift of reversal.
It follows that the mathematical - hypothetical method is inadequate in 
dialectic.
But the Meno is especially important to us because the two halves of 
the argument are treated together as part of a whole. Certain propositions 
hold throughout the argument, certain propositions are withdrawn and replaced. 
How, in the midst of the general reversal, to keep our heads and avoid 
concluding that argument is foolish and there is no truth anywhere ? I 
suggest the answer lies in the structure that binds the two arguments 
together, and in its message, that without knowledge of an arche no knowledge 
is possible.
Robinson’s difficulty lies in finding one proposition to be the 
hypothesis. This question applies only to the mathematical method. The 
dialectical method quite obviously has lots of hypotheses, varying in type. 
Lynne E. Rose has given an elegant demonstration of this.^^^ He writes out 
the first argument of what I shall call the Meno diptych as follows:
1. Knowledge is taught
2. If virtue is knowledge, virtue is taught (1)
3. Virtue is good
4. All good is profitable
5. Thus virtue is profitable (3, 4)
6. If something in the soul is profitable, it is knowledge
7. Thus virtue is knowledge (5, 6)
8. Virtue is taught (2, 7)
105. Rose, L.E.Journal of Hist.of Philosophy 1970 pp.1-8 esp. p.3,
He points out that 3 is called a hypothesis 87 d 3; that 2 is treated as a 
hypothesis at 89 d 4, if not at 89 c 4; and that 7 is called a hypothesis at 
89 c 4 where ^ 'SlTz> Ob c ~i \/ is in loose apposition to (S'
(there seems no reason to accept this"explicit reference" but Stahl p.413), 
Now if 2 is treated as a hypothesis by virtue of the phrase £>^K
then he argues (4 ff) that 6 must be a hypothesis because it is also withdrawn.
If 2, 3, 6, 7 are treated as hypotheses, but only two of them are called 
hypotheses, it follows that there may be many more. Now this argument does 
not help us with mathematical hypothesis, but it does luring out the 
proliferation of hypothesis natural in dialectic. 2 and 6 are ’hypotheses’ 
because they are withdrawn - the withdrawal of a hypothesis has no role in 
the mathematical method. Unfortunately the argument is not strong enough to 
establish that 2, 3 are ’mathematical’ hypotheses; and 6, 2 are dialectical.
Nor can we be sure that 6 is simply withdrawn, for Plato represents it, as 
we shall see as a misdeduction, and consequently, not an independent hypothesis. 
For Rose^^^ a hypothesis remains a hypothesis after deduction from a higher 
hypothesis. He envisages a chain of them descending from the good. A 
hypothesis is what may be questioned; i.e. withdrawn from a specific argument 
in order to justify the hypothesis more fully. We must hold fast to the idea 
of a chain.
Simplifying greatly we get the following:
1 virtue is good
p virtue is knowledge
q virtue is teachable
r virtue has teachers.
Now in our simple world, the process might read: 1 is a necessary 
condition of p, and p a necessary condition of q; but ^ '
r our analysis is not convertible. PlÊiüto would then be pointing
out like Aristotle at Post,Anal.78 a that most dialectical propositions are 
inconvertible, whereas most mathematical propositions are convertible. It
106. op.cit. p.6; Journal of History of Philosophy 1966 p.192,
is because of the lack of convertibility that it is so important to proceed
/
in dialectic from the p K (1, p, q etc.) to the consequences and
not vice versa. But there is no sign in the text that is what Plato means. 
Instead he tells us that virtue is good; good is useful; useful is knowledge. 
He proves the latter by an exhaustive diaeresis into blessing;of the body, 
blessings of the mind etc. When a flaw is found in the argument he tells 
us the mistake was made because the diaeresis was not exhaustive. Neither 
the statement: ’if virtue is good, then it is knowledge’ nor the statement:
’ if virtue is knowledge, virtue is teachable’ is ever impugned. He tells 
us only thatif p then q, p, . . q (M.P.)’ is not sufficient. For one must 
first be sure of the inference from p to q; and one is only sure of it if 
one knows p. In both cases one wing of the conditional is rather dubiously
proved to be untrue. So a double pressure is exerted on p from above and
below. (1, q).
Presumably 1 is not refutable; and it stands as a carry over from the 
preceding ethical discussion.The method of standing assumptions, carried 
from one argument to the next, is, as we shall see from the Phaedo, associated
with the hypothetical method. But a mistake about p possible, because it
has not been firmly attached to 1. Similarly q is not firmly attached to p.
It is not the uniquely necessary consequence of 1, that p.
At the same time we must be clear that "deduction" in the Meno is a two- 
way business - starting from p (to 1, somehow) and from 1 (to^ ) and from p 
(to q) and from q (to p) and from q (to r) and p ' O  9 4“^  r is given. But
l4^> p. is not given; nor is p, q, r. At once we discover the anomalous
position of 1: it is given and in two senses
(a) it is inherited from the previous ethical discussion and (can
therefore represent a known theorem of mathematics).
(b) it is someway closer to undeniability and the roots of Platonism.
Now our hypothesis is p. An easy way of proving p is for it to be
107. Meno 77b 6; 78 c 6.
implied by 1» But 1 is a fact of |j^^and has to be adapted to the point in 
hand, viz. p. Hence the strange deductions Plato gives about the good being 
useful. But Plato insists on "deducing" consequences. He can only be sure 
of p, if from no angle does it appear —» p. So he adds further tests he would 
expect to be positive if p is true. We get the dangerous position
1 P q — r; 1 . . r M.P.
where p -y) q —> r; - r .*. -p M.T.
Somehowe, we suggest Plato must save himself from
- r - 1; - r . . - 1. In other words, the writ of Modus Tollens must
not run as far as 1. Plato saves himself from saying ’Virtue is not good’ by
the very artificial device of spotting a misdeduction. The only method Plato
proposes of correcting such mistakes is to make a correct and exhaustive
diaeresis. But the goodness of virtue is a belief to which the Socratic is
committed. Anything else lands him in the contradiction of believing that
the good is bad and the bad good. This may be one reason why it is necessary
to put a seal on the form of beauty, and never identify it without definitions
or explanations. If we end,our discussion by saying virtue is not good, it
is we who are at fault, not virtue. So too in the frightful case of ’Good is
not good’. We suggest then that some of the reasons for the postulation
of Forms may have their roots in the need to prevent Modus Tollens from
striking ideas of an "exalted status"^^^ or of/O#|tological ; - {"'4''" -3- '
"nobility". We do not know the propositions in the ’1’ group because of
their consequences,.and we can infer nothing to their detriment from failure
of those consequences. Dialectical reasoning must work from the arche to
the consequences. If the consequences are unacceptable then the arche has
109
been misunderstood: as Socrates says in the Cralylus: / \
^ tfuvc^ s
108. Crombie vol.II p.354; Ryle; Plato’s Progress p.213.
109, Cratylus 4368.
5^
E However a school we are calling Popperian might argue as follows;
the strength of a hypothesis comes from the failure of attempts to refute 
it. To strengthen a hypothesis you do not justify it but elenchate it.
This attitude to ’Meno? derives some support from the attempt to explain 
Phaedo 100 d 1 ff. as; before deducing your hypothesis from another 
hypothesis, test it for its power of producing contradictions. We shall 
question whether or not Phaedo 100 d 1 ff does mean this. Accordingly, 
the fault of Meno procedure is that the hypothesis is justified rather 
than elenchated. Crombie appears to be thinking on the same lines, bu^^^ 
with more attention to deduction. He reads the following moral into the 
Meno; "This circuitous path could have been avoided if the things that 
emerge from supposing that virtue is knowledge had been scrutinised before, 
rather than after, the production of arguments in favour of this view. For 
if that had been done the view would have been ruled out from the start. 
'Socrates finds his hypotheses on this view simply by eliminating old ones - 
a rather negative way; and one that Popper has avoided discussing by 
dismissing as a matter of psychology the relations between the hypotheses 
successively elenchated. We may doubt that the middle Plato had reached 
this pitch of scepticism. He was looking for schemes of justification, 
explanation, of opening the ways of God to man. To help himself he had 
started jostling sets of beliefs. It was not beyond his hopes that by 
arranging, or understanding, these beliefs correctly they would prove to be 
harmonious. "Elimination" is inadequate for this process. Certainly I 
can only be sure that I have understood my interlocutor after asking questions
i.e. drawing consequences. But my interlocutor’s beliefs are true
ones, which must not be abandoned in the general melee of elenchus. So when 
Crombie goes on to say; "The point that must be clearly seen is that a higher
110. op.cit. p.545,
111. Gosling 1973 p,115 ff "when Plato talks of degrees of truth he is almost 
invariably considering the adequacy of a discipline to producing adequate
answers
“SI
hypothesis i.e. may be as good grounds for an untenable or for a tenable 
lower hypothesis and that this may be so even though the higher hypothesis 
is true... Therefore an eristic could easily confuse his opponent by first 
producing what seemed to be a clinching argument in defence of some view 
and then showing the views to be untenable. Such practices could easily 
induce in their victim^Misologia is just what Socrates is trying to induce 
in the Meno. But his cure for the antilogy he produces is not to "draw consequen­
ces" before adopting a hypothesis, but to redirect the attention to the prior 
questions, whatever they are. Using other dialogues, we may guess that these 
prior questions are the peculiar province of dialectic; but the need to draw 
consequences before adopting a thesis ( ) is tactical only.
I think the Popperian sort of position is unlikely for the following 
reasons:
(a) You can go on drawing consequences without hitting an anomaly and without 
proving anything. But Socrates does not so much draw consequences as look at 
things from all angles, after he thinks he has established them. The 
consequences in the Meno are drawn in the usual place - after the establishment 
of the conclusion (Meno 89 b, 89 d. cf. Gorgias 480 a 5 ff).
(b) Merely noting contradictions among prima facie consequences is a recipe 
for eristic, not a protection against it. A recommendation that the grossier 
types of contradiction should be avoided through the use of a quick elenchus 
is too trivial to be the moral of the piece.
(c) Plato does develope a positive science of handling hypothesis - 
explications of the concepts of negation, identity, similarity and the like. 
Specifically in the Meno, we find the hypothetical method gives us the entry 
to a mechanism of deduction that yields correction. This mechanism checks 
previous arguments for mistakes, and combines or reconciles arguments. At 87 d 2 
we resume the hypothesis^virtue is good^ ; at 96 d f f We correct the previous 
argument; at 98 d 5 ff we summarise the joint argument. In fact consonance with 
previously established hypotheses is one way of "eliminating" other hypotheses;
1û
and the preparation of a scaffolding of hypotheses into which a new one ought 
to fit is a novelty of the Meno/Republic period (Phdo. 92 df). We have no 
reason to believe that Plato objected to the principle of deductive justification.
(d) The dialogues have strong protreptic elements. They dû not publish Plato’s 
beliefs - but hint that they could say more than they choose to say. The 
’aporetic’ nature of the Laches or Euthyphro is more apparent than real.
It looks like a convention of literary form, rather than a convention of 
argument. The "destructive" Popperian attitude of Plato to hypotheses may 
well be an illusion.
It is clear from all this that Plato thinks there is something wrong with
method of hypothesis he has used in the Meno. because there
is something wrong with the method of hypothesis or because he has made a
mistake in his use of it. To answer either question it would be useful to
know the mathematics of the situation; but we can do something withAuf:very
tenuous knowledge of the mathematics. For it is difficult to see what Plato
could have found wrong with the method of apagoge, or reduction; and Bluck
does not suggest that Plato makes a mistake in its application of the sort
a good mathematician would notice, but Meno would not. As for loose intuitive
112
analysis - the tradition associating this with Plato is a thin one; and 
most of our descriptions of the method are heavily influenced by Platonic 
vocabulary. But no one has proved that strict analyses did not exist.
Robinson claimed that even if it did exist, still it was not the method used 
in the Meno. Stahl claims that it is the method used in ’Meno’. For, he 
argues, if ’virtue is knowledge’ is the hypothesis, two "consequences" are 
deduced from it.^^^ The answer to the question: "What is virtue?" is the 
real focus of the dialogue, and it is natural that the answer to this: virtue
Û T . Cornford op.cit. p.68 f; Lee, C.Q. 1935 p.113-114 p.118 f; Cherniss, H.
Rev. of Metaphysics 1951 p.395-425 esp.418.
113. Stahl p.418 f.
is knowledge" should be hypothesised. On Stahl?s account the argument does 
not end until r is proven; for the passage p q r is an example of 
"deducing the consequences" of a hypothesis.
There are many things wrong with this approach. The first we have 
touched on: the synthesis the proposition virtue is knowledge is deduced
from the fact that virtue is taught. Second, he ignores the ’antilogical* 
structure of 86 e . As in many dialogues the same thing is both
proved and disproved. The implication is that the proposition was not proved 
in the first place. Most people seem unready to draw the further conclusion 
that what can be proved without being proved can be disproved without being 
disproved. So the proposition is not really disproved either: it is simply 
not known. For knowledge is what stays put and cannot be made to look 
opposite to itself. It follows that what is demonstrated is not the truth 
or falsity of propositions so much as the lability of propositions. We 
certainly cannot conclude that virtue is not knowledge or that knowledge is 
not the only good. The propositions require to be reconciled and held fast in 
a framework. Perhaps it is not fanciful to see a connection between 
which is the outcome of the practice of dialection the Slave and
which is the morally unexceptionable statement virtue is knowledge. For
neither can stand fast in a dialectical process. A clever Socrates can make 
the opposite seem true.
The third weakness of Stahl’s approach is that he removes the only 
available witness to what the method of hypothesis might be. For Meno is
under the impression that the hypothetical argument ended at 89 c. He is
prepared to accept that virtue is teachable
like Hippias in our earlier example. He might be missing out on mathematical 
form of Socrates - but the fact that Socrates now refutes the conclusion is 
so usual that it is no argument for claiming that Meno does not know how the 
conclusion is to be arrived at ^  . It is also likely
that the argument ends at 89 c because ^'^r is proved in conversation with
i"L
Anytus - which is quite a severe break; while 9 6 is ostentatiously the 
finding of a new argument.
Finally Stahl is reduced to making nonsense of 1. He says 1 is called 
a hypothesis because it involves an implication . (= deductive)" virtue is 
useful". So he is condemned to say that the only single proposition to be 
called a hypothesis in the work is "not too loosely so called" ("nicht ganz ohne 
Berechtigung.")^^^
There seems to be no safe evidence for what the specific mathematical 
method of hypothesis was. The method of Analysis is the only method in which 
the conclusion is hypothesised: and we have seen no internal evidence that 
fits it. In the other forms of hypothetical method suggested, the hypothesised 
statement is always the grounds of proof - the beginning of the demonstration. 
The hypothesis is better known than the conclusion. In these circumstances 
one can suggest that the ’method of hypothesis? was a way' of describing how 
a mathematician confronted with a problem will very often begin his solution at 
a known theorem which is relevant or more closely connected e.g. is a part of 
the problem, a simple element in a complex problem of several elements. The 
point is, he works from what is known, blind as it were, to what is required.
The description of such a method is easily generalised to fit any geometrical 
method that stops short of complete "proof from the axioms".
Now there is little point to Plato’s dragging in mathematics without 
reaping any benefits, even if it is true that mathematics is only related 
to true method as orthe doxa to episteme. I can only suggest that the 
mathematical method was pressed into service because it is a conspicuous 
example of the use of (a) unquestioned propositions (b) extrapolated from 
one argument to another (c) combining with other hypotheses to produce a 
system powerful enough (d) to select in some fashion additional hypotheses.
Plato nowhere suggests that wh^t he says in the hypothetical section is a 
tissue of lies. The point is that his system keeps reversing itself. So
114. Stahl p.414.
i l
for Meno. If Socrates had been able to teach him that virtue is teachable 
by merely preferring a hypothesis or endoxon from his store, namely that 
virtue is knowledge, a thing Socrates probably believed, then Meno would 
have been able to defend the hypotheses against the use of a criterion of 
knowledge which it is very easy to rob of its s t i n g , W h a t  settles a 
system is the arche of which there are a few indications in the Meno - a
pun (86 e 2), the insistence that knowledge and true belief are different 
(86 b 6 ff) and the asseveration that knowledge of what'j^ is is prior 
(e.g. 100 b 5). But Meno himself is the witness that something more than 
hypothesis is necessary.
We have argued that the phrase 
has multiple reference - as foundation, as element of a chain, as theorem, 
as certainty, as a method of considering the unknown starting from a known 
general principle. But we have failed to find a satisfactory specific 
mathematical technique that is closely followed by the ethical discussion.
The ethical discussion appears to presuppose a chain; and the ‘
element is simply the attachment to or interpolation of a 
link into the chain, as when one deduces a rider to a theorem, or reduces 
one theorem to another, and considers the result proven. Questions of 
implication, and what sort of implication is necessary, do not appear to be 
raised in the Meno. The method is not adequate to the production of knov3edge, 
for reasons which can be extended to cover all mathematical methods. It is 
implied that there is something to be learned from the mathematical methods - 
and I suggest this ’benefit’/^ to be derived from treating dialectical statements 
as linked hypotheses. The flaw of mathematical method can hardly be that it 
does not draw consequences before justifying a proposition deductively; but 
must be something like the fault of not dealing sufficiently with prior
115. KoyNe, A. Discovering Plato 1960 p.17 cf. Bluck’s Meno p.41; 24:
questions, first principles. They are content to leave one proof hanging on 
another. We also noticed that Socrates? method is not so much to destroy 
hypotheses as to manipulate, shuttle and reverse them. Of this activity 
there can be a positive study; but it is a study about hypotheses rather than 
the finding of one hypo-hypothesis. But this is to treq>ass on later ground.
Dialectic makes the running rather than mathematics. Socrates is 
describing a dialectical method.
I t
III
Stahl has produced arguments purporting to prove that Plato recognised 
a primitive Satzlogik in the matter of hypotheses. The argument is that 
what is taken over from mathematics in the Meno is the notion of equivalent 
propositions (i.e. p^ j_j^  q: biconditional implication). This, says Stahl 
without acknowledgement to Aristotle, is more suited to mathematics than 
to dialectic. The proper method of dialectic is to deal in mere implication. 
Now biconditional implication has the advantage that what you know of one 
side of the equation you also know of the other. But mere implication warrants 
you only two inferences; from the presence of p where p-— -p> q we can infer 
the presence q (modus ponens); and from the absence of q (i.e. — * q), where 
p — ^q we can infer - p (modu^ - tollens). Stahl claims that Plato deals 
only in equivalences and this is proved for two cruces:
(a) where Plato needs only M.P., he states equivalence
(b) where Plato observes the possibility of M.T. he will only act 
on it if he can state it first as equivalence. In his own words (416) Das 
heisst logisch gesehen: fur ihn verlief der Weg vom modus ponens zum modus 
tollens nur aber den "Aquivalenzschluss, denn erst nach vollzogener 
Umkehrung von Hypothesis und Folge (98 d 12) in positivem Zusammenhang 
schliesst er aus der Verneinung der (ursprunglichen) Folge^uf die Verneinung^er 
(ursprunglichen) Hypothesis (99 a7)". And later, after an examination of the 
arguments against the thesis that the soul is a harmony (Phaedo 92 d ff) he 
concludes: "Damit bestatigt unsere Erkenntnis, dass die theoretische Fordern 
nach wechselseitiger Implikation fur die Praxis Platons ohne Bede^tung
J)leibt."
We agree with Stahl that Modus Tollens is never used in serious Platonic 
argument. But we claim that far from being unaware of the possibility of 
using Modus Tollens, Plato regarded that possibility as pernicious; and the
%attempt to rub it out of court underlines a portion of dialectical method.
For Modus Tollens underlies reductio and absurdum. First we examine 
Stahl’s proof (a) and (b) in the Meno: He cites 87 b 5 ff pointing out that 
two equivalences are given:
/  q
87 b 5 ff X (if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable
(if virtue is not knowledge, it is not teachable
P  ^  q
p q
87 d 4-8 II (if there is no good that does not fall under knowledge, then
( good ia<^ knowledge
(if there is a good that does not fall under knowledge, then 
( good is not<; knowledge
( P ^  q
II permits the deduction of I from A where
A : virtue is (a) good.
Plato does not stop there. He adds III.
q r
89 d 6 ff III((a) if something is teachable then it has teachers and pupils 
(
((b) if something has no teachers or pupils, then it is not
r q teachable
III of course is not an equivalence, but a statement of mere
implication (involving M.T.)
Stahl argues that the course of the Meno runs:
p q — >r; r; .". q; .’.-'p.
But he points out that at 98 d 7 ff this result is stated and III a 
replaced by III b.
r q
III (b) (if a thing has teachers, it is teachable 
(
(if a thing has no teachers, it is not teachable, 
r ' q
i.e. Ill(b) is a statement of equivalence.
Similarly I.b. reads
q P
Ib (if virtue is teachable, then it is knowledge 
(if virtue is knowledge, then it is teachable
p q
from III b and I b it can be concluded that virtue is not knowledge i.e. ^  p.
14
In other words, to prove that virtue is teachable, Plato gives a succession 
of equivalences where mere implication would do. To prove virtue is not 
knowledge, he gives us a succession of equivalences where M.T. already runs 
and where, in consequence, equivalences are unnecessary for his purpose.
Plato is aware of mere implication (III) but he will not use Modus Tollens 
(hence III b) in such circumstances. He has lifted the notion of equivalence 
from a mathematical source - obviously the method of Strict Analysis.
We have already shown that Stahl?s reconstruction 
p —P q — >>r; r = analysis-deduction.
is a serious grossening of the argument. But his logical point would hold 
even if Meno 87 ad fin. were not a single "mathematical" argument, but a 
unified dialectical one. His philological arguments are too weak to prove 
that the reason for. the logical anomaly is Plato’s failure to appreciate the 
convenience of Modus Tollens. If he cannot prove that Plato fails to use 
M.T, because he is blinded by Strict Analysis, then he fails to prove his 
contention that Plato used Strict Analysis. If this is so, then a different 
explanation must be provided for the fact that Modus Tollens does not seem 
to run at least in Platonic arguments of this date. We also see the method 
as something other than a prepositional logic.
The main argument against Stahl is that he assumes a principle of 
logical elegance that he has no right to. If both equivalence and mere 
implication produce in certain circumstances the same result, why am I 
obliged to the weaker implication, merely because no stronger implication 
is needed, even though it may be the case that the stronger implication 
holds? But there are more detailed arguments.
(a) the 6 ? ' * construction on which Stahl puts so much 
weight is as much at home in rhetoric and dialectic as in mathematics. It is 
a sort of antithesis.
(b) at 89 d 5 is not strong enough to imply that Socrates is
is
less sure of the weight of the mere implication argument than he is of the 
weight of the equivalence argument. It softens and expresses the reluctance 
Socrates feels before performing a disagreeable demolition job. It asks for 
the interlocutor’s surveillance of the whole succeeding argument, and not 
just of the hypothetical inference. The warrant^if p, then q^receives no 
attention. Meno (and Taylor^) immediately assume Socrates is talking about 
fact; Are there really no teachers of virtue?
(c) In order to make I b he brings together statements at 98 d 12 and 99 a 7 
(p.416 diese Zeile gehort gedanklich zu 98 d 12). But 98 d 12 is the summary 
of 89 c - if p —^ q; p, .". q which is rejected by Socrates and accepted by 
Meno; while 99 a 7 is a report of the outcome of the later argument, namely 
that it was not teachable and so, it is not knowledge.
(d) If I b is the outcome of careless expression - or rather if there is
no normal form for an equivalence, can we be sure that III b is a correction 
of III to warrant a conclusion of - q? If III b is a correction, and the 
remainder of the passage is a summary of the course of the argument, then 
Plato is being disingenuous in his summing up - for Meno and he did not agree 
that III was an equivalence ). This sort of
sharp practice detracts from methodological clarity. The purpose of the 
passage is diverted to convict Socrates, not of a mistake, but of a lie. In 
the Protagoras such a ’lie’ occurs - but only, one feels, because Protagoras 
misses the point.
(e) The <^ k0mA;)^^^nversion at 89 d 5 is sufficiently explained if we 
remember that it is not part of the earlier argument, but an investigation 
of whether or not there are teachers of virtue. For this purpose, it is 
better to have the teachers of virtue in the protasis. Also it would be
1. Taylor II p.140,
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embarrassing to have to argue for the proposition "Virtue is not knowledge" 
which is the alternative, in the circumstances, to arguing that "Virtue is 
not knowledge" via the proposition that "there are no teachers of virtue", 
Socrates has telescoped rather than stumbled here.
Stahl (421) also draws support from similarities to the Meno that he 
has been able to find in the Phaedo. He finds an example at 70 c ff: that 
q - that our souls can be in Hades before we are born and after - depends 
on p - that our souls come from nowhere else but the dead; q is proved (70d 7 ff). 
Now the relation p, q is stated as an equivalence, but the practical consequence
ÿ\ is mere implication - quite correctly. For as the objections of Cebes 
later shows p and q are not equivalent. But the only ground for considering 
p^q as an expressed equivalence is Stahl’s dubious translation of 70 d 4:
6-7^  ^ réîTroy fôv
as "Wenn die Bedingung nicht erf&llt ist, /(ommt etwas anderes herans."
2Hackforth translates correctly as if it is the outcome of the argument that
matters: "But if that is not so, we shall need another argument." Stahl also
misses his ^ a t  70 b 7. Nor does this proof play much role in the rest
of the Phaedo: the principle^from opposites come opposites? surfaces at
103 a 4 ff, but the proof of immortality here given is not used again. It
3seems in any case to be a merely dialectical proof from agreement. The 
drawing of consequence^ is not part of the method.
However the remaining proofs of the Phaedo do seem to be linked with 
each other, and to depend each of them on the theory of Forms. At 91 e ff 
he points out correctly that a distinction is made between arguments accepted
and those accepted
But he does not point out that no hypothetical method is in question here.
The relation between the prior hypothesis and the later hypotheses is simply 
that Socrates clashes with p but q does not. Now Socrates "the soul is a 
harmony" is later called a hypothesis (93 c) which commits the holder to
2. Phaedo p.59
3. 72 a 9 f.
ncertain consequences, which we examine. But our examination of the 
consequences is not necessarily the pa^ of the method of hypothesis which 
Plato has borrowed from mathematics. There are some parallels for the 
distinction between eikos and geometry, but none of them add mention of 
the deduction of consequences. What seems to be in point is the deduction 
of consequences which are correctly deduced from the hypothesis. As, of 
course, one cannot deduce from one hypothesis, this comes down to making a 
choice between the hypothesis and other "hypothesis". For instance at 
Theaetetus 16^  e Protagoras says:
3(1/- 4-
But the passage is not followed by any change in Socrates’ tactics if 
the change is not dialectical. From shocking Theaetetus we move to 
dialectical questions - 163 a C yiO vTl^
After a succession of consequences Protagoras announces that Socrates is 
not sticking the correct consequences of his position‘d Eikos is rhetorical, 
hypothesis is mathematical. It is not the elenchus (= drawing of consequences) 
which is mathematical but sticking to correct consequences. Nor is there a 
shadow of evidence that genuine consequences are consequences by 
reciprocal or any other strict implication. To know the genuine consequence 
one must examine the arche.
MerJypointing out the clash of the two hypothesis is enough to convince.
So unless Simmias like Meno does not know the mathematical method of hypothesis, 
this was all mathematics would require.^ But Socrates does draw consequences 
- from the hypothesis to be elenchated. The substance of the elenchus is
4. cf. Philebus 58 d 7; Timaeus passim.
5. Theaetetus 166 f.
(G(
significant - it is the test of " more of less", and, second, it claims 
^that an object cannot be affected indifferent in the same respect at the 
same time - though the statement of this is not as full as it is in the 
Republic.^ Both these tests are dialectical and part of the techne of 
arguments IcoS/ )•
The second thing that Stahl says about the argument is also 
important for us. He points out that Plato does not draw a full conclu­
sion. For full Modus Tollens leads us from the failure of the consequent 
hypothesis to the failure of the oiginal hypothesis: .p.425: "Platon 
sagt aber nirgends, dass man mit Recht von nunmehr als falsch erwiesenen 
Hypothesis auf die Falschheit ihrer ursprunglich zur Diskussion stehenden 
Konsequenz (die Seele ist sterblich) schliessen kann, obgleich er das unter 
Berufung auf die von ihm sooft ^Onstatierte Regel der "Aquivalenz ( >A wenn 
nicht p, dann nicht q <S) gut hatte hinznfugen konnen. Damit bestatigt sich 
unsere Erkennti^s, dass die theoretische Forderung nachwechselse.tige 
Implikation fur die Praxis Platons ohne Be^Leutung bleibt."
Stah]?s instincts are right. It is possible under Modus Tollens to 
move from the first unfortunate consequence to the invalidation of the 
original proposition. Plato does not do this. So much of Platons time is 
taken up with giving examples of where Aodus pollens or reductio ad 
absurd^Om should not run (as in sophistical consequences) that he can 
hardly have been unaware of the fa#t of M.T. But if linked hypotheses are 
introduced to support an argument, then the "higher" the hypothesis the 
more difficult it is for anything resembling M.T. to touch it. Proper 
understanding of a higher hypothesis should guarantee us, we suggest^against 
sudden dialectical reversals. We suggest that elenchus is in the service 
of hypothesis, rather than hypothesis in the service of elenchus, and that 
the hypothesis linked to form a system - even if a changing, floating system 
of doctrine. But Stahl has failed to prove a Satzlogik; and with it fails 
attempts to show that Plato is directly interested in the relation between
6. cf. Robinson, Plato’s separation of Reason and Desire. Phronesis 1971»
\ùx.
each link of the chain as a standard relation. Such "standard relations" 
are the connectives of modern logic V etc. Instead Plato’s
was an investigation about each link - about good, 
about sameness etc - and there is no link that does not depend on some 
concept or other from this "exhalted" group. We have seen in the Gorgias 
and Meno 'Socratic" chains of thought". The links are not fixed, 
immutably forged, but the same ones do tend to crop up again and again.
The study of the chains does not seem to take the form of a Satzlogik but 
of Prinzipienlehrelf? To the notion of chain the notion of hypothesis added 
divisibility. Parts of a chain can be isolated, at one end the separated 
chain is a hypothesis and the other a consequence. The separated chain can 
always be reattached to the main chain. Instead of all Socrates’ beliefs being 
interconnected and put at risk in each argument - which is the sort of 
impression we get from the Gorgias (509) - it may be that some of Socrates’ 
beliefs are more intimately connected with each other than otheti of his 
beliefs.
"To sum up: Plato does not have an ideal of arithmetical or geometrical
proof for philosophy, nor do these two disciplines somehow determine rationality 
or goodness"^. What a hypothesis is, and how to deal with it, is defined and 
developed in dialectiojiterms. The mathematical comparison makes the role 
of hypothesis in dialectic clearer; but the role of the hypothesis is not 
copied from mathematics. We may suspect Socrates of always manipulating 
dialectic in the interests of positive ethical beliefs. Hypothesis is one 
way of replacing the moral direction given by Socrates'the man behind the 
argument. A hypothetical argument says something, even if it does not say 
as much as it ought.
The difference between a dialectical hypothesis and a mathematical 
hypothesis is that a dialectical hypothesis is someone’s belief, and therefore 
bears contradiction. A mathematical hypothesis is true and does not bear
7. Gosling 1973 p.118.
contradiction. Plato will show that even mathematical hypotheses may be 
merely expressions of beliefs.
|(bLf
IV
Hypothesis in the Last Argument of the Phaedo,
We have seen no reason to suppose that a hypothesis (is a tentative 
thing, or that it is subject to correction, or that its "consequences" 
are related to it in a logically specifiable manner, or that it is put 
forward to be demolished. There is no reason, therefore, to assume that 
the Phaedo descriptions of the hypothetical method should be read in any 
of these senses, and no evidence in the Phaedo to compel such an assump­
tion. The uncertainties of the argument are no more than is incidental 
to all mortal argument (107b), but the hypothetical method is not chosen 
to express these uncertainties. It is the best sort of argument available. 
When Socrates declares at 100a that he hypothesises, the strongest argument 
or logos that he knows, the reader’s mind should revert to 92 d 6, where 
Simmias says that the doctrine that soul is a harmony has been presented 
to him only with speciously reasoned argument, but the anamnesis logos was 
argued by means of ( ) a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. Hypothesis
is contrasted with eikos. No word is said about the proper form of a 
hypothetical method, only of the credibility of the hypothesis. So at 100 b 
Socrates hypothesises the Forms - that is, those things or propositions of
which he is most certain. Now he does not argue for them, yet they are
supposed to save the young dialectician from misologia.^ Classically the 
misologia is induced by reversal of opinions, Bluck translates 90 b f as 
follows : "you may believe that an argument is true without being an expert 
in arguments, and then a little later on decide that the argument is false 
- sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn’t - and again the same happens with
another and yet another," You will end by believing "that all things are
simply carried this way and that exactly as in the Euripus, and never remain 
fixed for a single moment," Evidently the method of hypothesis, or indeed 
T . 89 d ff.
loS
the hypothesis of the Forms is not enough to halt this process. For 
exactly this has happened at 88 c ff - the group are despondent because 
they have prematurely deserted their earlier arguments in face of attack 
by other logoi. Which logos should a man choose among these always 
changing logoi?^ Now suppose, Phaedo," says Socrates, " that there should 
be a true and reliable argument, one that could be comprehended, but that 
a man had come up against arguments like these present ones which sometimes 
seem true and at oftier times false. Wouldn’t it be a pity if .... the man 
finally in his distress gladly transferred the blame for himself to the 
arguments ..."^ The arguments to be presented later are special, not
special because they are hypothetical, but, as we shall see, because the
hypothesis are properly handled. In these circumstances a logos which they 
. 3 .have had all the time will be seen to be the same every time and adequate 
to new challenges. Plato does not claim credence for the last argument 
because it is in correct form, but because it is the best deduction he can 
make from a premiss he considers to be true (though, of course, he admits 
it requires investigating^ The essential thing is to make sure that the 
good Igos does not lose its virtue in the course of deduction and dialectic. 
This approach should remove the astonishment Bluck feels that "lOOA should 
be left virtually as a statement of the obvious".^
Opinion is divided on whether the passage is epistemological or 
methodological.^ But we may doubt whether this is a real division. The 
substantiil/ issue is the assimilation of the Phaedo to the Republic; but 
this will not save us from the difficulties of the Phaedo since the 
assimilators go on to explain the dtfficulties the Republic by reference to 
the Phaedo. It is enough if our explanations of Phaedo are not inconsistent
2. 90c 8 ff. Bluck.
3. or at least 76 d 7 f; 78 c 10 f; 9^ a; 100 b; 107 b 5.
4. Bluck. Phronesis II p.23. ( in the Phaedo and Platonic
dialectic p.21-31).
5. Robinson I p.138 cf. c(^rniss 1947 p.141.
Kwithout explanation of the Rp. A more important line of division runs 
between those who think of the Phaedo method in logical terms^, those who
g
think of it in dialectical terms and those who think of it in substantive terms . 
Those who think of it in substantive terms as being about the handling of ideas, 
make ’relevance to the context’ their main platform. Plato is looking in 
logoi for a second string to his bow ( ). Hackforth refers
to Goodrich C.R. XVII-XVIII which effectively de-metaphysicises the passage; 
and he points out "The latter logos (i.e. 100 A4) evidently means a proportion 
which someone lays down or postulates as the foundation of an argument; but 
in the earlier place (100 Al) logoi seem to be arguments themselves, trains
or processes of ratiocination; and the contrast there drawn is between observ- i
i
ing physical objects (' ./and constricting arguments as alternative methods 1
of studying reality".^ Bluck admits that even notions can be propositions,
though we might prefer to call them statements; but seems to me to produce
no cogent reason why hypothesis at lOld is not the logos at 100 A.^^ Bluck
is in any case obsessed with the idea that a hypothesis is provisional, for
which ko there is no evidence. Those who think of the method in logical
™ust face Robinson’s difficulty: if ’accord’ means consistent with at a lOOA
it is "rash and unwarrantable"; if ’accord’ means "is deducible from", it
is impossible to believe "and there seems to be no third interpretation".^^
Sayre and Stahl try to save a ’logical’ sense, the latter according to a
method he has discovered in earlier works and we did not, the former by
claiming that both interpretations are logically satisfactory and settling
12the matter for "convertible propositions". But Sayre shows no trace of
13 , ^
philological sophistication. The extreme form of the dialectical
13treatment is represented by Huby . She says the passage 99D-102A is "an
6. e.g. Robinson op.cit; Sayre 1969 p.29 ff; Stahl 1960 p.428 ff; Ross,
Plato’s Theory of Ideas p. : Taylor XI p.139.
7. e.g. Murphy 1942 p.120; Huby 1959 p.l2f. Hackforth’s Phaedo p.139 f; 
Sprague R.K. Hermes 1969 p.632-5.
8. e.g. Bluck Phronesis 1957 p.21-31; Taylo% II p.203.
9. Hackforth op.cit. p.138.
10. Bluck 1957 p.21 f. 11. Robinson I p.126; 7.
12. pp.19-28. 13. e.g. p.46 n.59. 13. P.Phronesis
1959 p.14. ■
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affirmation of certain quite elementary principles of psychological 
as much as of methodological importance. These Plato believed were needed 
by young men who had to deal with sophistic tricks of argument." She says
too that the only point in clinging to the hypothesis is "nothing more
than a tactical move on the psychological level and is in fact what Socrates 
himself did at 95e. "T'OjA the meaning of ’seeing whether results accord" 
she inclines to Robinson. Those who understand the passage dialectically, 
as we shall see, must defend their interpretation from the charge of triv­
iality. Why does Plato see fit to make such a fuss? It is not easy to
find an innovation; and Stenzel said pfOUKiyof 100a: "no new procedure but
the normal one which Socrates follows elsewhere.
We claim that lOOA+lOlcd refer to the. interrelation of thinking and 
dialectic. The logic of the affair is hidden in thinking and not explained 
to us at this point: we get instead instructions on how to bring ’ logic
or what we really think, to bear on dialectic. An argument is not to be 
given up prematurely, that is to say before it has been validly disproven.
Now it is obvious that the horror of ^
was not something invented by Plato, but part of the stock in trade of the
sophists.Now Plato’s main method of describing sophistical argument is 
dramatic. The thinker is in a special situation. Whatever he does in that 
situation is going to be turned against him by an interlocutor or questioner. 
He goes into the debate as into a game of blindman’s buff. In the circum­
stances he needs caution.Anything he says will be used in evidence against 
him.^^ comes in the shape of the questions that he is asked: it is only
secondarily and derivatively that the danger is felt to lie in the statement 
he makes himself. The final argument of the Phaedo is possible only after
the danger of premature elenchus has been eliminated. The true prophylaxis
18is the subsequent examination of the nature of opposites which reveals the
true extent of an opposition. In order to reach this point, the current.
14. Stenzel-Allen p.7.
15. Euthyd. 293 e?; Ptgs.339 b 5f; Theaet 155B; Laches 195c 196 b,
16. Ptgs.351 d; 335 a.
17. Laches 187 e 6 ff; Meno 80.
18. 103 c 7 ff.
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sophistical doctrine of self-contradiction must be neutralised. The 
misgivings scholars have felt about the meaning of sumpho«^ eiv\ at 100 a and 
101 dKU|/j^ i£partly misplaced. For those passage is probably not discussing 
the relation between proposition and proposition, statement and statement 
positively, but responding to a challenge, by the interlocutor, that the 
speaker has contradicted himself.
Th^ first and most important recommendation is at 100a:
-rc J z io   ^&
2/i^rA iîër^ i adx/cL(^ ... Sg
We summarise the movement of thought: "I choose the logos which I think
most robust and then I posit what seems to me to chime with it as true,
and vice versa. By way of example take my treatment of the logoi: ’there
is ' beauty by itself’, or ’by beautiful is everything beautiful’. The
illustration falls into two parts — the choosing of the starting point and
19the consequences thereof. The sense of both principle and illustration 
is: "I please myself". Rather than thinking in terms of the discussion,
I think in terms of its origin, the hypothesis which is my reason for being 
in the discussion. This hypothesis is not the disputed remark that is to 
be proven or disproven in the course of the dialectic, but something that 
underlies, or I hope underlies, the remark.
But what does he mean by "I posit what seems to me to chime with it 
as ^ ure, and vice versa"? The translation is deliberately vague for a 
more literal translation would be incorrect. Stahl says: "Der Zusammenhang 
zweier im^ositiven Verhaltnis als richtig beurteilter Satze
oiAv^ '^  ÿ\/a )
kann dem Tv^ i^ Verstande genau so richtig erscheinen wenn beide ic^ ;leicher 
Weise vermeint sind; fur unsern Fall kommt noch hinzu, dass das nachhinkende 
d^\/  ^ {p(  ^ O o k ganz ahf^ich dem sonst fast
I
A
stereotyp zugesetzten ^  Wenn nicht ..., dann nicht ... klingt - dgssen
w. cf. Sayre p.14 - but the theory of Forms is only ironically an 
____ illustration.__________________________ _ ___ _____ ________
theoretische Fundierung im mathematischen Aquivalenzschluss wir in 
Menon-Kapitel zeigten.’
Again Stahl's instincts are right - that the positive and negative 
are two faces of the same Logically speaking, this should issue
in an equivalence but no properties of an equivalence are used later in 
the discussion. Nor can the phrase just mean 'what I think chimes ... 
what I think does not chime', because this does not amount to a method.
My 'positing' excludes something - that is to say, if I answer yes, it 
excludes no, and vice versa. Plato cannot abide the partly - yes, and 
partly - no answer, which is correct in most conversations. 'What I think 
chimes' commits me to answer 'what is not - x does not chime with it'. In 
virtue of this exclusive either ... or, positive or negative, my dialectic 
works.
So if I posit hypothesis A, and am about to accept a 'consequence' B.
I may find in virture of my rule that I have excluded , which may on
other grounds be a completely acceptable proposition. For instance, I 
say 'There is beauty by itself. I am now confronted with many sorts of 
beauty. An unlimited number of beauties by themselves in compatible with 
the statement, the statement that requires least addition is; 'there is 
at least one beauty'. But given our interpretation, it follows that there 
is only one beauty by itself. For my reply must exclude there being 
more than one. The function of this sort of deduction is to exclude 
pEtfectly possibly ÿtue andwets to a series of independent questions.
I can ask: 'Is Timothy smaller by a head?' or say 'The heel makes her 
taller'., and''heel and'head^would be adequate replies to questions asking 
about causes. But when the replies are brought .together in a single 
conversation they clash.
The presence of a hypothesis alters the normal course of the conversation, 
because answers are no longer independent of one another. Many true answers 
are closed to me. Hypothesising makes explicit that in virtue of which my 
answers are made.
Ilù
Plato uses his hypothesis in a special way - as if it were one side of 
an antinomy. A thing which is one cannot be m ^  and vice versa. Later 
in the proof he establishes the rule that opposites exclude own
opposites. He takes advantage of the Eleatic tradition to work out the 
consequences of his hypothesi^but the Eleatic element is negative - I 
fear attack from that quarter so I am especially cautious about admitting 
that what is one may be many.
I/'^ . however are the consequences in the sense
of the remainder of the dialectic the questioner is responsible for
provoking subsequent steps, and think^s in terms of what a reasonable man
would accept. The answerer is probably thinking in terms of the one many
ai^nomy. The restriction placed on the answerer that he should answer
yes or no turns out to be a saving grange.
Dramatic reporting and dialectical method combine to give the impression
of chain or logical consequences. We compare the Gorgias, where Socrates
i 23
answers out of his head to the consternation of his interi tor 
This is clearer in the sequel where the word P Ç tc(  ^
is used for the successive steps. Commentators seem to be unanimous
as far as I can see that this does not mean 
24 , but, as it were, the ripples of the stir caused by my hypothesis. These 
consequences are dialectical i.e. the sort of things that would be urged 
against a thesis. What Socrates is recommending is that the answerer 
should think for himself, but I doubt if he is yet telling him to do 
that thinking.
The same advice pervades c - e, where Mrs. Huby compares ^e 
^0 Crv^/av
17
But something^more must be being said connected with the advantage of having 
alypothesis, for we haven't yet been told what the advantage is. The 
hypothesis is useful in defending or explaining a thesis.
Many comment at ors ^ ^ consider that the passage is mainly about rejecting 
arguments or statements, and sifting out what is left. Even Crombie wno 
realises that 'Socrates is not telling us how to prove things but how to
il
27prove things but how to find things out ' summarises as follows (1) First
scrutinise the challenged hypothesis for inconsistencies; (2) next back
it up by reasting it on a ’higher’ hypothesis; and (3) do not confound
28
these stgges together’ . This seems back to front - we are not looking 
for a true hypothesis which cannot be turned into its contradiction, or 
will clash with another hypothesis.
23. Gorgias 463 d ff ; Charm. 161 d ff ; Laches 199 c 3. 24. Robinson
I p.109; Bluck 1957 p.28; Hackforth’s Phaedo p.139; Stahl op. cit. 436 etc., 
25 1959 p.13. cf. also Euthydemus 283 C. 26. Ross op. cit. p.28
Stezel Allen p.7. 27. vol ii p.544. 28. vol ii p.541
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Robin is nearer the mark with: "1 ne pas le laisser (le principe)
mettre en question tant qu’on n’a pas examine encore si les consequences
qui en découlent s’accordent ou ne s’accordent pas entre elles, 2°,..
procéder semblablement en déduisant le conséquences d’un autre principe.
But he still has the notion of testing by elenchus. Robinson sees
clearly that "seeing whether the results accord" is not "primarily a test,
30inspite of its expression here"
Reinstating the discussion in its dialectical situation we get:
1. 100 c 8 - d2
An apparently innocuous, obvious proposition is put forward for your 
agreement. Do not accede without deliberation. Answer the new question 
with regard to the hypothesis, but not with regard to the new question 
(cf. Theaet 154 d). The new question is additional to the hypothesis.
2. 100 d 2 - 5
This is the temptation to agree too easily that your hypothesis is 
disproved. The attack is made directly against the hypothesis
which is declared to be incompatible or declared 
to yield a consequence ( ^  ). In these circumstances
you must see whether the results that you think follow from the hypothesis 
agree or do not agree among themselves i.e. the very thing your opponent 
tried to do for you. You will do it, not as a test of the statement, but 
because dialectic is deduction and combination of statements. Of course if 
the statements do not chime, the hypothesis must be given up; but the cause 
of logic is not much advanced in this contingency and it is difficult to 
see how someone clinging to the safety of the hypothesis would be called 
upon to give up a statement he had been elenchating.
There is of course one element of dialectic which the above instructions
29. Phaedo L ii (Bude).
30. Robinson I p.136.
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might fit, the instruction to foresee ( CTp^  ), hut this instruction
is either tactical or refers to the ability to work out what is acceptable
31in the name of the hypothesis and what is not . It is an art that does 
not seem necessary here, because we are not interested simply in the 
importation of a Trojan horse premiss into the argument, but in the relation 
between the premiss and subsequent steps.
3. lOle. We deal immediately with , for the
section seems to apply to all points of the procedure. Indeed the instruc­
tion to avoid confusing arche and consequences is the only explanation for 
the otherwise unmotivated clause^L)^ ^  (P
Before you can keep arche and consequences apart you must have both sorts
of statement. If an attack is made directly on a hypothesis - ùen there is
neither arche nor consequence, just two statements jostling i.e. sophistical,
and not hypothetical, argument. Now the reason why sophists are so prodigal
with contradictions and arguments is that they have the art of reconciling 
32anything. Socrates does not have it, but it does seem to follow that he 
is more interested in reconciling arguments - i.e. getting them to remain 
the same, that in testing them by finding specious contradictions. If a 
man gives his honest opinion for arche, then he will be in no hurry to 
accept an elenchus. The remainder of the passage on the sophists reads like 
a formula.
4. 101 d 5 - el.
It is not clear in what circumstances it is necessary to justify a 
hypothesis. The point surely is that in order to justify a hypothesis you 
need to take another hypothesis, so that you have both an arche and ’things 
that follow after an arche’. Your new hypothesis is a s a s  the
31. Theaet 166 a 5.
32. 101 e 5 ff; 90 c; Theaet 154 e.
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old one, but the old hypothesis itself is now in question. Rose^^ says
that hypotheses are always subject to the tax of giving an account of
themselves, and a pupil could question any of them. But the arche (which
for him is the nature of good, that all men pursue it) has never been a
hypothesis and can never be questioned. Cherniss believes that the process
of "giving account" of the hypothesis is automatically part of dialectic^^;
while Robinson believes recourse to a higher hypothesis depends on the
circumstances, the adequacy of the hypothesis on the nature of the
35
objectors* objection. But these are questions it is not profitable to
pursue since an answer to them really depends on our treatment of the
D T1 - 36Republic.
What points of the overall argument fit these specifications? It is
a crippling objection to Robinson that he does not root the method in the
practice of the Phaedo^which is Robin’s view. Stahl admits this but does
little about it, since for him 100 d 3 - e 7 is a case of hypothesis and
its confirmation, securing (Sicherjing) by a higher hypothesis. For
injunction 1. we compare the attempted elenchus at 100 e 8 ff.l. is
essentially a repetition of 100 a, the policy which has been followed
37100 c 8 - 101 c. For injunction 2. there are two sets of candidates 
The first set consists of the drawing of further consequences against 
Simmias’ objection, against the theses that virtue is teachable or that 
to do wrong and go unpunished is the greatest evil. But these are
rather remotely retrospective, and adequately expressed by Socrates’
insistence on leaving no stone unturned. The sort of illustration for 2. 
is the use of the principle the section 102 b — d. But this is a 
demonstration of why Socrates was right not to submit the elenchus 100 e 8 ff. 
For a little distinction and ingenuity makes plain what Socrates’ meant -
33l Rose, L.E. Journal of Hist, of Philosophy 1966 (p.188-98) p.194.
34. A.J:P 1947 p.141, relying on 107 B 5-6.
35. Robinson 1 p.137.
36. Stahl 434; Sayre 28 ff; Robinson 138; Cherniss 141; Crombie 543 ff;
Robin Lii.
37. Stahl 433; Robin XLiv, Lii.
38. Phdo 93 ff; Meno 89 d ff ; Gorgias 480 ff.
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Socrates spells it out by the prosaic device of showing the respect in 
which a contradiction holds. This illustration supports our view of 1.
- that it avoids improper elenchus. But it does not illustrate the 
first half of this process, for the objection to the hypothesis is not 
made (unless at 100 e 8). However at 103 a 4 ff an objection is brought 
against a fairly hefty hypothesis - namely that nothing can become 
not-F at the same time and in the same respect. The objector makes a
fairly clear declaration of contradiction. It is the sort of objection
/
that (102 c 6) , and is sophistical, and easily
dismissed with a little distinction. The episode fails to induce the 
sort of despondency felt at 88 c.^^-^The illustration of 4. is generally 
taken to be the call for a review of the first hypotheses in deference 
to the fallibility of mortal nature (107 b 4 ff). It almost follows that 
the deduction of consequences has played no part in strengthening our 
hypotheses, since what is required is a more thorough examination of the 
first hypotheses themselves in terms of understanding them (diae^resis).
f,'
We noticed it was diaeresis that saved the hypothesis ’Virtue is good’ in 
the Meno. It is more difficult to find an example of 3., since the only 
sophistical objection is at 103 a. This objection is rebuked on the grounds 
that the earlier and the current argument are about different things - i.e. 
the two arguments must be kept apart even though the words clash. This 
explanation may count as keeping arche and consequences separate. But there 
are more subtle ways in which the Phaedo illustrates the importance of 
keeping arche and consequence separate. For Phaedo^demonstrates why answer­
ing from a hypothesis is essential to dialectfS^Lthere must be a separation
between the hypothesis and the demonstrand or consequence, and fiw hypothesis- 
arche hypothesis-consequence.
39. Contrast the view of this objection i . ____  \ - given by Nehamas,
A; Predication and Forms of Opposites Rev.Met. 1972-3. p.462-491, p.483.
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Plato has no way of proving a proposition. But some statements are 
manifestly truer (for whatever reason) than other statements. Some 
statements must always remain true - like those relating to the goodness 
of the good. Yet the disconcerting vicissitudes of dialectic can make even 
the goodness of the good seem a little the worse for wear. Dialectic in the 
sense of unrelated, verbal arguments, usually of a destructive tendency^does 
not advance knowledge or morality very much, as Plato never tired of saying 
(only he blamed the sophists for it). A hypothesis, however, enables you 
to answer a local question in virtue of a more general truth; the recursive 
nature of the method of hypothesis prevents the hypojftasis of this more 
general truth into an error ^  frigid limitations. For the hypothesis 
is itself true only in virtue of another hypothesis, the presence of which 
alters the meaning, or makes plainer and truer the meaning of the lower 
hypothesis. The method allows for some diplomacy between arguments - on this 
occasion x was proved in virtue of Y; and when not-x was proved it was in 
virtue of Z. But more important it enables you to make a study of arguments - 
not in a formal sense but in a semi-substantial sense. For certain 
hypotheses are more fundamental than others, and a disproof these hypotheses 
is a great advance towards demonstration. But the disproof is not by lining 
up as many geloia as possible, but arises out of an intimate understanding of 
the nature of the hypothesis itself. Thus in the Theaetetus we shall see 
that Protagoras dismisses the various absurdities that Socrates prestidigitates 
out of Protagoras’ own position; and when for example the arguments 
Heracliteans are reduced to incoherence it is virtue of Plato’s understanding 
of what he is pleased to call the Heraclitean arche that this demonstration 
is accomplished. There can be no formal by-passing of an understanding of the 
superior hypothesis in favour of ’deduction’ of prima facie contradictions. In 
the Phaedo, too, it is only in virtue of the hypothesis that the argument can 
lengthen to the point of becoming adequate to reality: it is only in virtue of 
the hypothesis lying behind the specific answer that we can say the Fire causes
Ill
Fever for the underlying statements prevent this statement from becoming 
paradoxical, or in Vlastos’ words "x is F because it participates in 
and rentails^ The principle is the same: dialectic must take into
account what is behind the answer and fix- i the answer’s sense.
The advantage of the present interpretation is that it eliminates 
the sort of mistaked that lead,. commentators to accuse Plato pointlessly 
of confusion. These crystallise in the symphonein passages, where it 
will not help matters merely to breath a little intentionality into modern
logic and attribute the mixture to Plato, à notion like
"relevance"^^ and "deduction in the presence of background assumptions."^^
It is better to accept that the Phaedo passages require the framework of 
a situation, of question and answer, of a range of explicit argument so 
narrow that it is almost a bottle-neck in sophistical hands, for our thoughts. 
Those thoughts concern the nature of opposites and exclusions. In that area 
is the real beginning of logical procedure and it is that area which saves 
us from going as far as S p r a g u e " T h e  truth is that Plato is more 
interested in eristic than most of his interpreters have been... He had to 
be; he was hammering out a theory of Forms, an essentially dualistic theory 
at a time when the descendants of Parmenides had become experts in the 
sophistical defence of monism..." ... if indeed the sophists were the 
descendants of Parmenides! Sprague is too ad hoc, too local. Plato 
outlines the pretended role of contradiction in eristic or conversations in 
order to rescue dialectic and put it on the unsupported foundation of his 
own doctrines of opposition.
In the Phaedo we are at the point where Plato calls the into
existence to redress the balance of dialectic in favour of the answerer, 
the justifier, the constructive. His model for these activities is sternly 
deductive and conceptual.
40. Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo, Vlastos 1971 p.159 (p.132-166). 
But see now Nehamas’ reply op. cit.
41. Stahl 429 f.
42. Robinson I p.32. .
43. Hetmes 1969 p.635.
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We have an example of the state of dialectic at Rp. 451 b ff.
Socrates returns to a matter that might have been discussed earlier.
The place of women can only be discussed ^
We investigate how it behoves 
us to bring up women, ignoring the inevitable laughter. The laughter is 
caused by consequences of a sort - women exercising naked with men; but 
the laughter is unjust. True consequences are more serious affairs. They 
are answers to questions like "is it possible for women to be given the 
same positions as men." (Here we remember the arguments about the diorismic 
force of a hypothesis). The answer to this question is given in a rather 
broken backed way. On the one hand SO^ates presents a case against which 
is not conclusive because the imaginary interlocutor gives the Socratics 
pause - they have to think about what they mean (453 c 7 ff) and Glaucon 
asked Socrates to come up with a defence of their logos. Socrates says 
that he has long feared and foreseen ( ) such arguments
against his position. The imaginary interlocutor has produced one possible 
argument; though Socrates has foreseen that many of the same sort are possible. 
If we examine the interlocutor’s argument, we find it consists of the recall 
of a (i/^^^\Xand a statement of difference. The resulting
are alleged to contradict each other.
1. Everyone should do only the work his nature suits.
2. There is a great difference between a man’s nature and a woman’s 
nature.
3. Women should do the same things as men.
The lynchpin is the nature of difference, once again. Inevitably follows 
the charge of eristic. For the argument depends on the unexpanded use of 
the word ’different’. But in order to explain this Socrates asks a question 
about the original hypothesis - the term is not used, but enough of the
44. 451 c 6 - 452 b 6.
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associated vocabulary is used to make it plain that we are dealing with 
a dialectical hypothesis. However the hypothesis’ "position under" is 
not being discussed here, which may account for the word’s non-appearance.
The true place of the hypothesis is in the intention of the speaker^^.
 ^ • • • But what is required here is not a higher
hypothesis, but a modification of the hypothesis. We meant, says Socrates, 
a difference in nature relevant to the occupation in question. Here the 
onus (455a KAAOS/" is thrown back on the imaginary interlocutor:
let him show a profession in which the nature of men and women are 
relevantly different. A host of instances leap to mind. But Socrates’ 
interlocutor cannot think of anything on this occasion — a very strange 
state of affairs! It is of course the ’pause’ inflicted on Glaucon (453c6 f) 
come again on the other side. It is also artistic - mere failure to produce 
an example, or the production of an example, whether satisfactory of unsatis­
factory, provej nothing. But Socrates now siezes the active role and leads 
the discussion persuasively to the correct conclusion to be drawn in the 
light of the hypothesis. In the end, as in most dialectic, the opponent 
will be made to eat his words (457 a 6 ff; 456 b 8). But the attempt of 
Socrates to prove his point is broken backed because so much seems to 
depend on persuasion. There is no normal or definitive form in which 
results can be stated. The interplay of role and role, person and person 
is still essential to the statement of the proof. At the same time, the 
passage shows the way in which Socratic argument can procédé from one ’small’ 
argument to another and this is a guarantee of seriousness, coherence, 
genuine discussion and the genuine meeting of minds and propositions; and 
how this is bound up with the status of hypotheses. We notice too Plato’s 
own diagnosis: an eristical objection is verbal only co
In the particular case of the argument we are dealing with, he says that
45. cf. 454 cf.
we did not investigate
o^TyOv r/ ry^  ^3%
«ici -^ 'ç  d ô ^ -'ç  ( f u û ^ ç  âpAf r / fe ^ i/
7o r^- 4^-
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There is no reason for supposing that the passage refers to the theory 
of Forms, though it does carry the suggestion that there are many types of 
difference — which are not categorised simply because of the multiplicity 
of the task. For it supposes that there is a type of relation of difference 
of which one thing can be said, and another type of which something else 
must be said; and our understanding of the statement under review depends 
on our knowledge of which type ...
Our exegesis however is neither clear nor certain. It is suggested 
here that 454 b 7/454 a 6 are indications of the type of study Plato 
conceived the techne of logoi to be. Thus^when Socrates asks his 
interlocutor to name a pursuit for which women are unsuited because they 
are women^this could be taken as a request for the fulfilment of a necessary 
condition of the hypothesis that the nature of women is different from the 
nature of men with respect to pursuits. But I do not see that Plato is 
concerned with the type of implication holding between statement and 
statement. He hopes the analysis of the statement itself will make that 
implication obvious. Our section of the Rp. has not been concerned with 
explaining or justifying a hypothesis, but simply with showing its usefulness 
in preserving arguments. The same sort of pattern - scandalous attack, 
followed by learned defence - is common in the Theaetetus. But in the 
Theaetetus, as a subsequent chapter will show, an attempt is made to get at 
the arche of an opponent’s position.
First we must learn more about the notion of arche from the Republic.
46. 454 a 6; b 6-8.
mBut we must note that Plato has no where said that the method of
hypothesis is the method of dialectic par excellence. His mention of it 
is usually linked to a mathematician whose esteem he wants to win: a 
dialectical proof is accordingly in mathematical words, which
are intended to make dialectic easier to understand. The arche, on the 
hand, is the method of dialectic par excellence. The emphasis on the 
word ’hypothesis’ in the Phaedo may be entirely due to the weight^ 
presence of mathematicians.^^
47. Remarks similar to our remarks on 45 1 ff can be made on 437 ff the 
’hypothesising" of thé so-called Law of non—Contradiction. Contrast
Stahl p. 438 ff.
12.
V
Dialectic and other Sciences: the Republic
"It is hardly too much to say that Plato, at the height of his powers, 
never wasted a word; whereas many readers of Book VII must have been 
troubled by an impression which the commentators do nothing to remove, that 
dialectic is described over and over again for no clear reason. "^Cornford’s 
Solution is that in Book VII two types of education are being described 
concurrently - the mathematical and the dialectical. For him 534 bd 
(hereinafter called B) is too dialectical in its vocabulary to fit the 
preceding mathematical methods. It was natural therefore to claim that the 
distinction applied to subject matter : mathematical methods apply to
2mathematics and dialectical methods to morality (p.77 f). For Hackforth
533 C-D (i.e. also B) is equivalent to 511 B and its context (hereinafter
called A): he says they "agree in their account of the ascent to the Idea of
Good as the method of Dialectic" (p.8). If the idea of good is left
unexamined, then our hypotheses are left fragile and unexamined. Hackforth
points out that Plato’s description of the synoptic dialectician is
couched in the language of moral dialectic, but cannot be restricted to the
moral sphere, since it envisages the same sort of general teleological
3explanation as at Phaedo 98a. Cherniss comes out strongly on the side of 
those who think Plato subordinated mathematics to dialectic (422 f). He 
quotes a passage from the Euthydemus in which recommends that mathematicians 
hand over their discussion to dialecticians^ so that the dialectician can 
teach them how to use their discovery. However the Euthydemus does not mean 
that dialecticians have any mathematical competence, or that mathematical 
proofs require to be based in dialectic; but simply as generals hand over
1. Cornford (Allen) p.61.
2. C.Q. 1942 p.1-9.
3. Rev.Met.1951 pp.
4. Euthyd. 290 c.
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cities to the civil arm when the city is reduced. The Euthydemus also
disparages the diagrammata which Cherniss comments on as follows: "Even
the attitude towards geometdcal construction revealed in this passage was
never altered by Plato - so far as there is any evidence to show". For
him the methods of mathematics are inevitably inferior to those of dialectic,
because of the method of proof and subject matter (p.424). Cross and Woozley
are among those who agree: "(plato’s) view then would be that though the
objects about which the geometrician is thinking are intelligible objects
and not the sensible diagrams he uses, he still cannot deduce the properties
of these objects without constructions in space ..." (239)^. Stenzel claimed
that Plato envisaged an a^Ulfi^ci^ij^zion of mathematics.^ Robinson^waters this
down to: "He seems to hope for nothing short of deducing the whole of
knowledge from his single beginning, a goal which now appears infinitely 
8removed. Taylor (C.C.W.) insists that mathematics is to be brought under 
a moral jurisdiction: "Plato appears to think that it is true that all the 
radii of a circle are equal because that is best i.e. because while there 
might be circles with unequal radii, that would not be such a good state 
for things to be in."
Commentators are agreed, then, that dialectic is superior to
mathematics, but they are not agreed on how fqr mathematics can be made
9dependent on dialectic. Of say Taylor’s solution Sayre says (without 
adverting specifically to Taylor): "I see no way in which the "notion" 
of the Good or of any other Form could serve as a hypothesis from which 
consequences can follow and conclusions be deduced." But there seems to 
be agreement that the charge against the mathematician is that he cannot 
give a logos, though what the gravamen of this charge may be is disputed.
The division of opinion seems to fall into three vague and very informal 
groups :
5. Plato’s. Republic 1964.
6. cited Robinson I p.168.
7. op.cit. p.169.
8. Philosophical Quarterly 1967 p.193-203
9. 1970 p.45 n.51.
(a) There are those like Crombie and who maintain that
mathematics cannot give a sufficient account of its own objects. Crombie
(p.85): "The entities of mathematics are not pure principles, they are
embodiments of such principles." After explaining that a pure circle is
a concept and not a mere postulation (for all entities of mathematics are
postubtions). Mills says lucidly (p.158): "This argument - that since the
Forms are presupposed in the positing of "hypotheses" they cannot themselves
be posited "]ivnotheses" (his italics) - leads Plato to the conclusion that
12they are clearly non-hypothetical." So also Gosling when he claims the mean­
ing is that mathematicians, through not grasping a conceptual nature do not 
grasp the significance of their hypotheses for other disciplines. I take 
this to mean that mathematicians do not sufficiently grasp the notion of 
equivalence; therefore they use it hypothetically rather than dialectically 
or in its pure form. This group emphasis^hat mathematical objects are 
special cases of. concepts; and somehow oppose^ "postulations" (as they call 
hypotheses) to the concepts behind the postulations.
(b) The second group - Hackforth, Taylor (C:C:W)^8, 13^  ^Burnet/s ^ teleological 
algebra (1914 p.230).* We can identify the group by their belief that it is 
valid to ask mathematics non-mathematical questions - questions the meaning 
of which is usually derived from non-mathematical subject matter. They might 
be said to differ from (a) in that they are not opposed to something like a 
series of statements leading to the good. But the boundary between (a) and
(b) is fluid. Murphysummarises best. He believes both in the role of 
the good (p.182) and also (178) that once mathematicians have answered the 
question "what is the number one" (as they surely do at 526 b) " there are 
furftier questions to be asked: is the figure so defined a sensible or intelli-
10. vol.ii 85.
11. Mills. Durham University Journal 1970 p.152-159.
12. 1973 p.114.
13. Mind 1969 Forms as Causes in the Phaedo. p.45-59; 52 f; cf. Burge,E 
Phronesis 1971 p.1—14 Ideas as action in the Phaedo.
14. 1952. Introd. to Plato’s Republic.
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gible object ... is it individual or universal, real or fictitious, 
changeable or unchanging? All these are subforms of the question 
f/ belong to dialectic rather than
mathematics."
(c) The third group consists of those who believe Plato was making
practical criticisms of mathematics. Cornford finds an adumbration
of Analysis and Synthesis; Sayre (44) says "(Plato) most likely
illustrates a prepositional relationship in terms of which the geometer
is intrinsically unable to give an account of the hypotheses he initially
accepts as true. If two propositions imply each other they are equivalent,
and neither can serve as an explanation or account of the other. Thus
'this man is married' in no sense explains or is explained by 'this man 
I* 15has a wife'. R.MiHare suggested that Plato emphasises in the Line and
elsewhere the role of adequate definition. "If we wish to know what it
is to be a circle we have to find out what it is to be a good or perfect
circle" (p.36). Taylor (above) has largely rebutted Hare's suggestion.
He points out that the importance of definition is frequently mentioned
in the accounts of contemporary mathematics and generally attribute! to
8 16the Pythagoreans (p.201) . Gulley claims that "the inferiority of 
contemporary mathematics to dialectic appears to have been largely 
eradicated from the method of the mathematical sciences described in 
525 a ff. The 'eternally real' is now studied without reliance on sensible 
observation, and if studied with a systematic thoroughness which will 
obviously demand an extensive use of that type of analysis which the Line 
represented as the exclusive mark of dialectic. "Gulley then claims that 
reformed mathematics is subordinate only in the sense that all systems 
are part of a larger unified theory.
15. Plato and the Mathematicians, (ed. Barnbrough 1965) p.21-38.
16. 1969 p.58.
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We claim that Cornford (p.61) is right to draw attention to the
difference between A and B; but that the difference is largely accounted
for by the reform of mathematics noticed by Gulley. However, the reform
of mathematics in question in the Republic is not axiomatisation^^ but a
reform of "objects" and of direction. For the difference between A and B
is that precisely references to the misrepresentation of the objects of
mathematical study have been eliniated. These have given way to a renewed
interest in the relation between arche and hypothesis. In this relation,
Plato seems to find the irreducible difference between mathematical and
dialectical methods. A discussion of the relation arche-hypothesis is
absent from the survey of the ancillary sciences. However, it does not
follow that geometry can now do its work without constructions (the reverse
is the case); it just follows that the focus of Plato's interest changes
during the passage. Group (c) is wrong if it merely attributes the desire
to correct mathematical abuses to Plato, in the sense that intuitionism
ff
excludes infinite sets from the domain of genuine mathematics, or^Berkeley's 
criticism of his contemporary infinitesimal calculus. So too Plato criticises 
mathematical methods because they are inadequate to the ousia of the matter 
under mathematical discussion; but he nowhere suggests that if mathematics 
abandoned its hypothetical method then it would still be successful mathematics 
The element of axiomatisation or explanation inside mathematics would, I 
suggest, be counted disguised dialectic by Plato. But those who subordinate 
mathematics to dialectic in other ways will admit that the subordination 
is ill-worked out by Plato. J^s sketched possibly as a future programme.
I claim the situation is rather worse than that - the passages dealing with 
hypothesis in the Republic are mainly the result of a device; and
the resulting subordination of mathematics to dialectic is more than Plato 
had bargained for. What he claims eventually is not that only dialectic 
can explain mathematics but that only a man who has survived a dialectical
16. cf. Gulley 1962 p.58 n.9; 1958 p.5-9; Robinson I 169; Cherniss 1951 p.414.
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training is fit to defend virtue and its minions from the claws of vice.
A training in mathematics will not do - not merely because of a difference 
in subject matter, but because of a difference in tbei ''method proper to 
each science. Or . ■ . \ • r". - . a tra! \ in
The difference between mathematics and dialectic is the crux of the 
matter, and the contrast of both with apaideusia^^. This is in the nature
18of the divided line, in which the upper half, as it were, wears the trousers.
Obscurity results from the multiple purpose of the line - it is both an
account of relative epistemological worthy and at least the upper half is
meant to be translatable as straight pedagogy. The line gives us a distinction
19between reason and unreason, as well as between knowledge and opinion. It
. 2 0has also been taken as a statement of ontological doctrine; but though the 
distinction between the Upper and Lower half of the Line is one of ontological 
category, it is not clear that this is true of the categories of the Upper 
Half. But even a minimising interpretation leaves us quite clear that 
mathematics and dialectic are distinguished in respect of method. Plato's 
'distinction of method' is generally agreed to be double.
Section A: The section says that mathematics works through hypotheses
which mathematicians use as though they know? for starting from them they 
deduce their conclusions, but they do not explain the hypotheses. Now 
whether these hypotheses are existence propositions, concepts, or definitions 
does not concern us here. The most recent treatment claims that, notwith­
standing the phrases ;( and direct object), the hypothesis
is a proposition . For whichever they are they are not the technical "hypo­
theses" of mathematics which we suggested means something like "theorems", 
but something rather more basic, like sorts of angles, sorts of triangles 
and the like. In other words, the demand for an arche has already been
17. Murphy 1951 p.163.
18. Fergusson 1921; 1922; 1934; Murphy 1932; Raven 1953; Hamlyn 1957; 
Malcom 1962; Nettleship: Lectures on Plato's Republic; Stocks, CQ 
1911; Ptardie 1936 p.55 f; Cooper, N.1966; Tanner CQ 1970.
19. esp.Raven p.30. 20. e.g. Ross p. •
21, Taylor, C.C.W. 1967 195; cf. Stahl 440 ff.
made, but the beginnings of mathematics are for some reason not suitably
^ f
described as cLQ^^i . The clue is that they enter mathematics without 
apology or explanation because they are allegedly clear to everyone. For 
this reason, they are made the bases of mathematical proofs (
) * from then they reason. But this is a dialectical 
characterisation of mathematics; and not even the champions of the
"mathematical method of analysis" find that the circularity noticed in
22the passage is a reference to analysis-synthesis. A situation in
dialectic is envisaged, as the vocabulary shows: 0(fO ^(TS <Ç j
533 Q may be consistently 
as Robinson p.148, or 'a series of consistent steps' Cornford. I prefer 
to take it as a pregnant or punning use); j
^ . The description of dialectic (511 b c) is almost
exacf^hparalle/, but with this difference - that in a dialectical context 
the words acquire a more just, moreetymologically piquant meaning e.g.
y 510 d 5).
The odd man out is -  which we suddenly realise can
be paired with (510 b 5). This, like can
23mean belonging to the same ontological or other category . This symmetry 
emphasises the point made by Cherniss^^ and Rose^^, that the unhypothesis- 
hypothesis is qualitatively different from a hypothesis. Cherniss translates 
as "not resting under something else to which it is a stepping stone." It 
is not a question of the survival and hardening of hypotheses. Stahl makes 
the point that the demaiJf0<^an Unhypothesis is tantamount to exceeding the 
hypothetical m e t h o d . T h e  identification or qualifications of the 
Unhypothesis is a mystery - but it is the main point of the Republic 
comparison of the two disciplines.
22. Stahl 444f; Sayre 49f.
23. cf. Tigner, S., Phronesis 1971.
24. 1947 A.J.P. p.144.
25. 1966 p.188, 194.
26. 1960 p.448.
lii
But there is a second element which is typically introduced by 
This element is the so-called . The
denotes objects of the mathematical world. It is also a thing in the
real world - a diagram or a model ^  ) -  the
point is the same whether a mathematician draws three figures, or points 
to three apples already on the table in order to "illustrate" a set of 
three. Now it is clear that the mathematician does not say or is in any 
danger of believing, that one apple is one (511 al - 526 b 1-3); he is 
quite clear that he is only using things to another purpose. Plato does 
not think that the use of t^hings ' is the mathematicians fatal flaw. He 
may think that the use of 'things' to denote mathematical things leads 
to laziness; but though several passages s)\ow a connection between the use 
of hypothesis and failure to reach the arche (510 b 415; 510 c; 511 b 516;
511 d 1/2), only one passage connects the use of visible objects with a
radical ^failure of mathematics (527). Cherniss (p424) glosses as follows; 
"The contradiction between the language and purpose of the science (Plato) 
represents as something that all geometers will admit; and when he calls 
their language ludicrous he says in the same breath that it is unavoidable. 
Far from pronouncing an interdiction on the problems of construction, he 
recommends at Rp,530 B, that astronomy be pursued as geonEtry is, by the use 
of problems." Cherniss' passage we may add Theaetetus 165 where 
Theodorus excuses himself from further argument, because he early left 
( j / i ^  for geometry. (Campbell's^^ note ad loc shows that
Sire 'bare' words. The root notion seems to be that of 'pure' 
against 'less pure'. In that sense the truer parallel Politicus 299e ought 
to be added to Campbell's note ('unaccompanied arithmetic'). Phaedrus 
262 c 8 comes near our passage** ^  ^
27. Theaetetus 1883.
1^ 0
But it is probably unwise to argue that the Theaetetus passage means
'words without illustrative things'.)
Now Cherniss' view seems a little extreme. Plato says in fact that
geometricians talk about their procedure in a silly way and they do this
inevitably because they speak . With the conversion
28to intellectual purposes only this foolish habit will surely disappear 
because "Cd? 0
(527 a 9f.) (but the fact is
... cf. 527 d 6). The passage reminds one of Aristotle's anxious demonstra-
• 29tions that a construction used as proof is prior in noesis. So at 531 c
he says of harmonicians; "they do not rise to the level of formulating
problems and inquiring which numbers are inherently consonant and which are
not for what reasons. Just as astronomy is taken back to geometry, so
accoustics is taken back to arithmetic. Taking a hint from the Timaeus we
might say that the further we depart from arithmetic the more irrational our
subject matter becomes. But there is no attack on the subject matter of
arithmetic - merely on the mistaken affirmation that any thing is one. What
makes the ordinary arithmetician inferior is his use of artihmetic ^
fOÙ 525 c 3. If however arithmetic is
done for another purpose, what is there against the science? We are given
no answer in the Republic, where the existence and status of mathematicals
can be read more by way of inference than in the text. But it is possible
to use four apples to represent four, or to treat a triangle as if in
certain respects it were the triangle. This I think is what Plato means
^ /
when he complains of the use of i think too that he
recommends harmonicia/^^ a^stronomers to treat sensible occurrences as if they 
were * His reâSns for this are pedagogical and historical'it
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trains the mind, and it is what the contemporary state of astronomy needed. 
Physical observations very rarely produce the sweeping simple movements which 
are the hallmark of a good theory astronomy. Commentators point out that
29i cf&fjsT48 f! I^t retires proof that Aristotle is 1. answering Plato
2. justly here.
Plato Is using picturesque and rhetorical exaggeration; but "exaggeration" 
does not explain the points at issue — why Plat^ dislike,: eikones so much, and 
are they inevitably part of each subject. Why for example is astronomy 
without observation of the heavenly bodies not simply solid geometry? Lloyd 
says that Plato leaves things ambiguous : are diagrams worthless, or merely
imprecise? But he does not make clear eikon of geometry is the
equivalent of the sighted star^or the star itsel^^^astronomy. This seems 
to be confirmed by the cryptic splendours of the Timaeus^^ where perhaps one 
ought to look for the answer — in the relation between eikos, eikon, techne 
and ananke.
Arithmetic is not about apples, geometry is not about tables*Construetions; 
astronomy is not about the stars; and harmonics is not about the sound of 
screaming strings. The eikon is eliminated by being reduced to its proper 
place - as an image of something else, purer. But the eikon in each case is 
the defining characteristic of the science - ordinary astronomy is the science 
of stars ... but the man who will do astronomy for his mind's sake will 
concentrate on working out the meaning of the stars, though the sight of 
the stars may seduce him into thinking that he has another purpose. He will 
be rewarded with the vision of a more regular geometry than was possible 
under the old system ... but abolishing reference to stars and diagrams utterly 
- this is rhetorical exaggeration.
Thus the mass of the irrationality of mathematics is removed, but not 
according to the Republic through systématisation. But it cannot be extirpated, 
simply because mathematics is mathematics, or rather because geometry is about
31. Dicks, D.R. Early Greek Astronomy 1970 p.107; Lloyd G.E.R. Plato as a 
natural Scientist J.H.S. 1968 78-92; Shorey, P., Platonism and the History 
of Science, J.of the American Philosophical Society 1927 p.159-182 esp.
p.171-6; A survey of experiment in Aristotle, Empedocles and Hippocrates; 
G.E.R.Lloyd; Experiment in early Greek Philosophy, Proc.Cantab. Philolo­
gical Society 1970 pp.50-71 esp. 53 f on the limitations of the experimental 
approach cf. Vlastos Review of Cornford ' s PrincipiiWlSapientiae (ed Fur ley 
1970 p.42-55) Generally e.g. Platonism or Aristotelianism Edelstein, L. 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 1940 p.757-769.
32. 1968 op.cit p.78 f.
33. Lloyd op.cit. p.82 f; Witte, Bernd, Der &<£«>£ xn PlatoiTimaxos
Arch, fur Gesch.der Philosophie 1964 p.1-16; Cornford, P.M. Plato s
Cosmology 1937 p.164; 31.
diagrams. It has its purely rational element, but this we suspect is 
dialectical. The passage from A to B has said nothing about hypothesis.
We suspect this is because the contrast is between pure arithmetic and its 
debased forms; and in B the contrast is between dialectic and mathematics.
Mathematics, then, has tumbled to the first element of correct thinking — 
namely the ability to make use of something only apparently real as though 
it were an eikon of the real. The seen world is less real for mathematics 
‘ ' - than the unseen. Mathematics is forced to this conclusion by
the nature of its subject matter. This is a respect in which it resembles 
the dialectic of the Forms. For both disciplines deal with a single (exemplary) 
object that can be none of this (ostensible) objects of discourse. The 
mathematician talks about the "diameter itself" and the dialectician talks 
about "justice itself". Today we might be happier talking about 'real' or 
'true diameters' and real or true justice. In consequence a. mathematician 
deals with ousia. Just how Plato establishes that a mathematician deals 
with ousia is not clear. The population of the world of Forms is disputed, 
and possibly varies from period to period. Marks of membership are informal 
oneness and unseeness are among them. Numbers would be members on both those 
counts, but they may not be members on the same terms as justice or otherness. 
For us it is important only to point out that mathematics and dialectic are 
similar in their objects. The Upper Divided Line is a comparison, or 
competition, between two disciplines which closely resemble one another both 
in nature and in pretensions. It follows that Plato need not have set out 
with the idea in his head that the World of Forms included, or did not 
include integers. What could explain it is the similarity of mathematics and 
dialectic. Both deal with unseen and unitary objects. In the one case the 
object is what lies behind the the other it is what
lies behind words # Plato nowhere admits in the Divided Line that dialectic 
does use words as eikones of real things, but it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion. We do npt suggest returning to an older view which sees the Line
131,
as an explication of doctrine set out at Phaedo 99 d ff^^ÿjt'words simply
33
are eikones of reality. But in a comparison between the methods of 
mathematics and the methods of dialectic some reference to the role of 
words in dialectic is balance diagraramata, visual observa­
tion and the rest. 'Words* was a standard gibe against eristic; and 
Plato's omission of any reference to them requires explanation. We can 
even note the point at which misrepresentation occurs; Mathematics makes 
use of "seen shapes" { Q Ç C o 510 d 5); or "seen types"? 
rather wickedly Plato says that dialectic proceeds - hardly by means of the 
shapes or "types themselves", but by means of Forms ( cCd'cùT^ - -
511 c 2). Someone should have reminded Socrates of just how 
many difficulties he had with words!
The maddening thing about mathematics was its obvious success.
Encouraged by its success, mathematicians like Simmias, Gebes, Theodorus (and 
even Protagoras; Theaet 162e) apply their mathematical methods outside their 
nature science and like similarly maddening mathematicians today they drew 
conclusions from their use of them that the rest of us cannot quite accept.
We have seen that a "hypothesis" is an advantage and not a drawback. It helps 
one deal with problems otherwise obscure and recalcitrant. A mathematician 
generally has such helpful hypotheses at hand (as he does in the Meno) .
Having once admitted the hypothesis we see the conclusions follow as night 
day with apparently no difficulties of meaning or i n f e r e n c e / the 
mathematician says imperturbably if A, then B. But if you start using
in this fashion, you reach the most deplorable conclusions; 
and mere demonstration of the incoherence of such "generally accepted 
statements" is no cure at all. We have seen that Plato's interlocutors tend 
to accept B, once they have granted A; and rest content. We have seen no 
evidence that Plato says; if you have accepted A, and A implies B, do not
33. Archer—Hind 2nd Ed.1894 Phaedo p.159; 160 f; Goodrich, C.R.1903 p.381 f; 
1904 p 4 f.
34. Supra Cap.II ii C; iii.
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accept B until you have survey edits consequences B, ... B . For if A
1 n
is true and B validly deduced, then B^ ... B^ will be coherent. But theV^  
^ y  not be coherent if B do noes follow correctly from A, or if A 
itself is not known. In our Phaedo section we suggested that Plato's 
injunction to look at the consequences was intended to prevent us from 
accepting an impostor consequence B'offered us by our interlocutor as 
if it were B, the consequence of A. In the Rp., attention fixes on A.
Is it known? B is only known to be a valid consequence of A if A is 
known to be true. It is only knowledge of A that can establish B and not 
vice versa. So arche is distinct from consequence. But is this enough?
Now arche is typically dialectical. Hypothesis is typically mathematical.
It is difficult not to connect it with
and with the Phaedo injunction to examine the first hypotheses. Knowledge 
of A gives us knowledge of B; but knowledge of B tells us nothing about A.
The passage in which Plato contrasts maths and dialectic in Book V is 
at 511 b. _ ^
)
Cornford translates: "like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the
way to something that is not hypothetical, the first principle of all; and 
having grasped this may turn-back..." This translation
but it has the virtue of sharing with Plato a sense of the epistemologically 
apocalyptic which Robinson's more accurately ambiguous rendering lacks (149) 
"like steps and sallies, in order that, going as far as the unhypothesised to 
the beginning of everything and grasping it" (distorted by our emphases).
The analogy of a daîs with a set of steps for mounting and another for 
descending seems to be wrong. It is in the realm of the unhypothesis that
1 3 $
we look for the arche. There is a discontinuity between hypothesis and 
arche. Mathematics is hindered by hypotheses (plural) whereas dialectic 
is liberated (singular). It looks
as though dialectic breaks out of the hypothetical mould in every encounter. 
It is not a matter of climbing ladders^^^ so much as jumping off them. 
Similarly 'the beginning of all' could simply mean the beginning of my 
question propounded. The arche is the most important element in the method 
described here but is not properly part of the 'hypothetical' method at all. 
Even if the Tf of the Phaedo foreshadows it, it i^the Republic
that we get the arche's uniqueness its difference from a mere hypothesis, 
stated clearly. Yet where has it come from? why is it included at all?
The answer must be that the arche is included because it is the
distinguishing mark of dialectic. It is the characteristic most notoriously
dialectical - the repeated demand ; yet in the
dialogues we rarely find any obvious result or answer to this question. This
is a weakness that Plato seems to feel more acutely in his middle period. It
was also most probably a gibe against Socrates that Socrates turned into a
glory. We notice the contrast between the mathematicians who argue
from hypotheses, and the dialectician who begins at the arche. Now the
complaint is surely not that the hypotheses of mathematics (three sorts of
angle and the like) are dubious, tentative or wrong, and should therefore not
be assumed: the complaint is that mathematicians say they know something
30which they cannot give a proof of ; and the result of saying that you know 
a thing is that you never look beyond it. In order to discover the non- 
hypo the tical, the mathematician must be stung by the gadfly, stunned by the 
electric ray ... And will it benefit him? It is difficult to see how the 
aporia will make him a better mathematician. Axiomatisation might alter the
35. cf. Rose 1966 p.191; 181 f.
35a. For a denial of the Up/Down metaphor in hypothesis, see Rosenmever, 
T.G. Â.J.P. 1960 p.393-407 for a survey of 'spatial positions'
36. Taylor, C.C.W. 1967 p.196 f. discusses logondidonai, give a definition 
V give a proof.
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form and vigour of his proofs; but such a specifically mathematical benefit 
looks out of place. Perhaps the benefit is that he will not be misled by 
sophistical proofs either in mathematics or elsewhere. He may be benefited 
by the vision of mathematics in a larger whole, part of a greater system, 
as Gulley^^; of w ^  circles are as they are as, Taylor believes,or by 
deeper insight into the nature of equality or as Mills^^ believes.
But our only sure guide is that a mathematician fails the dialectical test 
of giving a logos.
Now mathematics is as universal as dialectic (522 c); its objects 
resemble hers; but in this one matter of giving account (= explanation, 
proof) a mathematician has no special training. The point cannot simply be 
pedagogical - that the mathematician has not been trained in the giving of 
logoi - but must be connected with the fact that dialectic adds the arche, 
before descending to a conclusion. Descenè^  to a conclusion looks as if it 
is a deduction, and therefore not specially dialectical; but ascent to an 
arche is what dialectic is all about - and there is no hint here that 
dialectic is to be identified with a merely corrected form of hypothetical 
method. Dialectic is (Afferent ab origine because it is a method of the 
arche. It is possible of course that there a particular arche like the 
Theory of Forms, or the Good but that is not the point made in the Line, where 
we have simply a contrast between mathematical (= hypothetical) procedure 
and dialectical (= arche) procedure. It is more than possible that Plato 
has here simply rephrased the hope so common in the dialogue that a man 
who can answer a q u e s t i o n w i l l  know the answer. The most 
intractable, most distinctive feature of dialectic, its destructiveness, is 
here accounted its ' ,A. glory; and the boast of m3,them3,tics, its
hypcdietical method is made by a shift in meaning a detr&ction. It is nowhere
37l Gulley 1962 p.58.”
38. Taylor 1967 p.203.
39. Mills 1970 p.159.
said that knowledge of the arche will make a good man. Preparation — 
ordinary pedagogical preparation, the knowledge of fact is necessary; 
but dialectic will give him the additional right to claim to know it, 
the ability to explain and defend it, and to see it more clearly.
We can now follow the argument of B more accurately. What things 
have happened to mathematics since A?
(a) Its direction has been turned: it is done for the sake of ousia.
- f ^
(b) The role of the eikon~ u attenuated in applied mathematics
and was never obvious in arithmetic.
(c) We have found no specific reforms in mathematics 
Now B makes two criticisms:
(a) Mathematics treats ousia hypothetically. The hypothetical method
is inappropriate. The reason why it is inappropriate is that if you don't 
know the beginning of the matter, you don't know anything about it. This 
charge is made in A also (533 c 3-5 - 510 d 1-3).
(b) B/N k^es the further criticism that as long as the sciences of being leave
their hypotheses unshuttled, unagitated ( \ are unable
to give an account of them, they will be dreamers - which is not to say of
course that they will be mistaken all the time, but that they will be
subject to reversals and misleading associations. The point of agitating 
the hypothesis is that otherwise a hypothesis is an arche faute de mieux :
it begins the line of reasoning. The hypothesis is an agreement - the
conclusion is an agreement - the mathematician might as well be a diplomat!
Dialectic on the other hand insists on the arche. Its method of 
introducing the arche is: "destroying the hypothesis'^ it proceeds to the 
arche to confirm for itself ..." This sentence is so annoying that it drove
Hackforth^^ to an emendation viz that should be read as
and it drove Rose^^ to translating as denying (L.S.5. II; 4)
41. CQ 1942 p.8.
42. J.Hist.of Philosophy 1966 p.192,
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which is often % Aristotlian meaning. 'Denying* he understands as 'deducing 
from other hypotheses'. Adam^^ and Burnet^^ assume it is a matter of 
consciously finding a contradiction among the consequences. This is subject 
to Ptfpper's difficulty^^: that connections between successive hypotheses are 
psychological only. All these suggestions envisage 'hypothesis' substanti­
vely, as £ statement, £ conception^ Robinson (161 f) argues that it is the 
hypothetical character that is destroyed - for all hypotheses, true and false 
are so treated. Cherniss^^ claims that a hypothesis is true when it is no 
longer a hypothesis but true and this happens when it is attached to the good. 
But nowhere does Cherniss given an example of this process. Both these 
versions involve distinguishing between 
and and
The three phrases can be kept thoroughly apart, though it is possible of 
course that giving a logos implies both changing hypothesis into an arche, 
and arranging and rearranging one's beliefs. The phrase may refer to the 
self-addressing dialectical-hypothetical method of the Phaedo, but there is 
no way of showing that it does. Interpretation seems to be more a matter 
of choice than of evidence.
The hypothetical method is a method of agreements whether genuine or 
interim.The boast of dialectic is that it attempts to eliminate the 
element of agreement and substitute something else more binding than mere 
deduction from a hypothesis; and this can only be discovered by checking
i.e. abandoning the initial agreements. Techniques for doing this are 
various, but the most common seems to be the trick of reversing the hypothesis. 
The reversal shows that something more is needed. It is possible that the 
arche simply stands for the body of specifically dialectical knowledge in the 
light of which one's thinking is changed. The dialectical knowledge has two
43. 1902 Vol.II p.191 Appendix XV
44. Burnet J.Greek Philosophy 1914 p.163, 229.
45. Supra II ii E.
46. 1947 A.J.P. 145.
47. Cornford (Allen) p.64; Robinson I p.66; Rp.432 d; 504 a c.
sides - moral and technical. The dialectical arche is the exactly 
equivalent to the Rp.'s list of mathematical hypothesis. The picture '
this leaves us with is not a picture of an axiomatised system ramified '
into various domains - mathematics, astronomy and the like: but of one 
domain, dialectic, (dominated by the question of the Good?) into which 
any hypothesis at any stage plunges only to be broken by the unprecedented 
demands made upon it. The Socratic identifies the arche within the 
hypothesis; that in virtue of which the hypothesis
The second characteristic of dialectic mentioned is that it is gentle.
This is very much a characteristic of person to person dialectic, and, if 
anything, a confirmation of any interpretation that takes ^
as simple old-fashioned dialectic transposed^^. Of course the igentle- 
ness has a new look - it now coordinates and commands the ancillary 
sciences, making sure that candidates are led to a vision of the good 
without being blinded by rough and premature disclosures. We are left 
to deduce that all throughout education, when our eyes turn to reality, it 
is some form of dialectic that so turns them.
The discovery of the arche is envisaged^ we suggest^in an old-fashioned
If
dialectical sort of way. It not merely a logical matter but an 
empirical one. In each discussion there is an arche (usually false) which 
lies at the root of several arguments and usually has to be rooted out of 
the interlocutors mind. The mere finding and identification of the arche 
is ‘difficult. Just as arguments are stated in personal terms and the 
analysis of them is the analysis of people holding them, so the discovery 
of the arche comes to take on an empirical air. If, as we suggest, the 
discovery of the arche is partly empirical, we cannot be surprised that 
Plato has left us no algorithm. In any case, most commentators agree that 
the Rp. passage is more ambitious than substantial. Sayre says (p.54) "we 
may assume also that he found no reason to anticipate these problems with
48. Supra Cap.I.
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specific answers in a context given over to a discussion which from the 
beginning is not expected to Veach the exact truth' (435 D). Anyone 
convinced that Plato knew precisely what the technique of the "upward 
way" amounted to could do no better than seek evidence of Plato's thought 
in his practice in the later dialogues. He will not do for such a person 
to limit attention to prior dialogues ... But in the later dialogues the 
"upward way" as such is not illustrated."
If there is a further secret in dialectic, then it is to be found not 
in the picture Plato has decided to give us but in the picture he has
decided not to^  give us: 352 e: ^ TpoV©;
It is consonant with our view that Plato gives a highly unsatisfactory 
picttoE of the dialectical man. He tells us that £f a man can go through all 
the arguments about virtue, proving his points validly for the real world 
and not just as facts of language, then he will know virtue. Only a 
dialectical test is sufficient to show this. If on the ether hand, he fails 
the dialectical test, then he has grasped an - which is not on
a level with an eikon. We are given no hint about how a practitioner of
this paragon of methods comes to be so deluded. Would Plato have to admit
that words are as dangerous for dialectic as dots for arithmeticians? No 
arithmetician says this and only this set of dots is the Three, but an 
unsuccessful dialectician can say something similar about a set of words. 
Again it looks as if Plato is covering up.
Two points from the Cave may be admitted. In each Plato is turning 
to his own advantage a drawback of dialect or a current theory: 516 c 
"They may have had a practice of honouring and commending one another with 
prizes for the man who had the keenest eye for the passing shadows and the 
best memory for the order in which they followed or accompanied one another, 
so that he could make a good guess as to what was going to come next. 
V^ornford) Cornford says this refers to the 'empirical politician'. But he
cites Gorgias 501 a
<yw j o ■ s $ '
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This passage of the Gorgias links with the distinction between science and
empeiria at 465. The distinction is what (i) it is impossible to proceed
scientifically in the absence of the knowledge of the good (ii) and that
the man who has techne must give an aitia related to physis. In both
Gorgias and Republic we seem to be dealing with the same point. But the
emphasis is not the 'empirical politician' but on a certain false theory
of knowledge to be found, I suggest, at Phaedo 96 b 5.
 ^ I f
I Ta.0 fd.
As is generally admitted this theory probably originates with Alcmaeon of
49 .Croton and is dealt with elsewhere. The important point is that a 
respectable theory receives a pejorative meaning in the Republic from its 
position in the argument. This is a polemical device# a . z
The second passage is at 516 e 6 ff^  of the philosopher emerging from 
the sunlight: "He might be required once more to deliver his opinion on 
those shadows, in competition with the prisoners who had never been released, 
while his eyesight was still dim and unsteady; and it might take some time 
to become used to the darkness. They would laught at him ... " With this 
one has only to compare Theaet. 174. The helplessness of Socrates before 
the law courts is a common theme of the dialogues. That the uselessness of 
a sophistical . education was also urged against Platonic dialectic we may
49. infra Cap.III.
infer from such passages as:
Isoc: Helena 5:
cf I ^  ^ ^  \CP T{ ui(Au Kn^ iX rc i /  %crïi iTCrpi
(n'luv éClc-iKÛj boÇjiTkxv ~t\ Tu>*^
’<5tK<5<P><Si ttn'eraffbxi
The polemical intent is obvious; and as is usual in polemics, the 
criticism is not justly answered.
Our main conclusions are as follows: Mathematics is criticised for
the tmpropriety of representing the unseen by the visible; nothing is heard 
of the (papropriety of representing the Forms by words. As a separate issue 
its method is contrasted with the method of dialectic. But the contrast of 
method is conducted only in terms of notorious characteristics, and no hint 
is given of a true criticism of mathematical method as mathematical method, 
or many clues to the nature of dialectic as dialectic. The extent of the 
subordination of mathematics to dialectic is difficult to determine: the 
important thing is for dialectic to emerge as uniquely qualified to deal with 
Good. This is not to say that a mathematician is not in some way dealing 
with the ^ od, but not in its purest form and in the most adequate way. The 
Good is a "given" it is outside the scope of the line, which is a competition 
- a race which dialectic must win and the prize is virtue. But as we have 
it the competition is conducted with methods more familiar to the polemicist 
than to the philosopher. Solid and worthy contemporary descriptions of 
mathematics are turned into descriptions of the inadequacies of mathematics; 
while the drawbacks of dialectic become its advantages.
H ?
VI
The Theaetetus seems to be more about arche than hypothesis!^ But 
there are certain similarities between the method of hypothesis and the 
method of 'Theaetetus*. The similarities are disguised, however, because 
the positions examined in depth are not the positions of Socrates, but 
of the interlocutor and of third parties.
152 a - 154 d.
Theaetetus' position is somehow the same as Protagoras', though Protagoras' 
position is of greater generality. It is very difficult to mark off the 
point where Protagoras' position ends and the deduction^follow. Taking 
the particle ' 152 c 5 as our guide we get two conclusions : appearing
and perceiving are th^same in Hot and Cold, and aesthesis is knowledge of 
Being. These conclusions are strange enough (almost an elenchus) but 
behind them there is a secret teaching. The teaching is given 152 d and 
its implications or meaning pointed out e.g. change is good, rest is bad, 
even in the matter of character. The distinction between being and becoming 
is made to rest on: either there is one thing on its own or there is not.
An elenchus follows,^ 'resting more on Theaetetus'character than anything 
else. The elenchus is not a really effective one because the positions are 
not explicit enough.
155 a - 161.
Three agreements are made about what Socrates and Theaetetus (as opposed to
the experts) expect to be the case e.g. anything to which nothing is added
or taken away remains the same. In answer to this position the arche of the
experts is brought into view, on which everything that has gone before depends
T! Theaet. 155d; 156 a; 181 c 1; 161 c 3; 164 c etc.
2. N.B. 153e 5
( ) , that everything is in movement. Now the relevance of
the arche to the problem of knowledge has to be shown at length. The
arche is seen to be an expansion of the first section of the elenchus
(153 e 5 - 154) - that our sensations are entirely unique to ourselves
is incredible. This elenchus depends on our notion of what remaining 
c /
I I S  about; and sure enough a fresh elenchus consisting of the 
stock objections to a sensation - knowledge system viz. dreams and 
madnesses turns into an admission about sameness and likeness (159), which 
is the second element of the secret theory, but not acknowledged to be such.
It is elicite^Theaetetus and Socrates as a part of dialectic&ftraining, 
and reiterated by Protagoras^. Conclusions are drawn: Theaetetus = is 
delivered of a child.
161 ff - 166
An elenchus follows: its substance is that Protagoras abolishes the degrees 
of expertise. Protagoras (in the mouth of Socrates) protests that this is 
a demagogues' trick: something more worthy of mathematicians is required. 
Socrates obliges with:
163 a 7^  ^  5^4 ^ter k^K
^ 'Z&vto ITo u ^
This is somehow the source of the U (ÙC‘À . It is
posited for the duration of the argument^; and disproved first on the grounds 
of words (164 c 7) then on grounds of what is ironically called the most 
frightful question of all, can one know and not know at the same time, which 
Protagoras later is quite willing to accept. Both these arguments are rather 
sophistical — we tried to get away from words, only to find a old
horsechestnut of a problem like knowing and not knowing. The consequences
3. 156 a.
4. 166 b 5 ff.
5. 164 e; 165 d 9.
are not seriously meant because they are not irreconcilable with Protagoras, 
but they are dialectical consequences which is why they are addressed to 
Theaetetus . Theaetetus suffers the young man's malady of being flung from 
one opinion into the opposite opinion by dialectic^ whether or not the argument 
is in proper form. So why is the argument 163 a ff superior to the preceding 
arguments? For superior it must be, even if it is not quite good enough.
I suggest the answer lies at 163 a 5. Let us see if knowledge and 
aesthesis are the same or different. The words make a special interest of 
the dialectician (cf 164 c 7) but the same sort of verbal elenchus follows 
even for a demonstration in fact ( ^ y w  ). Socrates is not protesting 
against words and verbal agreements as such here, because they are the only 
sorts of agreement possible. He forestalls a typical objection that his 
method is verbal only - and amusingly, by setting up an experiment, an act 
( ) in which the Sophist covers one of your eyes. Obviously this
is not an improved answer. We deduce then that the improvement required at 
162 d is that the statements of the discussion have been reduced to a more 
basic form - and in these basic forms, there are a few basic concepts which
the dialecticians is skilled in using. Still the discussion is summed up
0 / 
as C'Vc?^ tJL
166-184
The discussion with Theodorus is a discussion about the respective manner 
of life of the Rhetorician and f&ilosopher. It moves to the 
of men - what they actually believe viz. that they need an expert^ » to a 
discussion of what life-style is more likely to produce the expert. From 
177 b f it is clear that the first duty of the expert is to give and receive 
the logos over a long period of dialectic; but the rhetorician cannot do 
this. Here the rhetorician becomes confused with the man who says that. 
is moving^ with reference to the political world. But if you have to
8. 177 c 6 f.
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convince a rhetorician of the error of his ways, begin by asking him a 
question about the good. He will be too shamefaced to extend his 
relativism to that. At this point the argument moves out of^ the realm 
of 5^ and reported elenchus, and asks a straight question about
knowledge of the future: what sort of knowledge of the future do we have? 
Obviously deliberative knowledge, subject to technical criticism. But 
the victory has been won by splitting the opposition. No#A& thinks that 
sensation is the same as deliberative knowledge; butf^ for sensation, ,it may 
be true that the sensation is knowledge of such matters as hot and cold.
Here Socrates comes to grips with the arche: that everything is in 
movement. We show in Cap.IV and V that this passage (179 d ff) is Plato's 
characterisation of the Heraditean position, and his charge is mainly that 
it is impossible to argue with them dialectically. The arche is not 
envisaged as the first answer - this appears at 183 a 1, 3. The arche 
is that in virtue of which the answer is given. As we shall see in Chapter IV, 
the arche works as a sort of principle throughout the subsequent answers.
The answers are not deduced from the arche, but each answer must be given in 
the spirit of the arche. The arche will be v^ Jolated £f a "non-moving" 
answer is given. Plato has identified the root of error and treats it 
accordingly. The arche £s their erroneous method of thinking (183 c 2 f).
Now Sayre elegantly expresses the relation between Theaetetus' opinion 
and Heracleftus' in the following fashion.
(«) Knowledge is perception.
(()) Man is the measure of all things.
(y) All things are in change.
(V) Meaningful discourse is impossible.
page 95: "Th&s (jj) entails the falsehood of (pL) and (*f) entails the
9. 177 e
10. p.94 f; 86.
11. p.63.
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the falsehood of Whereas (^ ) entails (i/), (eO entails its negation.
How could Plato have shown more convincingly that (X) and (yQ are
doctrinely (sic) distinct? ... The theses ^), (^ ) and iy) have been clearly
separated." — Which does not explain why they were united in the first place.
Sayre points out that and (^ ) have a common necessary condition QZ) that 
«
man s awareness of perceptual knowledge is infallible with reference to the
properties which it discloses." (^ ) is also a necessary condition of (<t),
12 . . . 13 {p) ; and (^ is not discussed in the dialogue . But Sayre's insistence on
the importance to the Platonic method of hypothesis of sufficient and
necessary conditions rings false. What we get is not that it is a necessary
condition of (<X), (fi) jointly that (j^  all things are in change^which is
rather too extensional an approach. (|/) is what converts (pO > (()) from
truths about som^hings into errors about all-things. This is the arche,
and there are few archai suitable for the post - of sufficient generality,
sufficiently radical, sufficient^historic. (yO is a secret of sophistication
- how to turn things into error. dialectic the danger is that a formula
is taken to apply more generally, without specification of its range;
i.e. it is taken at its verbal value as a statement about knowledge (without
limit) and a statement about sensation (without 11 it). It has this
characteristic over and above its character as a supposed necessary condition.
Similarly Sayre's discussion of the "exquisite conclusion" (171A; 170 e f)
which Sayre thinks invalid^^. He applies to his discussion principles of
necessary and sufficient condition, but he ignores that the discussion is
an argument about doxa - the sort of argument from the opinion of many which
is often referred in dialectic.
Sayre's third important point concerns the 'new way' of 187 D. Up to
this point Plato has been proving the existence error or rather finding out the
12. p.73.
13. Cornford P.T.K. 1935 p.49; 101; Sayre p.75
14. p.87 f.
consequences of its existence; now Plato examines the possibility of error 
itself. Sayre 'translates* this as folbws: "Whereas before Plato was 
tracing out the necessary conditions for, or consequences of, the possibility 
of false judgement, now he is concerned to determine the sufficient conditions 
from which, when realized, the possibility of false judgement itself can be 
deduced." He compares the Parmenides "To suppose 'that such and such a 
thing (his italics) and then consider the consequences' (136 A) is to test 
the consistency of a thing's necessary conditions, under which test Protagoras' 
theses(^) was found untenable. To consider 'the supposition that that same 
thing is not' (his italics) (136 A) and the consequences thereof however is 
to consider the sufficient conditions of the thing in question.
The remark is illuminating, but can be deflated. For up to 187 D Socrates 
has assumed the existence of error - in fact it looks as though he has proved 
it when he proves that knowledge may be a matter of deliberation (doxa) because 
doxa is notoriously either true or false. Antilogical structure now involves 
Socrates in an attempt to prove the opposite.
Having, in a specious way, proved both p and not -p, Socrates must 
enquire further in an effort to make his results comprehensible. Hence, 
possibly, the dream.After the examination of sufficient and necessary 
conditions, we find that doxa is a necessary condition of error but not a 
sufficient condition. We need more necessary conditions. We assume error is 
possible ... and so on. Eventually there is a definition in them of necessary 
ans sufficient means of the link between definition by hypothetical
method and definition by diaeretic method, Sayre is able to find both methods 
coexisting in the Theaetetus - coexisting not in the sense of explicit 
existence herej but, as he says, the dialogue can be described in terms of 
both methods, using the link of sufficient and necessary conditions. This 
fact is a clue to what is wrong with Sayre's explanation - his logical methods 
are so powerful they will explain most Methods' simply because of their own 
15. p. 104. """Xdk
logical properties. But these spare and elegant logical tools are not 
sufficient to generate the often baroque forms of Platonic argument; and 
it is the asymmetries that will give us our most rewarding insights into 
the method Plato thought he was developing in dialectic. It seems 
insensitive to reduce Parmenides 136 a to a means of finding sufficient 
and necessary conditions in view of what we know of Parmenides, of Plato's 
difficulties with the negative and in view of Sophist 242 c 4 ff; 243 b;
"It strikes me that Parmenides and everyone else who has set out to 
determine how many real things there are and what they are like, discoursed 
to us in rather an off-hand fashion ... When I was younger I thought I 
understood quite clearly when someone spoke of this thing that is now 
puzzling us - 'the unreal' ... " (Cornford) In the Sophist, the interest in 
the negative is found in conjunction with the interest the plural. The 
conjunction is repeated in the Parmenides passage.
The arche " e v e r y ^ V i q i s  only one possible mistaken arche, 
identified by Plato with a historical philosophical tradition. In the 
Sophist, he examines another possible arche - everything real is at rest, 
which again he identifies with a historical philosophical position. He' is 
to accept neither nor
but tries tying them together and having both at once. Though he gives us 
clues about the archai of error, he tells us nothing about the arche of the 
true philosopher. Commentators lament (or not, according to temperament) 
that the idea of the Good does not reappear in such a splendid position 
subsequent to the Republic as it does in that work. The answer may be that 
Plato looked for an arche, and did not find it; that the concept of arche 
survived only as a means of analysing rival arguments in depth and securing 
correspondingly a greater degree of assurance of one's, own position from 
their destruction; 155 d Theaetetus.
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VII
From our analysis of hypothesis and arche in the middle dialogues we 
have formed a picture of statements increasing in powerfulness with each 
elenchus. The elenchus itself is often frivolous, designed to shock; and 
only when the ’shock* value, the facile consequences, have been exhausted 
does Plato get down to business. The art of handling hypothesis is not 
the art of finding sufficient and necessary conditions; nor have we found 
any inkling of propositional logic in Plato, who seems to work instead 
with master concepts. These master concepts are familiar to the dialectian, 
and introduced by him into any available discussion - likeness, unlikeness, 
sameness, di fference - and in fact they enter into thought in a very intimate 
way. Attempts we made to find master-master-concepts ; but the archai are 
more successfully found in the diagnosis of error than in the diagnosis of 
truth. Two of these archai are that ’everything moves’ and that ’everything 
stands’: the archai are then used to defeat themselves. Before a disproof 
of a hypothesis or archai can have the sort of results Plato is interested 
in, it must be expressed at a certain level of generality, in terms of 
certain key concepts. Apart from those concepts, proof and disproof are 
impossible for Plato, who worked with an intensional sort of logic and not 
with the extensional sort of logic we should be using if we expressed the 
method in terms merely of the consistency of hypotheses without attention 
to what those hypotheses mean.
Hypothesis is native to dialectic as a method of agreement: but it gains 
prominence partly in the effort to make dialectic comparable to other 
sciences, and partly as dialectic itself becomes capable taken longer and 
longer breaths between arriving at its (albeit unsatisfactory) opposing 
conclusions. The status of the arche vis a vis the hypothesis is as far as 
we can judge a sort of cross between analytically necessary and empirically
I5i
radical.
These complexities gave one commentator a false impression, because 
they are so obvious, so implicit, for Plato. Rose writes^^ there is "a 
lack of emphasis on any difficulties that may be involved in the process 
of deducing consequences ... the process of deduction is almost automatic 
and not worthy of precise analysis." In these circumstances it is 
dangerous to assume a method, mathematically inspired, which proves truth 
like mathematical _ theorem _§ince what makes for the consequences
of a statement, or for a contradiction within it, is so little defined in 
Plato.
Plato himself provides the key to a very different sort of analysis 
of the method of dialectic, in his Euthydemus. As Shorey says^^ "The 
Euthydemus in subtlety and logical analysis and in its attitude towards
eristic is akin to the Sophist and the Theaetetus. The question. Can
\
virtue be taught? the protreptic discourses and the quest for the political
art resume similar discussions in the Meno, Protagoras, Charmides and Gorgias.
18(An attempt by Bluck to date it before the Meno fails, because the
19Euthydemus is obviously not an explanation of doctrine; but Sprague
following Luce puts it in the middle group). Sprague summarises its purpose
clearly: "to champion the Socratic dialectic as against its false invitation,
20
eristic, or contions reasoning." In "Plato’s Consciousness of Fallacy"
die claims that the Euthydemus reveals "Plato’s consciousness of the fallecies
of equivocation and secundum quid. She also finds historical solutions to
some of the puzzles - like the ox at 301 a, where she claims the argument
21
is the Eleatic one referred to at Parmenides 130 c 5 ff. She argues that 
the surrounding arguments are references to the Forms, which Eleatics will 
not accept. She diagnoses one of the faults as follows: "other" is an
Tel Phronesis 1964. On hypothesis in the Phaedo p.116.
17. Unity of Plato’s Thought 1903 p.76.
18. Bluck’s Meno 1964 p. 113 ff; Sprague R.K. Euthydemus 1965 p.21 n.29.
19. op.cit vii f; Luce, J.V. Date of the Cratylus, A.J.P. 1964 p.154.
20. Sprague R.K., 1962 p. xii; 275D-78E; 293-304.
21. Sprague, Phronesis 1967 p.91-8. Dionysodorus’ ox and Parmenides’ Sail.
illegitimate form, though "beautiful" is a legitimate. The brothers go wrong 
because of their handling of the Theory of F o r m s . B u t  this is to raise
23 " ■ ^
many questions x ' - . .  ^ ^ ^
An alternative approach is simply to discover the errors made in
dialectic by these imitators. The Socratic method is strongly contrasted
with its imitators: Kleinias is naturally able to do dialectic as he shows
us but is hopelessly confused in the presenCe of his new master (at 290 b)^^.
Ctesippus learns quickly from tha^  but all the wrong things (299f). The
whole is set in a framework in which genuine philosophical and ethical
questions are discussed by Socrates and Kleinias to the point of aporia,
which the Eristics claim to be able to solve. They do at the cost of a mindless
use of rules and phrases.
The first thing that is wrong is anger. The anger of Ktesippus is
exacerbated by this sort of dialecticwhereas Socrates* touch is gentle^^.
27The result is that Ktesippus goes in for open elenchus . Next they insist 
thoughtlessly on rules of discussion we recognise from the Gorgias, which 
are used by Socrates to ensure relevance and clear presentation.
At 286 c f they refuse to investigate their position that "it is not 
possible to contradict". They deny that their previous claim to know 
virtue and to teach it best has any relation to the argument they are now 
developing (287 b) - which we compare with Socrates* constant return to a 
previous argument (288 d 5). They do not explain why it is a separate 
argument but simply insist on keeping them separate, otherwise Socrates is 
avoiding the logis. It is a rule (cf. dikaios 28708).
The continuity of Platonic arguments is brought out in the few -chains* 
of which one is to be found in the Euthydemus. Kleinias and Socrates are 
so ostentatiously simple minded in this passage (278 e ff) that wn are not
22. Sprague, Plato’s Consciousness of Fallacy p.26.
23. Anscombe, G.E.M. Monist 1966. A new theory of Forms pp.403-20 and 
Vlastos, G. Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras, Review of Meta­
physics 19^ up. 415-58.
24. For see Burnet ad Euthyphro 12 c 5.
25. 283 e; 284 d 7; 288 b; 294 d; 299 f.
26. 288 b 2.
27. 294 d cf Rp.476 e.
tempted to think of it as deduction, but as guidance. Nevertheless, the 
statements contained in it are statements of Socratic ef^ics. Now it is 
interesting that this chain includes a (^<%trr!/5^&elf-correction exempli 
gratia (279 c 5 ff). It has a retrospective force (279 d 3). The corrected 
cK.ô.jh is resumed (280 b) and corrected (281 d) and interrupted while we 
are still unsure of something (282 c). Socrates also makes a mistake at 
290 b. Built in corrigibility!
But Euthydemus and Dionysodorus cannot be reached through dialectic, 
Socrates tries to put the brothers on the right track. At 295 b they refuse 
to answer Socrates* question, and ignore the implications of Socrates answer 
when he tells them that he knows in virtue of something i.e. his soul. The 
fault obviously lies in the application of a rule of question and answer. 
Socrates is wise to the tricks by now (296 a9). Socrates trips up 
Dionysodorus with an agreement that looks very like a favourite text of 
Plato’s - that the good are just (296 e) in which he use^ the same rule 
legitimately to force something like a statement Like the busi­
ness about the soul, this is a starting point of.^ fA | b u t  instead of 
its leading to anything, we are treated to short buffets of argument with 
Socrates, including some important in dialectic - same and different (297 ff); 
parousia (301); and self-predication - that the beautiful is beautiful, which 
Dionysodorus refuses to follow through (301 B). They culminate in blasphemy 
(302 e).
If dialectic cannot teach them anything because of the misuse of rules, 
it is moral doctrine that effectively dictates the proper use of those rules. 
There are arguments to be put forward, beliefs to be inculcated, and the rule 
of question and answer, of keeping to the logos, cannot be used without them. 
We get a picture of dialectic without the doctrine in the bad behaviour 
( ) of Ktesippus.
(a) 298 b 4 - 300 b 8: His trick is to find cases that fit or contradict his 
argument spuriously or humorously e.g. it is good to have only one spear -
what about Geryon. This lands him in vulgarity — the Scythians and their 
skulls.
(b) 300 c-d. Ktesippu^^t^^dmit a qualified answer. The reference is to 
Socrates' difficulties e.g^ 296 a 7-8. He also speaks out of turn by 
questioning.
(c) 300 d 1-5. "Dionysodorus with his "neither and both" is answering
a Ctesippus' question with yes and no, thus breaking a rule tacitly
assumed by the Sophists themselves, that every question must be answered 
28
by yes or no" . But we can go no further - Ctesippus' ought to have
29
accepted this answer , because it is not prevarication. In the Hippias
Major^^, Hippias expresses disbelief that two things can be qualified in
31
one way, without either of them being so qualified separately
j
- ^ o C o  ^
^
Hippias is wrong, as mathematical examples show. Ross writes of this
passage of the Hippias Major: "it seems to be evidence of a further
development of the Theory of Ideas than anything to be found in the
32
Laches or Euthyphro" . He links it with "the problem raised in the 
•^rmenides as to whether it is the whole or only a part of each idea 
that is possessed by individuals falling under it." The answer which . ^
Ktesippus scorns is possible, and only an adherence to rule excludes 
it. But even if this is not the case, the Ctesippus' answer is 
inappropriate: he has posed a false alternative: are all things silent 
or do they speak. To this the answer is neither and both. A double 
question is met by a double answer, the sense of which is some things 
are silent ..." Again we get the feeling of misapplication of rules.
Doctrines and dialectic influence each other, but it is not through
28. Sprague, Euthydemus, p. 54 n 94. 29. cf. further Cap. IV.
30. For authenticity, see Hoerber R.G. Plato's Greater Hippias, phronesis 
1964 p. 143-155. 31. 300 b 6. 32. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas p. 17.
the medium of formal rules of discussion that doctine is driven into 
its advances. The ruling spirit of dialectic is still that of conversation 
and not games spirit. Plato analyses the whole conversation with the 
dead Socrates.
h;
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The Lower Half of the Line : Appendix
The Line is not worked out completely. Plato’s attitude to the lower 
half is quite probably opport(&istic. Hackforth seems to state the construc­
tion best\* (It is to) "illusüate the relation of dialectical to non- 
dialectical procedure by the relation of one sort of perception to another 
in which the object perceived is the same and yet not the same, just as in the 
illustrandum." The Lower Half is there for the sake of the Upper Half. Once 
established a proportion is commutative, and many relations may come to light 
that were neither obvious nor intended. One can only take advantage of them 
in moderation, hoping all the while that one is not being duped by them.
The situation is complicated by the question whether or not the Divided Line
should be joined to the other two similes of the section and read as mutually 
I 2
explanatory. It is not surprising that no agreement has been reached about 
what ’states of mind’if any the two lower portions are to signify.
We append a sort of discussion of the Lower Half of the Line if only to 
show that interpretations of it are possible which relate closely to dialectic, 
and do not require the positing of large amounts of doctrine.
Is the line continuous?^ Ross^ argues for the continuity of the line as 
follows; "In the phrase# using as images the things which formerly were 
imitated^ which tells us that the contents of the second subsection are images 
of those of the third as those of the first were images of those of the second, 
I find the clearest evidence that the equality of the two middle sections of 
the line ... is something intended; that the visible and invisible subsections 
are not (as Prof.Ferguson holds) introduced merely as an illustration to bring
1. CQ 1942 p.2.
2. See Robinson I cap.XI; Revenu 1953
3. Cross and Woozley p.212.
4. 1954 p.47 ff.
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out the relations between the two subsections of the intelligible but 
that there is a continuity between all four subsections of what is 
symbolised as there is between all four subsections of the symbol 
(the line)." ^
A D C E B
Is DC an image of CE and CE an image of EB? This seems to be an unduly 
direct statement of the doctrine of mathematicals. The evidence of 
the text (510; 510e; 511a) does not carry us further than a shadow/object 
relation AD:DC; DC:CE. One solution to this asymmetry is to realise that 
the point is AD:DC shows two ways of handling the physical world, and 
CE:EB two ways of handling the world, of which one is more
in touch with reality than the other DC and CE being more in touch. We 
have two sets of objects, the seen and unseen, of which the seen are the 
shadows of the first. There are two ways of handling then - directly or 
indirectly, through themselves or through shadows.
Instead of considering the Line as a set of lengths, representing 
a set catalogue of ontological types, it might be profitable to look at 
it as lines running from point to point. This makes it clearer that A B 
is one line not two. C is the point at which D C is divided from CE. I
am it is almost a sort of point of orientation: one can move
from it in two main directions. Only one physical world is necessary and 
only one set of shadow object relations. Anyone opting for direction C B 
will use a method (of rdELection on the contents of the world). CE, however,
is a mistake though it points in the right direction. It is mistaken because
it has copied the relation of shadow and object in the Lower World, and 
thinks it can transfer them to the Upper World by treating figures as shadows 
of realities. The correct method is E B ^  
i which is the "furthest opposite" of AD. To this extent C-B is a method 
of behaviour towards the whole of AC (and so perhaps is CE, because it
distinguishes between shadows and^^^j^<t7X ) . Consider AC: first we 
give direction and call it CA; for DA is furthest away from EB. To find 
a parallel in methods that holds between Upper and Lower Lines we have to see 
DA and CD as alternative methods of handling the world, and as alternatives 
to each other. There might be some strain in this, for AC (which we have 
transmogrified into CA) was simply a division of the physical world (509 d 5 ff)! 
But the strain is present in the text: for at 534 we are given CA - states of 
mind.
We get some such picture as the following:
■ReaUtj. ^  /
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wrong right wrong
 ^ ^
wrong right
My main justification for introducing these notions is that 
 ^ (a) they economise on objects and situations
(b) it uses the outstanding fact about Platonic education 
- convers "jion, or the "turning in the right direction".
(Even sophistical education was understood in this discontinuous way. The 
pupil was to be astonished into learning. In both eases, that astonishment 
meant the dawn of a disbelief in what the pupils had believed before ).
We know that pistis has to be broken before the mind accepts the unseen 
(524 e); and the nature of the unit is something that can break pistis. This 
is possibly a report of an aporia - a unit is and is not itself to the naked 
eye. Aporia is a desirable state.
(/p
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It might be an account of the soul at point C, when it makes its 
choices. If pistis is taken as the ordinary unadulterated opinion of the 
world (for Pkto was never worried about whether it is a dagger I see 
before me)^which has to be destroyed for better or worse, we get the follow­
ing picture. , ^
-,  ^
..V >
Now that the soul at 505 d II f Is consideringXhe Good is no argument 
against this. For the Good at this point is quite undifferentiated - stocks, 
stones, divinities and virtues are all good and it is this multiplicity
which produces the soul’s quandary. Now in the- continuous lines’ there might
.
be an aporia at D and at E; but does Plato really want to tell us that we 
discover pistis in the matter of the shapes of the visible world after being 
forced into aporia by the contradictoriness of shadows? and there cannot 
be an aporia at E unless there is one at D. It seems preferable to me to 
recast the line as the spokes of a wheel around a central aporia. This loses 
the evaluative power of the Line but it at least keeps the method clear.
6Hamlyn suggests that eikasia is subsequent to pistis. It is being 
acquainted with eikones. The conjecturers are adulterated, sophisticated, 
conjecture theories. It is an acquired state and worse than pistis. He 
points out that the nearest candidate for the meaning of eikasia is the 
power of predicting from memory future images. He connects it with a 
|^ kKt"0Ai^ nalysis of perception, but in historical terms we should connect it 
with the apologetics of Greek Science or, generally, the instructed thought 
of educated men of the period. Eikasia is the sophistical way of escaping 
from aporia. At Rp.475 ff we are given instruction in how to pick out the
(Co
most apt pupil for training in philosophy. He is not a follower of the 
many in any of its shapes, but of the one. "SinglemiAdedness" is also 
a characteristic of the mathematician and we shall learn its significance 
l a t e r . B u t  the sophistic?^solution is simply that there are many kinds 
of good: and from that he moves on to asserting: there is no one good.
What goes for Good goes for the other concepts we use continually in our 
thinking iwithout acknowledgement.
We began by admitting the force of Ross* proof that the Line is 
continuous: but we have combined this with Crombie’s insight that 
(eikasia plus pistis) does not add up to -doxa (p.74) and Hamlyn*s reali­
sation that eikasia is subsequent to pistis. Eikasia is the destruction 
of pistis and the Lower Half of the Line gives the mirror image of the 
Upper Half.
Our version still assumes against Robinson that Plato has given 
attention to the two lower parts of the line. The most persuasive 
argument for our assumption is the character of the Cave simile, which 
we have ignored and which Robinson points out cannot be matched stage for 
stage with the Line. The Line after all is an image of knowledge, while the
g
Cave is an image of Life. The Cave is about politics . But we suggest that 
it is about politics at least partly as an example of false science. Ij^ it 
is remembered that pistis can be inadequate and eikasia can make matters
worse, then our interpretation can fit the Cave, in which there are
9
competitions for prediction. Unfortunately it is impossible to prove 
Plato did take the intellectual component of the Lower Half of the Line
seriously.Perhaps this impossibility is not so distressing as it might be, 
because eikasia and pistis Jink into obscurity and if they ^  leave issue in 
Platonic philosophy, then the eikasia section probably turns into the
7. Infra Cap.IV.
8. Ferguson CQ 1922 p.18 ff.
9. Rp.516 c. r  Tf
10. Other attempts see note 18pî^ te-l! /
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tù*i^ of the Timaeus - the natural science of the lonians and
Sicilias which is only a little improved by a strong admixture of ^
C /
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CHAPTER III: DIALECTIC AND MEMORY
It needs emphasising that Plato had the same theory of fV-C^oHl
as other people: .^ or him as for other people, memory is linked with affects;
is conscious only fitfully; requires constant renewal. But the Ancients
thought of memory as an intelligent faculty more than they thought of it
as a faculty closely connected with time^, but separate from reason.
However the theory of memory contemporary with Plato had not separated
active memory from passive memory; and contemporary accounts of memory
suffered accordingly,the more so as they were historically committed to the
2belief that memory was the mother of the arts. This deficiency is first 
noticed by Plato. The theory of memory must be distinguished from the 
(titular) theory of Recollection, but much of the the theory
of Recollection is lost if recollection is dislodged from its niche in 
the theory of memory.
The most important sources for the early theory of memory are Gorgias 
501a, Phædo 96 b and a group of texts connected with Alcmaeon.
3
Here empeiria is distinguished from techne, probably for the first time. 
Empeiria is associated with memory and pleasure. Techne, on the other hand,
1. cf. Vernant 1966 Mythe et Pe/is^ e 58; 52; 74.
2. e.g. Hesiod: Theogony 915 ff.
3. Dodds* Gorgias ad 465 a 2-5. Add Heinimann 1961 p.115 f; n.50.
"counts", examines aitia and physis, and because of this can give reasons.
The distinction, also made at 465a, and dramatically confused by Polus at 
448c, is one of the themes of the work. The vocabulary of Polus* utterance 
is sufficiently unusual to be a quotation from the real Gorgias, and is often 
taken for such. Radermacher^ discounts the evidence of Syrianu^ which is to 
this effect. Aristotle^ says that Polus claims empeiria makes techne but 
this proves nothing. Socrates himself makes the attribution to Polus at 
462 b Ilf. Polus existed and specialised in rhetoric.^ His 
need not have heen a technical handbook, but we have no reason to doubt 
its existence. At 462 b Ilf Dodds ^following Robin) translates "(Empeiria) 
which you claim to have made an art in your treatise" instead of the usual 
rendering" (Empeiria) which you yourself assert in your book has c/ated 
art." If techne and empeiria are not distinguished at this date there is 
little point in saying that one creates the other. What the passage means 
in text of Polus is still not clear  ^ mean, that because he has made 
many^ speeches he has the art of speaking. Polus* subsequent remark brings 
into play the opposition *techne - tyche* which is very much in the
g
tradition of the "professional" disputes of the medical corpus . Polus may 
be defending the *practical* orator against the "theoretician", or vice 
versa. In any case the use of empeiria 462 c 3 recalls empeiria 448 c 5; 
and there is a strong presumption that Polus used both the word *empeiria* 
and the word *techne*. But Socrates* sort of distinction between techne 
an«f empeiria is known to neither Polus nor Gorgias.
Empeiria is irreducibly connected with memory. Memory is one of the 
first elements in a Gorgianic (or Isocratean) education. The meaning of 
a sentence claiming that empeiria makes techne is not so very different in 
the context of memory from the meaning of a sentence claiming that empeiria
4. Radermacher, Artium Scriptores p.173.
5. Met. 981 a 4.
6. Phædrus 267 b c; Radermacher, XIV For Polus and memory, Gorgias 466 a.
7. cf. Gorgias 457 c 4.
8. e.g. Vetus Medicina Chap.I; XII; de Arte IV, VII.
\L^
meaning of a sentence claiming that empeiria has been made into a 
techne by i ^  ) techniques. Aristotle^ accuses Gorgias
of just this - giving his pupils arguments to learn off 
Aristotle complains that this sort of pedagogy produces results quickly, 
but is not scientific ( ). It is unlikely that Polus claims to
correct Gorgias in this respect, for the distinction requires more thought 
than we generally credit Polus with; but it is possibly the criticism that 
Socrates is making. A techne can be taught - but teaching does not rest 
on the memorising ^tlone, because memorising cannot meet all contingencies 
and does not rest on principle. So it is possible, using Dodds' 
translation, to read into Socrates' remark the complain^ Tthat the school 
of Gorgias uses memory too much. Now it is a sufficient connection 
between Memory and Empeiria/Techne that a man should learn his empeiria 
by memory work. But there are signs that moreis implied.
Wikramanayake (G.H.}^says : "According to the sophistic theory,
just as according to Aristotle's, techne is based on empeiria and empeiria 
probably means memories of sensation". He does not argue for it;^  ^but the 
strongest argument I can find that empeiria does not simply mean "skill 
gained by practice" is the connection empeiria has in Plato with pleasure. 
It is not simply that the aim of empeiria is pleasure, because hedonism is 
not directly in question in these contexts. "Pleasure" here stands for 
"pleasant sensation", "unexamined appearance". A paty of schoolboys is 
perfectly capable of judging the performance of a pastry cook because 
nothing more is required than taste buds. There is no question, here, 
of entering into disputes about the nature of pleasure, or whether virtue 
or pleasure is the goal of life. The argument assumes that pleasure is 
immediately identifiable and not subject to reflection. There is a
T! e.g. Soph.Elenchi.183 b 38 et infra.
10. Das Verbaltnis der Philosophie und der Rhetorik bei Platon und 
Aristoteles; Diss. Gottingen, 1965 p.252; 245 ff.
11. op. cit. p.246.
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conflation of subjective and objective: the pastry cook aims at the pleasure
of others, the man led by empeiria is led by the memory of his own pleasures
and pains - for neither can there be a standard. Little distinction is
needed at this point between a habit formed by pleasures, and a 'knack*
K m  procuring pleasures. We note the
connection of memory with affect, and that memory is evanescent. It is
because of the connection between memory, pleasure, pain and sensation that
Plato began by asking how does memory last rather than why do we ever forget
12- an equally natural question. To emphasise the double nature of empeiria 
("personal experience" and "practice, trial and error") we may compare two 
passages of the later works. In the Republic, Plato faces the problem of 
how a guardian is to come by knowledge of evil. The guardian judge must 
learn about evil late, and through the experience of others (409b)
£ > te v ' â iS u t c é - KcticX/
f e Ï H À t *1 .
4^ The second passsage comes from the Laws 720 b c, where the slave-doctor 
learns his art by empeira and not according to physis and in consequence 
must give orders to a patient, like a tyrannos, as if he knew his art 
correctly. But the free doctor examines his patient:
Aesthesis and empeiria seems to have a more full blooded connection with 
each other than a mere connection of sense-perception with memory suggests. 
In the next passage aesthesis ishould probably be translated as sense- 
experience,/ sense faculty:
12. Encyclopaedia of Phiksophy "Memory" p.273 suggests the latter is a 
more natural question.
W
%Phaedo 96 h 4f.
0^1)  ’A (A\\) o
B)ivf &  (^vVd>fro <A, &fc Sèj»y>f (c*.i 3 ^ r
■/^t(de>ucnj£ xi c^pe^ut?<^i ÆkA TxJfX
"Or is thought due to something else, namely the brains providing our 
senses of hearing sight and smell which give rise to memory smell and 
judgment, and ultimately, when memory and judgment have acquired 
stability, to knowledge?" (Hackforth).
The editors agree that this theory belongs to Alcmæon. At D.K.
Alknæon A5 (26) the wording is similar. In that passage Alcmæon is
said to have declared that sight, hearing etc. are connected with or 
% '
suspended from the brain; and this seems to be the point of the rather 
indirect locution here ( ^  ^ ^  ^
*^ v; c^ i(jP<^ /'*) • But we do not know whether the clause B above 
follows clause Aii, or both Ai and Aii. If it succeeds both Ai and Aii 
then B is not expressly part of Alcmæon*s theory; and in fact we know 
nothing about a theory attributable to him. If it is the
case that he had none, then (B) is probably an original formulation of 
Plato's.
Our reason for thinking athat Aii and B belong to Alcmæon is, 
briefly, that in the medical writings^^ a theory that the head is the source 
of thinking is found in conjunction with a theory of flux. The brain and 
the eye both need to "settle down" before registering knowledge. Excessive 
moisture prevents this. The passage contains some signs of a ranking of 
the senses: the brain and the tongue speaks whatever it sees and
hears. We know that Alcmæon paid cparticular attention to a theory ofgty
O l i { f r  ,1 y la DK) centred presumably in the head. Added to this a few
15. De Morbo Sacro Cap.l c ^ - f ^ C a p . 18. This evidence is not 
used in 'Alcmæon Re-examined*, D.Z.Andriopoultfs, Studii Clasice 
Bucharest) 1971 p.714. and Pauly-Wissowa, Supp. XII 1970. H.Dorrie.
shreds of Aristotle make it likely that Alcmæon held theory that mentioned 
doxa and mneme. The case is as follows: the Phædo passage above contains
no reference to animals, and Plato seems to have dealt with the
distinction between men and animals in largely mythological /nodes.
Yet Aristotle uses the theory contained in the Phædo to settle the 
difference between men and animals in passages^^ that would otherwise be 
taken as corrective references to the Phædo passage. The De Morbo Sacro, 
Plato and Aristotle all use the same word
(L.S.J.). DK fr.Ia informs us on the authojïty of Theophrastus that
Alcmæon thought the superiority ( ) of man over the animals
was a consequence of his powers of understanding. The difference between
man and the animals is one of the headings of Theophrastus' "history of
philosophy" and he is quite capable of distorting his sources to fit it.^^
But it is quite likely too that it is a heading of Pre-Socratic
18anthropology . It seems, then, that Aristotle may know of a theory of 
the development of knowledge which connects both with the Phædo passage 
and with what is known of Alcmæon.
Both Aristotelian passages generate memory out of the staying power 
of aesthesis^^. For the purposes of Posterior Analytics, this is a 
sufficient condition of the development of empeiria in an animal; and 
an empeiria that has fixed itself is the beginning of techne and episteme. 
But the Metaphysics adds a further necessary condition. If in addition 
to being intelligent an animal is to learn, it needs a sense of hearing 
as well as of memory. Metaphysics qualifies the Posterior Analytics 
account of the relations of empeiria and techne. Although there is little 
difference in practical benefits between the two, techne is considered
Tel Met.980a 27 ff; Post.Anal. 99 b 35 ff. c.f. De Mem et Rei^ 450 a 32.
Though Aristotle has his own reasons for introducing animals of course
17. McDiarmid, TheophlD|stus on the PreSocratic Causes; ed.Furley 1970 
p.178-238 esp.233 f.
18. cf. Anaxagoras DK fr.21b. / /
19. 980 b 22 - 99 b 37 op.cit; Cratylus 437 B;
Topics 125 b 9. '
superior to empeiria because it is reasoned and can be taught. At
two levels then Aristotle has included a reference to communication by
sound and by language. This serves to distinguish between the acquisition
of knowledge and a process of conditioning, but the distinction is not followed
through by Aristotle in either passage. Instead he is more interested, at
least in the Posterior Analytics in the process by which many things (i.e.
memories) become one thing (i.e. empeiria). The process is repeated during
the transformation of empeiria into techne. This Aristotle calls the
22
problem of one over many and the mention of it seems to owe more to the 
challenge of Platonism than to pre-Platonic theory. As we shall see, Plato 
himself is aware of this conversion by memory of many things into one. But 
in his "ordinary" theory of memory, the phenomenon does not present itself 
to him as a problem: everyone knows that memory is deepened, strengthened,
clarified by successive experiences of the same thing. Repetition makes 
perfect. This is an element of Plato's ordinary theory of memory from 
the beginning. It does not refer to the possible congealing of "sense 
percepts" by an occult natural process.
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Hackforth says of the Phædo passage: "This purely empirical theory 
of knowledge is of course incompatible with Plato's But how
Alcmæon would reconcile his physiological emphasis M^th his equally 
emphatic emphasis on thinking (fr.l, la, ) is anyone's guess. The 
problem probably did not arise for him, since the divide between mental 
and physical substance first arrives after his death. The distinction-of' 
is one of the points of tension Plato has spotted in the theory.
We can now see more clearly what is meant in the Phædo passage.
First, episteme is us^d in place of empeiria. We have no reason to assume 
that the Alcmæon theory denies the role of reason, but the absence of any
20. 981 a 25 ff.
21. 981 b 8 ff.
22. 981 a ff; 100 a 3 ff.
23. Phædo. p.123 n.3.
%mention, of reason from the sentence seems to be the motive of Plato's 
formulation of it. Second, it is a 'physical' theory, so that according 
to it the acquisition of knowledge is involuntary. But it is superior to 
other possible theories in that it postulates grades of awareness, 
necessary conditions of knowledge. Memory, for example, is essential 
to the sort of mental activity that leads to knowledge^^; Plato seems 
in no doubt tha iknowledge has to be worked to through other things .
The list of grades turns up again in the Theaetetus, as a guide to the 
subjects to be investigated when defining knowledge (Theae 179 cl-4); 
and in the Philebus, ti|;escoped, 38b 12. / C \
S
From the similarity of phrasing we can conclude littjL; for drastically 
altered methodologies often underly an unchanged Platonic Vocabulary 
- dialectic, diaeresis and possibly anamnesis are examples of this sort 
of vicissitude. But what is instantly remarkable about the Philebus 
passage even here is that it deals with mind on its own. The'physical^ 
features of the Phaedo theory have been removed to the antechamber in the 
Philebus and are no longer admitted into the realm of 'mind on its own'. 
It is questionable if the physical side of the theory was ever of real 
interest to Plato. Two texts shows something like such an interest but 
slightly different^that mind and kiowledge succumb to universal flux.
The texts are in the Symposium and the Laws.
The Symposium context is as follows^^ all nature longs to perpetuate 
itself. Human beings might look iter children out of calculation; but 
the fact that animals do it proves a deeper force is at work . The 
scene, then, is genesis. It is old hat that generations and individuals
24. Knowledge of past, present, future is involved e.g. Theaetetus
178 b 6 ff;|186 d. cf. Cooper 1970 p.142; Laches 198d.
25. Laches 20lab; Charmides 176 c; Euthyphro 15d.
26. i.e. Physics 206 c 4; 207 c 8; 208 b 5; Rosen, S. 1968 p.249 ff.
are always changing: but it is more important that character and mood and 
opinions are always changing. Even each and everyone of our knowledges 
pass in and out of being — Plato adduces a typical 'proof* of this from 
ordinary practice. We have to keep rehearsing our knowledge to keep it 
with us. Thus it is not really the same knowledge but a constantly
27renewed knowledge we mistake for knowledge which endures in our minds.
The very words we use indicate flux The
conjunction of knowledge and rehearsal is of course educationally sound
29and a contemporary preoccupation . Plato is obviously talking about the 
'appearances' or phenomena of knowledge. But once again the materialism 
of the theory does not seem to be important, and importation of semi-modern 
concerns about mind/body is an anachronism. Memory and the attendant 
phenomena of forgetting and remembering, coming to mind and passing out of 
mind is an obvious example of flux in its own right. These are
^ ^  Ideas defined as what is 'seen'
in introspection are particularly evanescent because one keeps on thinking. 
In the wot$d of change the answer is melete. Laws too change and lose 
appeal at Symposium 210 c 3 ff, but laws are in no helpful sense "physical" 
or "material". Obviously Plato is talking about what people think is law, 
what people think is kn#vkdge etc. and agrees with them that these things 
are in flux. Perhaps 'people' would be a little taken aback by this - as 
it is the opposite of Alcmæon's 'rest' theory - but Plato would point out 
the implication of their own practice. If laws and knowledges are an 
example of flux then by a Platonic slither never fully explained, they are 
examples of perpetual flux.
The second example of the ordinary theory of memory and flux is Laws 
732 b 5 ff. Everyone should keep recalling his neighbour and his himself
JT , cfl The Theætetus account of the effect of genesis on mind 153 d 8 ff.
28. Klein 1965 p.157.
29. See passages Guthrie IIIA p.256 f.
(i.e. who they are, their true nature) both at work and play" ....
presumably because the power of rehearsal and recall is necessary to 
prevent the dissipation of our sense of reality into the dream of flux.
The Timaeus passage begins at 25 e 3. The structure of "recalling"
is the same as the structure elaborated in the Meno and Phædo. First
Critias is 'put in mind of  ^ the tale of the elder Critias by hearing
Socrates' "speak" the Republic. But he does not remember clearly at
first instance, because of the lapse of time. The act of "recollecting"
is thus far involuntary and set in motion by a perception. From here on
it is voluntary, taking place only in the mind ( ) without
31physical occasion or concomitant. He begins going over everything in 
his memory, bringing up ( )^  ^  ^and examin­
ing them ( 7^ • He rehearsed again at dawn, having slept
on the memories, and now he can repeat in detail what was said to him when
he was a child. The passage is clearly a description of ft
technique; but it also makes a statement about the nature of memory. Why 
is it that Critias would have difficulty in recalling an event of the 
previous day; but he can recall in detail eventsfcof his childhood? The 
answer is, first, that memories of childhood are tenacious, as everyone 
says ( 1/ )> but second, he originally heard it under
propitious circumstances. Pleasure, play, an old man's enthusiastic 
teaching and a child's vigorous questioning made the event memorable.
It is branded on Critias' mind indelibly. That is how this particular 
memory achieved its tenacity. We have already noticed the connection of 
memory with pleasure. What we notice here is something rather odd — why 
should the child's questions improve his memory of that occasion. After 
all the old man probably produced an instructive monologue. In this 
3ÔT Sorabji 1972 p.35 on the 'passive'
31. Contrast De Mem et Rem. 453 a 14 ff: recollection is bodily.
32. Vide i
' 4 ^
reference to questions we perceive a fusion of the method of dialectic with 
the method of effective teaching and educational psychology which should 
remind us that divisions and labellings we make of Plato's "philosophical" 
methods should not be separated very distinctly from educational situations.
At Rp.518 b 6 f we are told that the professionals { , 0 ^  
are wrong to claim that they put knowledge into souls where previously 
there was no knowledge. Perhaps this is true of ordinary virtues, but 
intelligence is diviner and always present in the soul, making the good man 
better and the b^d man worse. Treatment of the intelligence is an art on 
its ownmthe . Gulley suggests that the passage refers to the
doctrine of Anamnesis. But changes have been made - intelligence exists 
as a ^ i n  the soul; and it is separate from Anamnesis because 
it can work equally strongly in two directions,
L. Intelligence must be provoked and used properly 
before the teaching of outsiders can metamorphose into knowledge inside 
someone else. The thrust of the argument appears to be directed against 
an educationalists' memory theory - that knowledge changes hands in the 
shape of statements and is kept in memories.
We have seen that Plato has a strong "ordinary theory of memory",
in which anamnesis and memory are distinguished. Memory is at home among
appearances, emotions, character traits. It must be constantly renewed by
anamnesis, the descriptions of which resemble the descriptions of dialectic.
Just as dialectic needs to work on a good physis, so the most striking
thing about memory is the variation of its quality from person to person.
The ability ot account for this variation is an additional recommendation
33
of any theory of memory presented at the time and a bad memory, one 
suspects, is considered a sufficient cause for mistakes and intelligent 
behaviour. Plato draws on two sources to elaborate his theory of memory^ 
the educational and the Alcmæonic, in neither of which is the distinction
33. Theæt. 194 e; Rp.526 b; Ep.VII 344a; Theæt.144 ab; De Mem Rem 450 a 32f. 
Diogen^ of Apollonia DK 64 A 19.45.
made between active and passive memory. Yet the two memory theories only
work on the assumption that there is an "intelligent" memory. Plato
became aware of this tension in his examination of dialectic in which
>
the tension is most flagrant. The statement of this tension seems to 
him sufficient to disprove the two rival conceptions of learning and to 
turn them on their heads. But he did not consider the whole process by 
which we acquire knowledge in school and in the world, which he takes for 
granted is roughly as the rival theories have it.
It will become obvious that a good memory is not just a trick of 
conversation for Plato, but plays an essential role in giving or guaran­
teeing the truth content of a conversation. This is the additional link 
required to turn an analysis of the iffaent types of memory in pupils 
into an epistemological doctrine: The theory of Anamnesis is not a bonanza 
Plato sudden ly got from the Pythagoreans, but essential to the validity 
of dialectic; and an appreciation of it arises naturally says Plato, from 
an appreciation of dialectic.
Nowwhere is the problem posed or solved by distinguishing between 
a "physical" memory and a "mental" power of recollection.
II
At Gorgias 495 d. Socrates puts Callicles* monstrous yiews "on 
record" (Dodds ad loc). To this end he uses a legal formula, drawing 
attention ot a "deposition". But he can only entrust the deposition to 
his listeners' good memories:
écA x k v 'è v
The same combination of legal metaphor and memory occurs at 473 d: 
Socrates says to Polus^ ^   ^ ,
^  d j fCA< o Z k  ^
Here memory picks up the "unguarded" admission. Socrates does not mean 
"Remind me of what you said" but "I begin to remember letting something 
pass". Such requests for "reminding" are not followed by a yerbatum 
account of what was said, but rather by a reexamination or clarification 
of the issue. So at 500 a 7 the releyance of Socrates’ "recalling" 
the conversation with Polus and Gorgias has to be made clearer 500 e ff. 
A good memory is necessary to prevent mistakes.
At 466 a: Scorates criticises Polus: ^  c /
Pa( : FoK et crSi i
'F{iltCPuZéç Uv S>
Now Socrates is trying to teach Polus the art of dialectic, one of the 
cardinal points of which he thinks is a full appreciation of the 
interlocutor's meaning. Polus is merely interested in eliciting a short, 
indefensible answer. Socrates criticises him, pointing out an obvious 
sharp practice, but he is not criticising him for mere misquotation. It 
is clear to anyone who examines the role of memory in Platonic dialectic
that memory is an intelligent faculty. Memory chooses its moment^ it 
remembas only to the point. There is an exactly similar passage of arms 
in the Protagoras, when at 350 c 5 Protagoras accuses Socrates of not 
remembering an answer properly. But what Socrates does not remember 
is the sense of the answer. Under that appeal to memory lies a distinc­
tion amounting to the distinction between a proposition and its converse. 
Convertibility is a logical notion, and cannot be wrapped up as mere 
misquotation: all courageous men are bold, but not all bold men courageous. 
Yet the word by which Plato draws attention to this is a memory and word; 
and by implication, the facul^ guarding against such practices would 
seems to be memory.
The Gorgias has its quota of summaries. It was a principle of Socrates 
to repeat and repeat - but to repeat in order to avoid mistakes and to 
verify inferences. He justifies this habit very often with light-hearted 
colloquialisms (498 e 11 f », ^  \ M
K-i' A  K m  T p i i
K m  ^ (X C u rfc o ^ r^ c r'& ^
it is a "retake" ) of the argument from the beginning .
But these "retakes” are usually "recreations", at least clarifications of 
the preceding argument. Yet if Socrates was asked how it is he manages 
to devise and correct his arguments, he would say he did it by 
of "going over the same things" and exercising his memoy. Of course, X 
do not imply that the Platonic Socrates was so naive as to think he was 
reporting verbatim what was said: X am merely suggesting that Mhmory is a 
much more active faculty for him than for us, and verbal exactitude was not 
ranked very high in the list of Greek virtues. But perhaps the most 
significant use of "recalling" in the Gorgias is at 500 a 7. Here Socrates 
joins the results of two arguments - the argument with Polus and Gorgias 
and the argument with Callicles. Now what is remembered is not a verbal
35. 488 b; 498 e; 506 c 4 ff.
formula, but a genuine relevancy tbat requires explanation before tbe 
partner appreciates it. Yet the only answer Socrates can give as to why 
the argument has behaved like this is that we recall the previous argument. 
At Euthyphro 15c, Euthyphro is asked if he remembers the result, not of
the argument they are engaged upon, but of the previous one (lOd) : for if
he does (and we may add only if he does) he will see that the argument 
has come full circle. In the Protagoras after the long excursus on 
literary criticism, Socrates persuades Protagoras to begin the real 
discussion with him again. But the results of the previous attempts are 
not annulled:
349a 7 f: i f  'A
^  ^  (3^ ).
Socrates uses the interlocutor’s. memory to remind himself of the argument.
The point is especially effective since the preceding passage tries
38(ineffectually?) to prove the need for an interlocutor in dialectic.
An especially remarkable example of "recall" linking more than one 
argument is found at Phædo 103 b.' where an argument from the beginning 
of the sequence (viz. that opposites beget opposites) is brought into 
collision with the last argument (viz. that opposites are always opposites). 
The word for this is ^  and in the circumstances
one is tempted to translate "raise an objection from what has been said".
Memory, then, has a special role in dialectic recognised before the 
date of the Meno, and seems to be independent of the "transcendental memory" 
used in the Meno and Phædo. The picture does not alter in the dialectical 
works written later. Timæus repeates the lesson of the previous day 
(17 b 7 ff) but his memory has already resolved the lessons of the Republic
36l 500 d 6: cf. the reverse Phdo 100b, 100 a 3. cf. Cap.II i supra.
37. The passage has memory in mind. 350 c 6; 349 el.
38. 348 c 5 ff-
into capital points* , which he repeats like a successful dialecticiUtn 
^ T h e  structure is repeated when 
Critias remembers . The danger is that a man has forgotten something 
essential. This is a ruse of dialectic — and, we must remember, 
in the language in which dialectic would be described.Recollection 
must be completed - a point of great importance in the titular theory 
of Recollection - in a rational fashion. In the Euthydemus, as elsewhere, 
memory surfacing causes a change of mind, a reversal of previous arguments 
but what is remembered requires investigation.^^ For it is not always
understood properly. Nicias for exam^^ has often heard Socrates say
that a man is good in so far as he is knowledgeable, but in so far as he
is ignorant he is bad. Yet he still does not understand it.^^ Protarchus
confesses that he had often heard Gorgias, but now does not understand
48(i.e. has not learned) what Gorgias was talking about. Meno, also a
pupil of Gorgias, evidently has the same difficulty, and itiV no accident
that Plato examines recollection first in dialogue with a man brought up
49on memory-training. Charmides is an example of a man who can remember
- what Critias has said - but cannot defend it or, in consequence, understand 
50it. He is a victim of what we should call *mere memory work *. *Mere 
memory work* has its place in Plato; and is probably one of the root reasons 
for Plato*s objection to book learning.But Plato never complains, like 
a modern teacher, that his pupil is working from memory. He claims that his 
pupil is not remembering (or using his memory) correctly. The pupil has 
the hypomnemata to help him: it is the pupil*s business and his alone to
perform correctly the reciprocal operation of anamnesis, Memory provides
52 53objections to arguments, memory keeps up the rules of debate. A request
40^  17 b 8; for the general situation compare Lysis 211a.
41. 17 b 8. 42. 26 c 6. 43. 19 ab.
44. Symp. 201a; Ptgs. 329 b 6 f; Phdo 73 a 5.
45. 279 c 5; Cap.II iv 42. 46. Meno 81 a 5; Phdo 70 c b; Phdrus
270 c 3; 274 c 5; Phil 20 b. 47. Laches 194 d.
48. Phil 58a. 49. Meno 71 cd; 73 c; 76 ab; 79 d; for
Gorgias and memory supra. 50. Charm. 161 b f.
51. Ptgs. 329 a; Theæt. 152 b; 162 e 4; 162 d etc; Phdrus 274 e5,
52. Pol. 293 a; Theæt. 205 c. 53. Theæt. 157 c; Pol.285c.
to be reminded is a requested to be reminded rationally; and a remembered, 
ordered summary is as much part of diaeresis as of early dialectic^^ though 
of course this is true mainly of the technique of discussion.
Now one of the main functions of memory is to provide a guarantee
of coherence — it links arguments together in the way found typical of
55 'the Socratic earnestness. All genuine arguments are continuations of 
one a nothe r . I n  the Euthydemus this can be shown quite elegantly: 
for what is sophistical about Euthydemus is precisely that he does not 
allow appeal to the memory of statements in the previous argument.^^ We 
noticed that Plato holds no fully stated law of contradiction until the 
Republic and even of this there is some doubt - but one way of filling the 
gap is to cultivate a memory, not a verbal, but an intelligent imemory.
A possible guarantee of such a memory is the genuineness of the pursuit 
of truth: if any argument can lead to truth, then all arguments must be 
given their due weight at all times. But if the objective is to win one 
round of discussion, then previous rounds are irrelevant. To this extent 
Plato is conscious of the crucial role of memory in his "method of dialectic".
We see the results in the Philebus. The Philebus discusses memory on 
the "philosophical" level - the level of superstructure; but it is also 
shot through with the uses of memory in its infrastructure. Memory is 
treated as a dialectical reality - as much an element of the situation as 
bicarbonate of soda in pastry. In fact remembering something is superior 
to seeing something: because the remembered fact is softened and regurgi­
tated for a relevant context, whereas a fact seen is likely to be dsconcerting 
with no clear line of connection with anything. A fact seen is not part of 
discussion, and discussion is what produces truth, not looking at things.
54. Soph. 250; 264c.
55. Vide Cap.I supra.
56. Phil.fin; Ptgs. 349a; Laches 201 c etc
57. Euthydemus 287 b; 288 d5.
The Philebus reference to listening fruitlessly to Gorgias has been 
dealt with above. The remaining references to memory in the Philebus 
divide most easily according to the stage of development of the argument 
at which the power of memory is invoked. We find that the use of memory 
is as follows:
1. Outset
Here a statement is memorised, or memorialised, as being of special
importance like the "deposition" in the Gorigas. 20bc is an example.
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A god puts device or memory into Socrates mind - the memory takes the 
form of a statement with the qualities necessary to serve as the basis of 
discusssion cf. 33a; 41c.
2. Memory joins the outset to the consequences, and enables one to draw 
conclusions. It joins in three ways - either it brings into proximity with 
one another two contradictory or otherwise important propositions e.g. 41c; 
or it reminds the interlocutors of the method or principle being used in 
this particular argument e.g. 25 a - 23 d; or it brings togeftier propositions 
dispersed in what seem to be different sub-arguments e.g. 41 c; 33a.
2a. A request for explanation of the previous argument is couched as a 
request for "reÿ»|jLnding" 31c; 67 b.
3. Memory introduces propositions from outside the chain of arguments.
These are then worked , fnto the structure e.g. 20 b; 19 d; 24 c - where 
the propositions involved are well known to Platonists.
4. Conclusions are also committed to memory, as at 31a. For concluions 
become starting points and so the cycle begins again cf. 33a. The outsets 
of the different arguments are connected by memory, as they were in the 
linked hypotheses of the Phædo, and so we come full circle, without ever 
leaving the orbit of memory.
58. Compare Hector at the Ships: Iliad VIII.181f.
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One point needs to be stressed. Our examples of (3) are examples of 
propositions that are already in the minds of the interlocutors, and as 
such already responsible for their multifarious but related opinions. The 
propositions are well known top^i,^^ made use of in the logically correct 
place for them. For i/p6^ *Aare typical examples of the unlimited,
the "more or less".^^ Plato is investigating the content of minds. Further­
more he is investigating them in the mind. It seems that one of the special 
things about dialectic is that it is that it uses no "physical senses". It 
does not go out of its way to verify that water is wet by dipping its hand 
in a pond. It is enough for dialectic to remember that water is wet. Now 
using the word "remember" introduces the idea that at some time I have 
felt or tested that water is wet. But this is a red herring. Plato is 
simply not yet interested in the process by which a perception becomes a 
deni%pn of m i n d . U s i n g  the English word "remember" is misleading in this 
respect. Hackforth has translated the memory words very often by "bear in 
mind". In fact one can only have acquaintance^^ with the object of dialectic 
if one is in the mind. In the Philebus, pleasure and goodness are "pure 
pleasure" and "pure goodness". The operation therefore takes place in the 
mind and not in the experience. Plato describes the venue brilliantly:
This is a rather good summary of what Plato thinks is happening in a 
socratic conversation; for there is no doubt that ^ keina refers to those
Y9I Arist.Top.163 b 22 ff; Sorabji 29 ff; citing Solmtsen, 1929 pp.l70.
60. Phdo 93 ab# , . -
61. If indeed he is interested later.
62. The word is used without prejudice.
[%(
unseen subjects of Platonic interest good, mind, knowledge, which here seem 
to share the Ontological status of (pure) pleasure, delight etc. We may 
omit consideration of the bearing of this passage on the persistence of 
the Theory of Forms; and simply notice that mformation has been passed 
into the "memory" to make it fit for using in dialectic. The Phileban 
mind is greatly expanded and more populous place than mind in the earlier 
dialogues. This is reflected in the description we get of dialectic. For 
now do not merely retreat into our minds and talk to ourselves; we 
have cinema shows in our mind as well, to help account for error. Now it is 
absurd to think of Wordsworth recollecting his daffodil in tranquility 
before daring to make a scientific pronouncement on the length of its 
bugle horn. Accading to some theories, he could 'bear in his mind' an 
image of the daffodil, which, if he were very brilliant he might be able to 
measure as fishermen measure fish. But that cannot be Plato's meaiing.
I suggest that our description is not a description of mental images, but of 
the world of dialectical discussion. After all, where does evidence come 
from in dialectic, if not from the memory? Plato's much criticised^^ proof 
from the watchdog^^ is an example. For when Socrates is in doubt about 
the possibility of combining aggression with gentleness, he thinks the 
point is "proven" by the existence of tamed watchdogs. He remembers this 
fact, while in a state of aporia, by dint of considering the course of the 
previous argument (j^(
). Facts are "inminded" ) i.e. their
relevance is seen cf .375 a; 375 ;376 is not a report
of experience) . At Theaetetus 190b Plato seems to have used an anamnesis- 
word when requesting a report on what is possible for the mind. It is an 
intentional variation of the more usual
63. Popper, K; Open Society vol.I p.51, 149. Routledge Kegan Paul 1969
64. Rp.374 eff.
fThis is regarded as a weakness of Socratic method — that it does not leave 
room for inquiries into fact.^^ But the explanation of this lies partly 
in the situation of the discussion — knowledge must either be discovered, 
or learned from someone who knows. In either case, something has to be 
known beforehand viz. what we are looking for; and in the latter case, 
the investigation often takes the form of a search for a sufficient reason 
for holding the opinion imported in the first place. Nor is this 
procedure so ^ ide of the mark - because I am looking for knowledge rather 
than for fact, my main interest is in the reasons why such and such is held 
to be knowledge, which is a matter of reasons. Ferreting them out, or even 
conducting a normal and natural discussion resting on what all reasonable 
men accept or ought to accept - this is a matter of exploring the content 
of their . No great emphasis, either in the ordinary theory of
memory or in the argument for the theory of Recollection, is placed on how 
those opinions got there.
It is clear then that Plato's theory of memory is highly developed, 
even if the Phædo and the Meno are ignored. The theory of memory proper 
seems to be an inheritance from an earlier thinker, probably Alcmæon; but 
where the earlier theory may have been materialistic, Plato's theorising 
does not concern itself at all with its material elements. The nature of 
memory is quite discontinuous enough to qualify for a place in genesis, 
without reference to "physical matters". Plato was more interested in 
the succession
æsthesis mneme empeiria techne 
into which he interpolates theories of logos, at suitable points of 
transformation. This "or dinary" theory as he states it in the Phaedo is
65l Vlastos, G., intro, to Protagoras (trans. Jowitt and Ostwald) 1956,
XXXVf.
66. cf. Ackrill, J.E. Studies presented by G.Vlastos 1973 p.186.
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indistinguishable from, a theory of conditioning; and anyone claiming to 
the possession of knowledge on this is near to claiming that he remembers 
it because it happened many times, therefore it must be the usual thing 
to happen. Plato changes this; passive memory cannot be used as a 
means of discussion in the fields in which Plato is interested. Yet it 
was a standing assumption of the time that if a man knows something he has 
either learned it (from a master) or discovered it (for himself)^^. In either 
case his continued knowledge of its due to his memory. Plato uses this 
theory as a framework, without being satisfied with it. Certain elements 
in it he is content not to question because in his view they are adequately 
dealt with in the theory. He was content to relate for example the 
durability of memory to the intensity of frequency of the perception. His opin­
ion on the mechanics of how memory "happens" seems to be summed up in one 
word - jfo^^LbCi^  9 and if one remembers something because one has seen it 
often, then one learns it by the same means. He knows, too, that pleasuE 
oils the memory. But apart from matters of educational horsesense^^ the 
theory of the relation between percqtion andmmemory, and how one becomes 
part of the other, does not interest him very much. Within the theory he 
wanted to make room for dialectic which is an active pursuit of knowledge 
originating in the mind, and not the passive reception of information. There 
is a polemical tinge to his "theory of mind"; it seems to come into being 
in a comp ai gn agai/|st the ordinary "phenomenal" theory rather than as a 
construction in its own right. For Plato is interested only in the dianoetic 
side of things. The ditfiÆtic side of knowledge is best mvealed in the 
practice of dialect. Memory plays a considerable role in the dialogue, but 
an active intelligent role. It came to be thought of as one of the 
guarantees of the integrity of an argument. It links one argument to
67. Archytas fr.3; Cratylus 5436 A; 439 B; Phdo 85c.
68. For five analogies of mem,Qty in Plato, taken from S.S.Tîgner, see 
Sorabji p.37 ff.
another. Like dialectic it requires constant rehearsal and rexxamination.
In the Philebus we have a snapshot of dialectic taking place in the memories 
of the participants. Memories are the stuff of which dialectic is made. We 
see how, in the following passage of the Republic 474 c 5 (after Cornford)
" 'Here, then, is a line of thought which may lead to a satisfactory 
explanation. Need I remind you or do you remember that a man will deserve 
to be called a lover of this or of that, only if it is clear that he loves 
that thing as a whole, not merely in parts?'
'You must remind me, it seems, for I do not quite mind what you mean'.
" 'That answer w&uld have come better from someone less susceptible to 
love than yourself, Glaucon...' " Needless to say it is an argument 
Socrates means based on 'facts' Glaucon ought to remember, or know, from 
his own experience but does not.
I am suggesting we need look no further for the source of the titular 
theory of anamnesis found in the Meno, Phædo and possibly the Phædrus.
Such a provenance would explain why ftie role of perception in the perception 
of a tree is nowhere investigated in the dialogues. Plato seems to accept 
the ordinary theory while claiming that ethical matters require a special 
sort of remembering - dialectic. From this point on the dominance of 
dialectical procedures spreads to most areas of the "mind"^  for which it 
provides the models. I take the theory to be an explanation of why the 
results of dialectic are so satisfactory, when no one has taught or other­
wise inculcated the ifnormation. Obviously, the information is in my 
memory. "I recall it" is a perfectly acceptable way of accounting for 
my knowledge of things dialectical.
What calls for explanation is why we are first told of the theory
in a mathematical context.
Any correct statement coming from the mind must come from, the 
memory, only if all correct statements have been learned or discovered 
previously, by hearing (froma teacher) or in some other way using one s
\<6<
sense organs. This is just the assumption readily made in Plato's time; 
and the sort of theory in correspondence with which he elaborated his own 
doctrine; by accepting and reversing his opponents' theories on their own 
assumptions.
III Recollection in the Meno
Commentators are very dissatisfied with the Meno proof.
They are not sure how far xt is meant to be a proof, nor of 
what it is a proof, Bluck interprets Meno 86bc to mean that 
Plato himself did not think he had proved that learning is. 
Recollection, though he admits that Phaedo 73a calls the Meno
69
passage a proof. Perhaps the best way out of this initial
difficulty is to 'recall' that 'proofs' ) can be
good or bad, strong of weak at this date. Moravcsik points 
out that, for it to be a proof, Plato must consider every
70alternative to instruction and recollection and eliminate them.
&
Plato does not do so, but I suggest that Plato is working on a
generally accepted theory of memory viz, that it is the faculty
out of which we answer technical questions, then it is quite
effective to leave us stranded recollecting things we have not
been taught. Taylor calls the passage an 'illustration of the
principle that 'learning' is really 'being reminded of something',
i.e. ' the following up by personal effort the suggestions of
71
sense-experience* . Klein makes the best choice by calling
72the passages an epideixis and it is certainly intended to 
show off a technique. As we shall see, some of the conditions 
of a genuine Meno, e.g. a genuine aporia, have been aimed at, 
but it is sufficient for Plato's purpose if he can point to a 
well known fact of education, and interpret the fact on his own 
theory. Granted that a rigorous proof a metaphysical matters is
6 9 . Bluck; Meno 1961 p.11, n.2.
7 0 . Moravcsik,J. 1971 Learning as Recollection (ed. Vlastos 1971 ) 
pp. 53-69*
71. Taylor II p.137*
7 2. Klein,J. A Commentary on Plato's Meno 19^5 P * 175*
(s:
not required in the Meno, it remains unclear what the Meno 
experiment is about * First, even the method of the exp e ri m en t 
is in doubt Taylor says: 'Yet Socrates has 'told' (the slave) 
nothing» He has merely drawn diagrams wliich suggest the right 
answers to a series of questions. "Following in this tradition 
Gould claimed 'the of the slave are con­
cerned with the particular geometrical figure which Socrates
73has drawn for him" The consensus of opinion seems to be
against this. Gulley argues on the ground of Cratylus 436 of
and Aristotle 4l b14, that the^W^pl^jUi\to which the slave is
74
taken according to the Phaedo is a proof and not a diagram.
However, in his later work he says "As for the use of sensible
diagrams, this is in accordance with the normal procedure of
Greek geometers. If Plato had meant in this way to suggest
the value of sense-exp eri ence as an aid to recollecting it is
surprising that no mention (by italics) at all is made of sense-
experience either in the dialogue with the slave or ( subsequently^^
Vlastos has investigated the questions most fully. The
demonstration is intended to apply also to sciences other than 
. 76
geometry (86e). He claims a portion that the boy's "two
blunders are miscalculations, slips of the mind, not of the
77
eye" and draws attention to the abundant hypothetical optatives 
(e.g. 84 d5) • But Vlastos tends, as we shall see, to over­
estimate the pedagogical and underestimate the mathematical 
elements of the epideixis. us willing to admit that
the slave is told to answer in advance, but says the slave also
73. Gould, Plato's Ethics p.136.
74. Gulley, C.Q. 1954 p.197*
75. Gulley, 1962 p.Ilf, So Dorter,K. Phronesis 1972 p.209 n. 10.
76. Vlastos, G. 1965 Dialogue vol. iv p.l45 u;4.
77• op.cit. p . 15 1•
7 8 . op.cit. 150 n.lO.
remembers the answer because "he cannot cite Socrates* 
attitude towards p as evidence for its truth" It seems
indisputable that no attention is drawn to the fact that 
there is a diagram, not is any clue given about the slave's 
ktltimate episterijplogical state that connects his failure to 
attain knowledge with the limitation of his right opinion to 
this specific squre.
Doubt has been throiwn on Vlastos' solution by deeper 
examination of the mathematics involved. The question is not
about the role of the diagram, but about the nature of geometry.
ftoThe mathematically more sober of these attempts is Gaiser's.
He points out that two main questions are asked of the slave 
(a) how many feet is it (82c/d) (b) how long is it? ( 82d?, 83el)
Now (a) requires a definite numerical answer; (b) admits an 
answer in terms of irrational magnitud^es. At 84 a1 Socrates 
changes his tactic and says:
"Damit ist unverkennbar angedeutet, dass die gesuchte Grosse 
grôrisatzlich (his Italics) nicht durch Zahlen bestimmt werden
Q .
Xann. " He points out that Socrates begins to solve the problem 
by taking the "great" and the "less" - that is, by initiating 
a progressive approximation. Now it was known that the pro­
gression is infinite and Plato mentions the "series of fractions 
which form the successive convergents to y/2^ *  ^at Rp 546^ff and
go
he may have been acquainted with the "method of three means'.
In the Meno, we are taking the first step toward Theaetetus 
classification of irrational numbers. The Academy is already 
occupied with the status of irrational numbers. Gaiser then
79. op.cit p.158.
80. Gaiser,K.: Arch, fur Gesch.der Philos. 1964 p.240-92 
esp. pp.257-64.
8 1 . op.cit. p . 258
8 2 . Taylor II p. 137.
8 3 . Gainer p.259 u3 citing Becker 1957 p.67/8 .
elaborates the philosophical significence of the passage in
terms of the assimilation of mathematics to ethics and ontology.
84Malcolm Brown finds a more specifically mathematical function 
for the experiment "Plato disapproves of the slayeboy's answer" 
because he disapproves of non—arithmetical geometry that consents 
to accept irrationals in the first p l a c e . " P l a t o  is crit­
icising geometry for claiming to be able to assimilate any 
given size to square form" p . (91 ) . Plato uses a special juncture 
in the history of mathematics to discredit geometry. To prove 
Brown is obliged to posit a period when mathematics believed such 
a thing between the floruits of Theodorus and Theaetetus. He 
finds Archytas omajL-present in the dialogue. But much of his 
argument relating to the history of mathematics is fine-drawn 
and conjectural.^^ He claims that the situation at 83df is a 
realization of Archytas DKA19» iu which Archytas proves that it 
is impossible to inset a geometric mean between any two numbers 
which are in epi mo ri c ratio (i.e. where the differences between 
each number is equivalent to a number 1:2,2:4). On the authority 
ofy^(Mem Scient. Ill 1915 p.8l/2) he cites an "Archytô:^* method 
for generating approximations to quadratic irrationals, to explain 
DK.A.19 wliich is a piece of Boethius. Whether all this machinery 
is reliable or even necessary, I doubt*, Wordo I think there is 
much common ground between the Meno and Archytas fragment 3*
But the essential point of both arguments is that the mathematical 
aporia is a genuine one: there is no way of proceeding to a 
solution by the routes Socrates has used up to 84a.
84. Plato disapproves of the Slave—boy's answer' Rev. Met.
1967 pp. 57 - 9 3.
8 5 . op.cit. p .87ff.
86. op.cit. p.?8ff.
Brown agrees with Gaiser on the translation of 83 eff.
"If you don't want to count, at least point to the sort of line"
( ) • He develops as follows : Those questions with
which Socrates elicits smswers to the main question (what size
must the required line be?) are exclusively 7<- form before the
interruption, and exclusively f 0Î0)/ - form after it". This
links with a similar opposition in the rest of the dialogue. 87
He claims the boy in no sense knows the answer at the end of
the process because no mathematical argument has been given.
Now if we examine the last section of the proof we find that
the language of that passage is ostentatiously impure by the
canons of the Republic. Use of "becoming", "is to us", "adding"
are en ought to show that Plato could not have admitted this
88section was good, mathematics. But Brown goes too far: he 
translates at 85 a3 rather as "So it may be"
expressing the interlocutor's dissociation of his reply from 
any judgment about the rightness andwrongness of the answer.
This interpretation defies the dramatic appropriateness of 
the piece. Why should the slave adroitly disbelieve?®^ He 
claims that the section is "essentially an exhibition of a 
sophistical course of argument" and emphasises the reverbe­
rations of ' Sophistai ' (85b) . The noble slave apparently 
pierces sophistical machinations at a glance.
The main things wrong with Brown's argument are as follows :
(a) It has the slave "recollect" erroneously rather than 
inadequately (b) The Rp. passages claim that though practising
87. op.cit. p.6 0 , 64f.
8 8 . p. 62 ff.
8 9 . p. 66 f*.
ma th. era at i ci ans t alk in this way they do not understand their 
science in terms of the motion picture jargon. It is approp­
riate that an ordinary maths lesson should be given in the 
informal jargon. ( c) It is true that Plato takes advantage 
of the properties of incommensurability, but it is just as 
likely he is emphasising the role of construction in geometry.
This is continually represented by Plato and Aristotle as a 
blemish on mathematical tliinXi^ ig that ought to be eradicated 
or neutralised^^ (d) The argument puts too much stress on the 
meaning of polos. ¥e suggest that the vocabulary is idiomatic 
rather than technical. To take poios in what follows as 'qualis* 
in opposition to 'quantus ' is frigid. All it really means is 
'qui^?! ^ \
The question is taken up again at 85b in the interchange
which is hardly an answer in terms of quality. Examples are 
abundant of this idiom a conversation use of poios expecting 
the specification of an individual for an answer, rather than
M d H . e ( L s ^
y i - e ^ e X e ^  : Ilepf(jy-\^\K,Cc
.  .  89a
where it carries overtones of scorn (See L.S. I, IV)
trdTo^ is the word for Socrates* request almost from the beginning.
The answer envis aged is successively a ratio (82 c10, 83 c3)
and a lie (83 a5, 8562) Plato does think it possible there are
9 0 . Gulley 1962 p.l4f also connects with construction (i.e. non­
reciprocal analysis)
89a <0 is common without surprise Soph.232 d5; 235 b3,
Phil. 38e, 39c.
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ways of coming to an accurate knowledge of this question even 
though the line involves irrational magnitude, audit may need 
thinking about (85 all, 83 el 1 ( e) The point of the
proof of ignorance is that neither a diagram nor a wrong rule 
are sufficient to yield a new fact, but a new approach and a 
new construction are instantly appreciated. The proof depends 
on construction, and a construction is the sort Cf thing a 
mathematician must "think of", "chance on" in his own mind.
The direction of thought may be irreversible#^^ (f) The 
mathematical step to which Brown objects is 85a, that the boy 
assumes all four diagonals are equal. But this is "in^i^^%^ly"^ ^ 
obvious since diagonals are the equivalent parts of equiv^^t 
squares. Certainly it is not proven. But then it has the same 
sort of likelihood as the other "rules" the slave used (e.g. 84c) 
But this time it happens to be right. (g) It is perfectly 
possible that Plato would require a proof of this proposition 
and that would constitute the aitias logismos of 98 a3 (not as
Brown has it the "computation of the root").^ It is not clear
that an answer in terms of numbers is superior to an answer in 
terms of line, since the rule extrapolated from the number 
section is the wrong rule, and therefore the answer is wrong 
anyway. To make the point of the passage into a comparison 
between arithmetic and geometry misses the point because it gives 
no link with the rest of the Meno except an ad hoc one. Now as 
Vlastos has pointed out, there is a Wortklang between 98 a3 and 
82de: (^ Û^ i The point of this
must be that in geometry (or geometrical arithmetic) an aitia 
is required. It is difficult to see what aitia would be required
9 1 . Gulley 1958 p. 1-l4.
9 2 . Moravesik p.68.
9 3 . 95 n. 7 1.
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(at our present stage) of arithmetic if not a proportion.
Be geometry requires more; an examination of the aitia is 
the only way of "computing" geometry. Computation is 
wreathed in inverted commas for the purpose.
It appears, then, that rather more is at stake than the 
merely psychological process of detaching the boy from his 
trust in his own on considered opinions and in Socrates'rein­
forcement For this seems to be a case in which there is
no rule, but only a solution i.e. a different and essential 
piece of knowledgeis required to solve the puzzle. The slave 
is able to appreciate the solution, and this constitutes a 
grade of knowledge. The solution could only have been reached 
by abandoning the usual algorithms and constructing a figure.
Of course the slave's grade of knowledge is not yet technical 
knowledge. Still less can we agree with Bluck that mere 
"further questioning along the same lines as ? before and the
use of evidence already obtained in the course of the reduction
95to peiplexity elicit the correct answer".
Second, the language used is not the language of good 
mathematics, but of ordinary mathematicians spealcing to each 
other in a vulgar idiom. It does not seem excessive to 
extrapolate some of the criticisms made of mathematics made 
in the Republic and apply them to the Meno. The Meno mathe­
matics is not rigorous, nor does the slave really learn. Plato 
might well have thought the whole of geometry slightly shad^ 
because of the need for something like an "irreducible spatial 
intuition" I can find no increase ôf inappropriate language 
in the section following the aporia, and there is no reason 
in the language to suppose that the proof is more impure after
84. cf op.cit. 158f Vlastos.
85. Bluck * s Meno p .16 f.
84 than before. Also it is difficult to get clear what Plato 
regards as the role of the diagram. Vlastos points out that 
the argument is intended to apply to all knowledge (8 5e)^^ but 
this is no argument that Socrates has not availed himself of the 
special properties of geometry in the proof... and then simply 
asserted (as fact requiring investigation) that this is true 
of all sciences.
We should not be in such perplexity about the mathematical 
bearing of the piece if the method Socrates used on the slave 
was obviously am# mathematical. But the method's roots seem 
to lie in non-mathematical teaching situations; though as we 
have little idea of how maths was taught at the time, we cannot 
be sure. The use of the question only method suggests Socrates 
only, and the points of correspondence between the "maths lesson" 
and dialectic are too numerous for us to dismiss Socrates* 
implication that he is applying dialectical methods to mathe­
matics, and showing that they also work there. Given the same 
mateidal as a mathematician he produces the same (or a similar) 
result by non-mathematical methods of pedagogy. Of course, he 
knows the method he is using has eu imath emati cal basis, but it 
is not important for his puipose to make this plain. Similarly 
though he avails himself of the use of diagrams, because a maths 
instructor does so, he wastes no time on the fact that they are 
diagramst wrtthe nature of the figure.. Socrates induces first 
a false reply, then explores two (related) likely numbers and 
proves that neither is required andno other numbers f ; ' possible*
9 6 . op.cit. l45
This is the state of aporia which leads (by a mechanism never 
established) to the a thiixi and successful attempt at the problem*
At 84d he begins in effect • The mathematical back­
ground is hidden; and it is made to seem as though the only thing 
required was the recognition of aporia. In fact, of course,
Socrates is 'playing* on the slave. For what the point is worth, 
nowhere does Socrates attribute knowledge of what is to the 
mathematician, only knowledge of what is such.
The obviousness of the Socratic manoeuvres have led the 
same critics to suggest that Socrates has taught the slave 
despite his denials. 1 think that the overall impression is 
of the slave's malleability. Gulley and Moravscik go further.
For Gulley, the point is that the slave can recognise that I
99certain propositions are true. But we may point out that
the recognition of the truth does not produce permanent or
rational knowledge. Moravscik claims that the Meno theory is
a theory of inference (at least partially) . The slave must
understand the question and relate to one another in order to
100
give an answer at all. But I suggest that Socrates is only
concerned to point out a ' real analogy ' between what happens in 
the outward questioning and what happens in the boy's head; so 
that Socrates does not dictate the boy's answer so much as 
enact the process taking place inside the boy. Here the fact 
that the mathematical aporia ia s genuine cone comes into its 
own. All mathematicians, not just the slave, have to rely on 
Anamnesis to solve this problem or discover the proof that 
established the validity of this solution. This is not to j
reinstate a faculty of mathematical intuition, but simply to jj
99* op.cit. 12.
100. op.cit. p.6l, 6 5.
97. 83 d2-
emphasise that, by some mental process, the calculation was
once made and the proof once discovered in the absence of an obvious
method - how? by dialectic with a man's self, says Socrates.
This question is linked to the further question of what 
the slave has recollected - is it particular? is it general 
and a priori? What is the limit of range of anamnesis? Are 
the Forms involved ? For if there is a concept of triangle 
already existing in the boy, he presumably shows it by 'getting 
it in three' instead of in six etc.; for a sense certainty 
cannot be the required criterion. What the boy gets is true 
opinion whicla can be worked on - thus knowledge is thought of 
true opinion plus. The plus is simply repeated dialectic... 
and possibly metaphysics. Gulley says 'None of the metaphysical 
distinctions associated with (the doctrine of Forms) when it is 
explicitly presented in the Phaedo and later dialogues are to 
be found in the Meno. Thus no attempt is made in the Meno to 
distinguish the perceptual and conceptual elements in experienceV^®^ 
But to argue from this that Plato was not aware of these 
distinctions, or had not worked out the theory of Forms at 
this date, strikes me as gradualism gone wild. An equally 
likely explanation is that Plato is limited by the occasion 
to the demonstration that dialectic works in a maths lesson; 
why ? Ifpravscik argues strongly that some ' entitative persistence* 
in the memory is a desideratum of the argument. We
suspect that the principle of explaining the 'Meno* from the 
'Meno ' alone is not a sedU^principle - the work, because of
103of its inadequacies, cries out for a key.
101 . Gulley 9 ^  p. 19. 
102. cp.cJ-p^  IX
103. cf Gaiser K. 1964 op.cit. passim, Loyre I968 p.7-17.
Introduction to Plato 104 86a 6/8.
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It does not argue directly but hints at deeper meanings and 
a more extensive 'logical' power than So crates is willing to 
reveal. It seems to me we require a theory of Forms to explain 
why we are interested in the slave's right answer.
Nevertheless I think we can learn more about the stage
of Plato's thought by asking two questions (i) what is the
relation of 'Meno ' to the 'ordinary theory of memory' ?
(ii) why if the matrix of the Meno theory is dialectical, is
it transferred, in the introductory work, to a mathematical
setting? (i) The Meno avails itself of the techniques of
ordinary memory theory. Frequent anamnesis fixes the memory
more firmly - and begs all questions. This coming to the
forefront of a memory is also the completion and clarification
of it. As it becomes clearer so it becomes more accurate.
The process is begun by a question, as in a rehearsal, or by
104
a reminder, it is progressive. The process is essentially
the same as Critias' (supra). Here it is assimilated to dialectic^ 
and for the conversion of the slave's newly discovered doxa 
into knowledge, Plato can take advantage of the generally 
acknowledged power of rehearsal. Something more than mere 
rehearsal is needed because the rehearser is required to put 
his questions in many different ways. (Though the Meno 
refers only to true opinions there is no difficulty for our 
interpretations in accommodating false opinions)• Thanks to 
the theory of Forms we hope that the true opinion carries with 
it a field of true opinions. If, by any chance, any pupil 
fixes on a false opinion, I remove it by generalisation and 
examination.
104 .  86a  6 / 8 .
mThus the discussion seems to require three givens
(a) the independent knowledge that x is known.
(b) a relation between experience and memory - e.g. temporally 
prior, what has not been an experience cannot be a memory.
(c) a relation between memory and knowledge.
Not one of these requirements is investigated. Habituation 
accounts for (a) and (c). The whole argument for immortality 
is made to depend without further question on (b) , One has 
the impression that this is a proof of immortality on the 
grounds of some else's theory. Granted, it says, that the 
growth of knowledge is as you say it is; if so, then mathe­
matics for example must utilise the memories of an immortal 
soul - which you did not expect at all * No doubt is cast on 
(a) (b) or (c) by the questionability of this conclusion. Let 
us see how the picture fits 9 8a.
A man has many doxai. But not even the true doxai are 
the genuine article, because of their erratic behaviour. One 
forgets them, misunderstands them, abandons them, confuses them. 
Knowledge on the otherhand is constant. The change of doxa into 
epi81erne is promoted by habituation - because it is underlaid 
by a concept. The process of habituation is also a process of 
active recall. But what we recall is experienced before birth - 
but not in any meaningful sense through aesthesis. The point 
of my argument, says Plato, on which I most insist is that 
opinion and knowledge are different things. (98b). The rest 
of the argument depends on the acceptance of a theory of memory 
and J knowledge that I have inherited but am not entirely 
clear about. As we all know, ^mething is one of the best
claims to knowledge, and failing that, a claim to remember having 
seen it. How much easier it would be, if we had seen such
H i
knowledge in our soul state before birth; since it would
fit the only theory of knowledge known to us - the 'ordinary
theory '. This enables Plato to avoid exploring the role of
reason in knowledge. It aJLso indicates our claims to be able
to know or discover additional facts about what we don't know.
At this point it might be enlightening to quote Crombie's remarks
on the Aviary image. He suggests that Plato there needs the
distinction between knowing S and knowing all about S. "That
may be the reason why Plato chose an arithmetical example by
means of which to demonstrate, that knowing X cannot be thought
to carry with it all the true propositions nor even ail the
a priori propositions into which X enters. An arithmetical
example," he continues, "make it very clear there must be 
something wrong". An arithmetical (or geometrical) example
also makes it very clear what the conditions mus tbe of knowing 
further facts about P when you start from knowing P^ - P itself 
or one's knowledge of p must have an enduring structure that 
can surface a bit at a time. This leads us to the second 
questionrjj^(ii) It is here suggested that the mathematical example 
is chosen first because mathematics fulfils the specifications 
of an episteme, at least for most peop4-e, and second because of 
the nature ofits object. Meno is no woodcutter who identifies
A
a circle with a physical circle. The paradeigmatic role of the 
mathematical object in the Meno may make easier the question 
what it is that the boy recollects. Attempts to read into the 
text a distinction between propositions and concepts, between 
a priori and other truth, or between analytic and synthetic^*^^ 
break down for lack of specification in the text. Certainly 
Plato applies his theories only to mathematical propositions, 
which shows an awareness that some sort of distinction is required.
105. Crombie op. cit. II, 119.
106. Gulley 1962 p.18, Moravscik op. cit. p.68f.
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Empirical knowledge is not at issue. Crombie, however, notes 
that the example given elsewhere in the Meno of true opinion 
is ' true opinion of the road to Larisa'. This, he says, 'gives 
some place to acquaintance. Perhaps we ought to say that under­
standing is thought of after the model of acquaintance. The man 
who knows, not by hearsay, but by following the demonstration, 
that the square on the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares
of the other two sides, has seen for himself these features of
107
squareness which bring this about. We have suggested that
this matter of knowledge by acquaintance is residual. The proof 
of ' transcendental ' anamnesis, sufficiently breaks the back of 
the ordinary theory of memory for Plato to ignore the remaining 
points of the theory.
But I can come by a right opinion by accident. It is not 
clear what makes the slave's attainment of the particular right 
opinion so important. Two answers, probably complementary 
present themselves. First, there was no way of getting to the 
answer along the routes Socrates first outlined - which were the 
routes that might have presented themselves to the slave. 
Anything more requires very special knowledge of geometry, yet 
the slave under Socrates' guidance gets it in one. How did the 
slave get (or even appreciate) the answer so quickly? - a dim 
stirring of memory perhaps. Second, we know independently that 
the slave has learned a genuine mathematical fact, which somehow 
ought to make it easier for him to learn others. In other words* 
a right opinion can serve as a starting point for investigation 
and improvement. Now this right opinion can only so work if
106. Gulley 1962 p.1 8; Moravscik op.cit. p.68f.
107. Tigner 1970 Phronesis pp. 1-4 On the Kinship of all Nature 
in Plato's Meno.
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there is hidden knowledge, the tip of the surface of which 
the right opinion is. The hidden memory will the, with a 
little help surface itself. If we look back to the introduction 
to the theory of anamnesis we find that this is all Socrates 
has promised us.
 U ^ l /C ^  i / j  Tcj
HvdpéÇci ^  <^7 001/
The slave incident gives us an example of learning which 
is really recollection, though we call it learning (in other 
words, in the ordinary way of things, the slave would be said 
to have been taught something), given this one successful 
memory, there is no reason an energetic man should not discover- 
all the rest.
107The meaning of 'all the rest' is in doubt. Tigner 
has argued persuasively that it refers to all the other things 
that can be recollected in the same way the things of the same 
ontological status viz. Forms. Plato does not envisage a 
cogito, a maper formula, here. But two other aspects are 
important for us. First, it is an old hope of Socrates' that 
if he can only be sure of one thing in an argument, subsequent 
points would present no difficulty. Now the topos may have 
been given a new meaning in the Meno by reference to the 
ontological status of the Forms, but our only ground for 
supposing this is the strange phrase about the 'kinship of 
all nature'. I suggest, with Prof. Gulley, that this 'kinship' 
belongs to the mythological setting, but unlike Prof. Gulley
107. Tigner 1970 Phronesis pp.1 -4  On the Kinship of all Nature 
in Plato's Meno.
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I think it may connect not with the Pythagoreans, but with
such genealogies of nature as Hesiod gives us - in which the
108
Deities have names similar to Forms. This is speculation but 
as likely to be true as more heavily phi so sophical int ei\- 
pretations•
The second aspect to note is that we are told a fact about 
teaching in order to justify a hope about searching. It is the 
'searching* point that answers the eristic logos; if even 
learning is really remembering, then seeking is just as good a
( ( 0
ia a structure which makes possible both successful learning
110
and successful seeking. The success of one seems to involve
the success of the other.
The Meno is one the dialogues making the transition to
a 'positive Socrates'. In this transition, religious belief
in metempsychosis must have been a godsent shelter from the
111spistenological storm brealcing over his head. ¥e are free
to suspect that much of the storm was unleashed by his own 
attacks on other 'professions' - his empire building, which 
can involve him in deeper difficulties than he is aware of.
We have argued that the weapons and grounds of his polemic 
lie in the analysis of the dialectical situation, especially, 
here, in the role of the memory. The religious element is 
imponderable, but cannot be responsible for the type of proof 
chosen, though it may have contributed to the conviction.
The Meno is the only work in which Plato uses the notion of 
metempsychosis without reference to morality. Nor is a 
'psychological' theory sufficient to generate the Meno proof — 
feelings of recognition when you have solved a problem^ might 
have stimulated the belief, but the stimulus and the argument 
are not at all the same thing. Of course, our version does 
rather encourage the notion that Plato criticized the ordinary
way of getting to know things as being taught it. For there i
theory from the standpoint of a conviction which he was not 
prepared to defend directly; but he was prepared to defend 
his analysis of dialectic and the possibility of its general­
ization from * conversation * to technical disciplines.
108. Cornford, P.M. Principium Sapientiae 1952 p.192.
109. for this paradox see Moline J. 19^9 Phronesis Meno * s 
Paradox p.153-61*
1 10. 81 d 4-5.
111. Vlastos op.cit. 169; Bluck op.cit. ?4; 10.
112. Eansing P. Monist 1928 p.253 quoted by Bluck p.192.
MEMORY IN THE PHAEDO 
_  At Phaedo 7 5c lOf^Sboratea says, ViTcu
â (^o^o(. i^ p rv  ri ^ (7g^ ^ T cC k <lU o icA
1j!>C
The V W  is sufficiently emphatic: up to now the argument has been 
about 'equal* and 'bigger* and 'smaller' but from this point on it 
broadens* One could say that the 'equal' was used as an example, 
but that is to miss some of the potential force of the argument. 
'Equal* is a visible property for most people, to be identified 
through ocular or manual investigation. In fact anyone who deals 
with 'equality* apart from its instantiations would be thought to 
be talking in air. We all know what "it is to be equal' because 
we have examples of the property before our eyes. Yet by 75c 10 
it has been proved that when we assess equality with our hands or 
eyes we are referring ) to something unseen. No difficulty
is felt (74c) about assuming the existence of an unseen (relation?) 
equality ( ? or "A- )\ but this is no mere assumption
of what is to be proved: (a) that is irreducible to
and (b) related somehow to judgments about 1 Once this
is proven the question becomes: how do we acquire such knowledge if 
we do not acquire it through thensenses. The inadequacy of the 
senses to that purpose is obvious in the case of a concept like 
"equal" or "bigger than". Now nothing has been done to prove we get 
our notions of justice before we are bom: instead it is assessed 
that notions ojf justice are not derivable from sense evidence alone. 
As this underivability is common to our notion of equality, and we 
start life able to judge equal things equal (74b4ff; 75b), it 
follows that we derive (a sort of) knowledge of the good from our
1. Mills 1957 128f; Rist. 1964 27ff* The equivalence of
W W - I .  essential
memories of a time before we had the use of our senses. The rule 
that warrants this conclusion must be something like* where a 
category has been established by a suitable criterion, what is 
relevantly true of some merafeers of that category must be true of 
all. Now the criterion here is essential to the category*if a thing 
is invisible but knowable, then this knowledge is acquired independently 
of the exercise of the senses. Whether it is acquired before hand 
or independently is another matter. The notion that an idea is 
acquired before birth introduces mythological elements. "There is 
no answer except at the level of popular mythology to the "where is 
it?" question as asked either of the forms or of the preexisting 
soul." The preexisting ideas seem to have some entitative 
structure - which tempts one into questions like "by what faculty 
are we acquainted with them?"
The tension between the example of Equal and the general 
application^ (e.g. to justice) causes another dislocation of the 
schema. For we do not know the first - leastways no one except 
perhaps Socrates can give an account of the just, but everyone 
knows the Equal (74b) • Not everyone however can give an account 
of the Equal - surely it requires mathematical sophistication to 
approach the problem - but Socrates does sajr, presumably using the 
word informally for him, but morteuLly for his opponents, lie know 
the Equal. Presumably he says this partly because there is no 
disagreement on the matter^ .* we all agree on what is equal after 
^appropriate tests. But at 7 6c he claims that not all people know
2. Allen, R.E., Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms p.l62.
3 . Moravscikop. cit.5 8; supra.
4. Gulley 99f; Hackforth's Phaedo 1955, P*75; Dorter, K., 
Phronesis 1972 no.3 p.199 n.2.
5 . e.g. Euthyphro 7^5 FT.
the Good (and the Equal?) because not all people can give an 
account of it. Prima facie there is a contradiction. On the 
Good there is notorious disagreement, on the Equal there is 
agreement, but not everyone can explain it as the argument itself 
shows. Part of what people cannot explain of course, is the 
nature of its existence and the consequences thereof.
Plato's aversion to allowing technical precision to ossify 
his vocabulary is we^l established: and in our own argument there 
are several examples of the interchange of technical and non­
technical word usages . can mean "it seems clear to me" =
"it is acceptable to me"; or "this is the impression I get of the 
thing before me", or it means "it gives the false impression that.
Now at the outset of the argument there is no presumption in favour 
of any particular usage. 74 C6, 74 b7 seem clearly "it is acceptable 
to me" because we are being asked for our considered opinions »
74 b8 seems to many "give a false impression" because it is 
contrasted with "being the same". Nothing is said about whether 
the person to whom "it appears" is duped or not - I am duped
by painted cherries. Some sort of divergence of opinion is called 
for,' so presumably the people concerned are duped. Otherwise there 
would be a chance the passage meant simply "in addition to 'being^ 
stones have the faculty of ^ appearing deceptively." At 74c I am 
not sure whether to translate by "Has there ever been an occasion 
when..." (Dorter^, Mill5 )^ or as "There is never a time when... 
they turn j^^equal. " (Mills®). The rest of this chapter will show 
that Plato nowhere else appeals to personal experience in this 
argument, so it is unlikely he 6U$11 appeal to it here. I therefore
6. 1972 p.2 0 3.
8. 1958 p . 50 Phronesis Plato: Phaedo 746c Part 11
9 . op.cit. Phronesis 1957 part 1 p. 130*
prefer the second version. For equality can give no sort of
impression, false or physical. The result is that I class the
occurence as "it seems acceptable" - a statement of opinion, Ve
shall see later that this opinion is a belief about Equality, -
that it can never be unequal. The second doubtful usage is ?4 d5.
Now here we cannot be being told that equal - looking sticks look
unequal. The point here seems to be that a pair of equal objects
never imposes on us the impression that they are equal in the same
way as Equal. Their appearance is to that extent quite honest.
So one is left without grounds to choose between. My opinion is
"and" this is the ingression it gives me", but one can exclude any
question of "false appearance". Our conclusion from the ; survey is
that two main uses are opposed to one another. What seems to one,
and what seems true but is false. The only instance of the latter
use is 74 b8. The question of "sense ingressions" does not seem
to be important : for it is not relevant to the opposition how the
false impression is conveyed. The proof is argued from our
opinions about equals and Equal.
The second word of some resonance is 76 d9)
12I refer. It is used frequently in legal contexts; and in this 
sense by Plato at Gorgias 487e ^
13Before Plato it is used in three striking epistemological contexts. 
Though these are insufficient to establish a technical use, the contexts 
in which they are found make it likely that the word was used in
14
epistemological debates of the time.
10. of. Gosling, J.C.B. 1965 Phronesis p.l51-6l Similarity in 
Phaedo 736ff. p.6o8.
12. Stephanus, Thesaurus 11 609dff.
1 3. Vetus Medicina Capi ; Cap IX; Herodotus 11, 23 (cf. 1v.8 ; Thuc.1.
2 1).
14. Eegenbogen, Otto Eine Forschungs methods antiker Naturwissenschaft, 
ffiuelle und Studien zur Geschichte der Ma^ematik 1930 iv, 45ff; 
Diller,H. Hermes 1932 pp.l4-42,^^i T3. p . l4f;
p.19f; Hermes 1952 Hippokratische, Medizin'und, Attisbhe 
Philosophie p.400f; 402n; Ct. Kuhn J.H., Hermes Einzelschriften: 
Heft 11, 1956 System.... im Corpus Hippocraticum p.47ff; Gomperz,
H. Hermes 1933 . PP 041-3 » Festugière, Ancienne MdÜ&cine
p.4l; AddClouds TOoO.
No evidence but great likelihood connects it with a particular 
side of that debate - the "experimentalist" who emphasised measurement 
and therefore aesthesis. In later Plato it becomes a technical
word for referring something to a mental image. We must also
notice that the word is irreducibly asymmetrical, mo re so even than
and f ts companions in the argument.
One refers a pound of butter to the standard pound but not vice versa.
The final linguistic point to investigate before we sort out
the argument is the translation of 74 e9: "So we must know the equal
before that time; . ^ . / Cl f
-XiCc*. w./ C»  ^ éj(&i ê
Probably the furthest from the text but most traditional is 
Robin 1 926:
pour la premiere fois la vue des/ égalité /s nous a donn/
2;: _,v
l'idee que toutes elles aspirent a etre telles qu’est l'Egal 
bi enque pourt ant il ; $ ;
- a very Romantic idea. Variations on the theme are endless, but
most translators avoid translating v clearly. Hackforth
1955 'that first sight... which lead us' p.75 (So Trede^fnick 1954;
Bluck 1955), Jowitt 1953 Vol. 1 p.428 is better", "the time when we
first saw the material equal and reflected." Dorter sees a difficulty
but straddles too many fences ; "when first, upon seeing equal things,
we conceived..." — which reads like a c(octrinaire reading of Greek
18Syntajf with the help of a doctrinaire English punctuation.
The idiom "as soon as I saw him" is easily
comprehensible.
1 6. Timaeus 2^A; Rp.484c; Theaet l84c.
1 7. cf. Gorgias 487e. Phdrus 237d;
1 8. Phronesis 1972. p201; Ackrill, J. 1973 p.80f best of all - 
but see later.
So L.S.J* z , .2; til e; L.S.J's next example #ys. 211b is similar
but for some reason translated as "the first time you meet" (Rp#3 3 8o 
is not parellel) • No time elapses between the two events.
0 f
A rather different possible parallel is Heracleitus fr. 1 .
translated by Kiik as "when once they have 
heard it." " p(b 6 1^/ restricts the universality
of In other examples the sense of the phrase is "first",
"at the beginning", "before any time can elapse"
In view of the polyvalence of the phrase, I suggest for ?4 e9, 
that does not mean "for the first time" but (a) when
having once seen the equals we conceived...* i.e. the sentence 
rules out as irrelevant anytime when I conceived Equal without 
having seen equal objects or (b) 'when having first of all seen the 
equals we conceived' meaning largely the seime as (a) "First of all" 
gives priority to the seeing of equals, but it does not refer to 
cthat first time* when we saw equals and conceived..."
I claim in fact that e9 does not record a historical or 
first occasion, but a typical one. My main reasons for so 
translating are that if at ?4 e9 it was already clear that I knew 
about Lqual before I saw equals (surely rather early) then it is 
difficult to see why Plato argues in the way he does that this 
time was before birth. Second, no part of this argument refers 
to^  historical event in someone's life. This will be clearer in 
the sequel.
The second part of the sentence also repays study. The 
construction is paratactic — which Dorter and Robin bring out by
2 0. 1 954, 70 p.34; ApipC
21. Eurip. ^f:.52. 3ff; Hecuba 287ff
an "although", but Hackforth, Tredennick, Bluck and Jowitt 
codrdinate. With Dorter and against Robin we take the main 
clause to be "that theyare d&ficient. " The effect of our trans­
lation is to make it clear that only one thing, not two, is 
reflected upon viz. their deficiency. As at 74 dlOf the thinking 
part of mind thinks ordinary things deficient. It does not 
(and cannot) see them as deficient, nor is a sèatiment of their 
deficiency suggested by the sight of them:
"We conceived that they are all deficient, although they
o p
aim at being of a sort with the Equal." The "although" as we 
shall see introduees^half-explanatory thought, and the weight of 
innovation is on the later clause. As 74 c4ff shows, Plato does 
not envisage a double thought, or one thought reminding a man of 
another thought. A thought is not a perception, nor vice versa.
The connection between "seeing" the reminder and "thinking" 
of the Equal is left deliberately vague .
Broadly speakin^^^rgument proceeds by taking a "sensitive" 
example, and examining the implications of making a statement about 
it. The argument is not an examination of the structure of perception, 
but of the implications of dialectical discussion. The only difference 
is that the topic ostensibly under discussion is the Equal which is 
not at this point of Plato's development a typically dialectical 
topic.
Once this point is grasped we see more clearly what sort of 
dialectical situation the argument is an account of.
We begin in the way we expect of dialectic*
(a) there is a real Equal, as there is a real justice.
This is the first admission of the So era tic. But strangely, we 
claim to know what this Equal is — and Socrates never openly proves 
us wrong.
22. vide infra.
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T ‘ (b) We next claim that (i) Knowledge of Equal is different 
from the knowledge of perception of equals (73 c8 - 74 b6) but 
that (ii) both knowledges "obviously""come from" perceived equals.
One might think it is unnecessary to prove b(i) since 
everyone will accept that thinking about equality is different 
from thinking about particular equal things. But Plato does give 
some sort of proof of it, not by adducing a proof from experience, 
but by adapting a usual "move" of dialectic, as in (a). The next 
dialectical move we expect is (b) that the Equal is never unequal:
This move which implies the homogenity of a Form is
adapted for use as the distinction between ordinary equals and
equality. Equality never tums out ) unequal. Now
precisely what corresponding property of visible equals Plato
has singled out for us will be forever uncertain.
Two readings are possible:
(i) Tty ^  (ii)
both of which have found dej^enders; and three interpretations
25
have been given of (i) >^f -which two are acceptable, namely
that the sentence can mean (traditional) "seem equal to one man, 
but not to another" or (Murphy) "seem equal to one thing but not 
to another."
  —
23* "the radical exclusion of its opposite" Allen R.E. op.cit. p.74i^^3
24. Tarrant,D. Journal of Hellenic Society 1957 P-125; Mills op.cit. 
1958 p.38 n.1;
25. Murphy 1951 p.Ill n.1; Mills 1957 p.133; Mills 1958 p.5lff;
Dorter op.cit. p.207; Haynes R.P., 1964 p.25; Gosling 1973
p.l6 lff; 1 6 5.
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Dorter and Mills agree on rejecting the third: "equal in one respect 
but not in another." The choice between Murphy and Mills seems to 
depend on some rather recondite views of the nature of this part­
icular form of "Equal". But the essential thing to notice is that 
the sentence is a statement of relativity rather like the statement 
that 'the same wind blows hot and cold' in the Theaetetus. Its 
visual qualities are incidental. It is a statement commonsense 
would accept in reaction against the claim that whatever is '4 
ï*qual will always and forever be equal. But the Equal will never 
be unequal - this is a commitment of the dialecticians. The inter­
locutor is being asked to clarify the conceptual difference ( cf
(75a2) ) between speaking about equgil logs and about 
Equality. Equality is a construction as it were. What we have then 
is a report of a piece of dialectic- what Ryle would call 'well known 
opening gambits* but the result ofthis piece of dialectic is not 
confusion - because at no point in the argument is the "look" of 
equal logs relevant to the p r o o f . F o r  it requires only a dial­
ectical construction (viz. the Equal) which is by construction 
different from equal things. The miracle of the proof is that the 
dialectical construction is shown to be at the root of our 
"perception" of such a mundane occurrence as a pair of equal logs.
Ignoring for the moment the section oA likenesses, we 
summarise: it has just been shown that our statement at (b) (i) 
is correct by dialectical standards; and that this implies our 
knowledge of the ordinary equals is different in kind from our 
knowledge of the Equal, but both knowledges presumably come from 
the saime source. In other words, the statement at (b)^ii)is 
absorbed into the argument, but absorbed in such a way that it
2 6 , This interpretation should remove Mill's persistent difficulties 
with "seems to you" ( =Simmias) 1957 13Dj 133; 135TT; 1958 P*50 
For the parallels show it is the old dialectical question "Is it 
your opinion" Ptgs. 33De; Euth.11e4.
coincides with the definition of Recollection, It has been shown 
that in dialectic we draw on a special sort of object - the Equal, 
that object is not the same as equal objects, but it seems to be 
drawn from our knowledge of equal objects. The name given to this 
unusual situation is Recollection , because it is only into the 
Recollection scheme that it will fit.
J
The next section begins fittingly enough with it ^ 74 d4, 
and it has a different dialectical situation to analyse - "seeing" 
things. The dominant tense is the present: the interlocutor is not 
asked to draw upon a lifetime's experience of sad inequalities, nor 
to look at a pair of equal logs and say what he sees. For the 
answer given by inspection would not be very interesting. The real 
question is about your opinion with regard to logs -are they equal 
as the Equal is? The answer to this question is not simply no, but 
a relation: they are less than and struggling to be like 2^ î.j^^^^f>.^ : 
the Equal. Obviously I cannot tellthis at a glance. Now the asking 
of that question and the returning of that answer is the new dial­
ectical situation. It is theorised upon in the next question (74 d9) 
which is a comment upon the "structure" of our statement about the 
Equal and about equals (74 e6-7) • The new question asks whether or 
not a man who has made the previous admission must not first know the 
Equal before he knows equeüLs, This question is our old friend "how 
can I tell you what virtue is like when I cannot tell you what 
virtue is?", and as such its reformulation tells us not about what 
the state of mind the man looking at things but what it ought to 
be. It is the mind of the good Platonist interlacutor who draws on 
&11 his present knowledge in order to answer the question. There is 
no Cartesian stripping here.
Thus the issue is: (i) when I say the equal logs are not equal 
as Equal is, what is the full state of my opinion on the point? - 
The answer is quite simple — all these equals wish to remain being
27 . Symposium 2 0 7 a .
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(equal) for ever and in every way and instead they pass away.
I am in fact saying that x is different from X and that when I 
see X, I think of something different, namely X. (ii) If this is 
the case, must I ’not know X already? - The answer to this question 
is more difficult. A certain amount of "influencing" is done by 
the metaphors, but the argument does not rest on those, however 
likely it is that Plato, like Descartes, thinks the Form is prior 
because it is more perfect. The move rests on the assumption that 
I refer (asymmetrically) something I do not know^-x j or have just 
come to know, to X, the knowledge of which is different from the 
knowledge of x I must then have remembered it (73 c6f) . In other 
words, I have not taken my knowledge of the Equal from equals: I 
think of it colhcid en tally, as if I had been "put in mind of one 
thing by something else."
So, he says, summing up ....
74 e9. "We must have known thé Equal before that time when it 
occurred to us, after once seeing equals that all these (equal?) 
things fall short of being like (of a sort with) the Equal, though
they aim at that condition."
'tyThe statement' analyses refers not only to the rather 
frivolous objection that we only got the idea of an Idea of Equal 
long after we had seen lots of equals; but to the empiricist 
argument that any thought of Equality is in some way related to the 
thought of equals. Plato maintahs instead that Equality can occur 
to one in the absence of an equal — if we have a good metaphysical 
memory presumably. He is stillhammering his point about the difference 
between and 7<^^J » but now he has established the
relation of Equality with the seeing of equals : in so far as our 
seeing of equals involves Equality (i.e. insofar as it is scientific, 
is part of knowledge) the knowledge of Equality is prior and
"Xoy-a,
independent• The addition made to the argument by the conclusion
at 74 e9 is that I say to myself when looking at equals that all
equals are inferior to Equal.
The next admission is at 75 a5f: one consequence of having
known the Equal before seeing it is that apparently I have never
been acquainted with it. For if I can only "thinlc" it ( 4 co
) as a result of my senses then either I perceived it and
know it, or have not perceived it and do not know it. But the
argument goes further - it claims that the exercise of sense faculties
is what prevents us from perceiving Equality, though admittedly it
does not do so in so many words. If it is not through sense-
perception that we know the Equal and sense perception is our only
way at the moment of knowing it, then we must have know the Equal
before using our senses, or not at all. i^ut we do know what it is
ex hypo thesi The dialectical situation is generalised at 75 b11
to include all knowledge given by the senses: / /
^  ^ v V ô ^77 yy
¥e notice that the clause following is what a man says in
his mind. The clause represents the appropriate thing for the 
mind to say to itself when presented with a sight of anything. It 
still refers to the considered judgment of the interlacutor, which 
is not founded in the main on the "evidence of the senses". From 
ever so extensive a use of any faculty it is impossible to conclude 
that the self same faculty is inappropriate for the job underway.
So here it is mind not sense perception that has decided the letter's 
character and sta^s. The meaning is simply that when using sense- 
perception a man must think that all these things are inferior,,.
But what do I do that involves this knowledge of equal?
Surely when I realise that Equality is invisibly eternal and 
has the other properties of Forms, whereas equals are vapid and 
visible, I ought to refuse to call equa^ by a name deriving from 
Equal. But I do liken these vapid equals to the Equal, though as
Z \L
we shall see mere 'likeness* does not entitle me to do so. For 
'likeness' can be a symmetrical relation whereas Plato needs an 
asymmetrical relation. An x is like an X, but an X is not like 
an X. Similarly Equal is the name of x because of X but not of X 
because of x. This relation can only be known one way - from the 
Form to the particular. So if, in the world of sense, we name 
equals 'equal' correctly it must be because we know the Form and 
not vice versa. It is only this additional premiss that will yield 
Plato's conclusion; for it makes the Form of Equal an essential 
prior element in an adequate judgment of equals. This, as 75 b6f 
tells us is the ability in question: I am capable of applying to 
particulars those constant criteria which are the mark of the 
Forms alone as entities. If we did not have this prior knowledge, 
we would not be able to handle the information given by the senses.
As the importance of this knowledge is so radical, it must be 
pushed back to a time before we use our senses at all (75 c12) and 
when we do use our senses later, we are simply regaining lost 
knowledge. That the possession of this prior knowledge is necessary 
to a rational being is simply not argued in the passage. The 
passage is not a proof of the theory of Forms, it points out 
merely that the immortality of the soul is a sort of rider to 
whatever led to the formulation of the theory of ideas in the 
first place:
Qocn 1/ <n) k J V
As commentators point out, the Theory of Forms is used in 
the Phaedo long before it is argued for; and so the fact that 
the relationship between Form and judgment iis used in my inter­
pretation of the argument and without being explained ought not 
to be regarded as a weak point of the interpretation. For when 
Plato says learning is recalling, he is not making a statement
2 ' }
about all learning, but about the particular teaching that he 
imparts - namely the learning of the Forms. Just^mathematics 
lesson has been shown to be recollection, so a dialectical lesson 
is shown to be recollection. The reference to 'learning' I
ok
suspect, is specific and pointed; Learning this particular new 
discovery is a case not of something new being taught us, but of 
a recoilectioni Because it is a recollection it has, as it were, 
retrospective force. One is now committed to its existence but 
it was always there.
The discovery that there is an Equality is not made by 
everyone. But once it has been made it transforms one's notion 
of what everyone else is doing like one of the so-called discoveries 
of thejîontents of the subconscious mind. In the case of "there is 
an Equal," the effect is more drastic because you are also convinced 
that, unless the concept had been there all the time, your earlier 
methods of judgment of equals would have been inconceivable rather 
than merely unsuccessful. This seems to be the force underlying the 
generalisation of the present dialectical situation.
Ve have noticed the extension of reference of the argument 
made at 75 clO; and found that it was based simply on the fact that 
the 'beautiful itself is unseen and so is the ' equal itself. 
Neither can be perceived by the senses. We have seen a possible 
way in which Plato made the link between the necessity of the 
knowledge of "equal itself" and each correct (or false) act of 
perception. The same pre-knowledge, and the same corrigibilityj 
presumably applies to the good - that we have a hazy notion of 
what it is which will become more definite with investigation; 
and even inj mistaken judgments of what the good is some living 
roots are left for replanting. We have also noticed that the test 
of valid knowledge at 76 b5 comes straight from the store-/of 
dialectic.
o
Nowhere is the analysis grounded on acts of perception or ^
on any consciousness of the mind and memory as the possessors of 
a structure different from that of reason. Plato's conclusions are 
reached by examination, reexamination and reporting of the dialectical 
process; and by means of the schemata he transfers from dialectic to 
other fields when he elaborates later more specialised "psychologies" 
or "cosmologies." The "field insensitivity" of his theories becomes 
clearer if a further point of ray argument is accepted. Equals are not 
like the Equal and no analogue of visual similarity can produce the 
transition from particular to form.
28This requires some argument on its behalf especially as Dorter 
has argued persuasively that our senses perceive the unlikeness of a 
particular to a Form in the same perception as they perceive its 
likeness. Gulley makes it a serious charge against Plato's theory 
that "having established as fundamental for his theory the relation of 
resemblfuice between Forms and particulars, Plato should complicate 
this thesis unnecessarily by adding that 'so long as the sight of one 
thing leads you to conceive another, whether like it or unlike, 4» 
case of reminder must have occurred." (Hackforth (p.6 8.n.l) considers
the effect of ?4 cl 1 is to make the earlier point unimportant). For
Gulley, but not perhaps for Plato, "the fundamental point is that
recognition of sensible instances is made possible by their re-
29semblance to a Form." The imperfection of sensibles is that copies 
"never perfectly or exactly match the ideal standard constituted by
30
the Form" As we have seen, this depends on unnecessary inter­
pretations of the Greek. We follow Allen that there is no claim in
31
the dialogues that instances resemble Forms. Yet it is undeniable 
that likeness and unlikeness play a great part in the Phaedo proof - 
at 74a; bit; e?>
2 8 . op.cit. 208ff; 199ff; Gulley 30f; Huber 3^9; Boss, Plato theory 
of Ideas p.23*
29* Gulley op.cit. p.32.
3 0 . p.3 8.
31. Allen cp.cit.6 9ff; cf Vlastos 1973
3 2. Dorter 209.
The question of the logical nature of "likeness" does not concern 
us here#
Before fixing this role we must note a few facts: the first 
part of the proof 73 cl - 74 a8 itself splits into steps:
(i) Recollection presupposes prior knowledge.
(ii) Recollection is when I obtain a thought as well as a sight
which thought is not determined by the sight alone
(Miterkennen, Huber p.348)
(iii) The^ typical instances of 'being reminded' are when a lover 
is put in mind of his boy#lehd by a lyre or a cloak, or 
someone remembers Cebes at the sight of Simrnias
(iv) Reminding is either by like or by unlike in the case of
( 1 ) a painted horse reminding us of a man.
(2) a painted Simrnias reminding us of Cebes.
(3) a painted Simrnias reminding us of the real Simrnias.
(v) In the case of likes, the "additional affect" 1/)
is the’blinding" ( of how far short the likeness falls 
of the original (in the matter of likeness??)
33It is not clear how these examples are to be taken, Bluck 
talks about resemblance or association - which does not give the 
right contrast. Gulley (p28) talks about resemblance and contiguity 
bringing it about that Recollection comes either from like or unlike. 
But this is took weak. Huber seems to think they refer to everyday 
occurrences merely,^ Dorter (p.199) takes (1) and (2) as examples 
of the association of image and thing, and (3) as natural resemblance
3 3 . Phaedo p.6 3 .
3 4 . 1964 Anamnesis bei Plato p*349Tf*
of image and thing represented. As he takes examples of (iii) to
be association of thing and thing by habit, he concludes that there
exists an omitted type of recollection^ between naturally related
things - which is the Meno case. But this reconstruction goes
beyond what is necessary and may give a false impression. For the
examples in (iii) are merely ex ample so f how the sight of a Jyre
produces a different sort of thought - the thought of a boy. Now
any theory of recollection has to have a two level structure in
that the thing recollected must be significantly different from
the reminder. But any relation between the recollected and the
reminder will be covered by the statement "it is like and/or it
is not like." Of this sort of relation Plato gives three examples.
Fairly clearly the relationship between Simrnias and his picture is
likeness, while the others are examples of unlikeness. Now the
example of "thinking of the real Simrnias when you see his picture"
35is hardly a usual case of reminding, and Plato is here stretching 
a concept.
The curious thing is that the step (iv) is apparently passed 
over at 74 d1f. It is passed over not because of irrelevance, but 
because the function of the step at (iv) is to make it possible for 
reminiscence to include a case of "thinking of Equality when looking 
at equals." The Form Equal is clearly different from equals, and to 
that extent is unlike. But that is to give it no relation to the 
equals. If, however, it is likeness that determines our thinking 
of the Form, as in the case of the painting of Cebes - which 
would make anyone who knew him think of Cebes himself, in the 
normal course of things, then there would be no reason to introduce 
non-empirical element^ into our knowledge of equals unless similarity
35. Gosling, J .  1965. op.cit. p.154.
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is admitted to be insufficient, It would all be done not be 
"lot t but by visual and irrational likenesses. And yet
we recollect Forms, as we recollect Cebes, from their pictures.
It is important to remember what Gosling^^ seems to forget — 
that the picture fills the lover with an inevitable disappointment.
The passage is erastic. This lover's disappointment gives us the 
clue to step (v) : I do not think inevitably that the portrait is 
unlike Cebes, simply that it is not the fleshly Cebes. The grief 
comes from my and not from out side. I then look more care­
fully at the picture so that I can blame some of my disappointment 
on the artist for having missed something. Now this reading accounts 
for the emotional tone at 75» but it gives no support to a reading 
which implies that the subject perceives the likeness of a form to 
a particular and the unlikeness of a form to a particular in one 
and the same act of perception. To notice the discrepancy I 
requirevnot my senses but my mind (=memory) and my senses, to 
check points of similarity. Not even a likeness can make a copy 
into a substitute or surrogate. These two points are separate - 
things may have points of similarity, but in the case of Forms and 
particulars, no total of points of similarity can add up to re­
placement, because particulars and Forms are simply different 
orders of things, like Simrnias and his picture. The "like or 
unlike" codicil is meant to avert these difficult questions (74 cl3).
Step (v) is not taken up beforé 74d - because it is so far
irrelevant whether Recollection is from similars or whether from
W
dissimilars. Nor, it is suggested, is the question talc en at 
74 d4ff. First means qualis not similis. Second, the new
point is sufficiently made without reference to (v) • For we notice 
a difference of sort between the equals and Equal. This difference 
cuts across misleading notions of similarity. Our interpretation
36. op,cit. p.l54ff.
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of 74 d5ff is consistent with 74 a5ff; for when I notice a picture 
of Simrnias and am reminded of Simrnias, I mind that one is a 
picture, and the other is a boy. Now no-one is in a n y o f  
supposing that being reminded of a boy by the presence of a lyre 
is an example of the ne'farious workings of similarity; but they 
could suppose that being reminded of Cebes by a picture of Cebes 
is sufficiently accounted for by the ' similarity’ between the 
two things. This is wrong, of course, because I have first to 
know how to use thepicture of Simrnias before it can suggest to 
me the real Simrnias. So I have to know how to use the sense- 
p res ent ation of equals before I can make the jump to Equality,
37and vice versa. The ’lover's disappointment’’ has an epi ste­
mological analogue: I am always conscious that what I see is not 
what I mean by Equal, yet the only reason why equals are interesting 
to me is because of the Equal. In any case if I 'see' that 'x is 
and is not P ', why do so many people require convincing?
I conclude that not even in this matter of 'likeness and 
unlikeness' is Plato analysing or taking advantage in his argument 
of specifically visual or specifically psychological properties.
The analysis remains purely dialectical in its frame of reference. 
But it does seem that Plato may be acquainted with a typical answer 
to the question "why is this red?" - "Because it is like this (other 
red thing)," and we have seen that he is acquainted with a theory 
in which knowledge "arises" as a result of the cohesiveness of 
particular memo ri es - one like the other. The argument may also 
be a reply to an "eristic" attack on the Forms — that the Equal is 
either the same as equals or different, if different, it is either 
like or unlike them, - the sort of argument pattern we found in the
37. For problems of this nature: Go mb rich, E.H. Art and Illusion 
1968 p.144-52, cf. Gosling 1965 p. 157ff (on Cratylus 432).
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Gorgias chain. Plato bypasses the exclusive disjunction (like 
or unlike) by assuming that a force like Recollection works in 
both cases, and that even in cases of similarity, we are aware 
of a difference;;;. The proof seems to be geared to closing 
access to the reply: the similarity of objects to Forms accounts 
for the fact that we "think of Equal when we see equals." It is 
not a case of similarity since a state both like and unlike must 
bring into play the real source of the leap from particular to 
Form - Recollection, which, works from both similarity and dis­
similarity.
We have given possible historical reasons for the inclusion 
of references to "like" and "unlike". But there is a more general 
reason. Plato usually extends the notion of anamnesis to cover a 
phenomenon the word does not normally fit. (The proof of course is 
none the worse for that) . Plato is really saying that rational 
interpretation of the world requires prior knowledge of the Forms 
and prior knowledge becomes, in the framework of the ordinary theory 
of memory,prior acquaintance.
I receive a letter wi4h a pictorial stamp on it. The picture 
shows the Petit Trianon. Now if I am reminded by the Petit Trianon 
of the Hermitage, that is a perversity (or accident) of my nature.
But I do not necessarily immediately assume that my letter has come 
from Russia - though I may be so misled. However, on seeing the 
picture of the Petit Trianon on the steunp, am I reminded of the 
Trianon as a building before I can draw my conclusion that the 
letter has come from France. Reminding is an additional unnecessary 
stage. Plato is extending "reminding" to include cases of "reading".
38. Cap 11, (1).
3 9. Supra.
He claims it follows that because the "signification" of the postage 
stamp is not the Petit Trianon bpt France, I need considerable pxdor 
knowledge to interpret correctly the "signifier". This prior know­
ledge includes a knowledge that France has ^ in it'the Petit Trianon.
The problem arises out of the question of the provenance of our 
knowledge of the signification. It is not derivable from the 
signifier, but it must be preestablished. Plato is not concerned 
with the nature of this preestablished harmony between the signifiers 
and significations.
It is not necessary that the theory should be fully ramified.
It could be argued that the int erpret ability of the signified is a
fact for Plato - this is the way the world was made. He does not
ask here; "What structure must the world have for me to have knowledge
of it?" He asserts that we can identify cases of equality even though
40we may often mistake them bin our early years!) The nearest analogy 
for this is "recollecting" something; in other words my "likening" 
of instances to Forms is not done on the basis of a likeness model 
but on the basis of (partial) recollection. By examining this process 
Plato hopes to make progress to clearer knowledge of a now widely 
extended dialectical realm. In fact the presentation of the present 
argument is ostensibly a case of promoting recollection in Simrnias.
Not even the summary of the Meno proof given here seems to fit 
that case very well (73 a7-fz). For the Phaedo - summary appears to 
distinguish two stages in the Meno.
4-2(a) the asking and answering of questions.
(b) the consultation of diagrammata.
40. 75e?
41. Infra; proof (Taylfr); geometrical figures, propositions K.S.J
42. The separatk?!^ ' of the stages is clear in Bury,R.G. Platonica, 
C.R. XX p.13.
The passage seems to suggest that the slave need not have seen
the figure before arriving at the answer. The explanation is
probably that Plato here simplifies his argument tendentiously•
The slave can understand, or deal with, proofs or constructions
that lie has not met with before if he has been prepared by the
method of question and answer; whereas if he were presented with
the experiment in reverse, and given the diagram first (and even
perhaps told the answer) and asked the questions afterwards then
he would not be able to do this. This proves the knowledge has
come from him and not from the diagram. But if our interpretation
of the Meno is accepted, there is an alternative solution. The
first half of the sentence (about asking people proper questions)
refers to dialectic; the second half of the summary refers to the
transfer of the method to mathematics, in which the implications
of the method are even more apparent. The Phaedo proof in fact
does for dialectic what Meno does for mathematics; but by using
lf.2aa semi-mathematical example, mainly because it is an example 
of what we do know. Thanks to the nature of dialectic, concepts 
can be more sharply distinguished from "ordinary" objects. The 
day to day workings of dialectic distinguish them explicitly, which 
is often what a mathematician forgets in his speech. Such a solution 
accounts, too, for the discrepancy some people have found between 
orthos logos in the Meno and plain (and increasingly plainer) 
episteme in the P h a e d o . I n  the Meno orthos logos is converted 
into episteme by drilling,' the proof that the slave has not been 
drilled sufficiently is presumably that he is liable to change his 
mind (97 e6) according to his interlocutors or teachers whims. But 
in Phaedo, the proof that we know "beauty itself" is simply that we
42a. For a raathematlcising interpretation cf. Brown,M. The idea of
inequality.in the Phaedo Arch.fur Cresh.der Philosophiel972 p.24-36
43. Dorter p.209 n.lO; Allen 1959 p.173f; Gulley 1962 p.23.
are able to talk about it at all in dialectics and the proof* that
we have this knowledge is that we can give a logos of it (76 b4).
Giving a logos is the archetypal difference between mathematician 
and dialectician.^^ Thus the discrepancy between the dialogues is 
best explained by the contrast of ,
The above was written before I could get hold of Prof. Ackrill* s
45essay "Anamnesis in the Phaedo, Remarks on 73c - 75c. His trans­
lation and discussion, especially the warning against overtranslation 
(p. 181) would have saved me from many unclarities. But perhaps I 
could make a few comments on the interrelevance of the interpretations:
1. p.l8 2f "To invoke the notion of reminding is to imply the avail­
ability of an explanation in terms of associative laws connecting 
thought contents..." A temporal and causal relation can hold between 
thinking *this is a lyre* and thinking of A1 cibiad]^^but not between 
thinking *this is Alcibiades* lyre * and thinking of Alcibiades. . . *
Prof. Ackrill is analysing the act of being reminded. Plato assumes 
certain conceptions and theories about being reminded. Plato thinks 
that, to be reminded, one needs a reminder that is a mixture of like 
and unlike with regard to the thing it reminds one of. It is this 
mixture of *like and unlike* which makes the relation between our 
thought of Equal and the equals only expressible in terms of an 
expanded concept of recollection. The relation between the two 
categories if fixed beforehand.
2. "... the thesis (at 73 c4 - dl) is false. For the account it 
gives of anamnesis of the kind of anamnesis that is being reminded 
- does not include the condition that the y item must have been 
already known to a person if it is correct to say that he is 
reminded of it." (p.l86)
44. cf % .  533c.
4 5 . Exegesis and Argument: Studies presented to Gregory Vlastos 
Rd. Lee E.N. and others 1973 though available only in 1974
pp. 177 - 195.
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Recalling is rather limited for anamnesis. ’Producing out 
of the memory* might be better. Memory is an active faculty, and 
the sort of anamnesis meant is qualified by the condition that it 
should contain knowledge (?4 c4/5). How does it contain knowledge? 
Obviously either (a) because the soul has found out the knowledge 
for itself or (b) the soul has learned it (by acquaintance or from 
a master). But (a) is out of the question, because it cannot give 
the sort of evidence of Forms that it could give if it had fogndï 
them out, and yet the Platonist is committed to the existence of 
the Form, without benefit of (b).
3 . "In tliis passage there is little doubt that Socrates is 
appealing to a doctrine - the theory of Forms - acceptable to him 
and his associates, but not, of course, to the man in the street 
... Plato seems to be drawing attention to ordinary familiar facts 
about how we all grow up classifying and recognising perceptible 
objects" (7 4 E - 75 B) " p.191; 192.
We hope we have ifaitigated this contradiction by treating both
passages as an analysis and generalisation of the dialectical 
situation. The survey of * familiar facts*of course undermines the 
usual explanation of those facts.
4. "A sign of Plato’s grasp of what his argument requires is,
I think, to be found in the precise wording of 74 d9 î " this that 
I see wishes to be like some other thing there is
.... In making the person himself say this Plato makes him commit 
himself to there actually being the thing of which he takes this 
to fall short, and that is incompatible with its being something... 
he is just now making up." p. 194-5 (Ackrill *s italics).
Plato is obviously talking to the converted. .*/ Ais argument 
is meant to make sense only to those people who already accept that
there is Beauty. By accepting this, they also find themselves
committed to the rest of the argument. They must reanalyse their 
traditional theory of knowledge to make room for it. Thus there 
simply something it can fall short of. But the man who has 
made the admission must say to himself when faced with a beautiful, 
"It does fall short of the Beautiful." Prof, Ackrill *s criticism 
in fact helps to show how different the aims and conventions of 
Platonic proof are from our own. Plato is still addressing himself 
to the person, and to persons believing specific things and reacting 
in specifiable ways.
l v \
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% How long anamnesis survives as part of Platonic dectrine is
a vexed question. No context requires us to abandon it, and those 
47commentators'who claim that Plato abandons the doctrine generally 
base their arguments on considerations affecting the theory of 
Forms and the method of diaeresis. Scholars^® who believe that 
Plato did not abandon anamnesis . {>elieve he did not abandon
the Forms and work by demonstrating that no text can be brought to 
prove abandonment. But as no text can be brought to prove the 
abandonment of Forms either, their arguments scarcely affect their 
opponents. Others try to find a role for anamnesis in the philosophy 
of the later dialogues. Crombie, for instance, admits the inconclusive 
nature of the evidence, but finds a reason for holding to anamnesis 
in the internal workings of Platonism: "It is true that Plato provides 
the forms to be, so to speak the objects of reason, but an empiricist 
would want to say that these are not "objects" in the required sense. . 
(But Plato) would always have wanted to say that forms can be "known" 
even without a world of things to partake in them.... and so long as 
you say this you will be likely to wonder how our concept of equality 
comes to conform to the nature of equality; and that is a question 
to which anamnesis is an answer. Bluck too claims that diaeresis
is inadequate without anamnesis, fordiaeresis is only an approximatil^^
progressive method. It does not produce true results in the way
recollecting true facts produces results.
4 7. Robin, Platon p.89f; Stenzel Allan p.35-40.
48. Comford, Plato’s Cosmology p.l44; Plato’s Theory of Knowledge 129f; 
Bluck’s Meno 58ff; Gulley 1954, 209.
4 9 . Crombie vol.11, l47.
5 0. Bluck’s Meno p.54.
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If the argument is to be fruitful, scholars must show that anamnesis
is essential (or felt to be essential) to the process of learning
described in the later works. Unfortunately there is no such
54evidence, even for the Republic, and the context in which anamnesis
is mentioned are "mythological"^^ or "physical"^^ or both.^^
The two passages in which a possibly continuous theory of
recollection of Forms is brought into connection with the developing
method of dialectic are at Politicos 285e ff and 249 b4ff.
They are both examples of assimilation and synthesis - old and new
jostle alongside each other with minimal cha#ge in vocabulary and
maximal preservation of patterns. The result is that one does not
know at Phdrus 249 bf how much is doctrine, how much pun, how much
redefinition of anamnesis i ^  terms of the new method of diaeresis.
The setting of anamnesis we have been discussing is confirmed with
the Symposium's version of the Ascent of Love. The Phae^f^^ tells
c /
us that whenever a layman sees a. of something "yonder" he
is struck with amazed desire, and goes no further. These are the
people of Rp. 4?4 dff who think there are many and love
all of them. Now it is noticeable that the soul does not move from 
C r
a to the Form, no matter how 'clear' the sense. It must
go by way of things that cannot be seen^^ and so have no obvious
- these are justice and beauty and the other subjects of
our argument in Phaedo. For these have no attractive glitter ^
in their • But when the soul has recalled that there is
a more worthwhile Beauty yonder, then presumably his attitude to the
51 * Phdrus 249 b-c.
52. Laws 732 c5ff.
53. Timaeus 42B ?
54. Rp. 518c ?
55. 250 b.
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•world changes and he realises that the rest of the world is a 
too. This pattern seems to me to be cosmology and 
philosophy, but not an analysis of perception. The memory of 
Beauty awakens longing in our soul - like the pathos of disappoint­
ment in the Phaedo. But the assertion that we know, when looking 
at X that it falls short of X has gone. The explanation is that 
the Phaedo argument referred mainly and probably exclusively to 
those things that have no "glitter", and consequently we are aware 
that what we see before us is not Equality or Beauty.
The same contrast between the seeable and the unseeable occurs 
at Politieus 285 eff with an overhang of vocabulary. A few things 
are changed - more emphasis is put on an eidolon for every sense, 
for instance. But more serious is the reference at 285 el that it 
is easy to learn through I ; but impossible
to learn in this way where there is no eidolon. Bearing in mind that 
we are dealing with collection, I suggest that the "likenesses" must 
be reasons for putting things together - whether particulars of genera 
and species. In the case of the physical likenesses I see no reason 
why the likeness cannot be the likeness of one piece of coal to 
another. For example is that a piece of coal? - Yes, because this 
is a piece of coal.^^ Much in the late Recollection passages is the 
same as in the earlier, but the discovery of a method, like diaeresis 
seems to have produced a reinterpretation of the doctrine from inside 
the new method.
Progress in Plato's doctrine made with the realization that 
many visible and touchable things are "in the likeness" of the Ideas, 
as well as the great unseeables, like justice. One compares the
56, S u pra  iii C. ^
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expansion of the realm of Forms noticed in the Parmenides. Both 
the Politicus and Phaedrus passages appear to contain references 
to visible likenesses of f o r m s . N o w  the Politicus passage seems 
to mean that in the matter of weaving, no same man will expect you 
to do more than take him to a weaver's shop, and point at a weaver. 
But if one must have a logos about weaving, then the logos works 
through division. In some matters, there are no counterparts of 
weavers to point at; but as the universe is somehow one, practice 
in the visible matters is also practice in the Unseen matters, if 
the method is correct. The upshot is that between the weaver and 
the Form of Weaving no visual similarity is envisaged. Even in the 
Phaedrus only some "copies" produce "madness of recognition" in a 
man ; and I suggest that there are many grades of copies, some of 
which are "striking likenesses" which can deceive a man if he is 
not careful. This "striking likeness" is not a "visual" likeness, 
but a "visible" likeness (apprehended in the realm of sens^. The 
appreciation of the likeness is the mind working upon information 
come by through the eyes. For example, in Socrates' encomium of 
sight in the Timaeus, the visual sense is praised because it gives 
us "knowledge" of circular movement. But oculai^ astronomy does no 
such things mind, working on evidence, eventually reaches a "picture" 
of circular motion; and this is a very different matter. The point 
appears to be that physical phenomena are amenable to the correct 
application of the same methods as we apply to the great Unseeables. 
For the method of astronomy or of defining weaving is the method 
Originally worked out for dealing with the Unseen — both the method 
of "problems" and the method of "diaeresis." Method makes the 
phenomenal world somehow rational : but the^link of the phenomenal 
world with the Forms is metaphysical.
57* Skemps Plato's Statesman 1952.p.76 ; Gulley 1962 p.120ff.
58. Timaeus 47 ab; Gulley 1962. p.134.
CHAPTER IV dialectic AND MIND
If Socrates asks "Is there beauty?" and the interlocutor 
replies that there are many, then the interlocutor is avoiding 
the issue* No one of those many beauties would be more beauty 
than not beauty. Various reasons have been canvassed for this 
second assertion, but the most likely is presented by Owen, 
that the many beauties are beautiful only relatively to some­
thing else, what is light is only lighter in comparison to some­
thing heavier, and so on, "The incompleteness which so 
embarrassingly characterises ‘equal* in its ordinary applications 
cannot it seems characterise it when it designates the Form. 
lu fact it is the demand for a non-relative relative that forces 
the positing of Forms in the first place; for there is obviously 
nothing in the world of appearance of which it is \&nambiguously 
true that it is equal. This sort of argument may lie at the 
base of Plato's theory. But his methods of presentation of 
this theory are not totally accountable out of the theory alone.
The missing links that help us to an appreciation of his 
method lie in the historical dialectic and particularly in;
(i) the realisation that the statement "There are many beauties" 
is a denial of the assumption on which the question rests;
(ii) if there is not one beauty, then no sufficient reason 
covering the 'whole' of beauty can be given why beautiful is 
no t ugly.
(i) Socrates made impossible demands for completely true answers
expressed in as few words as possible. The typical situation
turns up on the Protagoras at 331 b 9« Is justice holy? A
f  yO
rightly indignant Protagoras expostulates €>0 IT^
(£ '"JSio'oV
1. Owen 1957; ifi A lle n  1965 P*310.
He bursts into a relativistic tirade at 334 when asked if good 
is useful, because there are many sorts of useful things. But 
dialectic demands seamless answers; requires in reply
and answer tfli^without exception^ and is out of the same stable 
as^Kpi ^  j ^  to 3 -
hallmarks of the impossible, but in using them, Socrates, like 
the Hippocratic writers, is a man of his age.
(ii) So if Socrates cannot convince an interlocutor that there 
is one beauty, he complains that the interlocutor proposes 
something no more beautiful than not beautiful. The interlocutor 
has rejected the only safeguard against relativistic chaos.^
Now Glaucon is familiar with Platonic methods and agrees 
without more proof that;
%). 475 eff.
A. (i) (the) fine is opposite to (the) ugly P
(ii) they are two things (i)
(iii) therefore each is one thing (i) (ii)
(iv) the realm of doing things is separate from the realm 
of philosophy.
(v) There is beautiful apart from ugly.
The acceptance of (i) makes it possible for a man to 
discover or be taught the truth (476 cd; 479 e; 480) • From 
479 a ff we get a characterisation of the opinions of the 
polymaths.
2. Bury ad Symp,.206a citing 183 d; Ptg.331 c; Phdrus 244a; 
Hackforth Mnemosyne 1957 p. 128 ad Theaet. 188 d 3; de StrycKer 
1968 p . 160 f with a survey: no exception, no additional 
determination, approximative.
3 . Ptgs. 329 c 6 ; Gorg. 453 a 7; 452 e 9; 450 d 10; 450 b 9 .
4. Compare Gallop 196I; Savan 1963; Vlastos 1972 for this 
passage in Protagoras.
2  3 C
B. (i) nothing beautiful is never/not ugly P
(ii) there are many beautifuls (i)
(iii) each one is both beautiful and ugly (i) (ii)
(iv) each is no more beautiful than ugly (i) (ii) (iii)
(v) neither one nor both can we know firmly )
(vi) there are no beautifuls ^
The difference between the two "methods" is partly that 
by Glaucon*s method, answers are possible to questions involving 
"the whole of" beauty; but the polymaths* opinions never get as 
far as admitting the possibility of the question. Their reply 
that there are many beautifuls is both a statement about the 
world of appearance, in which the many beautifuls are all we 
have, and a denial that there is one beautiful; but the positing 
of one beauty is Plato's method of procedure. The beauty has 
for its "opposite" ugliness. Because the pair are in a relation 
of mutual exclusiveness, dialectic about them is possible. But 
the many beautifuls are a different case, because none of them 
are more beautiful than another when produced as replies to 
dialectic.
The pattern persists in %». 523 b ff. We identify the 
soul with the good dialectician, and sense perception with the 
bad dialectician. The senses provide nous with an aporia which 
nous solves by separating the long from the short and the heavy 
from the light. This nous can do because she already thinks in 
terms of length and shortness, heaviness and lightness separately. 
Rp. 524 b ff
A. Soul
(i) length is opposite to shortness P
(ii) they are two things (l)
(iii) therefore each is one thing (i) (ii)
(iv) each is other, different from the other (i) (ii)
(v) in nous they are "seen" or "thought" separately.
5• For evaluative opposite and Forms, see Allen, R ,E.Rev. Met.1969
p.325-350 For different attitudes to 'one' compare Gadamerl968
p . 17 «
"2. ^  G  >
(va) what is big and little? bigness and smallness?
(vi) there is a bigness «•••
B . Aesthesi s
one ) Ç many
(i) length' comes together with (shortness P
(ii) one is not seen as one thing. (i)
(iii) one is no more one than it is many (i) (ii)
(iiia) each is the other, is not different from the other
(i) (ii)
(iv) in aesthesis one and many are seen compounded.
(iva) aesthesis makes no advance to the real.
(v) there is no bigness ....
Now the pattern with which we are presented is one in 
which aesthesis is el en ch a ted by nous. I am not suggesting that 
aesthesis produces a genuine aporia: after all the compresence 
of opposites is simply the remarkable thing about the world of 
sensation. But if we remain in this condition, we can say 
little about the world, or at least about 'qualities* like 
'equal', 'beautiful'; the dialectical investigation begins, as 
we have noticed before, after the initial el en chus, with a 
purification of the objects of discourse. The new objects of 
discourse have the peculiarity that once split into "genuine" 
components - beauty/ugliness etc. - the(j do not again split.
It is not clear what relation A (iva) bears to the rest.
The question might indicate the soul's puzzlement at the nature 
of its own objects, the existence of which it is obliged to 
accept.- The question would then refer to an aporia the soul 
will solve as a result of its separation of one from many.
But the mathematical passage 525 d shows us that the mind
is not troubled about such a situation. In other words, being 
able to formulate or question which requires a single answer 
is the exi k from the aporia. Aesthesis, on the other hand, is 
in the aporia, and cannot formulate the question. Mind is 
analogous to dialectic and mathematics because it deals with
z ? /
things separately. Now the correct handling of such 'separate* 
objects, as the first part of the Parmenides suggests requires 
an appreciation that the apparent compresence of opposites in 
the new realm requires a more rigorous investigation, simply 
because the Forms "radically exclude their opposites". Yet 
these are the appropriate subjects of dialectic.
We can surmise then that aesthesis refuses to give a 
"simple" answer to the question "what is long?" This refusal 
need not be interpreted as telling us only that sight cannot I
discover by inspection, or even "imagine", a length which is |
not short in comparis on , with another length. It tells us j
also that aesthesis, being a bad dialectician does not make 
the division between 'long* and its opposite required to produce 
a siirple answer to the question "what is long?" Now the separation 
of justice from injustice is also a moral commitment, though the 
separation of heavy from light is not powered by the same fuel.
But the apparent peculiarity of aesthesis (that sense reports) 
opposites) has its analogue in the dialectical sphere by which 
we suggest it has been influenced, the principle is that 
knowing one of a pair of contraries entails knowing its opposite, 
especially in the matter of good and bad.^ But only the 
dialectical techne enables one to make a distinction between 
the two; free of this knowledge, sense can only "sense" both of 
a pair of opposites, and has no reason, of itself, to choose 
between them. We may suspect that for Plato wher ever a similar 
distinction is made, that distinction is an example of dialectic.
A structure rather like that of continuous dialectic has been 
imposed on our "mental processes."
6. Phaedo 97 d 5; Diss. Log. 8(9); Charmides 173 d ff ; Theaet 
176a; Aristotle passim: Top 156 b 10 ff: how to concedf a 
conclusion.
So why make th e  s te p  to  th e  one b e a u t i f u l?  The answ er
n
to this must be sought in mo reproperly philosophical connections * 
But the method of presentation, the 'picture* of nous deciding 
an issue because of its ability to deal with unsplit table 
objects and seamless questions and answers, after aesthesis has 
been reduced to returning an answer that is a formula of disproof - 
not more x than y - do es (^omething to dialectic. Behind the 
argument is the threat of premature el en chus: you say "this is 
big"... and "this is big".., leading to inevitable collision.
You will be reduced to silence if you refuse the only way open 
of giving me a "simple" answer. The argument implies dialectic.
The pattern may also help to make clearer how it is that the 
theory of Forms is described in Book X as a method of positing 
'one thing' for the many individual thingj^  for which there is the 
same name.
The form of the analysis of the "thinking" of the
o
HeracliteaHs Our interest lies in what Socrates calls
(jî'l c.)
Ihe flaw is the abhorrence of fixity. Heraclitea<\s cannot keep 
to question and answer, they are indebted to a book; their 
brevity is misleading, and each time you ask a question they 
assail you with a fresh minted answer ) (179 eff).
gL
Plato gives his own characterisation of the school. i
7. Owen, op. cit ; Brentlinger, Phronesis 1972: Incomplete 
Predicates and the Two World theory of the Phaedo; Nehamas, 
Rev.Met. 1972-3: Predication and Forms of Opposition in the 
Phaedo.
8. Theaet 152d; 156 f; 179 e*
0^. W ) " g  - : - •
He points out that the previous "subtle" descriptions of the 
changing universe of perception cannot be put forward by people 
who accept as arche that all things are in motion, Socrates 
distinguishes two sorts of change; given their arche, Hera- 
cliteans must "answer both". As Socrates shows, this is in 
effect neither, for neither quality nor faculty remain. The 
Heraclitean abolishes both, leaving us with an echo of the 
Republic that there is no tiling to think firmly of 
Thinking firmly is a dialectical privilege. The half-way house 
of the Protagorean initiates who keep a rather cornservative 
world picture (l5C6 - 157b?) is dialectically illegimate because 
their arche is not sufficiently subtle to maintain it.
Accordingly in the succeeding section of the Theaetetus 
object and f a c u i t y a r e  restored, though more on a deliberative 
model than on a "seeing" modelW. A criterion, or sense-tool,
IjL
for judging reality is expressly denied • Another difference 
is that the new section is very much about the sort of opinions 
that are usually expressed in explicit statements; and it deals 
with those opinions as if they were in no way the creatures of 
sensation. For despite appearances he does not deal here simply 
with the connection between sensation and opinion but with the 
more purely "mental" features of opinion. The relations between 
opinion and sens e-perception, I suggest, maybe dealt with in the 
Dream section: the enquiry into doxa beginning at l84cf is more 
limited in scope. We consider only its ostensible form.
9. Vide Cap. V.
10. Theaet 157 a 4; Rp. 479 c 4.
11. The word is used loosely, see Gosling 1968
12. I86d; 178 b9f; l84c 78..
a  c ^ o
The analog!smata of the soul are almost what we have come 
to expect: I85 af.
A
(ii) there are two objects P
(iii) both (l85a9 = I85c5) ii ?
(ilia) therefore each is different from the other (ii) (iii)
( (iilb) and the same as itself (ii) (iii)
(iv) the both are two, each is one (ii) (iii)
(iva) So one may examine their likeness to each other
(cf’Vl*>5 - perhaps I85b6)
^ (v) there is/ there is not/ a similarity)
The missing step in the pattern is Step (i) that F is 
"opposite" to -F.
The^proof ^ is not about contraries - which are what the 
individual senses perceive. The emphasis of the pattern shifts to 
'difference' which is felt sufficient to produce the 'two things* 
clause at (iv)• The doubleness is still considered necessary to the 
proof, but * sound* is not opposite to 'colour*. The schema has moved 
easily from relative opposites to mere difference, and the way 
has been smoothed by number. But the persistence of the schema !
I
Bhould prevent us from falling into a "sense faculty" trap - j
and supposing that on this theory we add a sight to a sound and !
make a baby out of them. Nowhere in our passage as we shall see 
if this sort of construction envisaged. Cooper^^ argues that the 
common things (i) - (iva) are common to all or several of the 
senses; but gives no reason why a double-object should have been 
chosen initially for the proof, and seems to attribute no 
particular sense to the items on Plato's list, whereas the 
schema tells us clearly that the two objects are chosen because 
they are different.
1 3. Phronesis 1970. Plato on Sense Perception & Knowledge p .123- 
l46, 129, 134 nl4.
aWe must reject an interpretation like: I perceive a sound —
I perceive a sight. My ' common sense* tells me that both are....
For there is no real evidence even in Aristotle for a 'common
14 'aesthesis as a special s e n s e ; a n d  the Koi^a of Aristotle, 
which are, like shape, common to more than one sense, are 
clean contrary to the sense of the example chosen here of 'an 
object of sound and an object of sight.' It might be arguable 
that one perceives existence both through hearing and through 
sight. But what sort of similarity does one perceive in this 
way? the similarity that both are? Would Plato ever say that a 
sound exists and a sight exists?
It is best to remember that the ostensible purpose of the 
passage is to restore quality and faculty. I suggest Plato means 
that what we think we perceive through our individual senses is 
not only a sound or a colour, or even only colour or sound, but 
we think we perceive that it is colour and that it is sound
i.e. the qualities. Having perceived both that it is colour 
and that it is sound we have perceived a necessary difference 
between the two objects even though the particular colour or 
the particular sound may not be an object at all or may not 
belong to different objects. In other words, Plato has removed 
us completely from consideration of the objects of individual 
senses and talks instead about the modalities of all perceived 
objects.
So, should we ever opine what we feel are our sense 
perceptions, we are immediately involved in saying "there is 
colour, there is sound". It is in fact a consequence of having 
divers senses, that our perceptions of how things O'/id =
real things) stand, or how things work, are dealt with by none 
of them but by all the senses working miraculously together to 
give a coherent picture. But Plato does not mean this. His 
rule that one sense faculty cannot perceive the object of 
another sense faculty warns us that he is not talking about
the perception of fingers, which can be perceived synchronously 
under varying forms by several faculties, nor is he talking about 
shapes or thickness or movement which Ccin be perceived by both 
touch and sight independently ; nor can he be talking about 
properties common to objects of the senses as objects of the 
(individual) senses - which is a wasteful way of filling up the 
world. I might then admit that all there is is a series of 
resonant or coloured events, as is the Pro t ago rean world, whereas 
a Platonic universe should contain fewero"things" than are given 
as the separate objects of each sense. Nor can Plato mean that 
the "common thing" is applicable ohly to objects that can be 
perceived through more than one sense - which would be an oblique 
way of talking about fingers, or primary qualities. Nor can the 
"common things" be common as names are common to particulars, 
because this is an unmotivated importation from possible practice 
e l s e w h e r e . H e  must mean qualities that can be perceived only 
through more than one sense.
Now in order to perceive something as sight does, hearing 
is UJseless: so, in order to perceive that something is sight, 
according to Plato, a list of dialectical statements is necessary. 
These KoiB»a must be common to sight as sight, and sound as sound, 
and therefore cannot be divorced from the relation between sight 
and sound. A claim to perceive sight, and not sound, is according 
to Plato a matter of doxa and not of sensation, because only doxa 
can command the concepts necessary for distinguishing between 
the two sorts of things. For my claim involves the belief that 
sight and sound are in some way real... To say of something that 
it is sight requires as much of a rationale as to say of it that 
it is two.
14. Hamlyn, D.W., Koine Aesthesis, Monist 1968 p.195-209.
l6. Comford p. 105; Chemiss A.O.P.A. p.236 n.l4l; Cooper op.cit. 
p. 128 n.8.
Our version prevents Plato from begging the questioning 
He does not say 'we perceive a sound*, so a sound must exist.
He is not even claiming that 'exists' is a very special word 
and can only apply to the sound that I have heard after further 
investigation! He says simply that one cannot perceive by 
sight that one perceives through sight. For sight only ' exists' 
in relation to hearing, and both kinds are (different kinds).
I complete the verb to be with a predicate, but we must remember 
the fact that 'to be' is also a value word - really is, is a
fact.
The essential of the argument is that the mind considers 
two things, not one, and any two things have other things in 
common. In the case of sense evidence it is particularly clear 
that to consider both the objects of sight and the objects of 
sound, one meeds a third faculty. The principle is the same 
in the Sophist when the Stranger points out that "being" applies 
to both movement and rest, and therefore must be a third thing, 
common (Koi^ Ka) embracing ((T6p(<^ 0K<A^  ) both. ^
It ought now to be clear that the method used in the schema 
is analogous to a sort of division. This change explains the 
omission of (i) , which is no longer relevant, and the addition 
of (iva) . But the schema gives us our diaeresis very schema­
tically. For it is true of the comparison of any pair of 
'objects' that they must be validly different, and that a general 
distinction must be made between them before we can appreciate 
which similarities are valid and which are not. Similaiities 
are only valid between 'objects' that are, in respect of that
pA
similarity, congeners .
17. Cf Cooper op.cit. l40; Xenatis,J: Kant Studien 1957/8 vol.49 
pp.167-181, esp.p.l76f, 181 Kahn C.tt. The Greek Verb 'To Be ' 
Foundations of Language 2 196^ p.245-65.
18. Sopliist 250 b7.
19. Holland, AJ. Phil.Rev. 1973 An argument in Plato's 
Theaetetus p.101.
20. eg. Soph. 231 a6 .
But the concepts one uses to establish the possibility of a 
correct judgment of likeness must apply to both objects and 
must be of a third sort for the purposes of the comparison#
So if we perceive that we are seeing colour, then our
perception that colour is being seen is not itself a seeing.
If colour is to be a valid perception then we cannot identify
our perception that it is a genuine sort of perception with
a series of 'sights* of coloured events. Coloured events may
be part of sensation, and come into existence only when perceived.
But holding an opinion about it, or stating a claim about whether
sight is a valid perception or not is a matter of doxa. We
need the dialectical list to make good our claim that lwe c ^
perceive as opposed to the suspicion that we are simply
influenced by an event. Presumably in the realm of sensation,
I can experience the most subtle shades of red, and this
immediate awareness of red puts me in as close touch with
the red event as I can wish for; but I cannot (claim to)
perceive it unless I can distinguish the parts of the total
confused experience. For my mind must break the combined
sensation of all senses into components - sight, sound and
what have you. These are not distinct as sensations but make 
21
one big blur.
What makes doxa more "r titional", I suggest, is that it 
divides into limited kinds - sight, sound and the like, so 
that in order to see something validly, I must know I am 
seeing it, and any doxa will present itself to me in one of 
these kinds. Now it is difficult to see what sort of 
perceptual difficulty Plato could have started from.
2 1 .  184 d 3 0 ; Rp. 524  c 4 .
He does not read like an Englislunan who starts by using only 
his eyes, or only his ears, and receives each packet of 
information already stamped sight and sound. He seems to 
envisage an act of analysis carried out on sense information.
My sense evidence comes in a block - both hearing and seeing 
in ray conversation with Theaetetus, and it is quite different 
from ray knowing Theaetetus. If I consider my sense-evidence, 
or am asked about it as sense evidence, I must first split into 
two kinds, by giving a clean answer to : what comes from my ears? 
what from my sight? But this is only possible if sight and 
sound are self-identical and separate. The argument appears 
to be that certain information is not given to individual senses, 
but to another sense, or at least is present in all the senses 
working together. But the task of this sense is comparison, 
abstraction and the like; so that its affinities are with 
discursive thought, deliberation. The nature of the "information" 
it adds to the information given by the individual senses is 
the sort of information associated with dialectic. It appears 
that Plato has not started from a perceptual situation so much 
as from a dialectical sort of problem.
The persistence of our pattern has suggested an inter­
pretation; but the acceptance of the interpretation depends 
on the overall picture we may have of Plato's attitude to 
sense perception and knowledge. But for us the important 
points are that Plato in the Theaetetus is purifying several 
positions, whether they are all his own positions are not; and 
the pattern of what the mind must ask itself before it can 
validly get to the point of knowing something has persisted 
from the Republic. The variations appear to coincide with 
different dialectical situations — the artful el en chus 
practised on sense perception; the raising of the objects 
of discussion to a level at which contradiction, and therefore
truth and falsity, becomes serious, in nous; and the handling 
of such objects in doxa, when for example we have to decide 
a question of similarity.
As regards its presentation, at any rate, Plato's "doctrine" 
of mind looks like a reflection of dialectic; and as dialec­
tical methods shift in emphasis so a new reflection appears in 
mind.
Having got to the stage at which we realize that truth 
and falsity involve "opinion", we proceed to convict Theaetetus* 
discursive mind, his reflections and calculations , of not being 
infallible. It is not enough to blame sensation. Formally 
speaking, we assume a constructive dialectic complete with the 
"correct" objects. But,of course, the question of the nature 
of those objects is more acute because we are asking 
how people think themselves into mistakes.
I I  ERROR IN  THE THEAETETUS
If the Theaetetus passage on error is an examination of 
the causes of error, theit^ange of its choice of the sorts of 
error to investigate are highly idiosyncratic. Ihe sorts of 
error investigated seem to fit dialectical situations, and to 
be handled by special dialectical methods. Second, Plato 
assumes throughout that we have knowledge, and that because 
we have knowledge we cannot make the sorts of mistake that 
Plato knows quite well are possible in minds and processes.
But if we have knowledge, they are impossible. This is more 
than reminiscent of the irony of el en chus. We shall suggest 
that Plato here describes successive stages of dialectic, 
transferred to dianoia, and at the end of it, where the 
successful dialectician should have satisfied himself with 
a logos, or should have grasped one, we find Plato examining 
the relation true doxa and logos. By locating the methods 
in our minds, Plato is able to add, among other things, some 
sort of correction to his naively expressed apparent earlier 
belief that mind (or its conversation with itself) is a sitre 
way to the truth. The quirks of the argument become more 
explicable if the argument is seen as a reflection on dialectic 
rather than as a direct reflection on psychological processes. 
The form of the argument mirrors the stage of dialectic 
examined in the argument. Now as we are only pointing out 
a form of argument, and suggesting that it is reported el en chus,
we are not concerned with what the objects of a true or false
belief are, but only with how they are described.
Our scheme fits both the main schools of interpretation.
For Prof. Ackrill ^ argues, principally on the grounds that the 
sorts of error envisaged are propositional, that Plato here 
lists the sorts of error that can or cannot occur; and
discovers that Plato makes a Humean analysis of the identity 
of physical objects. Bondeson^ argues that though the sorts 
of error envisaged begin to be prepositional, the knowledge 
in the Wax Tablet and the Aviary envisaged as compound 
knowledge of objects of which we have knowledge by acquaintance 
only. This means both that Plato is dissatisfied with the 
theory of knowledge by acquaintance, and that he has not 
freed himself from it. But as we are analysing the method 
of presentation of the arguments against error, and finding 
that they have a historical, recapitulatory component, our 
analysis will fit either interpretation.
Rightly or wrongly Socrates concludes at l87a that he 
must switch his search for error entirely away from the 
notion of the investigation of sens e-perception to the 
investigation of the notion of doxa. But he begins by 
ignoring it; and stating the "logic" of knowledge - one 
either knows or one does not know. Now this is true of 
knowledge by acquaintance; but we are here dealing with 
doxa, the logic of which may be different. Accordingly 
the following argument assimilates doxa to seeing and hearing 
- an additional sort of faculty and a reprise of the argument 
at 185 b 7 . Both arguments are rejected by the interlocutors 
because they do not fit the facts they are conscious of; but 
they do settle the limits of doxa in either direction. The 
thing about the arguments is that they are inappropriate and 
sophistical - the first is the old argument resting the 
exclusive disjunction either... or... beloved of the Sophists;
1. Monist p. 1966 p.381-402, Plato on False Belief p.395.
2. Phronesis 1969 p.111-22 Perception, True Opinion and 
Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus.
and the second rests on the Impossibility of "thinking 
not one thing," So historically speaking, their role in 
the argument is initial - the sophistic shocks, the out­
rageously "logical" 3^|l%tr)AptioifLhat we are almost sure 
we know. The two prongs of the sophistic attack are that 
if I know two things, I cannot make a mistake about either, 
and if I know one thing, then I make a mistake about nothing. 
It seems a solution that I must have two objects, and two 
modes of relation to them.
The following argument introduces the notion of logos; 
and seems to take up the calculating, comparing strand in 
doxa we noticed at I85 ff.
The sentence that follows the completion of the 
sophistical proofs has an emphasis that is difficult to 
catch.
189 b 12. ^
éc^Ktv
Alio do xi a has been prepared for by 188 b 4 where 
thinking falsely is said to be thinking things are something
3
else. The new idea is the last half of the sentence - that 
this exchange is made in the mind. Theaetetus takes it to 
be specifically a matter of mental opinion, because his mind 
leaps to ethical questions. A man is mistaken when he thinks 
that base things are good that is when a man really opines 
falsely. Socrates forbears to make dialectical capital out
3 . F o r  th e  change
of the apparent contradiction (really - falsely), and concentrates 
on the fact that it is impossible in dianoia to lay down that a 
thing is not itself but something else. Doxa, says Socrates, 
is something you get after the debate is over - the mind which 
knows both has made a choice; that choice is embodied in the
doxa. (190 a ^  d |. Doxa is not so much
a speeach as a spoken decision made to oneself silently. In
the light of this notion, Theaetetus must revise his remarks,
which were careless.
If the man coming up the path is not Socrates, and I mistake
him for Socrates, then I misidentify an object. But the mistake
in doxa is not made until I say to myself "The man coming up
the path is Socrates" or vice versa. In these circumstances
I make a mistake about two objects. A necessary condition of
ray mistake is that I put two things together to make a statement
about them. Now when Socrates refers to synapais, or tying
together, at 195 d, he does not restrict the operation of tying
to a mental process linking aesthesis and doxa. Synapsis is
itself a wide ranging motif in later Platonic philosophy.
It corresponds to a sort of clever technical philosophical
device (cf 195 d 2 co { T ( ^  F? The
joining is probably the joining of the two parts that are
5
necessary to the smallest statement, of truth and error, 
though what these parts are is left unspecified. There is no 
attempt to describe an "atomic sentence" comprised of reference 
and description, subject and predicate or noun and verb. The 
first essential is that what is true or false should be an 
opinion, doxa, or statement.
4. Soph. 238b; 2 38c; 238b etc.
5. Ackrill p.392; cf Prauss p.60.
Theaetetus agrees that there are certain things a man 
cannot say to himself - that the fine is base, the unjust 
just - the odd is altogether even, the ox is a horse^ and 
the two one. No distinction can be meant here between 
necessary and contingent truths - they are all concepts.
Nor are they chosen because it is peculiarly difficult to 
conquer a human prejudice believing such things.
Taking the standard impossible belief to be "that the
fine is base," we get the following possibilities about what 
it could mean:
(l) there is nothing fine that cannot be bad.
This is a statement of the denial of the Foim of Fine,
or else the denial that anything can be said to befine without 
regard to circumstances. As such it is not a belief formed by 
ordinary mental processes but an important dialectical belief.
(11) fine is the same as bad: nothing is more fine than bad. 
This is a statement of immoraiism. Plato may believe that 
no-onie has ever said to himself, only to others. But it has been 
said, and Plato himself is more than ready to accuse others of 
saying it.
(111) fine is had.
This is a straight contradiction, and presumably cannot 
be made to oneself. Fine is fine, and base is base. No fine 
thing is completely bad — for there is an irreducible opposition. 
Nor Can I ever persuade myself that even is completely, in 
every way, uneven. It is the basic principle of dialectic — 
that genuine contradictions cannot be brooked.
6 . Philebus 15B; Theaet 195 d.
The doxai are reached after argument (peithein 190 b 5» 
ananke 190 e 2) . To emphasise that sensation plays no part 
in the formation of this sort of doxa, we are shown doxa in­
variant under conditions of sleep, illness and insanity. For 
doxa in its pure state is not subject to these bodily disturb­
ances. Theaetetus' easy proof of error falls through: to make 
a mistake it is not enough to be wrong about something. There 
has to be sufficient reason (Robinson op.cit.p). To make a 
false statement about good andbad one must have some sort of 
knowledge that they are different. The good and bad distinction 
would form the first step in thinking about what course of 
action in the 'outside' world is good etc. Plato has begun 
at the beginning. But why after a right beginning do we go 
wrong? The point is dialectical.
The Wax Tablet is introduced not as a model of perception 
but as a model of 'learning more'. The notion of learning seems 
a hopeful model to Socrates because a man can learn what he 
does not know, first one thing then another (^T^oV 
The model of learning chosen is that of getting something from 
the outside: and this is very much what happens in the explan­
ation of error. Error never comes unless provoked from the
outside by aesthesis. Of characteristics specifically belonging
8 .
to memory it introduces remembering and forgetting, ana
9
differences of quality between persons. But the imperfection 
of psychological processes do not seem to be enough for Plato, 
lie insists that the "cause" of error lies in the two-level 
structure. It is only in the switch from one level to the 
other that mistakes occur. Bln>t nothing is mentioned about
7. There might be a
8. 191 d 8; 188 a2f
9. 191 c 10; 194 cff.
pun here CCr^ O\^  (f
; 198 d 6. ' /
o r ?
the confusion of two memories or of two sensations. This may 
be simple remissness, or a mistake due to the model, as Ackrill 
suggests. But it may be that only in making statement A B where 
A, B belong to different levels is the factor brought into 
play that Plato emphasises - aesthesis. It is aesthesis as 
usual that causes error. Two aestheses cannot malce an error 
because they are not a doxa. Thus aesthesis can only produce 
error in the process of (Wbrming a doxa i.e. by being a 
sufficient reason for its being arrived at.
It is important to note that the Wax Tablet may not be 
quite the mechanical theory of the acquisition of knowledge, 
that it became one later. In Plato recording on the memory 
slab may be voluntary. One can record whatever one sees, or 
whatever one spontaneously conceives. But the process of 
recording is a special one - like sealing with a signet ring, 
a sort of registration - so that the impression lasts and is as 
clear as possible. In any case registration is in some way 
selective. Now obviously we are not given here a perception 
theory in which knowledge depends on the strength or liveliness 
of an impression, the point being that any impression can 
congeal into knowledge of some sort. Typically in Plato the 
contents of memory are already knowledge, as in Cap.111, and 
knowledge is not continuous with sensation. The innovation of
10. 191 d 4; 191 d 9.
the Wax Tablet is •'f'f^ suggestiekthat a certain sort of memory can. 
lead to mistakes* But Plato shifts the blame from memory one 
rung down^mainly to memory of what has been perceived, though 
it is also possible that our memory of what has been conceived 
may fade* Nowhere does he deal with the question of how I get 
my knowledge of Theaetetus in the first place* . l/othing can 
get into my memory unless it has undergone something very like 
registration as knowledge* For instancé, my sight of Theaetetus 
is registered as a sight of Theaetetus. and this entails knowledge 
My knowledge of Theaetetus is not affected by subsequent mis­
takes caused by sensation because my knowledge of him is not the 
same as my memory of him* I have knowledge of him once for all - 
that he exists or has existed; but any ongoing or additional 
knowledge of him is affected by the fact that it comes from 
sensation*
For example, my knowledge of (or ability to recognise) 
Theaetetus is not quite knowledge by rememb fan ce of what he 
looks like. I have, in addition, if you like, knowledge of 
Theaetetus the individual, with a history and a nature, man etc*
At some point, my impressions have been doctored in order to 
make them knowledge; or else the source of my knowledge is not 
a sensation* Both alternatives seem possible for Plato* But 
he seems to differ from the Humean analysis of individuals in 
that some distinction is made between knowledge and a con­
glomeration of impressions* My full memory of Theaetetus is 
not the memory of the sight or sound of Theaetetus, but of a 
sight, that it is the sight of Theaetetus. Now if I hear what 
I imagine to be the voice of Theaetetus (l92d ^
do I fit my auditory sensation to 
the memory of the auditory sensation ofTheaetetus* voice? or 
to the knowledge of memory of Theaetetus? My mistake 
because I fit it to the memory of the auditory sensation of
Theaetetus but not to my memory of or knowledge of Theaetetus.
The model used does not explicitly tell me how I got my know­
ledge of Theaetetus in the first place. Its main purpose seems 
to be bringing out a distinction of type between my knowledge 
and my sensation, in which knowledge plays the role of a form, 
and the remembered sensation the role of a particular or image.
T0/j^  possible interpretations present themselves if this is 
meant to be an analysis of a real error - the sort of thing that 
happens everyday.
(1) The deliberative error is the stalker's error: if I am 
tracking a man and mistake a movement in the bushes for a horse 
when it is really a man taking aim at me, then my error may 
come underthe Wax Tablet. The movement in the bush is a 
sensation for me but is not a man and does not look like a 
horse. So when I think that Theaetetus is Theodorus it may
be because some perceived sign has led me to confuse the where­
abouts of the two. Against this it can be urged that Plato 
specifies that I must have sense knowledge of Theaetetus and/or 
Theodorus, by which he means specific sens e-knowledge i.e. I 
must confuse the look of Theodorus with the look of Theaetetus, 
which is
(2) In the daydreamer's error a man sees a horse which is 
confused in his sight with the look of a pig. The error is 
entirely due to having perhaps on one's retina and memory 
the image of a horse and in one's memory the image of a man.
Bad memory-stuff does the rest. But this is surely an outlandish 
solution, for an error which leads one to look again to see 
whether I really did see a pig or a horse. (A third error, in 
which I make a mistake through having the memory of Theaetetus' 
voice about a taperecorder next door is rare).
Now I suggest Plato is interested, in durable error rather 
than in case (2) » His interest in doxa explains his interest 
in durable error, but he assumes something very like (2) to be 
at the root of it. If this is so, then it is some confirmation 
that Plato is working with and ^ recapitulating his own past 
diagnoses of error. For in the Wax Tablet, there is only one 
knowledge, which is unaffected by sensation as far as the model 
tells us. Similarly there is only one memory trace, and a linkage 
between the pair. Error enters because of the weaker partner.
As a device for showing how aesthesis is responsible for error 
even in doxa, it illustrates the stage of dialectic subsequent 
upon the agreement that the true opposites are separate - the 
conceptualisation stage, the fixing of objects, when the forms are 
stamped and left untouched by questions about particulars. But 
because my 'total* knowledge of Theaetetus consists in this instance 
of the analogues of Form and image, then the statement, or pro­
cedure, or the confrontation of the two sens e-images, is subject 
to error. This sort of mistake would be common in dialectic; and 
an obvious extension of Plato's notion of the unreliability of 
the world of appearances. But as a mistaken doxa or the cause of 
a mistaken doxa, it is surely not very common.
In any case a new model is needed - the "techne" model of 
learning, which covers both knowledge of aidthmetic and the rather 
common fact that mistakes are made in arithmetic. Here no eikon 
can be to blame. Also there is not much difference between 
knowledge of an object and the knowledge of a proposition^ for 
discrete propositions like "Six is even" or "Six is sevenish" can 
quite easily be thought of as objects one grasps; and if one grasps 
an object, it can be thought of as a bundle of propositions. As 
Plato is describing here, the distinction for our puiposes is not 
crucial. Our point is simply that the methods of dialectic to date 
share in the general aporia of the Theatetus.
1 7. cf. Pp. 534 c5; Theaet. 197 c6; 197 bf. Crombie II p.121.
As a counter, I count heads and get them wrong possibly because 
of aesthesis* I also compile in my head through the science of 
arithmetic - and this is what interests Plato - a mistake in a 
competent technician* A reader is also a technician and makes 
mistakes, and it is obvious readers* mistakes do not occur in the 
absence of letters seen on the page. But the letters are not the 
source of the error, for the error is somewhere in the manner of 
use of techne. Furthermore it is a frequent error. The recovery 
of knowledge by the mathematician is not a recollection the opposite 
of which is a forgetting; for recollection and forgetting could only 
be said of him if the recollection of 6 or 7 were an extraordinary 
and not a routine event, and if he forgets the knowledge instead of 
merely leaving it unapplied, whenever he makes the mistake* He 
does not even say to himself *6 is 7* in so man y words.
Now reading, as far as we can tell, was taught through tables 
of syllables, whether used syllables or not, as ins ab, cab, dab, 
fab which were leamed by heart. A similar list this time of 
single numbers only and not in combination was learned by arith­
meticians* But the true arithmetician went on to leam the qualities 
of numbers, audit was his knowledge of the qusilities of numbers
e.g. ratio, or the tetractys, or the properties of evenness that
18
distinguished him from the counter (logistikos) *
Having learned in this manner and still in a sense remembering
the rule, the technician gets things wrong*^^ It is usually thought
that the distinction made is between dispositional and other knowledge. 
20Crombie suggests that it ought to be a distinction between knowing
18* Marro^ H.I.s L*Histoire de L*Education dans l'Antiquité* 1950 
p.212f; 2l8f; 247f; but dates are lacking,
19* Contrast the views of Ryle: Letters and Syllables in Plat Phil*
Rev. 960 p.431-51 ; answered by Gallop D. Phil.Rev. 19^3 p.364-76*
20. Crombie 11; 121; Ackrill 1966 p*402*
S X knowing all about S. Hackforth peoples the mind with
i/^ \/ | U j P w h i c h  it cannot c o u n t B u t  what we are
told is that the technician makes a mistake about,or does not have
to hand, the knowledge of how much a number is, which is distinct 
21from counting. The case Plato envisages is a case of having been 
taught (or at least having discovered) the properties of a number, 
namely that it bears a relation to 5, 6 and 5 + 6.
Somehow the new machinery makes it easier to understand how 
one arrives at such false beliefs.
It makes the "leamed error" clearer - there are some mistakes 
one has to be clever to make. But the supposition that one makes 
a mistake because one knows too much is only good psychology, not 
good philosophy. Thus we meet again our initial difficulty about , 
mistakes - I make, impossibly, a mistake about A & B, both of which 
I know ex hypothesis. Theaetetus introduces "bits of ignorance" - 
about which we know nothing except that their introduction is 
commonsensical but irrelevant to the issue. It remains true that 
I choose ignorance Intthe.ipresence of knowledge. Commentators have 
tried to work out a feasible theory for Theaetetus by themselves 
capturing more birds for the Aviary. There might be birds flying 
round to the effect that 6 + 5 = 12; or there might be a bird 6 + 5 
which teams up with 12, the possibilities are endless. None of the 
suggestions can be substantiated and Plato tells us any theory 
isomorphic to Theaetetus theory is wrong. It is possible theJ^  
Theaetetus is merely making a commonsense objection to Socrates* 
disproof of the Aviary theory; and Socrates shows that his disproof 
still applies. The objection seems to serve to bring out the sense 
of Socrates* original difficulty.
20. Mnemosyne 1957. ad 197dff. Notes on Plato's Theaetetus, Hackforth
21. For ontological mathematics, Lasserre, F p. 43-62.
a s r f .
Comford toys with the idea of complex birds, but thinks
that Plato did not recognise the possibility because he was
milled by the form *12(the number we are seeking) is 11 (the
\ 22number we lay hold of) * Ackrill rejects complex birds on the
grounds that they do not help - in order to understand the
"command for" a certain bird one must first have the bird in 
23hand. Lewis suggests: "The idea that the bird catcher has 
correctly summed 5 and 7 before (his ) he enters his Aviary
suggests that he has a mastery oj^  12 independently of the Aviary. 
It is this mastery which he must employ in claiming that a 
certain bird represents a certain number. It is a belief about 
the representations in his Aviary, and not something the Aviary 
itself must or can represent. He points out that Plato gives
his attention in the Aviary to only (b) of
(a) He believes that 5 and 7 are 11.
(b) He believes that 11 is 12.
(b) is an example of virtual, though not of a psychological 
b e l i e f . W e  pointed this out above with regard to the belief 
that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Now no competence is required at 
separating description from reference (which commentators agree 
Plato does not have) if all the Aviary produces is the answer to 
the question *what is 12* or *what is 6 * 5 * ? The supposition 
Theaetetus and Socrates make is that the number of numbers, and
their strange groupings - gregarious or solitary - are responsible
for the wrong answer.
22. Plato*s Theory of Knowledge 1935 p.138*
23. 1966 401f.
24. ’Foul Play in Plato’s Aviary* p.276 in Exegesis and Argu ment 
Studies., presented to Gregory VIastos, 1973 pp.262-84.
2 5 . op.cit 2 6 7, 2 6 9.
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This supposition, of course, is absurd. The presence of ignorances 
cannot affect the issue either, because ex hypothesi, the man knows 
what he is doing. So what is the advantage of the Aviary over the
Wax Tablet? The advantage partly is that the Aviary covers errors
not covered by the Wax Tablet, though little is made of the dist­
inction between the two types of error - in empirical and necessary 
truths. Second, the Aviary "Knowledges" are all members of the 
same category, have (unlike Forms and particulars) certain horizontal 
legimate relations between congeners. But the fluttering in the 
Aviary, so like a dream, makes it difficult to establish these
relations; or to get ready for the cooking pot the bird one bought
last week. One cannot be sure of one's bird until one has it out­
side the Aviary, in one's hand.
Again the model Plato uses is more appropriate to learning 
rather than to thinking. Just as the Sophists' pupils carry away 
purchases - food - in their s o u l s , s o  the arithmetician carried 
away purchases - food - in his mind: only this time the food is a 
bird and therefore bought live. When the arithmetician comes to 
use the bird, he must recapture it, and if he cannot, Socrates says 
sternly, then he does not know what he has bought. Plato knows that 
this is an inadequate model even of correct learning, and he 
probably uses it to show its deficiencies.
The behaviour of the birds reminds me not of memories, or
27thoughts, but of hypothesfs fluttering in dialectic when they 
are not bound by knowledge. McDowell^^ and Prauss^^ take it that 
the passage is a correction of the theory of Anamnesis.
2 6 . Protagoras 3,13c; 3l4a; Sophist 223 cff.
2 8 . f973 p.222f I ’ ' ^
2 9 . 1966 p.152ff.
In Anamnesis we get a correct remembrance: in the Theaetetus we get 
erroneous remembrance. But I find it difficult to believe Plato 
would have chosen this particular metaphor to correct they theory 
of Anamnesis. Anamnesis corrected this particular theory of 
learning in the first place. Nor was Anamnesis a theory about 
individual memories, but about the essential difference between 
knowledge and belief. The process of Anamnesis was dialectical: 
and its antithesis is the imparting of knowledge in ordinary 
teaching situations. But the connection between the Meno and 
Theaetetus is a strong one because they both insist that one must 
know what a thing is before one can claim to know it at all 
At this juncture both the Meno and the Theaetetus offer a 
hypothesis.
It is now becoming clearer what the "dialectical" method is 
in the discussion of False Belief in the Theaetetus. We begin 
by ruling out a possibility that Socrates knows only too well is 
true - namely, that I think I know what I do not know (l88c). 
Socrates spent hours convincing people that they often think 
they know what they do not know. But his means of doing so was 
indirect: if you know this, you can tell me - but you are playing 
with me, you won't tell me. In other words the assumption is 
always made that the interlocutor knows. Precisely the same
29
assumption is made in the Theaetetus and it is never retracted.
Now the assumption is first made in arguments in which it is
30possible to have only knowledge or not knowledge. Obviously
this is not a satisfactory description of the human condition, and
31
Plato long ago invented an intermediate state, doxa.
28. Theaet, I96d 5ff.
2 9 . 189 e6; 192 a2; 200 a5*
3 0 . 188 c2. -
31. ■
The allodoxia section arises naturally from the 
preceding section I85 ff, in which the role of doxa is 
though of as comparing. response to the sophistic
shock, the working assumptions of the interlocutor are 
made clearer. These are assumptions about doxa - that 
it is about judgments of beauty etc: - that came from 
Theaetetus: and assumption that came from Socrates - that 
it shares the nature of logos. The logos is taken both 
as a string, a combination, of objects; and as a description/ 
of statements made in dialectic. The interlocutor is asked 
to remember, or recall in himself, that it would be impossible 
for him to say to himself the fine is bad. The remedy for 
the sophistical shock is once again the examination of one's 
own beliefs - but this time, of course, with some logical 
force to back them up. The failure of these assumptions,
time, gives rise to a feeling of aporia - genuine 
shame ( 191) •
But as yet in the first two arguments none of the distinctive
properties of doxa has been used. We are given two sophistical 
or dialectical standard arguments: 'either you know it or not' 
and 'either it is or it is not'. The effect of the two arguments 
is to shock. A sort of definition emerges - from the preceding 
arguments it is clear that we think error is some form of allodoxia 
and it must occur in dianosa. Theaetetus misunderstands his own 
point: the question is not whether some doxai are mistaken, but 
how any mistaken doxa can ever be formed. For no one errs willingly, 
and a doxa is the end of a process. No one who knows the things 
he is forming a doxa about can make a mistake: look at the traditional 
first questions of dialectic surely a guide to what happens in the 
formation of doxa. Theaetetus makes a simple dialectical mistake 
(189 c?) which is corrected in the succeeding argument.
Now the sort of definition that has emerged is not pointed: 
it is already implicit in the discussion with Theaetetus. Socrates' 
first care has been to make it explicit and to fix its meaning.
He purifies it of its more obviously undesirable consequences - 
by asking the questions general at the beginning of an elenchus, 
but with greater indirection, and therefore more specifically.
Instead of asking is there «ffae beautiful'? Do you say there is 
such a thing a beauty? - he goes straight to the point: do you 
recognise that beauty and ugliness are distinct and opposite.
Only in the event of the correct answer to this question is dialectic, 
and now it seems, doxa possible. Such (j^ceptual errors cannot be 
made. The form of the argument between Socrates and Theaetetus is 
itself simply a question: do you accept,. as a preliminary? It 
calls on Theaetetus to examine his own thoughts in response to 
as in the Phaedo (190 b2 Theaet).
The third stage of the dialectic still does not rise to 
the positing of a statement but the examination of a possible case:
5 ^  ^O/co (191 c8) - means: consider the following
31as a m o d e l . _____________ ___
31. for similar practice e.g. . 53^ 6.3*
The Wax Tablet following is a metaphor or image ) • Having
introduced the notion, the pair return to the beginning distinguish 
the ways of knowing de novo (l92 al). The argument invokes a 
distinction between memory standing for knowledge, and aesthesis 
standing for, let us say, particulars or events. The argument is 
a set of consequences of that distinction; and the fault of 
"ordinary" doxa which it diagnoses simply consist s'*igno ring that 
distinction. Keeping thetwo realms open is the natural consequence 
our agreement about beauty and ugliness and part of dialectic. As 
the eristic says : we do not think horse is r man or ; man ‘ 
horse unless some sense evidence has intervened (195 d6) - but this 
absurdity is not a very likely mistake to occur in a visual machine. 
The Wax Tablet is not a machine. We are dealing with the consequences 
of dialectical positions.
The fourth section of the proof seems to me almost certainly 
the hypothetical stage: first the distinction is made between knowing 
what a thing is, and knowing what it is like { TT . oi~
r !  aoriUr!
196 d5) . This is a truly shameful situation (Cap.1l) and we should 
revise our position accordingly. The sophistical way out is simply 
to omit those things we do not know - which would leave Socrates, 
who knows nothing, quite silent. But his way out is to tell us
-Xc and this is a help for us - T, ) •
This is precisely the way in which the hypothesis was int<roxiuced in 
the Meno,^^ So, too, the hypothesis is adopted and posited con­
sciously, without Socrates* committing himself to it, from a store 
of heard maxims (l97 aS) •
33. 197 a6; 198 d7; 200 c2.
32. Meno 86 el; 87 a2; 87 b5*
2 4 T-
A correctly made distinction between two concepts is introduced# 
Finding the hypothesis is an active search. The hypothesis and 
the thoughts of the mathematician have been inculcated from outside: 
once inside they jostle alarmingly, and though one knows what one 
means, it never seems to be the right hypothesis one has siezed.^^^ 
For all these reasons it seems to me that the ties of the Theaetetus 
passage are stronger with the hypothesis passage of the Meno than 
with the Recollection; and just as I can find no evidence of con­
tradiction between the doctrine of Recollection and the Theaetetus,
I can find no evidence of contradiction between the two hypothesis - 
sections. But it can hardly be denied that they are different; and 
I suggest that the relation between them is one of supersession 
rather than correction. The earlier doctrineiare true - as far as 
they go, but they do not go far enough.
The dialectical experience the section represents is the 
experience of not being able to put forward quite the right 
hypothesis. Under the art of the dialectician, the apparently 
acceptable hypothesis changes, moves, behaves like one of the birds# 
At the same time, one cannot tell until after the dialectic whether 
or not the hypothesis one put forward is correct or not. So, one 
suspects, the thinker cannot tell which bird he has caught until too 
late when the bird is already outside the Aviary. The fluttering of 
hypothesis and birds is necessary to the identification of them. 
Having identified the wrong hypotheses, one puts back the bird.
When the arche is discovered, the fluttering stops and progress 
can be made.
34. 198 d 2 ,
34a, Supra, note 27*
2 4 2  S
The final disproof (200 aff) again depends on the claim to 
knowledge. If this claim is not made, then the disproof fails.
But any man who has arrived at a doxa has claimed knowledge.
Howbeit Socrates claims to know nothing - ostentatiously in th$S 
Theaetetus* brain children are stillborn. Even the examination 
of Theaetetus* mind in virtue of which he has assumed that most 
of his opinions are true, or appropriate, or timely, is devoid of 
knowledge. We all have minds and Theaetetus* mind stands in for 
all of us. In none of our minds can we find knowledge without the 
logos, which, one suspects, is an external science. Knowledge is 
not the outcome of a natural piucess, but a technical matter,' 
without dialectical skill, no opinion stands or yields its meaning 
The dialectical skill mentioned is probably at a special juncture 
in its history which we may guess at by comparison with the 
Parmenides and the Sophist.
At Theaetetus 199 ©7 Socrates praises (and it appears quite
genuinely praises) Theaetetus for the suggestion that contains
pieces of ignorance. What these are is not clear, but if they are
pieces of psychological ignorances, false ideas in the modem sense,
it is difficult to see why Theaetetus should earn so much praise for
the suggestion. But if the point is about the method of dialectic,
then the honourable mention is more deserved. For Parmenides
recommends that as well as considering it is (or it is F) one should
consider the problem it is not (or it is not F) • The statement to
be discussed splits into two. So in the Sophist we are told to
keep to the right hand side of our disions (264 elOff) ; and only
by dint of a succession of right choices will we get to the single
physis. "Theaetetus is flying", a false opinion, is a choice from
35the wrong side of the division.
35» St enz el-All an p.127f<*
2 q -
Now in a less intentionally absurd example - say a choice between 
Socratic instruction and Sophistical or false Socratic instruction - 
making the choice from the wrong side of the division is a frequent 
error. Only by holding to the principles under which the choice is 
made, or to criteria that cut across the similarity, will we manage 
to avoid the mistake. So Theaetetus touches on these technical 
matters of dialectic; Dialectician is always faced with a decision 
between being and not being, a choice between two possibly definite
f'
objects, like Sophisty and Socraticism; or between mathematical 
statements. "Six is even", "Six is not even", which are aldo 
definite. What Theaetetus is reco nun ending, then, is that Socrates 
should show some awareness of dialectic as a method - a method which 
can be applied in one shape or other to all deliberations. This 
explanation seems preferable to the alternative, which is that 
Theaetetus is praised simply for sticking so determinedly to the 
possibility of error.
Thus Plato finishes his examination of the dialectical 
situation. Mind which had been jp, placed^ "recollection" (l use the 
word as a passing pun) from which truth entered dialectic has now 
been explored. The structures found in it are really dialectical 
structures, and they have the same faults and as their
analogues. The result is to make the mind more mechanical. As 
Plato develops a doctrine more adequate to distinctively psycho­
logical events, mind becomes more obviously an unreliable base for 
dialectic. So far the structure given to mind has been relevant 
to the argument of the discussion; but in the Philebus, the mind 
is given a mechanical, passive structure which is used for everyday 
acts of perception.
Z i t  ■
The weighty structure seems to be crushing a butterfly.
It is not surprising then, that Mind in the Philebus is 
reduced to being that fertile source of error, a book^^ and a 
picture book at that. The resources of mind are addressed to 
a problem expressly excluded from the Republic disaussion.^^
The dialectical theory turns up in its entirety - the need to
38 3Q 40decide an issue,^ to ask oneself^^ what a thing is to form
4 ^a silent doxa, béiit with a stronger tendency towards the
automatic^^, However, Plato is dealing with pleasure and therefore
with habit. The writing on the mind and the painting of pictures
is not a passive matter, in which the man is helpless under the
action of his environment. For through his moral choices the man
is making himself and his mind - again there is no real mechanism,
and no real conflict with the Theaetetus. But having in the
Theaetetus and Sophist once elaborated machinery for the purpose
of a specific problem Plato finds it easy to transfer the machinery
wholesale, or streamlined, to another problem. In the context of
the second problem many details will seem to be unnecessary, and
give the impression of being elements of an independently existing
die trine,' or it may be something in the invented machinery itself
that appeals to Plato. The resulting "doctrine" may look so complete,
so elaborate and so distinctively pi atonic a way of looking at mind
that the doctrine or metaphor may give the impression of being the
results of an examination of the processes of mind and emotion for
their own sake. But it should be remembered that the source of the
machinery and the problem is more often dialectical than psychological
or epistemological; and the machinery is therefore more than the result
of an analysis of "the problem of perception" or "the problem of
knowledge".
52' b6; Phil. 38 c5.
38. 38c 6.
39. 38c 8.
40. 38c12
41. 38e 2.
42. 39 ai ; 39 b6; 39 blO; 39 82.
Many of its more bizarre features seem to find their place given 
a properly dialectical backdrop.
The problem of error is solved only in the Sophist, with the 
solution of the problem of being and not-being, to which Plato 
thinks it is a rider. The warrant of inference from the solution 
of the problem of not-being to the solution of the problem of 
error is analogical - etc.^^* The
solution of the second problem depends on the same logical 
principles as the first. A deeper connection between the two 
problems is likely. For error, to Plato, is not a wrong move in 
a game, or the misuse of concepts, or the misapplication of 
conventional rules : none of these is more than a possible necessary 
condition of error. For him a statement about error is at bottom
t
as objective, as-logical, a statement as a statement as about 
knowledge; and in the sense that psychology and method are irrelevemt 
to the latter, so^  they are irrelevant to the former. We are used 
to working on the assunç)tion that knowledge exists; Plato shows us 
that the same sort of existence should be attributed to error.
A man has a reason for being in error. Just as the man who 
knows is able to give an explanation so the man in error can give 
an explanation, not of why he is in error, but of what his doxa 
is. From this is extracted some sort of statement about what the 
world would be like in which the doxa would be true; and such a 
world is examined. But to be without either a true doxa or a false 
doxa is an impossible achievement for anyone.
42a. Soph. 263 e 3ff.
CHAPTER V. ORIGINS OF DIALECTIC
Socratic dialectic has been credited to different originators by
different investigators. The most recent lists of likely candidates 
1 2are found in Ryle and Gulley , w h o t h a t  the question of origin may 
be a double one:
(a) Whence came the method of question and answer?
(b) Whence came the elenchus?
Ryle appears to think that the whole method, comprising both (a) and (b) 
was in existence before Socrates (p.127)^while Gulley gives Plato (or 
Socrates) the credit for the proportions of the mixture - which amounts 
to a fresh method. Both agree however that "eristic" refers to a method 
existing independently of Plato, though Gulley dcyfag^ it after Plato’s 
invention of "Socratic" dialectic. Others link this independent method 
with Elea or Mega^^. Sidgwick^ thought the method described in e.g. the 
Euthydemus originated entirely with Socrates and Robinson, correctly noting 
that "dialectic" changes its meaning over the years says : "The fact is that 
the word 'dialectic* had a strong tendency in Plato to mean 'the ideal 
method, whatever that may be...*^  Of eristic, he says: "Plato does not
imply that there were any persons who accepted the title of 'eristic* or
'antilogician' as their natural and proper designation ..." though 
that Plato's text is compatible with this assumption. It will be contended 
that Robinson is largely right; but as he has neglected^ to^uho-A^ the argu­
ments brought forward by opponents using both Platonic and extra Platonic 
texts, the case merits further investigation. For what Plato means by 
dialectic is peculiar to him; but this must not biind us to the possibility
1. 1966. 2. 1969.
3. Guthrie 178 n.l; Taylor I 92 ff; Gomperz (T) 163 f; 209f; Peck 1952, CQ
39; 43; 56. ct. Gulley p.26; Grote 1884 p.174 Vol(Viii); 171; Burnet
1968 p.192.
4. Journal of Philology IV 288-306, p.298; V p.66-80.
5. I p.70.
7. e.g. I p.91.
■2?/.
that he may be adapting an outside method. In any case, as we shall see, 
he has to make his new method intelligible in terms of already existing 
rhetorical methods. A re-examination will bring out the roundness of the 
Platonic method which Robinson seems to neglej^
Plato and Aristotle expressly attribute dialectic to Eleaticism, or
g
at least to Zeno . But some commentators claim that Plato diows us 
Protagoras is responsible for both (a) and (b). Their arguments are based 
in part on extra-Platonic material. As we claim that their interpretation 
rests on a distortion of the texts, we first investigate the "Protagoras" 
of Plato, and afterwards investigate whether the extra-Platonic material 
is strong enough to stand upjon its own. The case is argued most plausibly
9
by Gomperz and most provocatively by Ryle.
Gomperz gives three passages of the "Protagoras" which taken 
cumulatively he claims attribute a reputation for dialectical ability 
to the Grand Old Man. At 320C Protagoras says : ^
Gomperz (128) paraphrases : ober durch Vortrag eines Mythos tun solle, 
Oder integrundender Auseinandersetzung. We allow 'Mythos*but
^ s i m p l y  means "going through the argument in 
argument, or in "reasoning" prose as opposed to heightend- -^ «etional
prose (cf 329 C 6).
cé" oCi^^Çpce^l
(It is followed by a formulaic elenchus).
This with C Gomperz takes to imply that it is common knowledge Protagoras 
makes a boast of his mastery of many genres, among which is dialectic.
A strange expression. Guthrie translates "(the faculty) of waiting and 
listening to the answer". But Protagoras is not being asked to listen 
to Socrates* answer, but himself to give the answers briefly. The usual 
phrase for dialectic is CP/
(Rp.531e; Phaedo 95d; Ptgs.336c). Two examples of development in the 
direction of our phrase are Theaet. 179e9 C W
and Charnvl56c where accepting the logos means raising no objections.
Now B either refers to a fully developed dialectical situation which this
8. DK 19A1; Soph.216 a ff; Phdr. 261 d 6 ff:
9. G.pl28; R.p.ll3. 10. e.g. Burnet ad Phdo 6164 (fact/fiction), Adam^d loc.
is one of the necessary qualities; or it refers simply the Art of Conversation, 
in which we rather hope for an interlocutor who will listen to our answers 
and with whom conversation will be consecutive; or it refers to dialectic for 
Socrates, and the Art of Conversation to Protagoras. A Socratic conversation 
is being offered. Ironically Socrates describes his own quality of fixing 
on the answers while eliciting a display of Protagoras' ability to answer 
briefly. The meat is in the middle: fctÎA * The phrase shows
that though Protagoras may not have understood dialectical implications, 
he did understand the phrase to refer to a special sort of method and not 
simply to conversation. As we see below, Socrates changes the meaning of 
this phrase too.
OC O é f^ T ' . This can hardly imply that
Protagoras invented"what is given to few". He credited with the ability of
discussing without being disputatiott^ . Most of Socrates' interlocutors who
are ready to discuss are in some way eristical or contradictiofcfe. Protagoras
is praised for not being an eristic. He does not practise the method of
dialectic in a non-Platonic way: he does not practise it at all
The presence of the phrase in caput VIII of the Dis soi Logoi shows that
11 ,brevity is a virtue of the time. But its use here is more comprehensible 
by comparison with the Gorgias, where brevity is an issue from the beginning 
(448 a 5; 448 c; 449). Gorgias, too, can speak long and short (449 b 5 f; 
449 c). But both Chaerephon and Socrates have to explain what is meant by 
'speaking short'. The reply "the finest art" is not short enough (448e). 
"Yes" and "no" are beautifully short (449 d 5) but this is ironically 
( ) . Socrates is quite prepared to accept an antithetical answer
from Gorgias that shows little improvement in rhetorical brevity over Polus'
11. See section on that work infra.
contributions but a great deal of improvement in the direction of
intelligent definition (450 b 6 f - 448 c 4 f). Before we get to the
definition (453) there are two long speeches from Socrates and some
rhetoric from Gorgias without a murmur on either side (451; 452; 452e).
A similar situation obtains in the Protagoras: length of reply is not
really important, but the simplicity of the generalisation given in reply 
12
is important , both for Socrates and in the medical writings. Formulae
of summary are also common in Isocrates,* for both to the rhetorician and
the philosopher such summary generalisations are invaluable, but for
different reasons. Plato himself seems to parody too literal an
interpretation of his demand for brevity at 342 e ff - the Laconic brevity
13of the early Sages, which he is critical of elsewhere . I cannot find 
any rhetorical tradition before Plato in which this sort of brevity is 
praised. But it was practised; and there was a dispute about the correct 
length of speeches, instanced by the speech of Hippias^^ calling for
n 15
\ 0 \ / ^ 4  , by a passage of the Phaedrus, where the same
sentiment is attributed to Prodicus and by Aristotle^^, where the sentiment 
could have arisen from Aristotle's own feeling for the Golden Mean, These 
are rhetorical contexts; but though they may indicate that the length of a 
speech was a matter for discussion and gibe, the passages do not prove a 
desire for originated with rhetoricians. It is worth noting,
too, that Gorgias and Protagoras feel speaking long and speaking short are 
part of the same general ability: they are speakers for all season,s
The language of AB probably refers to a rhetoriciccn's or a J^ avant's 
virtuoso abilities in conversation. Protagoras can give genuine straight­
forward information (the opposite of this is to make a (\o
12. See Caput IV p.
13. Prot. 342 e 2 f; Charm. 164 e 6; Theaet. 180 a 4.
14. Ptgs. 338 b 1.
15. Phdr. 267 b 5.
16. Rhetoric III 16; 1416 b 35.
17. cf. Horace, Ars Poet. I 26;, Arist. Ars Rhet. 1414 a 25; ^dermacher XXV _
which hé could have mcommended brevity in thein
of something); and outside the framework of an
^ ^  'f 1 8
. Sidgwick doubted that Protagoras had any mastery of dialectic
because of his subsequent performance^^. But the fact is that Protagoras
shows a greater mastery of logic than Socrates does (on the surface) .
He defends the principles of correct conversion, ambiguity, and responsible 
21
judg ment . He assumes the right to judge argument here and in the 
22
Theaetetus. But it is clear that these are points of clash between the 
old and the new. Underlying Socrates' outrageous behaviour is logical/ 
dialectical theory foreign to Protagoras. We note in passing that Protagoras
A*
shows Eleatic features in this work; and that Socrates is already making 
philosophical points disguised in ordinary language.
Our conclusions are the same for C (334 e 4 ff) which is used by 
Gomperz and D (336 b 6 ff) which is used only by Ryle (p.115).
Socrates needles Protagoras with Protagoras' own reputation. He can 
teach long and short speaking and can give the long and the short of most
things (335 a 7; 334 e 5 f). But Protagoras' experience has been in debate
(335 a 4^^ w / X  ; 335 a ) where this
vocabulary is at home. He is now required to converse i.e. to answer 
questions and stick by the answers.
It is possible that Protagoras knows of dialectic, but of a different 
sort of dialectic from the Socrates. This is apparently shown by D(336 b 7 ff)
Alcibiades thinks a vote should be taken in the matter (d5). This
23
suggestion is sufficiently glossed by the author of Alcibiades I , and ruled
18. Compare a similar feeling about the shortcomings of oratory at Antidosis,
48.
19. Journal of Philology IV p.300.
20. See those who think Protagoras winsj Gagarin 1969 TAPA.
21. 331 b 9; 351 c 9; 350 c 6; 333 d 3 - 334 c; 359 c.
22. Ptgs. 361 d 7; Theaet. 162 d; 166a.
23. 106 b; 106 d; 107 a.
out by e.g. Laches 184 d e; Gorgias 474 A. Alcibiades as usual misses 
the point. Nor is a matter of standard practice,since Hippias and
Callicles have their own solutions. The expedients are invoked in the 
way Englishmen toss coins or cut cards — because they are the first 
expedients to hand in an "agonistic" Society. The râle of the audience is 
not central; when Socrates agrees to switch roles, the feeling is that 
Protagoras must have his turn, as in a debate, which dialectic is not; 
and that Socrates and Protagoras will set each other an example to be 
followed rather than stage a double event. '
Ryle (p.114) also adduces Theaetetus 167 D-168 as evidence that
Plato "associates" Protagoras with dialectic. But Protagoras is very
much rejuvenated (168 c 6) and utters many Socratic sentiments. At 168 c
25he brings against eristic the sort of charge Socrates does - which would 
be odd if Protagoras had invented eristic. Everywhere in the Theaetetus 
Protagoras is much altered from the original.Protagoras is invoked 
as an expert in just argument; but not as an expert in dialectic or 
eristic. He says what an intelligent man would say. His charge is that 
Socrates should present his case in extenso as in a debate: ^
27
There is stronger ground in the Sophist (232 e) . Gomperz claims that 
Protagoras is here credited with an antilogical form which as something to 
do with . It must be pointed out that there is no evidence
that Protagoras wrote out two speeches, pro and contra for the shoemaker. 
Antiphon wrote such speeches in a judicial context; but I can find no
24. Ryle 1966 p.114.
25. Phdo 90b; Hthyd. - 277e 4; though also Ptgs 357 a 8.
26. See now Maguire, J.P. Phronesis 1973, Protagoras - or Plato? p.115-34.
27. 167 d 4 ff.
evidence of such a tradition in the Techne disputes. These passages fall 
into two groups - those in which tradesmen are arraigned for not being
23
scientific and vice-versa; or in which one trade (usually rhetoric) is 
shown to be superior to another.The debates reached a high theoretical
level, taking in concepts like techne, tyche not-being, as well as more)  -
pragmatical considerations. But the part played by Protagoras is difficult 
27
to estimate . Tradition credits him with the invention of the hod, but
we owe the information to the unscrupulous Epicurus* settling Democritus*
28old scores . This connects him with the trades, but so does Protagoras* 
'subject*, euboulia which is remarkably untechnical*^half political, half 
domestic (Protag. 318 e) . Now if does not have the force of
"composing two speeches" but simply of discussing, contradicting as it very 
likely does at 232 c 9, then Protagoras' "Antilogies" disappear from view.
Later we shall cast doubt on the tradition which attributes such a work to 
him; but we can guess already at the nature of the technai, which enable 
a man to face all tradesmen - not only rhetoric^but euboulia^the proper 
government of house and state. Protagoras defends the importance of a 
general euboulia against Socrates' argument from the specifiqty of trades^^. 
Protagoras' work may have been a cross between a practical enclyclopaedia, 
a defence or aid for general, layman's thinking in the face of experts, 
and a work designed to impart that extra something needed beyond expertise.
The tensions we have noticed in our reconstruction above affects the 
translation of the text. Gompaz (131) paraphrases, 'man finde in den 
Protagoreische Schriften iiber die Ringkunst und die ubrigen Kiinste" 
dasjenige nVedergeschrieben und veroffentlicht was man gegen jeden 
einzelnen Kunstmeister einzuwenden (»vY*'((r64V ) hat, ebenfalls
antilogische Form aufwrsen" Taylor translates (p.118); ‘"I believe there ^
23. Vetus Medicina I; XV; V; De Arte I,II,III,IV àc là
^ (0)Cp»Q^/nay be natural philosophers, though XIV mentions 
Note the Eleatic language of the debate cf. De Nat.Hom.I,II; De Flatibus 
I, XV. On the relations of medicine and philosophy, see Kuhn 1956, Lloyd 
1963, Longrigg 1963; and on the dispute of science and professionals 
Bourgey p.119 f; 115 n 1; Heinimann 1961 passif. 24. de Reg.I; Gorgias 
DK B 11, 8f; Plato Gorgias 456 a 7 ff; 465 ay Phil.58A; Laches 195 c 7 ff.
27. The. Gomperz 1910 crediting him with the 9^ °"^
P.W. col.920 630 f ; Longrigg op.cit. 28* DK 80 a  ^
29. Ptgs. 319 a 8 fj.________:__^ ^ ----------------  :----------
are written manuals in circulation for each and every profession from which
anyone who has a mind that way may learn Itow to controvert the professionals 
y
themselves.
- I take it .you allude to what Protagoras wrote about wrestling and 
the other professions (sic). - And to the works of a host of other writers 
too bless you!*"
The remark implies that Protagoras had no monopoly of ... only
'manuals* can suit this meaning, since lots of works disproving shoe making
to shoe makers would have left more trace. Taylor continues; "But to keep
to the art of controversy ..." Our authority for taking "wrestling" to
mean "controversy" is no greater than Diogenes Laertius."But to keep
to ..." translates which Denniston suggests introduces a change
31of topic in Attic writers and is usually adversative in Plato . The so- 
called Art of Controversy is therefore separated from its apparent originator 
by an O^ T o<p
If we examine the context of Soph. 232 b - 236 d it becomes clearer that 
we ought not to associate Protagoras with antilogy. For antilogy is 
introduced at 225 b 10, and no one thinks of Protagoras. Antilogy is defined 
as question and answer, non-forensic but comprising technical conversations 
on matters of justice and in justice. These are 'eristical* discussions.
At 232 b 6, the division is resumed,with the additional information that 
'antilogy* is to pupils. Now the sphere of antilogy can be divine
matters, cosmology, and politics, in so far as the discussions take place 
in private groups (232 c 7), and with universal reference (232 c 8; d 1).
This must mean that antilogy is a medium of instruction - the lecture^ 
after hearing which pupils think themselves fit to enlarge on any subject 
in (informal) conversations. The only direct connection made with 
Protagoras is that Protagoras has addressed himself to the sphere of all 
craftsmen and has done so in a book. The subject of the book is Techne
and its relations to individual technai. It is chosen because it is
30. Wrestling is the natural Greek metaphor for veAl disputation; Aristophanes 
Nub.126; 901; 1047; Rah.775 f; 878 ff. It does not help us here. '
31. 1934 p.52-3.
universal in s c o p e . A k t  ^  . e T l^ L o V ' we take to
refer to authors with Taylor against Cornford, if only because 
requires a difference and there is no point in repeating
Then Plato broadens his field to make a generalisation ( kUrC^<i^^(uj )
which will eventually cover both natural science and the products of art.^^
The connections within the section 232 b - 236 c are weak. The title
could simply mean just what it says - after all, there was
a discussion between 'sophists' on the question of whether or not one should
train in full armour.  ^ So it is difficult to analyse Plato's synthesis into
its historical components. The likelihood is, that the sophists assembled
here are a disparate group, with little connection, even in the case of
Protagoras, with antilogy as Plado defines it here-a sort of dialectical
question and answer. Had there been a close historical connection between
antilogy and Protagoras the looseness of this passage would have been
inconceivable. Protagoras is chosen not as an "antilogical" or a dialectician
but as a sophist.
An attempt has been made to find an attribution of dialectic to
Protagoras in the mention of the "noble art of sophistry" 'divided' at 
35 . .226a - 231b. This is the cathartic dialectic usually taken to be Socratic 
dialectic or imitations of it. The attempt has been rebuffed elsewhere.
Though the method described at 230 b 4 ff is similar to the method Protagoras 
uses in Simonides' poem, the essential feature of "cathartic" dialectic seems 
to be missing - a genuine elenchus stated according to Plato's so-called 
law of contradiction:
It is difficult to believe that Protagoras is credited with this. The
32. 236 c 7.
33. ^ l< 0LoXo^ can be Neuter or Masculine.
34. Laches 181 e ff; 183 d 9; Euthyd. 271 d 9.
35. Kerferd G.B., Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry CQ 1954 p.84-90.
36. Trevaskis J.R. Sophistry of Noble Lineage, Phronesis vol.I 36-49;
Booth CQ 1956 p.89 f.
M .
remaining trappings of noble sophistry - bringing wandering opinions
into obvious conflict, the moral benefit — do not seem sufficient to
prove a method of dialectic for Protagoras. The Socratic activity is
37like but is not eristic because it contents itself with a genuine
contradiction, unlike eristic which aims at any sort of contradiction.
The passage may aim at thinkers who adopted only the trappings of
Socrates like Euthydemus.
In Aristophanes the word is frequently and loosely
used. It is connected with "answering back" and getting away with things.
It is also used in its sense of answering or corresponding speeches, as in
an agon. One f amous ranges the against a
and this when compared with Aristotle Rhet.II 1402 a 23 f
38has been taken to reflect the influence of Protagoras. Clouds 1045 ff
may remind the reader of 'Euthydemus* e.g. 302 b 4 f; 303 a 6 f; but these
39are fundamentally puns, not part of a Protagorean technique. Dover in his 
edition of the Clouds does not seem to mention this attribution,^  ^and at no 
point does the question of formal antilogical structure seem to arise. 
Nothing we know of Protagoras leads us to suppose he would argue Sophrosyne 
is bad^^.
The testimony of Diogenes Laertius is a lynchpin in the Dialectical 
Protagoras argument. All we have are the bald statements:
XéfV' Xo
The three "firstÿ’ are sufficient to cast doubt on these assertions.
and 53 is also contains the assertion that Protagoras tried to prove the
37. 231a.
38. Gomperz p. 35 f; Gulley 1969 p.30.
39. Protagoras' Style is the grand Ionic. Norden, Agnostos Theos, Appendix
40. Dover: Clouds p.xxxvii ff.
41. cf. Clouds 1060.
slogan of Antisthenes that s^ Plato says
in his 'Euthydemus* Î Plato in fact says Protagoras maintained we
cannot tell lies^^ which issues in "contradiction is impossible". The
rfinder of Diogenes' information seems to come from Plato somehow, with
the important exception of DK B4. Plato gives us a hint of this fragment
(DKA 23 = Theæt. 162D) and Eusebius vouches for it, but our longest version
of the fragment comes from Diogenfg alone. The fragments seems to be
inseparable from certain unlikely biographical details. Atheism Plato
did not treat with respect; and according to him Protagoras dies full of 
. . 43
honour in Sicily at 70. Yet at least one wing of the doxography has 
chastised Protagoras for atheism, inventing successively worse punishments 
for him until we reach punishments that can only be paralleled in the 
C&fictian period. It seems likely that this is the tradition that has 
handed down, or invented, part of Fr.4. Now C.W.Muller^^ has shown that 
this punitive tradition rests on Philochorus (second century A.D.) who is 
called 'prophet' and ' d i v i n e r M u l l e r  emphasises that the source of 
Fr.4 is inseparable from some tradition of either a trial or an attempted 
pro^action and he prefers to keep Fr.4. The question is whether this 
source is reliable for other elements of Diogenes' account. It may help 
to loosen the tie between the historicity of the trial, the authenticity 
of the fragment and the worth of Diogenes' source if we add together 
Rp.492 E and Meno 91 d f and mix with a little imagination. For in the 
Meno, Socrates delates Protagoras to Anytus, and in the Republic, the wrath 
of the state against Sophists is made to seem a law of nature. Anyone 
wishing to punish Protagoras for atheism had hints that it ought to be done. 
Diogenes' proof from the lines of the Ixion is not much more extravagant.
So in the one respect in which Diogenes is independent of Plato his source
42. Euthyd. 286 c.
43. Meno 91d.
44. Hermes 1967 140-59.
45* Jacoby Fr.Gr.Hist.328 TÎ.
must be treated with caution. His other authonties read badly - Timon, 
Eupolis, Dion, Artemidorus, Epicurus. His quotations from Aristotle 
are anecdotal and also require caution. Given this background we will 
not go far wrong if we assume that Diogenes has been misled by the 
"Protagoras" sections which mislead Gomperz.
Diogenes' list of Protagoras titles is dubious. E. Heitsch^^ has 
shown that Plato knows Protagoras' book under the title of Aletheia 
(Theæt 161c; 152 c; 162 a; 166 d; 170 e; 171 c, Crat 386 c, 391 c). 
Unfortunately the title was a popular one for treatises; and titles changed 
over the years. But Sextus Empiricus (DKB 1 = S.E. adv. math, vii 60) 
has changed the title from 'Aletheia' to 'Kataballontes' - he too is under 
the impression Protagoras is an antilogical (getting the impression from 
Soph. 232 d 7 7 ). Had he known of an 'eristical'
work it is unlikely he would have used this title for the Aletheia; and
the famous first sentence is an unlikely beginning for a work written in 
eristic form. Porphyry's title suggests what
he found if anything was an Aletheia, though DK have credited him with 
the mention of an entirely .unknown work (DK.B2 = Eus. P.E. X, 3, 25).
All Diogenes' titles can be accounted for from Plato, especially the 
"Botagoras" which is worked through heading by heading, an unknown 
theological tradition and the anecdotes of his life in the fragments of 
Aristotle. Diog6K6^ gives us three relevant titles:
- Even DK find this title dubious ; for us it begs
the question.
- This is straight from Plato, and not illuminating. 
X'* ~ accepts this on the authority of Aristoxenos.
Aristoxenos is an enemy of Plato who tells us that most of the Republic is
46. Hermes 1969 p.292-96.
47. Cornford P.T.K. 191 n2.
47a. For a different reading of the list see Untersteiner, M y Sophists 
1954 p.lOf.
to be found in Protagoras' 'AntilogiLa'. C o r n f o r d ^ ?  identifies the
y ( /
and the ^ {  . Now guessing that Aristoxenos takes his title
from the Sophist, we find that Protagoras' work does contain the Republic 
because it is Protagoras' book on all trades (i.e. sarcasm). Unless 
Aristoxenos thought of the work as a dialogue, which makes matters 
worse for him, it is difficult to see what else he could have meant.
Now I suggest that the Antilogiai occurring in the Diogenes' list is not 
the same work as Antilogika accepted in DKB5 from Diogenes BK III, 37.
For the Antilogiai are forensic, as shown by their position in the list, 
following the "Suit for the Fee," possibly specimen pro and contra 
speeches. Needless to say, there is no evidence that any such were written; 
but for the compilers of such lists they fill a biographical gap^^^ - 
Protagoras' connection with the law.
We see a tendency in the doxography to fix on any available work as 
Protagoras' Eristic or Antilogies. All evidence seems to point to the 
'Protagoras' and Soph. 232 ff as the source of the tradition about titles.
The Sophist passage is innovatory in intent and therefore not a faithful 
report of the activities of an antilogical beast who prowled round Athens 
bearing his name on his brow. The difficulty Socrates experiences talking 
to Protagoras and Gorgias is due not to the rules of the method, but to 
a philosophical problem - the desire f<^an answer true without exception. 
Correct philological treatment of the passages concerned shows the large 
area of intentional verbal ambiguity that Plato cultivated, to give the 
impression that Socraticism is continuous with the methods of honest 
conversation, which is quite free of technical knowledge ( = zi ) .
Protagoras was being asked not to be knowledgeable.
47. Cornford P.T.K. 191 n.2.
47a. For a different reading of the list see Untersteiner, Ms, Sophists 
1954 p.lOf.
II
The first of the minor sources for eristic is the Dissoi Logoi. As
Ryle says (p.116) this is "highly pemmicanised, somewhat jumbled, and
fragmentary." The work is dated to before 404^^ because a reference is
made (1.8) to the ending of Peloponnesian War and not to the expedition
of Cyrus 401. It is very obvious the work is not original and debate
should centre round whether the author is an eclectic or a ^actarian^^.
Gomperz argued he was a Protagorean (p.172 ff). Kranz made him a
Socratic, Taylor an Eleatic (97). Many themes of Socratic dialogues
appear here for the first time. But our task will be easier if it is a
narrowly defined (i) are there in the Dissoi Logoi intimations of the
method of dialectic pursued in the early dialogues? (ii) If, as I believe,
there is nothing significant in the way of method, what is the nature of
the connexion between Dissoi Logoi and the early dialogues? The answer
is important because on this rests Guthrie's opinion that antilogic predates 
51Plato .
(i) Similarities of content and individual arguments are irrelevant: 
we need to consider the antithetical treatment as a whole. The anthro­
pological relativism of II, 9; I 2 etc. is independent of this structure.
.52Levi has reminded us that the antithetical structure accounts for the 
first four chapters only, also that the author is more in favour of his 
theses than of his antitheses (p.296 n.27 referring to Gomperz 185 ff, 191). 
He denies that Eleatic eristic can be found in the Dissoi Logoi. For 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus "asked short questions in ambiguous form and 
required their interlocutors to answer yes or no without distinction or 
limitation, in order to reduce to absurdity whatever they might say, while 
the first chapters of this work contain both thesis and antithesis rather 
extensively developed." The main difference between Euthydemus and the
48. Taylor I p.93; Trieber, Hermes 1892 p.210-22, p.216.
49. Bibliography and translation, Sprague Mind 1968 p.155-67
50. Kranz Hermes 1937. .
51. Guthrie III.i.p.178 n.l; 317.
52. A.J.P. 1940 pp.292-306; 293, 294 n.l4.
Dissoi Logoi.is the length of the expositions. This points to the influence 
of rhetoric. But certain techniques of argument are similar, though in 
Socrates they are used in a conversational situation and in the second case 
in a debating situation - I mean the techniques of saying the opposite and 
question and answer.
Kranz^^ and Ramage^  ^have drawn attention to the "trace of dialogue"
1 12-14. Ramage claims that (424) the writer is acquainted with Socrates 
mainly as a sophist. "This casual relationship (with Socrates) would also 
account for the sophist's failure to reproduce the Socratic dialogue with
accuracy." Ramage argues partly from Diogenes Laertius, but mainly from 
the language used at I.12f-tT5i^ (a "transitional combination" p.419),
(an attention getting device), /t/o c7 He claims that
colloquial speech provided Socrates and "Twofold statements" with a common 
source for this vocabulary;" and says that the only other "reference" to 
"dialectic" is in Caput VIII. The truth is that the "dialectical" passages 
occur in all four complete antilogies, and in the same logical place in 
each.^^ The matter cannot be reduced to the clumsiness of archaic prose, 
because the questions require personal answers; each has general scope; 
and the question is put before deatj^g with the arguments presented in the 
antithesisThe arguments work by substitution of the pretended equi­
valent concepts in statements of ordinary situations; but the "tricks" do 
not depend on the play of'like', 'same' and 'different' that we associate 
with Platonic eristic and perhaps with the Eleatics. This type of argument 
is conceived as conversational, working by the interchange of good and bad 
in a situation calculated (in the words of Podsnap) "to bring a blush to the 
Young Person's cheek."
The overall pattern of the antilogies is (i) general argument ad 
hominem (ii) specific arguments ad orationem. The arguments supporting
53. Hermes 1937 p.231 f.
54. A.J.P. 1961 p.418-24.
55. 1.12; II 21; III 13; IV 6:
56. cf Fraenkel:Eine Stileigenheit p.80 1960.
57. 1.16; II 23; III 15; IV deficit.
m .
the antithesis are mainly empirical, anthropological; the arguments
supporting the thesis are conceptual. There appears to be a stock of
57arguments on which the speaker can draw resembling Socratic arguments.
But we have no evidence that the 'art* of doing this is conceived as
anything but remembering an ad hoc argument; nor is there anything
particularly conversational about the work. The question and answer
sections prelude the continuous sections. But the work is evidence that
instruction was given in the techniques of debate at the time: many of the
techniques were concurrently applied by Socrates to "conversations".
We must now consider the meaning of Cap.VIII. Taylor thinks it
means (127) "the Kû^ is the true philosopher and the true
philosopher is also the true statesman." Levi finds in it a reference to
the encyclopædië education favoured by Hippias (p.301: Prtgs 337 d - Cap VIII),
with which Guthrie (Ill.i.p 319) agrees, saying that the Chapter's purpose
is "to maintain that the good speaker knows everything about everything." We
cannot agree that the emphasis in the chapter is on the**dialectician" -
who is only one among many. The fact that succeeding chapter is a de Memoria
58points to Hippias whose speciality this was. Also the method of the passage
is anti-Socratic - he who knows anything must know everything - a principle 
of unacceptable demonstrations.
(ii) Our interest lies in the first sentence, where the author says it 
belongs to the same art and the same man to teach the following subje^ gps;
) (a) 5t^(^jj^^^(13) incomplete
) {h) ItJSy incomplete
) (9) (10) (11)
) (d)^^^^ipp6?V (5) (6) (7) (8)
' î S y  (2)
) (e)/Ac/ybv (3) (4)
Vklssenschaf t
) (f)
Ti tie Argument
57. e.g.V 9. 58. Gomperz 179; Hipp.Min.368 d 7,
Now it appears from this list that (a) is a recognised area of study, 
taught, Gomperz suggested, by Protagoras; and the suggestion is bane out 
by the 'Aletheia* following, which we saw was Protagoras' title, though 
it is not clear that he was the "first inventor" of that title for a 
philosophical work. In the Aletheia Protagoras appears to have adopted 
a general philosophical position and expounded it at length. Item (a) 
is somehow opposed to this. Presumably it is not expository, and concerned 
with individual items in more iitimate situations — questions from the floor, 
for example; or how to conduct your day to day talk. It might have been 
a boast of Protagoras - but there is no reason to suppose it means "eristical 
conversation". For with or without Diel's emendations, the argument at 
(13) includes the giving of answers, which is not our usual picture of
r, .
eristic. The attraction of (a) as an is obvious. But
'conversation' in this sense merely seems to be the opposite of a harangue.
Nor can (a) refer to the sort of embarrassing questions we have found 
common to the Dissoi Logoi and to Socrates. For i^ i$ does, it is the 
odd man out in the list, because it is not on a level with the others. I 
am inclined to make the subject of (a) "a general knowledge" and of (b) 
theoretical knowledge. The movement of passage shows (a) is less important 
than (b).
The phrase (a) exists before Plato; but it is not limited to the art
of putting questions. It is quite likely that Socrates uses the vocabulary
of the generation of Protagoras to clothe or make intelligible a new method.
59
In any case the present writer is eclectic, being influenced by Hippias, 
Gorgias,Socrates^^ and persons unknown. Embarrassing questions occur in 
the work, but are probably not what is meant by dialectic. Nor has the 
connection between Dissoi Logoi and Eleaticism been demonstrated, let alone 
Taylor's; "I would suggest that his purpose in constructing his antinomies
59. Gomperz 171; Levi 300; Guthrie 319 n2.
60. Levi 301.
61. Kranz op.cit. Ramage op. cit.
may have been to reinforce the Eleatic doctrine that
the contents of sensible experience, are unknowable.The subjects of 
argument — the fine, the good, parents, frà'èl^ ÉJ^ and enemies and how to 
treat them - are more related to rhetoric, Socrates and the 'Clouds' than 
to Eleatic philosophy.
The remaining non-Platonic examples of pretended antilogy and eristic 
come from the Hippocratic Corpus.
(a) De Morbis I(i) 9 f  \
3< (Tép) ?
' tp C ^ 'o v  /(t
^  M e n .
There follow instructions about what to look for in a disease, how to
sort diseases, and how to be on guard against an opponent:
i f  ^  1/ à ( f  "u(^ 'XXp o Z<^Y  lej
%r9w7(^/ ?tAi ^
. . . t x S z '^  u^^ lcrcnsvCiK
The passage is cited by Cornford^^, Heinimann^^ and Bourgey^^ as evidence
of antilogy techniques taught presumably by Protagoras and used by 
craftsmen within a trade. Bourgey^^ says of it "C' etaitune coutume aux 
temps hippocratiques que, devant des cercles plus eu moins étendus les 
médecins fissent des exposés systématiques soigneusement préparés. 
Quelques-uns de nos traités et non des moindres représentent le texte même 
de ces discours.' He shows how the De Arte and the De Flatibus have both
62. Taylor 1.128; 93. 63. Plato's Theory of Knowledge p.191 n2,
64. 1961 p.111. 65. Observation and Expérience 1953 p.115 n3.
been influenced in their different ways by rhetoric. The Greek medical 
profession was vocal, because it had to sell itself. Bourgey points out 
that Xenophon, Mem.IV 2,5 implies that city states appointed official 
doctors, and that the doctors earned their appointments partly by making 
speeches. Plato himself makes distinctions between good and bafl| 
physicians, which involve logos - first in the use of theory^^, then in 
the use of theory 'sold* to the layman.They might even have tried 
curing by argument.
Edelstein^^ comments on our passage as follows: Bei Krankheiten
kann diskutiert warden wie die Kran((heit, die jemand hat zu erklaren, sei 
und wie man sie behandeln musse. In der Diskussion Ji oy/fj ) muss
der Arzt darai^ achten, ob sein Gegner unhaltbare Behauptungen aufstellt, 
und an solchen Stellen eingreifen und ihn widerlegen." Now we notice that 
the plea is for a more systematic medicine. The vocabulary of debate is 
distinct from the vocabulary of knowledge here: for the language of debate 
did not arise out of medicine, but equally it is not imposed eristically 
upon medicine. The passage strikes me as "for internal use" within the 
profession, but certainly not as, pace Cornford, "eristic debate about 
medicine". The physician needs the separate ability to make an antilogical 
speech because any recommendation he makes should be founded on a systematic 
knowledge of medicine, starting from general rules. No conclusion can be 
drawn about fixed forms of discussion from the use of the vocabulary. Dates, 
too, are lacking, but the De Morbis is not among the earliest treatises.
Ryle cites de Natura Hominis I (Loeb IV p5) as a proof of the existi^.^CC  
69of eristic moots. Like Ryle, I give the Jones translations but only to 
reject it:
(b) "Given the same debaters and the same audience, the same man never wins 
in the discussion three times in succession, but now one is victor, now 
another, now he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face of the
66. Charm. 156 e - 157a; Rp.405 c d; Phdr.270 c.
67. Laws 722 b; 857 c; Gorgias 456 b; Philips 1973 p.188; Joly 1961 p.439.
68. 1931 p.104.
69. Ryle p.117.
crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct knowledge ... 
should maintain his own argument victorious always...
It must be noted that these debates are about an arche and strongly 
influenced by natural philosophy. The passage begins in the Loeb text:
liz/tot 7 3 / V/(y<>?C6rvt^-- .
The first thing the reader thinks of is Rp.534 B f - dialectic complete 
with audience. But antilegein is a word naturally used of philosophical 
discussions. The emphasis, too, is on how to distinguish the man who is 
really right, not through these discussions, but inspite of them. A man 
claims to know - each side puts forward its own belief - which is not 
eristic. Akroates means the hearer of a lecture, rather than the member 
of an audience. There is no suggestion that the "audience" votes; nor are 
these debates regular occurrences before the "same audience" which is a 
misinterpretation of the archaic style:
(i) Tcf ..
someone who was present would have the following proof.
(ii) 'c*U>v' . ... , cf3^’cG>'y is used to echo^
. The audience must ^e^the same if anyone is to be in a position 
to appreciate this particular proof. The Xi.^ '
is a member of p f  kScA . Qwfc (i) and (ii) simply represent
the archaic shift from singular to plural.
(iii) Ter Xj9t^ • This is merely a metaphor
from wrestling, not a record of an "event". See Euthyd. 277 d Phdrus 256 B, 
though the sense does not quite correspond to what little we know of the
70. Fraenkel op.cit p.63 n.3 ad Herôd. II 70.
rules of wrestling.
(iv) 'Tripping oneself up' - Similarity to Theæt. 164c is explained by 
o
the pverty of Greek logical language. The proof from the words from the 
opponents' words is not a philosophical monopoly. The reference to Melissus 
is meant to show absurdity, notoriety, not "Eleaticism" on the part of the 
debaters.
We conclude that this passage does not refer to eristic moots.
(C) Euripides fr. 189 reads:
72Duchemin takes these lines as the chorus' " II suffit d'examiner nos
fragments pour nous convaincre qu'Euripide a institué ici un débat en règle
dans lequel il a développé de façon très poussée les deux thèses en présence."
73Snell has interpreted the debate in terms of the contrast between the 
active and contemplative life. But the terms of the apology for the 
contemplative are borrowed from the defence of rhetoric. The setting is 
firmly rhetorical/political (fr.l99; 200); and there is a science of rhetoric 
(fr.l86; 206). The fragment above is not a philosophical position; but 
it is a recognised test for the presence of science in a speaker.
74Ryle^ also considers the claims of Euclides of Megara and Eubulides.
Associated with these are logical difficulties like the Liar. But our
authority for considering them eristic is weak; and almost nothing is known
of Antisthenes except what Diogenes Laertius tells us. But with Antisthenes
we reach the Vifi Socratici. Even Euthydemus and Dionysodorus seem to have
75learned their art some time later than 420 B.C; and they are credited not 
with a new dialectic, but with a new art of fighting in argument. At
71. Also Harris, H.A. Sport in the Ancient World 1972 p.21 -"the best of 
three falls"; Gardiner E.N., Athletics of the Ancient World 1930 p.183.
72. in Greek Tragedy 1968 p.85-7.
73. 1964 p.70-98.
74. Ryle p.112; 123.
75. Euthyd. 272a-c; Gulley p.1969 p.27.
Euthydemus 286 c, Socrates distinguishes a sophistic puzzle (that there are 
no lies) from the innovations of Euthydemus - presumably fighting in words. 
But this sophistic puzzle that predates the new method belongs to Protagoras, 
who once again turns up as an example of an earlier non-dalectical generation. 
A great deal of the later dialectical vocabulary is associated with him; 
but the idea of applying this vocabulary to restricted, personal, committed 
conversation is Socrates’!
Ill
The case for crediting Zeno of Elea with the invention of dialectic 
rests on an apparent attribution by Plato, certain other Platonic t^ jtts, 
and the statement by Diogenes Laertius that Aristotle called Zeno discoverer 
of dialectic, (just as Empedocles was discoverer of rhetoric!) The statement 
was made in Aristotles*'Sophist* (Rose fr.65; Dk Al, 10) which should be 
interpreted through Platonic conventions as an answer (in this respect) to 
the Phædrus. Aristotle's statement is part of his demotion of dialectic, 
and made for analytical reasons, not historical ones. His analysis of 
dialectic and rhetoric are parallel. The close of the Sophistici Elenchi 
shows that his meaning in the "Sophist" was not that Zeno wrote the rules for 
dailectic, or had any scientific understanding of it.
However the assimiliation of Zeno to sophistical eristics began early.
In Alcibiades I (119 A) there is a report that Zeno charged a hundred minae 
for getting a reputation for cleverness for Pythodorus and Rallias 
( • Simplicius gives us the Millet Seed (DK A 29)
in the form of a dialogue between Zeno and Protagoras (Lee 38; DK 28). He ends
the quotation with the words y^wc^ VOt/
Diogenes Laertius (27.ix = DKAl) on the authority of Antisthenes^^ gives us a 
picture of Zeno asking a ruler a Socratic question. The modef^g on the whole 
have not accepted that Zeno wrote dialogues^^. As we shall ^ ee Eudemus 
(fr.7 Wehrli = DK 16; 21) and even Aristotle (DK24 = Phys. 210 b 22 f) put 
questions rather than statements in his mouth - misleadingly. The case appears 
to reduce to Plato through whose eyes in some way or other these people see
76. cf. Parmenides 126 c 3; Theæt 164 e 9; Ptgs.314 d 9.
77. Fr. Hist.Gr.Ill B 508, (11).
77. Guthrie II p.81; Lee II p.110.
him. About the independent access of Simplicius to Zeno there is no
 ^78 agreement.
The sense given by moderns to Plato's pronouncement is sophisticated.
Guthrie (p.83) refers it to the art of extracting contradictories - which
applies only to elenchus and marks a developed stage in the handling of it.
There is some doubt that Zeno dealt in contradictories, rather than mere
opposites; and mere antilogy could also provide a model for the extraction
of contraries, if possible on the hypotheses of one's opponents. Guthrie"
does not seem to link Zeno firmly enough to how this extraction takes place
in the dialogues. Vlastos^^ cashes the phrase "founder of dialectic "as"
founder of argumentative Greek prose," this being Zeno's main advance on
Parmenides. Ow.en^  ^admits that we know "Plato does echo some arguments
of Zeno, but ... he transforms them radically for his own ends." But the
81authorities converge in thinking that eristic has an Eleatic background.
Plato's references to Eleatics cluster la tC  in the oeuvre, but their
influence has probably been felt as early as the changeless Forms of the 
82Phædo . They are generally complimentary to Parmenides, but less so to 
83Zeno and Melissus. We are shown the Eleatic school in the following frame:
(i) members: Melissus, Parmenides, Xenophanes (sophist only)
(ii) they maintain the world is one.
(iii)Socrates met thennwhen he was young: (and therefore did not under­
stand them?)
(iv) Socrates fears he (still) misunderstands them and must work out 
their meaning.
Now the membership of Xenophanes ia moot point, resting as it does on the 
further evidence of the De Melisso Xenophane et Gorgia. Reinhardt^^ and
78. Guthrie II 8 n.3; Solmesen 1973 p.126 n29.
79. EMcycl. of Phil.1967 Viii p.378.
80. Symp. Aristotelicum 1960 101/2.
81. e.g. Guthrie Ill(i) 178 n 1; Levi op cit.296 etc.
82. cf Prauss, G.1966 p.41; Solm 2en, A.J.P. 1971 62-70.
83. Theæt 183E; Parm.init; Sophist 242d; 244e etc.
84. 1916 p.89 ff.
Regenbogen are mentioned by von Pfftz as defending the 
reliability of the De Melisso for Xenophanes, Reinhardt being driven to 
extreme chronological measures. Von Fritz solves the difficulty by finding 
in the Eleatic works remnants of an archaic argument, presumably Xenophanes! 
Steinmetz however says of our passage that Plato's language is picture-making 
(bildhaft)^^. Aristotle seems to refer the One to Xenophanes* theology.
89We may note that Xenophanes is credited with an epic on the city of Elea; 
add that Xenophanes is reckoned an Eleatic only in the passage in which the 
philosophical schools are distingui^ed geographically.
On (ii) (the oneness of the world) we note that there is difficulty 
in attributing oneness to Xenophanes' system; the tenet is attributed to 
Parmenides in the Theaetetus as part of a pun; ifd the Sophist d-ij almost a myth.^^ 
We shall see that the place of 'One' in Parmenides' system is disputed also.
B If we compare Plato's presentation of the Heracliteans and pluralists 
generally, we find an instructive symmetry. (Theaet 179 ef; 152 ef)^^.
(i) Members, (a) Homer and the poets - quite impossible. It balances 
Xenophanes.
92(b) Protagoras: Heinimann has argued for the connection of sophistic
with Heracleitus; but as far as schools are concerned, Cornford is right to
93make no inference that Protagoras was a Heraclitean.
(c) Heracliteans: Guthrie says that the Heraclitean school continued after
the death of its founder. Cratylus, the prime example, has recently been 
94revamped. Plato denies a master pupil relationship within the "school".
95 . 96Two editors of Heraclitus differing as much as Marcovitch and Kirk agree
accounts of the Heraclitean school are not to be taken seriously.
85. P.W.Supp.VII col.1544 f.
86. P.W. ix a ii 1548.
87. Xenophanesstudien Rh.Mus.1966 ppl3-77, p.19.
88. Met. 986 b 18 = DK A30. .
89. DK Al; A2.
90. Them. 183 e 5; Cornford P.T.K. p.101 n 1 referring to Di^; Soph. 242c 4; 8; 
d 6; Guthrie I 368.
91. See Capelle AM, Hermes 1962 p.288-94. 92. Nomos und Physis 1965 p.152 ff;
161, 93. P.T.K. p.36. 94. Kirk 1951 A.J.P. 225-53; Allan D.J. A.J.P.
(ii) Where does Heraclitus say he disbelieves in the One? For the unity 
D • 97of opps4>tes and the singleness of truth can both be expressed in this way.
The defence of pluralism does not seem to have been among Heracleitus*
objects. Plato gives the game away at 157 a 42 when he complains that on
Heraclitus* system "it is not possible to conceive anything singly, on its 
99 . .own" (Hackforth) . This is Plato's concern; and also shows us what sort 
of oneness he found attractive in Parmenides.
(iii) Much of the argument for the Protagorean position is taken up with 
arguments that work or fail to work because of the youth of the interlocutor 
Theaetetus. Theodorus has somepersonal acquaintance with Heracliteans, but only 
in the fighting moods, not when they are "keeping the p e a c e " . T h e  
implication is that there is another side to the "school".
(iv) No one can understand Heracliteans (179 e - 180 c) because it is
I  ^ ^  \
impossible to have dialectical discussions with them ( ^Tl
(CÀL
I find it ^T^ficult to believe that this stems from a mystical cult of 
paradox: my impression is that Plato is alluding here to a habit of literary 
composition - what Fowler would call Elegant Variation. They never say the 
same thing twice in^the same way:
ip^e^CrjA. 6 / W
i.e. they change the names. Now Hudson-Wi11iams^^^ has shown that 
is almost a term of art, a "stock epithet of rhetoric, like for example
Xï3 c
He quotes Isocratean passages to show the word's use to mean variation of
97. Dk B. 26, 67.
98. DK B. 2; 32; 30; 106.
99. Mnemosyne 1957 and 157 131 c.f. 152 d 2; 153 c 4; 157 a 7.
100. 180 b 4-7.
101. CQ 1948 pp.76-82 p.77n.
Icommon sentiments and appropriate remarks. For Plato he cites Phædrus 
267 b. We compare Phædrus 235a. The Heracliteans have one commendable 
dialectical feature - their brevity; but this brevity is tftpophthegmatic 
and useless, and probably come from a quiver, like Pindar's, of common 
places and dead people's thoughts. Their main fault is change words in 
midstream. It is corresponding and opposite fault to the Eleatic vice of 
using the same word many times without distinguishing several senses of 
the word.
C Dialectic cannot be used on "Heracliteans", but it can be used on
Parmenideans, because of their allegiance to 'One' - to leaving things
103fixed in discussion» But whether this is Parmenides' use of 'oneness'
is another question. It should come now as no surprise that the reliability 
of Plato's notices on the Parmenideans is doubtful. Solmesen says 
"Fortunately no lengthy discussion of the problem is needed; for lately 
several scholars have stated firmly that Parmenides' subject is not the 
but the To adapt the words of Shorey from another context
the illustration of these fallacies is too symmetrical to be unconscious... 
Plato knew what he was d o i n g . I n  keeping with (iii) and (iv) Plato 
treats the Eleatics as if they were dialecticians.
The information Plato gives us in the "Parmenides" is also dubious. 
Socrates divines that Zeno wrote his book in support of Parmenides and from 
an indirect angle. But most people do not tumble to this, nor is this fact 
the whole truth about the work.^^^ It is unlikely that information about 
Zeno's polemical youth brings out the whole truth either. Socrates has 
invoked a consequence (128 c b) of the position and not the intention. Now 
according to our principle of research, this should mean that Zeno ought or
102. Ad.Nic 41; Ep.ad 7 as 8; Paneg 8.
103. e.g. Parmenides DK B8. 12 ff; cap.Iv.
104. Phronesis 1971 p.119; n.ll; cf.A.J.P. 1971 p.62-70; M.K.N AW XXXII. 
8 p.221-233 "The Eleatic One in Melissus".
105. What Plato said p.290.
106. 128 a 7; 128 b 8.
ought not to have taken a dialectical step.
Two possible Zenonian errors present themselves. The first is a
mistake about the nature of contradiction: "There are not many" implies
"there is one" only if the statements are contradictory - i.e. exhaustive
and mutually -^elusive alternatives, which they are not, A failure to
appreciate this fact is the mistake of the Zeno fragments and of the
whole s c h o o l . B u t  Socrates is responsible for making the mistake here,
though his own treatment of the many and the one shows that he now thought
108of it as an anti|QpA^ . The second candidate for the error is procedural: 
in a debate in which the opponents had produced and apparent
contradictions using Parmenides' position, Zeno thought it an adequate
reply to "deduce" using his opponents' position (Cap II).
The result is not the advancement of any cause but the opponent's - because 
the opponent then defends his position by invoking a higher more general 
principle. Parmenides is praised (and absent from Zeno's recitatioi^ because 
Parmenides deduces from his own principle, ignoring the fact that the 
consequences seem laughable; it is enough for him that they are consequences, 
and this is the essence of the advice he gives to Socrates at 130 d 3 ff. 
Zeno's behaviour is almost by definition eristic, since he takes a 
hypothesis (which he does not believe) and deduces follies from it without 
too much regard for their quality. Having proved something of the 
following sort
p ( q p )  ; - (q p) ; - p.
he expects us to conlude
(i) - P
(ii) - p r ; - p ; .'. r.
We have seen that Socrates is not apparently attacking (ii); though 
Socrates own view combines the hypothesis of Parmenides with that of his
107. Lloyd, G.E.R. 1966 Polarity and Analogy p.106-8.
108. Parm 129 d 1 ff; Soph. 251 a 7 ff; Phil I4c 11; Lloyd GER op.cit.134 f.
opponents. This third alternative is apparently excluded by (ii) . Now
what is conclusion (i) based on? First, on Modus Tollens of which we found
no effective example in Cap.II. In the subsequent arguments of the work,
an unexpected conclusion, q, is not a ground for the abandonment in p, but
a challenge to further clarification of p. But there is no evidence that
Zeno thought beyond a sort of Modus Tollens. Second, legitimate Modus Tollens
depends on the notion of a genuine conbadiction, which Zeno has misapplied
to terrestrial things like uLg things, small things and the like. Socrates
points out that Zeno's contradictions do not (thanks to the theory of Forms)
constitute disabling objections. It is left to Parmenides to point out that
difficulties of the same nature still arise even among the Forms. So both
the "hypothesis"that there is one" and the "hypothesis that there are many"
present difficulties and there is apparently nothing to choose between them.
In such circumstances, Plato chooses to examine 'both' i.e. a little
109diplomacy between two sides. But the lesson he draws in both the Sophist
and the Parmenides is that individual concepts^^^ should be explored from
all sides because the interactions have to be "seen" to be believed. The
"absurdities" alleged by Zeno are premature: for there are more sorts of
possible relations in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in their
philosophy. This is why, in his second piece of advice, Parmenides recommends
111the Zenonian method to Socrates - not as a method of disproof, but as a
method of clarification and exploration. The Zenonian method leads to the
exploration of various sorts of concepts and relations; whereas the
Parmenid&an leads to the investigation of one concept and the demonstration
of the unthinkability of its opposite.
But the correct warrant remains p^^ q, p , , q, Plato himself uses
112the unthinkability argument, which is a proof of internal incoherence; 
but not the proof of the coexistence of contraries except as a goad to
109. Sophist 246 ef; 254 c ff; Phil. 20e.
110. Lloyd, G.E.R.op.cit. p.145; 148; 161.
111. 136 a b.
112. Crat.439 ef; Theæt 183 af; Soph. 238 c 8 f; Phil 21 d 4 - 22 c 4.
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further clarification. The "training" element is not mere practice in
disputation, but the enlargement of a young man's mind to tolerate more
forms of apparent contradiction. This will save an older man from
eristical arguments when he comes to consider ethical matters in maturity.
These forms of apparent contradiction are attendant on the introduction of
113plurality and negation; and it is ironic that Parmenides should give 
advice about exploring negative statements, and relative statements in 
what reads like a resuscitation of Socrates' old warcry about exploring 
everything from every angle. The improvement on Socrates' warcry lies in 
the set order in which these explorations are to take place: the positive, 
the negative, the relations with themselves and with other (a limited list 
of?) concepts.
D Little of this .^eads like history. Parmenides and Zeno are correcting
their methods in a Socratic direction. But even supposing that the 
"Parmenides" report is not historical and does not reveal method currently 
practised among Eleatics, it is possible that the method of dialectic 
originated with the real Zeno. Now So1msen claims that the 'quotation' 
we get from Zeno is only:
127 dr? ^  Tag
The succeeding phrase 1/ is Socrates^^^.
also impugns Simplicius' evidence fpf"Zeno's destruction of the many but not 
of the one. He brings several arguments to show that Zeno a&^ued as much 
against One as against Many and that "even if Zeno's entire argument ... was 
directed against "the many" he clearly had no qualms about knocking out the 
One on the way."^^^ The effect is to sever the close connection between 
Parmenides and Zeno.
He
113. e.g. Sophist 258 c 6 ff.
114. So1msen op.cit 118, n.9.
115. op.cit p.136.
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But Socrates does not believe that the compresence opposites is 
impossible. He attributes belief in that impossibility to Zeno; and those 
who believedin the Many believed it as a plurality of Ones - which Zeno 
should therefore have knocked out on the way. The resulting tension 
between what Zeno believes on Parmenides' principles and what he believes 
is wrong with his opponents' position could very well be described as 
Plato has described it - youthful excess. Solmesen admits Zeno's concerns 
are Eleatic.
ScLfen's main point must be that Zeno's work was not responsible. 
"Problems, dilemmas, paradoxes, equally defensible alternatives may have 
fascinated him more - and for their own sake - than the way out of the 
deadlock ... He may well head the long line of those who professed themselves 
able to present two mutually c o n t r a d i c t o r y o n  every subject (even 
though we do not in every instance know his second answer and he may indeed 
sometimes have thought one startling answer suffi ci en t) . This can be 
true whether or not Zeno is a Parmenidean.
So how did he conduct his arguments? So1msen admits we have too 
little evidence to be sure that each argument had an antilogical structure; 
but he is probably right in thinking the arguments range freely without 
much commitment. He reassesses the evidence of Endemus and Aristotle in 
this l i g h t . A s  Eudemus' is the only text approaching a proof that Zeno 
practised dialectic, we demonstrate Eudemus' dependence on Aristotle.
Eudemus (Wehrli fr. 37a; DK A16). ^  ^
M y p /  4 _/
f /  7 7 3 f J k ^ è ^ i v '  Pi (îipért
116. op. cit. 141. 117. op.cit.137.
The passage is based on Metaphysics 1001 b 7 ff; DK A21 and records the 
Aristotelian , itself recalling Plato (129 a ff ; 139 d 8 ff ) :
• Aristotle has encouraged him i 
his error by using such words as ^  ^^CK,
Svk\ XoZxo Twi/
Nor is it clear how much Aristotle quotes from Zeno apart from quoting
n
the useful criterion of material existence - adding and taking away.
Aristotle here argues against Platonic, Parmenidean and Pythagorean
traditions and ^does so dialectically, by stealing Parmenides* clothes
(i.e. Zeno's criterioq^. Further specification of what Zeno meant involves
attempts to make his arguments watertight, usually against historical 
118positions.
The final 'proofs' that Zeno was a dialectician are quickly dealt
with. The reference to Zeno at Soph.El. 170 b 19ff (= DK A14) is a gloss
119and should be removed; and the statement that Zeno was the first to write 
dialogues at Diogenes Laertius III 48 carries no conviction in the light 
of our knowledge of say, of our knowledge of the Millet Seed dialogue.
We next examine Phædrus 260 d - 263 d. It is important to be clear
what Plato is proving: rhetoric is not truth-neutral because no techne can
be. Specifically the most effective deceiver is the man who can disguise
error to look like truth. This is true of orat^fy, where antilogy is a
proof of the exist^ Ence of science# But Phædrus does not realise it is also
true of the Eleatic Palamedes, Zeno who has the same skill in persuading
people of opposites. The remainder of the passage (261 d 9ff) is not about
118Zeno but about dialectic - which brings out what is hidden and takes 
119small steps. Now the dialectician must be aware of the deceitful power
118. Bibliography in Vlastos' entry Zeno of Elea, Enclyclopædia of Philosophy 
1967. 119. So Ross (translation) and Loeb; This is the reference
which leads Hirzel to attribute dialogue to Zeno. Der Dialog 189^  I 
p.55 n3.
118. 261 e 4. 119 262 a 2.
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of likenesses ; and anyone who can use likenesses to produce
121verisimilitude must be aware of the truth - a point Socrates is
forever aiming at the Sophists; and a reason for his seeing Parmenides
behind Zeno, The source of this description is not Zeno's book. Our
suspicion is confirmed when we realise that the right way of being
122rhetorical is being dialectical. Zeno's book is chosen, I suggest,
partly because its first hypothesis is about the "like and the unlike",
of which concepts Plato had a whole theory but there is little reason
to suppose Zeno had even if he had the same meaning for
It suffices too, for calling a man in a popular sense that
he had written a book - there is no suggestion that Zeno worked out
(^logical theory beyond exploiting an ability to misuj^ contraries.
Almost nothing can be gathered about the man from this passage; but the
passage can account, for Aristotle's announcement that Zeno is the
discoverer of dialectic (DK AlO) as dialectic and rhetoric are the two
123arts that forge contradictions “ - as a degradation of dialectic.
The third relevant passage is the beginning of the Sophist.
(a) 217 c 4. "or to use the method of asking questions, as Parmenides 
himself did on one occasion in developing some magiificent arguments in 
my presence, when I was young and he quite an elderly man" (Cornford) - 
surely a reference to the "Parmenides" and no more. Socrates makes the 
request and it is almost a request to observe the custom of the country 
- dialectic is Attic.
(b) 216 b 8 "He is more reasonable than the devotees of verbal dispute 
... there is something divine about him: "I would say thtt of any 
philosopher". The strictness of Eleatic logic would lead to bad tempered
120. 262 b 6. P.W. III.A.2. Speusippus 1643/29f.
121. 262 c Iff.
122. 263 b 6 ff.
123. Frankel 1942 p.2 n.6.
hold ups in any conversation: but it is not necessary to suppose that 
any set of Eleatics went about actively holding up conversations for the 
sake of it.
(c) 218 d 9: the Eleatic Visitor begins his dialectic at an advanced, 
Platonic stage with a paradigm.
(d) 216a: For a implicit recantation of his own earlier views of the
irony in the opening, see Taylor's translation of the dialogue
If the explanation given above of the nature of the link made between
Parmenides' arguments and Zeno's is not accepted, we have still to ask
what use Plato or Socrates could have made of this method. What positive
position were they defending? Why did Plato not fall foul of Eleatic
irresponsibility, earlier in his career? It would be difficult, too,
to assess the vast change that must have occurred when Zenonian methods
were first applied face to face in responsible conversation.
If some sort of serious link between Zeno and Parmenides is accepted,
it can be accounted for on Parmenides' principle of the "unthinkable"
double way: the path that 'there is and is not', which after all applies
something like the phenomenal world which Plato tells us Zeno's antinomies
were intended to apply to also. But this is not a straight case of a
dialectical disproof. For Zeno there are only two ways of which one is
impossible. There is no room here for a method of disproving specific
hypotheses in ways relevant to the "true opinions" of the interlocutor.
For Socrates, "both sides" of the question have to be examined.
It is difficult to prove Zeno did not spawn a tribe of eristics,
especially as on our own showing he is maverick. But there is nothing
to show such a tribe used dialectical weapons. They could prove absurdities
X 2^ 3,like Gorgias, to show their mastery of a subject, but Socrates' 
absurdities came from a different root - his absurd demands for the
124. Taylor I p.92; ct.Taylor IV p.91. 
124a. or seriously, see Kerferd, G.B. 1955.
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exceptionless statement, for the good all men recognise. It is likely 
to have been later that Platonic dialectic came to pin down the rather 
bloodless Zenonian words like "like" and "movement" as somehow crucial: 
when Plato was perfecting his methods of dealing with doxai, or statements. 
Socrates* ethical interests remind us more of the embarrassing questions 
of 'Twofold Statements'. As for Zeno's assuming and deducing the conse­
quences of other people's beliefs - this depends on some rather half­
hearted words of Plato and an assimilation to rhetoric. Plato's definition 
of eristic in the Phædrus became the standing charge brought against 
dialectic by Aristotle - that it deals with '(V and that it
proves and disproves in appearance only. There is little evidence 
therefore that the urge to refute Aristotle's statements to Aristotle's 
face came from Elea any more than from rhetoric.
Parmenides seems to have paid some attention to polemical reasoning 
(B 1. 30; 6. 8; 7. 1; 3, 5; 8. 8; 15, 53, 61) but the odds are that 
Plato would have found Parmenides' methods too powerful for constructing 
a system of reality that somehow ties up with what we think we see.
His method is to force more and more definitive statements of various 
positions - neither of which is declared "wrong" until it reaches a 
sufficient degree of 'clarity' or definition. He does not rule out the 
opposition from the beginning because it says "is" and "is not". Much 
of his effort is taken up by giving sense to the joint t^jjression of them. 
What he owes to Zeno and Parmenides seems to be an interest in the concepts 
they dealt with, and which become lynchpins of an ordered dialectictic.
Elea provides as it were the copia verborum for Plato's but may
not provide the syntactical methods of dialectic.
What came from Elea was philosophy.
However some destructive means were generally known, with two main 
features - treating contraries as contradictories i.e. the excessive use 
of the exclusive disjunction; and the use of false composition i.e.
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difficulties about putting 'is' and 'not' together. Plato represents 
these tricks as verbal; but we are free to suspect that they were felt 
as dfifficulties rather than used as irresponsible methods. Plato 
sometimes pays them the compliment of imitation tj^better to discuss more 
properly logical i s s u e s . T h e  vocabulary used for them is used in 
talk d)out the Theory of Forms; and the only method of 'argument' that 
Socrates feels free to use in the Phædo is a method of hypothesis that 
may depend on the use of the exclusive disjunction. But even in the 
Phædo the Eleatic method is not completely approved of. For instance, 
the demand for deduction from a higher ^hypothesis seems to be 
completely Platos.
124a. though contrast Peck.
^ ^ 7
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Lys |.as gives us a plain man's view. ^ V \
K *\ hXv tfi}^0i>r> Se>o</TH â^iP' (>»
’ 0 c  3^U^*. o * > K
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Antilogy is typical of all philosopher^^ who talk for the sake of 
it; and as Plato's philosopher is such a mplain man, it follows that he is 
not affected by the habitI The fact is that Plato uses these words where 
the natural reference would be to his secret control of the argument.
But his descent into the practice is said to be involuntary, like so 
much else.
This is the message of Rp.452 d-7c. At 454 b Socrates says:
K \^ S ‘o ^ ^ o fO ffV  ^ / T f é t r â ^
It is called a techne, because it can reverse no matter what argument.
His diagnosis in the Republic is that antilogy works by prosecution of the
word rather than the t ho u gh t. Th is remains his charge against the 'practice', 
127 but the prophylactic recommended varies with the current method of dialectic.
Thus in the Rp. matters are set right by demarcating the sorts )
128of likeness and difference intended. In the Phædo, matters are cured by
129keeping apart arche and consequences . In the Philebus, eristic is due 
to ignoring 130^  in the Sophist, antilogic and eristic
are the art of question and answer and a subgroup of it. (Soph 225 b 10 ff).
The notion of contradiction does not seem to be as basic in Plato's
use of ^  the notion of 'saying the opposite'. The antilogical
131leads the 'argument off the track until it says the opposite, several times
132until any sajr^e person is quite dizy. Now this is precisely Socrates' trick 
with others, but Socrates tries to reconcile his arguments one with another.
125. Lysias (viii) (11). 126. 454 b 4 f. 127. Theæ.l64c 7 ff.
128. 454 b 6 ff. 129. Phdo. 101 e; 90 c.
130. Phil.17a. 131. Lysis 216a.
132. Phdo. 90 c; 96 c f.
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The principle of antilogy is that the tlafo partners develop^ their
principles in opposition to one another, or that two speeches produced
by the same man should be as contray as possible. Socrates distinguishes
133antilogy from dialectic in the Meno in the following way. (Socrates
defines shape in terms of colour; Meno asks him to define colour).
Socrates points out that in strict antilogy it is the oppoent who is required 
to define colour; but in dialectic, the two opponents work together through 
the admissions of the answerer. In such a case, if Meno accepts or knows a 
meaning for colour, Socrates is not required to define it. But Meno gives 
himself away as an eristic, when he presses his question: "what is colour".
All this does not prevent Socrates from producing two opposed arguments 
about the teachability of virtue later in the Meno, or the whole set of 
opposed arguments in the Lysis. But his check on this tendency of his 
is to find a true science of argument. Another check is the seriousness 
of the conversation. If Socrates swere practising antilogy it would be open 
to him to refrain from using words like 'understanding' and 'not understanding': 
presumably because antilogy is only an exercise. But no conversation can be
135M d  on such terms, because in conversation we must use such words and concepts.
As a serious man, Socrates must continue to use them. The difference between 
antilogy the method, and the 'realm' of conversation is a strong one, though 
conversation may use antilogy for its own purposes.
Antilogy then is a method of making strange things happen in an argument; 
but the philosopher tries to explain why the strange things have happened.
The science responsible for antilogy is not a science of mere tricks that can 
be learned: something more important is at stake. But the anly way that the 
philosopher can examine the nature of antilogy is by summoning the resources 
of a conversationalist - who is assured of, say, the cooperation of his 
interlocutor, and of plain committments to certain beliefs that are not to
133. 75 b 7 - 76 a 8.
134. 76 a 8 f.
135. Theæt. 196 d 10 - 197 a 5; Cap.Iv.
be surrendered easily.
Now who forced the development of antilogy the method? The most
likely answer is Plato himself - in 'antilogy' and 'conversation' he
had found a creative tension; which he kept : up by developing both to
more adequate levels.
In the Theætetus example, about the romission of "understanding"
and "not understanding", it is arguable that there were eristics who did
exclude the use of these words from conversation - as Lycophron may have
136excluded the parts of the verb 'to be'. But I suggest the above
explanation would in any case be sufficient. The power of conversation
is being invoked to correct the faults of antilogy. Antilogy itself is
mere inference. Conversation holds the power of the arche; and so a defeat
for the better side in the antilogical matter of deduction is the fault
of the argument, not of the better side to which ewe remain committed.
But antilogy forces us to purify our premises. So in the Theætetus we
stick to 'understanding' and 'not understanding'.
Dialectical investigations also "discover" one the distinctive marks
a 'sophist' - his interest in 'likeness'. The process of 'discovery' begins
137at Phædo 74 d and Lysjjfis 215 c f. add issues inf^oice of Zeno as arche­
type at Phædrus 261 d 6 ff.
We have reviewed the main occurrences of the words antilogic and eristic 
138in Plato. All of it has been adapted to the dialectical situation.
In the 'Euthydemus' we are given a picture of a flesh and blood eristic
who uses the method of dialectic, whereas we have discounted the possibility
of such a monster. But if we look more closely we find that Euthydemus is
139more an imitator of Socrates in this respect than vice versa.
Euthydemus has only recently come by his wisdom (272 b 7 f) and such
136. DK 83 A2; Guthrie III (i) 216 f.
137. cf. Rp.454 c 8 f; Soph 231 a 7: 235 e 3 f; Pol. 285 a 6; 285e.
138. see Thompson's. Meno p.278; 280. Excursus V.
139. Gulley 1968. p.28,
wisdom is bringing philosophy lately into contempt (304 d f). It is 
assumed that philosophy is about arete (273 d 8), s-eparate from rhetoric 
(273 c 8), and proceeds by question and answer. Kleinias is practised in 
it (275 a). None of these elements are the innovation of Euthydemus.
What he brings to the method is his peculiar experience as a former teacher of 
the military art (273 c) and a writer of speeches for the law court; the 
latest fashion is conversation and their boast is -  ^ _
b /  -fo T i X ir  k A
H . '
Except for the boast, it seems clear
that the originator of Euthydemus' method must be Socrates himself, as
Sidgwick saw;^^^ since there is no one else we know of whom he could have
been imitating. It is, of course, that we owe the dialectical mould in
the account of Euthydemus only to Plato, who pours into it the writings 
or philosophy of Euthydemus. We have already analysed the 'Euthydemus* 
as a com/die à clef: each mistake is provided for by the Platonic dialectic 
proper (cap.II).
Additional Note: Little of this is affected by Prof. Sprague's publication
of twenty-three reports of Euthydemus' teaching.Against Grote, she 
argues that the Sophist was historical (Rhet. 1401 a 26; Soph El. 177 b 12; 
Xenophon III (i)). Diels omitted him, she says, because "in common with 
many historians of ancient thought he underestimated the eristical side of 
sophistry." Prof.Sprague credits Euthydemus with an abundance of puzzles, 
on a false principle - that most of the difficulties raised in the 
'Euthydemus' are quotations from his oeuvre. But the fact that Aristotle 
takes up many of them in the Soph. El. is no argument that he found them 
in Euthydemus' own remains: for the Platonic quotations in the Soph.El. come
140. Journal of Philology vol.IV 298.
141. Sprague R.K., The Older Sophists 1972 p.294-301.
thick and fast. Ignoring for the moment the fragments she resurrects on 
these principles we are left with:
Euthyd. 276 d ff. (S.6) Rhet. 1401 a 29.
299 B ff. (S.14) Rhet. 1401 a 32.
(S.20) Rhet. 1401 a 26. Soph.177 b 12.
S.20 is attributed by name to Euthydemus, but what it means is difidcult 
to work out (142).
Again we get old dressed in the latest fashion; but this
dialectical fashion, absent from Twofold Statements, has added nothing to 
the strength of the arguments (S20 cf Dissoi Logoi V (5); S 15 cf Dissoi 
Logoi II, 13i Euthyd. 300 A ff; Euthyd. 276 d ff, S.6, Dissoi Logoi).
Prof.Sprague seems to think that Plato sticks closer to the "text" of
Euthydemus in his comedy of that name than be proved for any other
dialogue in a similar situation. She neglects to consider how much the work
is concerned metaphysical concerns of Plato's own. A : list of parallels 
binding the 'Euthydemus' to the later dialogue can be found in Shorey.^^^ 
Prof.Sprague shown elsewhere the relevance of parts of the Euthydemus to 
criticisms of the theory of Forms.144 These may have been objections 
raised specifically against the theory of Forms : but they may simply be 
tricks of argument, philosophical difficulties arising, say, out of 
Parmenides, which are adapted by Plato for his own use. It is difficult 
to imagine that Euthydemus can be quite like Plato's description of him and 
at the same time be a critic of the Theory of Forms.
142. COpe-Sandys ad loc; 1877.
143. Unity of Plato's Thought 1903 p.76.
144. Sprague R.K. Phronesis 196 pp.91-98.
VWe now consider two jpostmPlatonic sources: Isocrates and Aristotle. 
Burnet suggests that the Eristics were Megarians: but he bases his 
proof on a reading of Isocrates* Helen that aism the work against Socrates 
Antisthenes and the M e g a r i a n s F o r  it contains references to people who
spend their time in disputes which Burnet takes as technical for Megarians
(Soph.216 b 8). We add the contra Sophistas.
(a) The dating is not firmly fixed. Doddsaccepts 390 or the contra 
Sophistas. Sometime between 390-380 has been suggested for the Helen.
(b) Even if an early dating is accepted, the Isocratean texts do not tell 
us much about ^ t  a
Only in respect of fee taking are they obviously separate from Plato and
Socrates. For Isocartes is outraged that they charge so little for making 
a man good, may almost immortal (Soph.3-4). The passage ends with the 
Socratic warcry:
countered by y ^
Something of Socratic method is know:jmikrologia (8), doxa, episteeme 
)8); virtue, temperance, happiness, immortality - but no evidence of 
eristic in the sense of captions discussions (captioHs to a philosopher, 
not to a plain ma.n), (20) answers ^
(4) and is merely dispraaging: it is wrong to rely on words as opposed
to deeds. The following passage does not refer to eristics:
145. Greek Philosophy 139; 189
146. DoddGorgias p.27.
147: Mathieu and Brenon Bude 1956 p.160.
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(i) is the philosopher/plain man contrast not eristic/dialectic.
(ii)refers to ethical beliefs - immortality, making people better 
(not pace Ryle to Protagoras^^^). These people are Socratics.
(c) In the Helena, Socrates divides his enemies into three groups 
- (I) those who say there is no contradiction etc. (II) those who say 
virtue is knowledge (III) eristics#
(i) The translation of (C) is difficult. Either it refers to teachers 
and their pupils, or speakers and their audiences.
’iodise (51 A :
suits'
Nor * ennuyer * Bude. Either "make difficulties in discussion for their 
interlocutors cf Rp.505; Parm. 137b? Phil 14 d 10; or connected with
- difficulty, studium, philosophy, referring to the sort 
of difficulty Protagoras* written works arouse in discussion (Cratylus 391 BC; 
Euthyd 286 BC; Theæt 152 a - the last two discussions of a philosophical
work), cf ^ ^  (2).
“Co fT^ iérîV
does not exclude (I), (II). All philosophers are scrambled together; and
their degeneracy is a sign of the times, like degeneracy in rhetoric. It
all stems from ^ (4; 1; 8). But money making
is the only possible motive ( 6 answering an unspoken objection/. 
148. Ryle Plato*s Progress p.113.
J / f  ^
There are no records of Socratic fortunes, and the Contra Sophistas 
complains about the low level of Socratic earnings though the sums he 
mentions are high. The Cynics seems to be poor on principle. It is 
possible that the Helen is not entirely serious? It is dangerous to 
take history from a satirical tour de force.
(iii) The references to antilogic and dialectic in the Antidosis^^^ 
are quite obviously to Plato though the same vocabulary is used and 
fundamentally the same points made. The Antidosis meets the position of 
the Republic.
Now supposing some Socratics Used Eleatic doctrine to further their 
master * s teaching 1 - why should we not condemn Plato as an eristic for
doing the same thing? Isocrates cannot be used to prove that Eristics 
are a frivolous group who throw spanners in the works; or to prove that a 
conversational art of disputation was taught, if not by Plato. îT^ ;f»crates 
distinguishes the eristical mode of instruction from the obvious alternative 
candidate, Protagoras.
There are two main ways of connecting Aristotle*s dialectic to Plato*s 
to prove the priority of dialectic to Socrates. The first is Lee*s^^^ 
contention that Aristotle*s massive array of puzzles and ploys in the
Topics must have been the result of a widespread practice of "disputation".
151 152The second way is that followed by Ryle and Moraux , who try to prove 
the thesis from the method of dialectic. For Lee the method does not seem 
to be as important as the sort of puzzle it dealt with and it follows that 
he does not require the puzzle makers to be dialecticians.
But Aristotle does not seem to have inspected a large corpus of 
"eristical" works before coming to empirical conclusions about them. A list
150. Zeno of Elea p.113 ff. 1936.
151. Ryle 1966.
152. Moraux, P. La joute dialectique, Symp.Arist.1968 p.277-311.
of the named sources^^^ in the Topics provides no surprises: Melissus^^^ 
is there, but less frequently than Heracleitus . Speusippus and Xenocrates 
are f r e q u e n t t h a n  is a reference to a dialogue by Kleophon,^^^ and to the 
grammarians Prodicus^^^ and as a grammarian P ro t agorasbut the vast 
majority of references are to P l a t o . W h a t  is left is no more than ewe 
would expect from Twofold Statements.Some of the puzzles look as if 
they have originators - for example the Ethiopian's teeth; but not many are 
outside the Academic gamut.
Second, Aristotle's method is wholly Plato's. Even the distinction he
draws between the dialectician and the philosopher developes out of Plato :
because when Plato talks about the perfect dialectician, he implies that the
dialectician must be a philosopher first, and express this in dialectic.
The analysis of motive and passion in an interlocutor we saw in Cap.1 is
as much part of Plato's dialectic as of the roue of arguments, Aristotle.
Sometimes he repeats Plato's instructions, for example about looking ahead
in the argument^^^. For this feature the technical terms appears to be
which he has inherited from P l a t o . T h e  notion of
is so entrenched that it becomes formulaic - defined as an interlocutor
who refuses to give an answer when the relation between question and answer
falls into one of the categories distinguished as automatic by Aristotle.
A show of "intractability" is unnecessary.Memory plays the role we
167
noticed in Cap.III.
153. During, I. Aristotle's use of examples in 
1968 pp.202-229 p.211f.
the Topics. Symp.Arist.
-54. 167 b 13-20.
155. 1599 b 30; 160 b 19; 104 b 21.
156. During op.cit. p.213.
157. 174 b 27.
158. 112 b 22.
159. 173 b 19.
160. For the possible reference to Euthydemus, vide supra.
161. For division; addition; syllables, change of accents, etc. Dissoi
Logoi V (10) ff.
162. 167 a 10 f.
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In fact the unscrupulousness that figures so large in Aristotle's 
description is much of it good Platonic practice. The advice to ask the 
first questions laèt to most people, after having won their acceptance, 
but first to the bad tempered and the practised answerer is not far in 
spirit from the decision to reduce Hippias through an intermediary, the 
imaginary interlocUfe©^ or from the examination in depth of Thrasymachus and 
Protagoras (Cap.I). The concealment that Aristotle envisages is used 
to ensure that argument i.e. inference of some sort,is possible in various
I 1
situations in which it is often interrupted e.g. by mere character
(156 a 8; 157 a 6). When Aristotle talks about "dialectic" he does not
mean just the exercise, carried out at a high level free from distraction;
but also conversation with undialectical people, who require careful
handling. They young and the training should not enter into disputes with
the untrained because they will not 'handle' them properly.Some of
the advice is Platonic school practice, adopted for an amalgam of reasons
but not contentious in purpose. In the sober democracy of modern logic
the practices might look dubus but, as they aim to instruct or persuade,
they are felt to be justified. At 156 b 25 Aristotle says that answerers
concede points more readily if they think you are not serious. It sounds
dreadful when Aristotle says it; but when it happens in the Philebus, it is 
169merely graceful. In fact, the Topics can be taken as a commentary on 
the dialogues with special reference to why Plato does not pursue a straight 
logical line. This has little to do with Elea.
What is laid bare by Aristotle's analysis is the effort to get the 
argument, whatever it is, as fer as possible along its deductive course. 
Different situations allow different lengths of argument chains of varying 
strength. Thus if I am teaching myself and my partner to consider "inference"
168. Top. 164 b 14; 157 a 18 ff.
169. Phil. 30 e 6 f cf. Top. 159 a 12 f.
170a. cf. Owen 1968 p.106-7.
then I accept a hypothesis I do not believe, and accept to^the "consequences"
that other people think follow from it. It is only gradually that I
develope a power of discriminating consequences. This is the cooperative
point of the rules Aristotle lays down for the "answerer in training"
which is an area for which he expressly says no rules had hitherto been
introduced. The effect is to make the answering of questions automatic,
and thence more "deductive" in app^arnce. The tension between the arbitrary
(e.g. the psychological) and the automatic leaves the method unsatisfactory
but an advance in both departments, towards the maximum truth content
possible in the (empirical) circumstances.
So when we come to Ryle and Moraux we wonder whether the atmosphere
is quite right. A "tournament" does develope, but its rules tend to the
purification of argument, not to wringing victory out of the jaws of Error.
The yes-or-no answer, for example, is a way of ensuring a chain of statements
i.e. a sort of deduction.Ryle has given us a picture of a purely formal
4^xercise with Niederschlage ^howing that the exercise of dialectic preceded
the conversations of Socrates; or rather that Socrates^conversations were
172"rule governed concatenations of questions." He suggests contests had
a time limit but the evidence^^^ suggested is woefully inadequate.
It was a boast of Plato's that the philosophical life and philosophical
discussion did not run to the clock. This freedom from time produced a
more generous s p i r i t . B u t  it followed too that an argument was never
finished, because it was all part of one argument. The meeting broke up
only because Socrates or someone had to l e a v e . S u c h  is the ideal life,
totally devoted to the one argument of philosophy. When Socrates is asked
to explain his whole system in five minutes he refuses and adopts arguments
177to the limited tasks in hand. The correct length for discussions become
170. 159 a 32 ff. 171. 158 a 17 f.
172. Ryle 1966 p.119. 173. op.cit.p.105; Moraux p.285 n 3.
174. Top. 158 a 25 f; 161 a 9f; 183 a 25 f.
175. Theæt. 172 b 5; 154 e 8; 187 d.
176. Euthyphro 15 e 3 f; Laches 201 c 4; Lysis 223 a 2 f; Prtgs. 362 a 2. etc,
177. Meno 76 a 10; Theæt 183 c 5; Rp.504 c 9; 533 a; Mitic.* - 277 b 5. etc.
a matter of concern for Plato and the discussions themselves become longer
and longer. So when Aristotle says it is possible to address one's
conclusions to the time (183 a 25) or that blaming the time is sophistical
(161 a 10) we must put the remarks into context (159 a 9). We have dealt
earlier with some of Ryle's arguments for audience participation; the argu-
178ments Moraux finds for this in Aristotle are not much better. For when
Aristotle warns against upholding an unpopular thesis ), he
distinguishes the two senses of unpopular - unaccepted (proposition), 
despised (character) - and it is true that a conversationalist must remember 
such pitfalls. It does not imply that audience - popularity was important;
any more than that audience judgement is important when it cannot recognise 
a valid conclusion put in the form of a question.Fine judges!
We are left with Ryle's primary questions:
1. What is there in dialectic to correspond to the rhetorical profession?
- There seems to be nothing. Aristotle did not survey the practice of a
profession in order to write the Topics ; but he created the 'space' for a
new science, partly parallel with rhetoric, partly generated from his
own definitions. Plato, he probably regarded certain sorts of
argument as eristical, even if they occurred in a speech or a song. He
also formulated Plato. For example 159 a 20 ff he says "The function of the
answerer is to make it seem that the impossible or paradoxical is not his
fault but due to ^thesis." If the questioner must mislead, then so must the
answerer - though this sets up a strange tension with the mechanical answer.
The answerer, as so often in Plato, must claim that he does not mean the
181words of the thesis, but something else. Aristotle considers this shift 
(in e.g. Thrasymachus) as psychologically likely.
178. op.cit. p.278 n.l: Top.160 b 21f.
179. Top. 158 a 8 f.
180. Ryle 1966 p.104.
181. cf 170 b 12.
182. op.cit. p.127.
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2. "What is the "concrete or so to speak, Wednesday evening activity of
182prceecuting dialectic"? . This is the most difficult question. The
emphasis is on training, and on not discussing real opinions. But what
leads to this formalisation is not the "competitive game" of question
and answer, but the increasing bkndlessness of the concepts a man was
üained in. There may be many possible replies to questions about justice;
but possible replies to questions about wholes, parts and ones are few in
number and in principle exhaustively classifiable, like a division.
Perhaps "training" consisted in the practice of the methods, though method
was not philosophy, which was kept as a reward. Lloyd has noticed that
Aristotle's examples of division come mainly from Plato's published work 
183... It is very difficult to get at what went on in the School of the 
A c a d e m y. P er h a p s the Platonic "Definitions" were discussed - but much 
of this is a digest of published work. Whatever the answer, it it unlikely 
that "eristical moots" were held as Ryle wants them. If they were held, 
they might have included rather a lot of ritual, deference and piety. But 
this weak possibility is no evidence at all that the method was in existence 
before Socrates, or even perhaps Plato.
182. op.cit p.127.
183. Lloyd G.E.R. Polarity and Analogy p.159.
183a. Levinson, Cherniss, Riddle of the Early Academy p.
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The obvious candidate for the discovery of dialectic is Socrates.
The answer of Sidgwick's^^^ was denied by Thompson^ ^'^  and Gomperz^^^ who
argued that Protagoras had a share. Burnet^^^ suggest the eristics were
187Megarian; and Taylor declares roundly "Euthydemus and his brother are
borrowing and degrading the logical method of Zeno. "Ryle's attempt to
found non-Socratic eristic fails; and there is little point in calling 
188Gulley's earlier method eristic.' But it is true that the method of 
dialecticcoriginated by Socrates has close connection with his own and 
the previous generation. However, our evidence is merely linguistic, and 
we cannot connect the origin of dialectic or of antilogy to any theory or 
theorist.
Antilogy and its accompanying metaphors of co^fighting and wrestling 
turn up in all sorts of palces at the end of the Fifth century - medical, 
comical, rhetorical and judicial. It is used as a byword for philosophical 
talk; but it refers simply to the talk and sometimes to the maintaining of 
contrary arguments by different or the same people. It is used in ethical 
contexts and in contexts relating to techne - it was itself a test of 
rhetorical ability. Something must have given the term a new lease of life;
and the philological facts seem to centre on Protagoras, not on Zeno. But
of method we can say nothing. Almost the same situation applies to fCoitcc
Gulley has suggested that Protagoras 
189used question and answer, but for dramatic purposes. Question and answei 
is a natural educational^judicial method. What is likely is that from the
183. Journal of Philology Vol.IV 298.
184. Meno 276 ff.
185. Sophistik und Rhetorik
186. Greek Philosophy 139; 189.
187. Taylor II p.92.
188. Philosophy of Socrates; p.26.
189. op.cit. 29, 32.
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beginning Socrates' required a different sort of answers from anybody else; 
and was therefore incomprehensible to his generation in terms of their own 
slogan
Methods there were for presenting opposed arguments. One of these
might have been the dialogue form itself, with which j^^Prodicus and
Hippias are credited. Thucydides, Melian dialogues are according to 
190Jaeger "a sophistic device which occurs nowhere else in his book, to
show the two opponents parrying argument by argument, question by answef^,.."
Wilamowitz is breathless over the possibility that the root form is the drama
(of opposing speeches). "Der Gorgias ist eine Tragodie; er ist gewissermassen
als Komplement zum Protagoras geschrieben; aber der Protagoras ist dann eine 
. 191Komodie." But Plato was always aware he was writing dialectic and
undoubtedly used the techniques of his time, among which is antilogy. Mastery
of antilogy was a proof that whatever it was Plato was writing was a science,
192though we can only guess at the sort of science. Romilly has given us
some idea of the rules of composition governing rhetorical opposed speeches,
using as a clues the correspondence of phrases and unlikely symmetries; but
she goes too far in attributing her method to Protagoras. Plato in his
maturity used a techne based on metaphysics and^îhe analysis of concepts to
give himself the mastery of antilogy that would support his claim to be as
scientific as any other tradesman in words. But it is unlikely that his
techne came straight from Elea; and more likely that it came from an analysis
of patterns of dialectic, which in turn led him to rethink Eleatic doctrines.
One is required to think behind the antilogy.
But having established a techne he was immediately in competition with
other technai and with the sophistic tradition of epideictic and protreptic 
193writing. In addition, there was the pressure of other Socratic dialogues, 
with their burden of social polemic and philosophical refinement, forcing the
190. Jaeger Paideia I 398 (Higher).
191. Platon 1948 92-4.
192. Histoire et Raisonjihez Thucydide 1966 p.180 ff,
193. Gaiser ~ passim.
Platonic conversations to differentiate themselves from their origins
and their cousins. Robin may not be right in claiming that Plato is the
first to use the dialogue form; but he must be right with so /ÿviny others
in generating the Socratic dialogue out of the Socratic activity -
192conversation, protreptic and example. Much of the Socratic activity 
was pos thumous.
But the assumptions of the conversational method Plato started with
seem to be plain. A mastery of arguments for and against incurs the
suspicion that you are an expert; Socrates denies he is an expert but
performs the trick. In an antilogy, both sides have a right to speak:
nothing is more natural than the Socratic injunction to "accept the
193outcome of my argument; or else develop one of your own." But his 
purpose, though it can be mistaken for antilogy, is the propounding of a 
philosophical difficulty - e.g. the search for universal definitions, in 
which many apparently antilogical set backs are met with. Similarly 
Socrates in the presence of Protagoras and Gorgias talks of (C^TA
^ - but all he really means is "conversation", 
the 'shortness' is there for philosophical purposes.
No restrictions are placed on the method of a conversation by most 
people. Each interlocutor brings skills to bear that he has learned 
outside conversation. Socrates, too, uses ethical and philosophical lore 
that he learns of outside conversation. But he insists that the discussion 
or debate should be in miniature as it were : ^ e  miniature has its own
qualities; and these specifically miniature qualities are analysed by Plato. 
The emphasis on non-technical, non-methodical language, the choice of 
ordinary words like y  ^ff ^
is a clue to Socrates' answer to our main question: though from the 
beginning he was a philosopher rather than an honest man, he thought some 
matters of philosophy were too important to be left for philosophical method.
l9z. Robin: Platon p.20; 22.
193. e.g. Gorgias 509 a 2; 461 e; Meno 75 d.
The problems had to be examined entire in every way for as long as it 
took to reach ... whatever it is one should reach. The index of his 
success at breaking down the limitation^of contemporary philosophical 
methods is the general failure of attempts to find historical origins 
for the Platonic dialectic.
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